Terrence Howard Hill

The appellants challenged an order striking their contempt motion without leave to amend.

The court held the motion judge made no legal or principled error, upheld the costs framework used below, and dismissed both merits and costs-related challenges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Divisional Court and awarded fixed costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a decision restoring a restrictive covenant and Notice of Claim on her property.

The property was originally under the Registry Act, where a 1958 restrictive covenant was extended to 2038 by a 1998 Notice of Claim.

In 2003, the property was converted to the Land Titles system.

The appellant argued that under s. 119(9) of the Land Titles Act, the covenant was deemed to expire 40 years after its original 1958 registration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the conversion to Land Titles did not extinguish the rights preserved by the Notice of Claim under the Registry Act, and the covenant remains valid until 2038.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal originating from an application under the Land Titles Act, as appeals under that Act lie to the Divisional Court.

Consequently, the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act.

No costs were awarded.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Perell J. dated May 9, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the responding parties to pay $5,000 in costs to the moving parties.

The applicants initiated a proceeding by application seeking declarations and substantial damages related to an anaerobic digester, and subsequently moved to add a party and for injunctive relief to prevent the digester's reactivation.

The court found the application procedurally inappropriate and outside its jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly due to the presence of material facts in dispute and the complex nature of the claims (nuisance and negligence).

Consequently, the court converted the application into an action, directing the applicants to file a Statement of Claim, and denied the immediate injunctive relief on the basis that it was not available in an improperly commenced application.

The appellant, Hummel Properties Inc., appealed a lower court decision that dismissed its application to quash interim control by-laws enacted by the Town of Niagara-on-the-Lake.

The by-laws prohibited the subdivision of land, including condominium creation, and were challenged on grounds of illegality (not relating to "land use" under the Planning Act, infringing s. 38(7) by applying a second interim control by-law, and illegal process) and bad faith.

The Court of Appeal found that the by-laws were illegal because they purported to control land division, not land use, and violated s. 38(7) by applying a second interim control by-law to the same land.

The court also found errors in the application judge's assessment of the process and bad faith.

The appeal was allowed, the by-laws quashed, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for a trial on damages for negligent misrepresentation and misfeasance in public office.

The applicants sought to set aside a motion judge's order dismissing their application for leave to appeal under s. 131(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, arguing jurisdictional error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding it barred by s. 131(3) of the POA, which prohibits appeals or reviews from leave decisions.

The court also found no jurisdictional failure even if the cited precedent applied.

The applicant moved to quash an interim control by-law and its extending by-law enacted by the respondent municipality, alleging illegality and bad faith.

The applicant also claimed damages for misfeasance in public office and misrepresentation.

The court found that the emergency meeting where the by-law was enacted met procedural and statutory requirements, including being open to the public.

The court held that the municipality's actions, including extending the by-law due to delays in adopting the Official Plan, were justified and did not demonstrate bad faith.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the refusal of the Chief Building Official to issue building permits for lots created by a testamentary devise.

The municipality refused the permits because the lots did not front onto an improved street as required by the zoning by-law.

The appellants proposed creating internal roadways owned by the lot owners to connect to public streets.

The court held that this proposal did not satisfy the by-law's requirement that the lots themselves front upon an improved street, and dismissed the appeals.

The applicant, a private citizen, brought an application alleging that the respondent Mayor violated the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by failing to disclose a pecuniary interest during several municipal council meetings.

The court found that all but one of the alleged violations were statute-barred by the six-year limitation period.

Regarding the remaining allegation, the court held that the respondent did not have a direct, indirect, or deemed pecuniary interest in the matter before the council, as the business involved a not-for-profit corporation and was strictly informational.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury action due to the plaintiff's refusal to answer questions on examination for discovery and disruptive, incoherent conduct.

The court found the plaintiff's behavior, consistent with a serious psychological or psychiatric issue, rendered further discovery futile.

The action was conditionally stayed, allowing the plaintiff six months to seek to lift the stay if represented by a litigation guardian.

Prejudgment interest was stayed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant's costs of $5,000.

The applicant alleged that the respondent, the former Lord Mayor of Niagara-On-The-Lake, breached the Minutes of Settlement resolving a previous human rights application.

The settlement required the respondent to recommend that the Lord Mayor's Prayer Breakfast Committee become more inclusive, and if rejected, to resign and remove his name and office from the committee's name.

The recommendation was rejected, and the respondent resigned.

However, the committee continued to advertise the event as the "Lord Mayor's Prayer Breakfast," and the respondent attended in his official capacity, wearing his chain of office.

The Tribunal applied principles of contract interpretation and found that the respondent breached the settlement by failing to dissociate himself and his office from the committee.

The respondent was ordered to make a $500 charitable donation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for an order compelling the Chief Building Official to issue a building permit for a residential dwelling.

The lot in question was created through a scheme involving the registration of sham deeds designed to evade the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the scheme was a fraud upon the Planning Act, meaning the deeds did not convey valid title.

As the appellant was not the lawful owner of the land, she was not eligible to apply for a building permit.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following dismissal of an application seeking issuance of a building permit for a lot created through a scheme found to constitute a “fraud upon the Planning Act,” the successful municipal respondent sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The applicant resisted both the scale and quantum of costs.

The court held that while the applicant’s conduct constituted a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Planning Act, it did not amount to criminal fraud warranting full indemnity costs.

Considering the complexity of the planning and real property issues, the long procedural history, and the conduct of the parties, the court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent municipality was awarded $40,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently applied for non-earner benefits after initially returning to work.

The motion judge dismissed her action on summary judgment, concluding that because she was employed at the time of the accident, she could not qualify for non-earner benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, a claimant's employment status at the time of the accident does not automatically render them ineligible for non-earner benefits.

The court found that a claimant who is able to work may still suffer a complete inability to carry on a normal life, and remitted the matter to the trial court.

The applicant sought an order compelling the municipality to issue a building permit for a parcel created through a series of intra-family conveyances designed to circumvent the Planning Act.

The court examined whether the parcel constituted a valid lot and whether the municipality could refuse the permit under the Building Code Act on the basis of contravention of other applicable law.

The court held that the initial conveyances forming the root of title were fraudulent and constituted a deceit upon the Planning Act because the purported vendors were never owners of the land.

As a result, the deeds were invalid and could not create a valid chain of title or be cured by the 40‑year rule, Planning Act statements, or subsequent conversion to land titles.

The court concluded that the building permit application was the “fruit from the poisoned tree” and refused to grant relief.

Andrew Peller Limited appealed a decision by the Grape Growers of Ontario to appoint a third-party inspector to resolve a dispute over the quality of grapes supplied by a producer.

The appellant argued that the referral was not timely and that the grapes had already been destroyed, making an inspection impossible.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicable 2010 Regulations did not impose a time limit for referring a dispute to an inspector, and that the inspector's role was to adjudicate the dispute, which could be done even if the grapes were no longer available for physical inspection.