Sarah Rankin

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences after police obtained his IP addresses from a third-party payment processor without judicial authorization, then used a production order to compel the ISP to disclose subscriber information, and subsequently executed search warrants on residential premises.

The majority held that an IP address attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter because it is the crucial link between an Internet user and their online activity, capable of revealing biographical core information with or without a Spencer warrant.

The dissent held that IP addresses alone reveal only the user's ISP, not biographical core information, and that the police acted properly by obtaining a production order consistent with R. v. Spencer before accessing subscriber information.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Two appellants were unlawfully detained by police under non-existent statutory authority after reporting their roommate's death, then later arrested for murder by a homicide detective who directed their continued questioning.

At issue were: the voluntariness of one appellant's confession, whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the murder arrests, and whether the confessions should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The majority dismissed the appeals, holding that one confession was voluntary, the arrests were lawful, and that although one confession was obtained in a manner connected to Charter breaches, admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals, finding the arrests were not supported by reasonable grounds and rejecting the 'fresh start' doctrine as a basis to sever the connection between Charter breaches and the evidence obtained.