Andrew Barg

The Crown appealed declarations of unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for robbery with a restricted or prohibited firearm (five years under s. 344(1)(a)(i)) and robbery with an ordinary firearm (four years under the former s. 344(1)(a.1)) of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that neither mandatory minimum constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, finding the offences narrowly defined, high in gravity and moral culpability, and the minimums not grossly disproportionate even in reasonably foreseeable cases.

The Court affirmed the two-stage framework from the companion case R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, and addressed the role of Indigeneity in the s. 12 analysis.

Karakatsanis and Jamal JJ. dissented, concluding both provisions were unconstitutional and should be struck down.

Two appellants were unlawfully detained by police under non-existent statutory authority after reporting their roommate's death, then later arrested for murder by a homicide detective who directed their continued questioning.

At issue were: the voluntariness of one appellant's confession, whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the murder arrests, and whether the confessions should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The majority dismissed the appeals, holding that one confession was voluntary, the arrests were lawful, and that although one confession was obtained in a manner connected to Charter breaches, admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals, finding the arrests were not supported by reasonable grounds and rejecting the 'fresh start' doctrine as a basis to sever the connection between Charter breaches and the evidence obtained.

Two appellants were convicted of sexual assault by the Court of Appeal for Alberta after having been acquitted at trial, where the trial judge had applied an impermissible principle of broad advance consent.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to address the scope of the complainant's consent and whether it was withdrawn, making the trial judge's credibility findings on subjective consent undeserving of deference.

The Court upheld the substituted convictions under s. 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code, finding the Cassidy test satisfied because the trial judge's explicit and implicit findings established both appellants continued sexual activity with the complainant after she cried out 'No' without taking steps to ascertain whether consent was withdrawn.

The Kienapple argument raised by one appellant was rejected as the offences involved different subsets of facts and addressed different forms of harm.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice after attending the complainant's home uninvited to discuss the process for withdrawing criminal harassment charges she had recently laid against him.

The trial judge found the appellant's conduct was wilful and constituted an attempt to dissuade the complainant from giving evidence by corrupt means.

A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and a majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The majority held that the record clearly supported the inference that the appellant applied pressure on the complainant to manipulate her into dropping the charges.

Côté J. dissented, finding no evidence that the appellant used threats, bribes, or other corrupt means as required by s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code.

Two accused were convicted at trial of second degree murder in the death of a child and the provincial appellate court substituted first degree murder convictions under the unlawful confinement provision.

The Court confirmed that an appeal as of right after a substituted guilty verdict is limited to legal questions tied to that substituted verdict, while challenges to the affirmed lesser convictions require leave.

It also confirmed the provincial appellate court had jurisdiction over the Crown appeals from acquittals on first degree murder and upheld the substituted first degree murder verdicts.

The Court held that unlawful confinement was established in the parent-child context and that confinement and murder formed part of the same transaction.