Seta Linda Boyadjian

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Bennington Financial Corp. against 2724112 Ontario Inc. and Christopher Graham for amounts owing under a commercial equipment lease.

The court found that the defendants' defences were fully answered by the plaintiff's evidence, including admissions of payment and execution of the lease, and that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court reserved on interest and costs, inviting written submissions.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for the recovery of a deposit paid under an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS).

The plaintiff, Michael Asumeng, failed to secure financing by the closing date, leading to the termination of the APS by Cachet Estate Homes (Orangeville) Inc. and forfeiture of his $43,826.19 deposit.

The court found no valid cause of action against the individual defendant, Marilyn Rendine, an employee of Cachet Orangeville.

The court determined that Cachet Orangeville acted in good faith, properly terminating the APS and retaining the deposit due to the purchaser's repeated breaches.

Summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claim and awarding costs to the defendants.

This decision addresses the costs of a summary judgment motion brought by the Law Society of Ontario against Rosemary Cremer, which Cremer successfully defended.

The Law Society did not dispute Cremer's entitlement to costs but argued for a partial indemnity basis and a lower amount.

The court found that the Law Society's motion, though unsuccessful, was not unreasonable and did not warrant punitive costs.

While Cremer claimed $55,778.43 in partial indemnity costs, the court deemed this excessive and disproportionate to a focused summary judgment motion, noting that counsel's extensive time expenditure might be more relevant to the trial on the merits.

The court awarded Cremer $46,000 in partial indemnity costs, all inclusive.

The plaintiff sued the Law Society of Ontario for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, negligence, misfeasance in public office, and infliction of mental injury.

The Law Society moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act, or constituted an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the Law Society's motion, finding that the plaintiff's claims were not statute-barred, as the limitation period did not begin until her beneficial ownership of funds was confirmed by court order.

The court also found genuine issues requiring trial regarding statutory immunity and declined to strike portions of the claim as an abuse of process.