Stepan Juzkiw

The landlord brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of eviction and quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order.

The tenant had previously consented to an eviction order, which he appealed and had quashed.

He then sought a review of the consent order, which was dismissed, and appealed that review order.

The Divisional Court found the appeal raised no question of law, was devoid of merit, and constituted an abuse of process aimed solely at delaying eviction.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and the tenant was ordered to pay costs.

This costs endorsement followed a motion where the Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Statement of Claim, a motion unopposed by the Defendants except on the issue of costs.

The Defendants sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis, while the Plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs.

The court found that the Plaintiffs' conduct, characterized by delay and inadvertence, caused the Defendants to incur unnecessary costs, but did not warrant substantial indemnity.

The Master determined that the Defendants' claimed hours and quantum were disproportionate given the nature of the amendments.

Ultimately, the Plaintiffs were ordered to pay fixed costs of $7,000 to the Defendants.

The applicants brought a motion to enforce Minutes of Settlement and a consent order requiring the respondents to pay $259,570.38.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to set aside the settlement and orders, arguing they were induced to settle by a material misrepresentation regarding whether one of the applicants was a lessee of the business premises.

The court found no misrepresentation occurred, and even if it had, it was not material to the settlement.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, found the respondents in breach of the settlement, and ordered them to pay the settlement funds plus interest and costs.

The respondent brought a motion seeking full authority to conduct the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home, alleging the applicant was unreasonably stalling the process.

The court declined to grant the respondent sole control over the sale, noting a lack of independent professional evidence regarding the appropriate listing price.

However, recognizing the high-conflict nature of the case, the court imposed strict terms and timelines for obtaining appraisals, listing the property, and responding to offers.

The court also permitted the respondent to proceed with an access motion separately from the support issues.

No costs were awarded due to divided success and the unreasonable behaviour of both parties.

This endorsement addresses costs for two motions heard on October 22, 2019.

The Regional Municipality of Peel and Bi-Views Building Service Ltd. sought costs, while the plaintiff Aparna Sanwalka also claimed costs.

The court found Peel and Bi-View to be the more successful parties, particularly regarding the dismissal of Ms. Sanwalka's motion for examination for discovery accommodations and the necessity of Peel's motion to advance the action.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis to Peel ($2,500) and Bi-View ($750), payable by Aparna Sanwalka.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for damages arising from mould in their residential unit.

During the litigation, both sides brought procedural motions.

The defendants sought further disclosure and to schedule continued examinations for discovery, which was largely resolved on consent.

The plaintiff, Aparna Sanwalka, sought accommodations for her continued examination for discovery due to alleged mental health conditions, including receiving questions 48 hours in advance.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for accommodations, finding insufficient medical evidence to justify departing from the standard oral examination format under Rule 31.02.

The plaintiff successfully moved to set aside a registrar's dismissal order and sought costs of $7,680 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff was granted an indulgence and each party should bear their own costs.

The court found that while the plaintiff received an indulgence, the defendant unreasonably opposed the motion on the basis of prejudice that was caused by its own lack of diligence.

The court awarded the plaintiff reduced costs of $500, noting that much of the time claimed was unsubstantiated or for steps the plaintiff would have had to take regardless of the defendant's opposition.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's dismissal for delay under Rule 48.14.

The court applied a contextual analysis, considering the Reid factors (length of delay, explanation, inadvertence, promptness, prejudice) as affirmed by H.B. Fuller Company.

The court found the delay was not inordinate or unexplained, noting contributions to delay from both parties and the plaintiff's ongoing intent to pursue the action.

It also found no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant, attributing alleged prejudice (lost documents, audio recordings, witness contact) to the defendant's own lack of diligence in preserving evidence and complying with rules.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order set aside, and a new timetable for remaining steps was ordered.

The court rendered a costs decision following a successful motion by the defendant to terminate a temporary injunction.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, while the plaintiff argued for costs in the cause or on an actual indemnity basis.

The court found the defendant to be the successful party and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the defendant's request for substantial indemnity due to over-resourcing and animosity in submissions.

The court also declined to award costs personally against the plaintiff's counsel, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

Costs were fixed at $17,263.01, payable by the plaintiff to the defendant within 30 days.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order that found the respondent had not breached a settlement agreement regarding a judgment debt.

The appellant argued the deputy judge lacked jurisdiction, unreasonably denied a mid-hearing adjournment request, and erred in finding no breach.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Small Claims Court has province-wide jurisdiction, the refusal of the adjournment was a proper exercise of discretion, and there was no error in the finding that the settlement agreement remained binding.

The plaintiff sought to continue a temporary injunction preventing the defendant from restricting access to a water well on the defendant's property, which supplied water to the plaintiff's adjacent property.

The defendant brought a cross-motion to prohibit the plaintiff's entry, declare no easement right, and set aside the injunction.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald and R. v. CBC tests for injunctions, specifically focusing on the "strong prima facie case" criterion.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a strong prima facie case for an implied easement of accommodation or an easement based on common intention, primarily because the requested easement would require positive acts of maintenance and expense from the defendant, which cannot form the subject matter of an easement without privity of contract.

Consequently, the temporary injunction was terminated.

The appellant builder appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking its claim for $11,300 against the respondent purchasers for the construction of a deck.

The motion judge found an irreconcilable ambiguity in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale regarding whether the deck was included in the purchase price and applied the doctrine of contra proferentem against the builder.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract and denying the appellant's request to adduce fresh evidence.

The plaintiff, Shelly Wine, brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order setting aside a default judgment against two defendants, Houman Mahadjeri and Rayvin Teena Squires.

The motion judge had set aside the default judgment on terms, including payment of costs thrown away.

The plaintiff argued the motion judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of counsel retention and failed to address the defendants' delay, leading to prejudice.

The court applied the two-part test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b), which requires "good reason to doubt the correctness" of the order and that the appeal involves "matters of such importance." The court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which had properly considered the five factors for setting aside default judgment as outlined in Mountain View Farms Ltd. v McQueen.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.