ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

Court File No.: 111/11
Date: 20120703

BETWEEN

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Applicant

— and —

EMILIUS MARGARETA MARCUS MENNES (aka Emile M.M. Mennes)

Respondent

Counsel:

Ms. Ayesha Laldin, Counsel for the Applicant
Mr. Emilius Mennes, self represented

Heard: February 10 and March 12, 2012

H.K. O’Connell J.

RULING ON VEXATIOUS LITIGANT APPLICATION

Thumbnail Sketch of the Procedural Overview on this Motion

[ 1 ] The Attorney General of Canada served its notice of application on the respondent, Emilius Mennes, on January 12, 2012. The application itself was issued at Cobourg on November 15, 2011.The application is inclusive of an 11 volume application record. The relief sought by the Attorney General of Canada seeks to have the court find Mr. Mennes to be a vexatious litigant, pursuant to section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (CJA). The Crown also relied upon a factum and book of authorities.

[ 2 ] The matter was returnable at Cobourg on February 10, 2012. An intervening event occurred on February 07, 2012, namely the filing by Mr. Mennes, on short notice, of a document entitled “Factum of the respondent on preliminary objection to hearing of application.”

[ 3 ] The matter proceeded on February 10, 2012 by way of the Crown’s submissions in respect of their motion. I dealt with Mr. Mennes preliminary objection and ordered that the application of the Attorney General could proceed. There was simply no principled basis not to proceed. I underscore that Mr. Mennes was served in a timely manner with the Crown’s originating application, and supporting material. In addition I concurred with Mr. Mennes that he should be given additional time to respond, as a simple courtesy to him.

[ 4 ] After hearing Ms. Laldin’s submissions, premised on her comprehensive factum, application record and with resort to the affidavit within the application record, and having denied Mr. Mennes recourse to cross examination of the affiant, I then remanded the matter to March 12, 2012 for Mr. Mennes’ response. This adjournment, over the objection of the Crown, gave Mr. Mennes another 30 days to prepare his response. The adjournment also ensured that Mr. Mennes could digest the Crown’s position and fully consider the materials that the Crown placed reliance upon.

[ 5 ] Subsequent to February 10, 2012, on February 14, 2012 I received a letter from Mr. Mennes, inadvertently addressed to the Honourable Mr. Justice Hugh M O’Connell, wherein he set out a complaint that he had addressed to the Canadian Judicial Council, and the Chief Justice of Ontario, amongst others, asking me to recuse myself from the proceedings because of bias.

[ 6 ] In his letter of February 14, 2012, Mr. Mennes requests my recusal, failing which he advised:

“1) I take no further position on the application, without prejudice to me and my full, intended response in full opposition thereto; and 2) I will take my case to the Court of Appeal for Ontario against Your Honour’s conduct towards me, which I will do immediately upon receiving your honour’s judgment based on Ms. Laldin’s purported case alone, also without prejudice to me as to my full, intended response in full opposition to the application.”

[ 7 ] On the return date of March 12, 2012 I dealt with the recusal request and provided oral reasons as to why there was no basis for me to recuse.

[ 8 ] Mr. Mennes advised that he was not going to participate in the proceedings. He was taking the position that he set out in his letter of February 14, 2012. I gave Mr. Mennes ample opportunity to respond to the Crown’s position. In that regard the matter was addressed on a few occasions and held down to the luncheon hour for the opportunity for Mr. Mennes to make response. He refused to respond and took the position that the court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter.

[ 9 ] The matter concluded and I reserved my decision.

[ 10 ] As a consequence the Crown’s application, at the choice of Mr. Mennes, is absent his input on the relief sought by the Crown although it is clear from his preliminary objection, noted above, that he does not agree with the Crown’s position.

[ 11 ] For the reasons that follow the Crown’s application is granted. Mr. Mennes is declared a vexatious litigant.

Mr. Mennes’ History

[ 12 ] To commence, Mr. Mennes was declared a dangerous offender on November 13, 1996. He is a pedophile. His indeterminate sentence was meted out for sexual assaults that he perpetrated on two 8 year old boys. He is currently housed at Warkworth Institution.

[ 13 ] In December 10, 2004 Mr. Mennes was declared a vexatious litigant by the Federal Court, in accordance with s 40(1) of the Federal Court Act . That Court ordered that Mr. Mennes not institute further proceedings or continue existing proceedings at the Federal Court without leave of the Court. The declaration was upheld by the Federal Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed.

[ 14 ] Post vexatious litigant status in the Federal Court, Mr. Mennes shifted his focus to the Ontario Superior Court. There was, to be clear, no prohibition upon him doing so. Some 14 proceedings have been launched. Of these 12 were applications and 2 were actions commenced in the Small Claims court.

[ 15 ] Seven appeals have been undertaken to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. Four of those were dismissed; two were abandoned, and one appeal is currently before that court, but not yet listed for hearing. [1]

This Application

[ 16 ] The Crown relies upon the comprehensive affidavit of Ms. Glynis Evans, counsel with the Department of Justice Canada, with respect to Mr. Mennes and his involvement with the courts. That affidavit was described by me on February 10, 2012 as essentially a chronological recitation of the proceedings before the Superior Court of Justice, with some reference to the Federal Court proceedings, in particular the reasons of Madam Justice Layden-Stephenson. The material includes other documents germane to Mr. Mennes.

[ 17 ] The affidavit traces in a completely accurate and succinct fashion the proceedings involving Mr. Mennes.

[ 18 ] A visitation of the contents of Ms. Evans’ affidavit, juxtaposed with the application record, and the factum of the Crown, makes plain that Mr. Mennes is a very active, savvy and tenacious litigant. The question for this court is whether his activity should author the portrait of a vexatious litigant. In short, has Mr. Mennes persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner?

Legal Principles: Section 140 of the CJA and the Law

Section 140 of the CJA reads:

140(1) Where a judge of the Superior Court of Justice is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently and without reasonable grounds,

(a) instituted vexatious proceedings in any court; or

(b) conducted a proceeding in any court in a vexatious manner, the judge may order that,

(c) no further proceeding be instituted by the person in any court; or

(d) a proceeding previously instituted by the person in any court not be continued,

except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

R.S.O.1990, c. C.43, s. 140(1) ; 1996, c. 25, s. 9 (17).

(5) Nothing in this section limits the authority of a court to stay or dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process or on any other ground. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140 (4,5).

[ 19 ] The judgment of Henry J. in Re Lang Michener and Fabian , (1987) 1987 172 (ON SC) , 59 O.R. (2d) 353 is particularly instructive. Henry J. at para.19, after considering a number of decisions, stated as follows:

From these decisions the following principles may be extracted:

(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;

(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;

(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;

(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;

(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;

(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;

(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.

[ 20 ] This list is not exhaustive. It is, however, a template of many of the considerations that a court is required to consider in assessing the application of section 140 of the CJA .

[ 21 ] In addition, the Crown referenced other cases where the court has declared a party to be a vexatious litigant.

[ 22 ] I will trace the headings that the Crown relies upon in seeking the declaration that Mr. Mennes is a vexatious litigant. I will comment within each heading as I think appropriate. At the conclusion of reference to the headings, I will sum up my findings.

The Effect of the Federal Court Ruling

[ 23 ] I can take into account the fact that the Federal Court has marked Mr. Mennes as a vexatious litigant. To be sure, it is plain and obvious that the declaration as issued by the Federal Court does not dovetail into a finding that Mr. Mennes is a vexatious litigant before the Superior Court. Nor does the Crown suggest that is the case.

[ 24 ] However, what is apparent is that the pattern of conduct of Mr. Mennes before the Federal Court has now manifested itself in the Superior Court. He acts apparently on whim, albeit in a concerted manner, but without a chance of success and with a persistency that is devoid of merit.

[ 25 ] It is clear that having been declared a vexatious litigant in Federal Court, that Mr. Mennes trained his litigation cannon at the Superior Court.

Proceedings that have no Chance of Success

[ 26 ] Mr. Mennes has met with no success in his various applications. In relation to habeas corpus relief, there have now been 9 such applications since 2003. Four of those were dismissed by the court; 5 others were abandoned by Mr. Mennes.

[ 27 ] None of his applications have been properly constituted. They all have sought to challenge his convictions and sentence. They do not deal with his liberty interests.

[ 28 ] Mr. Mennes is not a litigant without legal acumen. He has cited the leading case of May v. Ferndale [2005] SCC 82 in many of his materials, in relation to habeas corpus and inmates. And yet he continues to seek the relief when it is not available.

[ 29 ] His is not a simple litigation effort, tenaciously applied and reasonably constituted. Rather I find that the commentary of Justice Layden-Stephenson in her judgment, now in excess of 7 years old, continues to be apposite with respect to Mr. Mennes, today:

Thus far, he has exhibited an incapacity to discriminate between what is reasonable and what is not with respect to both his underlying complaints and his requested relief.

Habeas Corpus as an improper venue to attack conviction and sentence

[ 30 ] In addition, Mr. Mennes has in three of his files, sought to invoke the writ of habeas corpus to attempt to find relief from his convictions and sentence. His campaign is driven to some degree by his belief that the gospel countenances sexual relations with children. Clearly his basis for habeas corpus relief are bereft of legitimacy. In addition, Mr. Mennes finds it appropriate to constitute legal proceedings then abandon same, only to attempt to resurrect his claims. I refer here to his habeas corpus applications involving illegitimate attempts to challenge his conviction and indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, premised on his pedophilia.

Habeas Corpus with no Foundation in a deprivation of liberty interest

[ 31 ] Mr. Mennes has authored four applications seeking orders compelling Correction Services Canada to do certain things. The Superior Court has entertained those applications.

[ 32 ] None have met with success. In one particular case, the Court of Appeal noted that Mr. Mennes’ litigation in relation to Kingston Penitentiary, a place of residency that was no longer his, was “no more than an attempt by the applicant to use habeas corpus to avoid the vexatious litigant order in the Federal Court. It is an abuse of process…” [2]

[ 33 ] It is clear that Mr. Mennes continued, post this commentary by the Court of Appeal, to use habeas corpus to avoid the vexatious litigant order of the Federal Court.

[ 34 ] His various applications were devoid of merit. Mr. Mennes appears to have abandoned two of the applications on the sole basis that the Attorney General of Canada was seeking dismissals on the grounds of abuse of process.

[ 35 ] In short, Mr. Mennes knows the parameters of the applications he is seeking. He is not simply a misguided litigant, ignorant of the process and otherwise properly and sincerely before the court.

Other Proceedings Devoid of Merit

[ 36 ] Mr. Mennes commenced an action in Small Claims court against the Attorney General of Canada. He lost after a three day trial, involving various novel causes of action. Not satisfied, and instead of appealing, Mr. Mennes brought an application before the Divisional Court naming the Small Claims Court Deputy judge as the respondent. His claim: that his application for recusal should have been granted by the Deputy Judge.

[ 37 ] In a not surprising endorsement, McDermot J. dismissed the application noting that, it is “in essence, nothing other than an appeal of the Deputy Judge’s decision not to recuse himself from the hearing of the trial of the matter.” Justice McDermot noted that the motive of Mr. Mennes in proceeding as he did was so that he could name the Deputy Judge as the respondent. Justice McDermot held that the application was an abuse of process, premised on a collateral attack on the decision of the deputy judge.

[ 38 ] Mr. Mennes has also commenced three applications against Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) officials, for criminal contempt of court. None had any merit.

The Seeking of Bizarre Relief

[ 39 ] Mr. Mennes has sought relief that is not within the jurisdiction of the court. I refer here to claims in court file # 35/11 that his criminal proceedings were in violation of the “laws of God”, that he be released a the expense of HMQ Canada and be put up in a downtown Toronto hotel; inclusive of three meals a day, a snack, unlimited internet and taxi fare not to exceed two round trips a day within Toronto, to any government building.

[ 40 ] In another file, Mr. Mennes sought a declaration that lawyers in Ontario are deficient in their education. The relief sought was damages of $130.2 million.

[ 41 ] These two examples meet with the moniker of bizarre, which is more than the title “unreasonable relief” that the Crown ascribed to the claims.

Improper Harassment and Disparagement of other parties

[ 42 ] The Crown points, under this heading, to the habitual bringing of applications by Mr. Mennes under the Criminal Proceeding Rules all aimed at having various CSC officials declared in criminal contempt for allegedly interfering with his access to courts. The foundation for Mr. Mennes’ claims are referenced in the Crown’s factum at paragraphs 51-62. Those contempt applications are three in number. None had merit. In particular in one case, referenced as Contempt #2, Justice Graham issued an order in favour of Mr. Mennes. However remarkably and inexplicably Mr. Mennes, one week later withdrew his own consent to the order.

[ 43 ] This behaviour, most charitably described as ‘shenanigans’, bespeaks the agenda of Mr. Mennes. That agenda is built on exceptionally unreasonable and vexatious conduct.

[ 44 ] Simply put none of the contempt proceedings had a scintilla of merit. I can do no better than to utilize the words of Justice Salmers in “Contempt Application 3”:

Judicial resources are limited. Judges of the Superior Court of Justice do not sit often in Cobourg. Lists are long and matters often are not reached. It is not just that an application that is devoid of merit unnecessarily utilizes judicial time and other court resources that could be used for other matters that have merit or, at least, are not frivolous. The relief sought in the application is without merit. Further court resources and time should not be wasted on it.

[ 45 ] These contempt applications, naming as they do persons within CSC, are nothing more than an instrument of harassment built on a foundation of sand.

Subject Matter of Proceedings Rolled into Other Litigation

[ 46 ] I also concur with the position of the Attorney General that the litigation history clearly shows that Mr. Mennes mixes litigation from one file into another. He does so improperly, and to some extent incomprehensively. I refer here to his claims for habeas corpus with respect to his conviction and sentencing as a dangerous offender. I likewise refer to his computer system claims and his continuous reference to his jailhouse library, in the context of contempt proceedings that are devoid of merit.

Disrespect for the Administration of Justice

[ 47 ] Small Claims Court Deputy Judge Burgess was accused of bias, on the basis that he was from Campbellford and therefore owed his livelihood to Warkworth Institution; was “anti Christian”; and was a member of a “legalistic Godless free Mason cult.” As noted Mr. Mennes’ motion for bias was dismissed. Not surprisingly. Costs were ordered.

[ 48 ] The Divisional Court ordered Mennes to pay $4,000.00 in costs, given his perpetration of an abuse of process and the malice involved.

[ 49 ] Mr. Mennes has described the trial judge who found him to be a dangerous offender, as being biased toward men, as well as having an “apparent, high heeled, highhanded, Fascist FemiNazi agenda”.

Examples of Vexatious Conduct

i) Abandonment of Proceedings

[ 50 ] Mr. Mennes has a routine habit of constituting litigation and then abandoning it. This pattern of conduct is not abandonment of proceedings “out of the gate” but rather after court appearances, and the need for preparation and response to the serving of numerous documents. In particular, I note the attempt by Mr. Mennes to abandon his habeas corpus application before Weekes J. after it was well underway.

[ 51 ] Mr. Mennes only abandoned his appeal of the dismissal of Contempt Application #1, after the Crown had perfected its appeal.

[ 52 ] Of real note is that after two days of cross examination of the Assistant Warden of Warkworth Institution, Mr. Mennes sought to abandon his contempt application on the pretext of a “a procedural flaw, that has rendered it impossible for me to properly continue with cross-examination. It’s my fault, entirely my fault….”

[ 53 ] His application was granted, but with prejudice.

[ 54 ] Mr. Mennes also abandoned his court proceedings in files 340/08 and 341/08. Finally in relation to what is described as his May Day Application, which is some 300 pages long, Mr. Mennes abandoned his application one year later.

ii) Lack of Diligence

[ 55 ] It is clear that on occasion Mr. Mennes advances his litigation in somewhat of a staccato fashion, occasionally relying on supplementary versions of affidavits and amended documents. It is equally true that Mr. Mennes has exhibited a belief that his manner of conducting his applications is the manner for the court to follow, inclusive of the apportionment of large swaths of time that he believes he is entitled to, to advance his position.

[ 56 ] It is also true that Mr. Mennes has at the least a wanton lack of skill at cross examination. At worst his is a wilful desire to mire the process. Given the other facets of Mr. Mennes litigation strategy I am comfortable in concluding that Mr. Mennes enjoys miring the process, for reasons that are not founded in lack of court sophistication or simple ignorance of the process.

iii) Uncivil Conduct

[ 57 ] The Crown references several examples of what it describes as uncivil conduct, inclusive of Warkworth Institution being run by women are who are not known to him “ as liberated women, let alone as women true to law and its proper rule under God and the Crown,” attacks on victims and children as liars, allegations of bias and corruption by a cast of characters from lawyers, to police to Corrections officials, to the bench and politicians, and accusing Department of Justice lawyers of abuse of office.

Pursuing Fruitless Appeals

[ 58 ] Once again, the abandonment of appeals, or the loss of an appeal, are the outcome of Mr. Mennes’ appellate process to date. Two appeals have been abandoned and four have been dismissed. Another two are apparently filed, but no date has been scheduled for hearing.

Failure to Pay Costs

[ 59 ] Costs have been awarded against Mr. Mennes in two Small Claims Court actions. He has paid none of these costs.

Conclusion

[ 60 ] A vexatious litigant order is an extraordinary remedy that alters a person’s right to the presumptive access to the courts.

[ 61 ] In Lukezic v. Royal Bank of Canada , [3] 2012 ONCA 350 the Court referenced the dicta of Lang J.A. in Kallaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 2006 3953 (ON CA) , 265 D.L.R. (4 th ) 320 (Ont. C.A.) where Lang J.A. emphasized that the Courts of Justice Act is designed to advance access to justice which is “a fundamental pillar of the rule of law.”

[ 62 ] The Court in Lukezic went on to say that “ Section 140(1) runs contrary to that important goal by denying access to individuals with carefully specified characteristics. In that sense, it is an exception to the thrust of the legislation and therefore should be construed strictly.”

[ 63 ] Clearly a declaration under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act , should be used sparingly. The administration of justice requires that access to justice be the sine qua non of the court system. Denial of access denies justice.

[ 64 ] However the finding that a litigant is vexatious is not simply deleterious to the litigant so described. As noted by Cumming J. in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Chavali , [1998] O.J. No. 5890 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) a section 140 order is beneficial to all parties, including the vexatious litigant. Such a finding ensures that the court is in control of the process. It serves as well to avert a further waste of money, time and effort in the proceeding.

[ 65 ] Succinctly put, a vexatious litigant order also serves the public interest in access to justice. As Power J. noted in Roscoe v. Roscoe (2005), 24 R.F.L. (6 th ) 331 (affirmed on this issue at 2007 ONCA 516 (C.A.) at para. 1 :

This court has limited resources and must, therefore, attempt to deal with the work before it in a fashion that is fair to all users of the court. While a person’s access to justice is a fundamental right, the court must be diligent to ensure that its processes are not abused by any particular litigant to the detriment , not only to those directly involved in the litigation, but, as well, to the system at large.

[ 66 ] Justice van Rensburg in the recent case of Ontario v. Coote 2011 ONSC 858 () , [2011] O.J. No. 697 (Sup.Ct.) stated:

The court must adopt a greater role as gatekeeper of the publicly funded justice system in an era where cases are delayed for months because of lack of available court time , and other cases are stayed on the basis of delay: Dale Streiman & Kurz LLP v. De Teresi (2007), 2007 1902 (ON SC) , 84 O.R. (3d) 383.

[ 67 ] There are, however, a small class of litigants who effectively remove themselves from the court process and require leave to participate because of their own behaviour. That class of litigant is small in the extreme. That class of litigant must now include Mr. Mennes.

[ 68 ] In coming to the conclusion with an objective eye that Mr. Mennes fits within that class of litigant, and has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted meritless and repetitive proceedings, I have considered the context of his pattern of conduct as a whole.

[ 69 ] Mr. Mennes’ actions, post declaration that he was a vexatious litigant in the Federal Court, have continued unabated. His lesson from that court should have tempered his approach in the Superior Court. But that was not to be. The only change was to be the direction of his vexatious compass.

[ 70 ] The history of Mr. Mennes and the Superior Court is well trodden ground. Mr. Mennes has engaged in litigation that is devoid of merit. Standing alone, he would not be the first litigant to fall in that genre. But cumulatively, his actions bespeak an exceptionally unreasonable approach to the forum of the court. He is not simply unsophisticated or naïve about the system. He is rather a tenacious, vexatious litigator.

[ 71 ] I have no hesitation, having reviewed the record from stern to bow, in coming to the conclusion that the actions of Mr. Mennes, viewed objectively, define him as a vexatious litigant. In arriving at this conclusion I have looked at the entire history of Mr. Mennes’ contact with the Court, and considered the factors in Lang Michener v. Fabian , as so aptly distilled by Henry J.

[ 72 ] Scarce judicial resources and public funds are being spent for no good purpose. Rather, court resources and taxpayer dollars to meet Mr. Mennes’ devotion to vexatious proceedings are being squandered.

[ 73 ] The price is not only a heavy one for the administration of justice but also renders the desire of others to have their day in court interrupted by the machinations of a man who simply appears to enjoy being a litigant, albeit a vexatious one. Mr. Mennes is engaging in an abuse of the Court’s process.

[ 74 ] Simply put in “this era of strained court resources [Mr. Mennes] can no longer be permitted unrestrained access to the courts of Ontario.” [4]

[ 75 ] To be clear, I would not have come to this conclusion simply on the basis of the failure of Mr. Mennes to pay the costs outstanding against him. Nor would I have come to this conclusion because Mr. Mennes is not a “gentlemanly litigant,” on occasion. It is rather a confluence of all of his activity, as so thoroughly referenced in the affidavit of Ms. Evans, and overviewed in the Crown’s factum, that precipitates my conclusion.

[ 76 ] An order will therefore go as follows in accordance with the relief sought in the Attorney General’s Notice of Application, which is replicated in the draft order provided to the court on March 12, 2012:

THIS COURT DECLARES that Emilius Maragreta Marcus Mennes a.k.a. Emile M. M. Mennes has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal for Ontario within the meaning of sections 140(1) (a) and (b) of the Courts of Justice Act ;

THIS COURT PROHIBITS Emilius Maragreta Marcus Mennes a.k.a. Emile M.M. Mennes, either directly or indirectly, from instituting in any court in Ontario, except until such time as he has obtained leave pursuant to s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act ;

THIS COURT ORDERS that the approval of form and content of this order by the Respondent is dispensed with.

[ 77 ] I have endorsed the order effective July 03, 2012.

[ 78 ] I have not endorsed any costs in the order, given that I have not received submissions as to quantum. The Attorney General shall have until August 01, 2012 to file its costs submissions, inclusive of a bill of costs, not to exceed 5 pages to my attention at the Courthouse, 150 Bond Street East, 6 th Floor, Oshawa. Mr. Mennes will have until August 15, 2012 to reply to the costs submissions of the Attorney General. Mr. Mennes’ submissions are not to exceed 5 pages.

The Honourable Mr. Justice H.K. O’Connell

DATE RELEASED: July 03, 2012

[1] The Crown suggests in its material that there may be more appeals pending.

[2] Endorsement of the Court of Appeal, September 18, 2007, per: Rosenberg, Gillese and MacFarland JJ.A.

[3] The Court of Appeal reversed the finding of the trial judge that Lukezic was vexatious, because the Royal Bank had not sought that relief by application. Given the need to strictly comply with Section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act , the seeking of the remedy had to be by originating application, and not as part of the action.

[4] See Fermino Susin v. John Susin, 2009 ONCA 231