Court File and Parties

Superior Court of Justice – Ontario 7755 Hurontario Street, Brampton ON L6W 4T6

Re: Betty Wei and Lawrence Vanderklei, Plaintiffs

And: His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, Brian Mills, and Anatol Monid, Defendants

Before: Justice Ranjan K. Agarwal

Counsel: Mitchell Wine, for the plaintiffs; Shahana Kar, for the defendants

Heard: October 2, 2025, in writing

Endorsement

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] In July 2021, the plaintiffs Betty Wei and Lawrence Vanderklei sued the defendants Ontario, Brian Mills, and Anatol Monid, on behalf of members of a proposed class, for losses they suffered from investments in syndicated mortgage investments marketed by Tier 1 Transaction Advisory Services Inc. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were responsible for the regulation of these investments. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs, as required by law, seek leave to start this action under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 7, s 17(2), and to certify this action as a class proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, SO 1992, c 6, s 5.

[2] In support of their motion for leave, the plaintiffs filed an affidavit from Krista Zingel. The defendants moved to strike this affidavit on the grounds that Ms. Zingel is not a compellable witness under the Public Service of Ontario Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 35. In response to the motion to strike Ms. Zingel's affidavit, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of that Act under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 2(b). The hearing of the defendants' motion hasn't been scheduled yet.

[3] At a case conference in June 2025, the plaintiffs advised that their cross-examination of Monid on his affidavit for the leave motion may lead them to withdraw Ms. Zingel's affidavit. The cross-examination was on July 9th. Monid's lawyer objected to several questions. The plaintiffs seek rulings on the propriety of those questions. I endorsed a timetable order to hear the plaintiffs' motion in writing. I encouraged the defendants to answer the questions with consent under the Rules of Civil Procedure, r 34.12(2), to avoid a motion. That did not happen.

[4] For the reasons discussed below, I endorse an order that several of Monid's objections were improper. I endorse an order that Monid shall answer these questions and any outstanding undertakings by October 17, 2025. The parties shall attend a case conference on October 23, 2025, at 2pm (by videoconference) to timetable the remaining steps in this proceeding. There shall be no costs of this motion.

II. LAW

A. Relevance

[5] A party to a motion who has served every affidavit on which the party intends to rely on and has completed all examinations under the Rules of Civil Procedure, r 39.03, may cross-examine the deponent of any affidavit served by a party who is adverse in interest on the motion. See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 39.02(1).

[6] The scope of a cross-examination of a deponent for an application or motion is narrower than an examination for discovery. See Ontario v Rothmans Inc., 2011 ONSC 2504, at para 143. Moreover, on a motion for leave, the defendant shall not be subject to discovery or the inspection of documents, or to examination for discovery. See CLPA, s 17(6).

[7] When a question is objected to, the objector shall briefly state the reason for the objection, and the question and the brief statement shall be recorded. A ruling on the propriety of a question that is objected to and not answered may be obtained on motion to the court. See Rules of Civil Procedure, rr 34.12(1), (3).

[8] The defendants organize their refusals into three categories: (a) irrelevance; (b) disproportionality; and (c) improper legal argument.

B. Relevance

[9] The cross-examination questions must be relevant to: (a) the issues on the motion; (b) the matters raised in the affidavit by the deponent, even if those issues are irrelevant to the motion; or (c) the credibility and reliability of the deponent's evidence. The deponent for a motion who deposes on information and belief may be compelled to inform themselves about the matters deposed about. See Rothmans, at para 143; Volk v Volk, 2020 ONCA 256, at para 10.

[10] To determine whether evidence is relevant, a judge must decide whether, as a matter of human experience and logic, the existence of a particular fact, directly or indirectly, makes the existence of a material fact more probable than it would otherwise be. See R v Candir, 2009 ONCA 915, at para 48. The threshold for relevance isn't high. It's enough that the evidence has some tendency to advance the proposition of fact for which it is offered. See R v J(JL), 2000 SCC 51, at para 47.

[11] The issue on the plaintiffs' leave motion is whether (a) the proceeding is being brought in good faith; and (b) there's a reasonable possibility that the claim could be resolved in the claimant's favour. See CLPA, s 17(7).

C. Proportionality

[12] There are several proportionality considerations in deciding whether to order that a person must answer a question:

• whether the time required to answer the question would be unreasonable
• whether the expense associated with answering the question is justified
• whether requiring the person to answer the question would cause them undue prejudice
• whether requiring the person to answer the question would unduly interfere with the orderly progress of the action
• whether the information is readily available to the requesting party from another source

See Rules of Civil Procedure, r 29.2.9.

[13] The plaintiffs assert that proportionality isn't relevant to cross-examination. That's incorrect. In Rothmans, at paras 154-164 (which the plaintiffs rely on), Perell J held that proportionality can't be used to expand the scope of cross-examination. But proportionality can allow the court to "downsize" the procedure as long it's not procedurally unfair.

[14] The court also won't allow parties to go on a "fishing expedition": parties can't engage in a discovery-like "rummage" through the adverse party's corporate files "in the hope of uncovering something helpful to her case." See Payne v Ontario (Human Rights Commission), 192 DLR (4th) 315 (Ont CA), at 365-366.

D. Improper Legal Argument

[15] On an examination for discovery, a party may have to disclose its legal position on a relevant issue. Legal positions can be a "matter" relevant to the lawsuit. See Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians v Canada (AG), 48 OR (3d) 377, at para 10.

[16] It follows that if the adverse party's legal position is relevant to an issue on the motion or raised in the deponent's affidavit, it can be cross-examined on. That said, where the cross-examiner is being argumentative with a witness (for example, by asserting its position, and demanding the witness's evidence about that position), the evidence is unlikely to be relevant.

III. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION

[17] My disposition on each refusal is listed in the parties' refusals chart attached as Schedule A. That said, to put my decision into context, I make two preliminary conclusions.

[18] First, Monid was being cross-examined on his affidavit. He wasn't being discovered on his own behalf or on behalf of FSCO. Monid is a named defendant—though he was an Executive Director at FSCO, he doesn't work there now. Under the CLPA, s 17(3), the Crown and Crown employees are not required to deliver affidavit evidence in response to a plaintiff's motion for leave. In requesting discovery-type disclosure from Monid, the plaintiffs submit that they are hamstrung by the procedural rules in the CLPA: "How are the Plaintiffs to prove bad faith, misfeasance or misconduct by FSCO and its employees if the Defendants have no obligation to file their own evidence, there is no documentary production and no discovery of witnesses?"

[19] The plaintiffs overstate the case. They don't have to prove misfeasance or bad faith at this stage. They only need to prove a reasonable possibility of success. Even if the procedural rules of the CLPA didn't apply, they still wouldn't be entitled to documentary or oral discovery of the defendants until after the case was certified as a class proceeding. And the defendants have filed some evidence. To the extent a Crown employee does so, the purpose of the CLPA would be undermined if the plaintiff could cross-examine the defendant as if they were a representative of the Crown and require them to produce documents in the Crown's possession as if it were a discovery. As a result, my disposition is made, in part, because Monid is not required to make inquiries of others or search FSCO's files. At most, he can answer questions about his information or beliefs and produce documents in his possession. See Canada (AG) v The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2016 ONSC 4938, at para 17.

[20] Second, the defendants understate the basis for relevance. The plaintiffs are suing for damages from Tier 1's SMIs. The defendants define relevance as beginning and ending with Tier 1. But the plaintiffs' theory is that FSCO, which regulated SMIs under the Mortgage Brokerages, Lenders and Administrators Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 29, knew about the risks to Tier 1's investors from other SMIs, including Fortress Real Developments Inc. For example, the plaintiffs plead that FSCO knew, by 2013, that Fortress was a Ponzi scheme, and the regulator should have warned investors in SMIs about the investment risk. Given that the plaintiffs must show, on the leave motion, that there's a reasonable possibility that the claim would be resolved in the plaintiffs' favour, information about these other SMIs may be relevant.

IV. CONCLUSION

[21] Monid shall answer the questions that were improperly refused and fulfill any outstanding undertakings by October 17, 2025. I appreciate that I haven't given Monid much time. But given the examination was in July and this action is still at the pleadings stage four years after it was started, time is of the essence.

[22] The parties shall attend a case conference on October 23, 2025, at 2pm (by videoconference) to timetable the remaining steps in this proceeding. Before the case conference, I expect the plaintiffs to advise the defendants whether they're still relying on Ms. Zingel's affidavit. If so, and the defendants are still moving to strike Ms. Zingel's affidavit, I expect the parties to file written submissions by October 22, 2025, 12noon on the timetable for the remaining steps in the proceeding, including whether some or all of the motion to strike, motion for leave, and motion for certification can be heard at the same time or one after the other.

[23] There shall be no costs of this motion as none were sought.

October 2, 2025

Agarwal J

SCHEDULE A

No.	Q	Page	Specific Question	Precise Basis for Refusal	Disposition by the Court
1.	196	60-61	To advise if nothing in the case law prohibits or says that FSCO shouldn't go to entities like the OSC.	Legal question, argument.	The defendants argue that this question calls for the "interpretation of case law" and is therefore improper. I disagree. Monid testified that the scope of FSCO's inquiries from other regulators is defined by the "caselaw". Monid put the caselaw into issue through his answer. The plaintiffs are entitled to know what caselaw Monid says defines the scope of their inquiries from the OSC. As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall advise the plaintiffs whether he's aware of any caselaw that prohibits FSCO from making inquiries about individual licensees from the OSC and, if so, to identify the cases that he's referring to.
2.	205	63	To produce the files related to Mr. Petrozza's licence and licence renewal.	Irrelevant, fishing expedition.	The defendants refuse this question on the grounds that it's irrelevant: Vince Petrozza is a "private" mortgage agent involved in Fortress, and Fortress isn't a party. Monid's affidavit discusses Mr. Petrozza. At paragraph 155, Monid deposes that FSCO didn't have "clear, convincing and cogent evidence" from the OSC to deny Mr. Petrozza a license. The plaintiffs allege that the licensing of Mr. Petrozza led to the harms they suffered. Even though Mr. Petrozza isn't a party, Monid raises the issue of why FSCO licensed Mr. Petrozza, which makes it a relevant issue on cross-examination. I endorse an order that Monid shall produce the files in his possession related to Mr. Petrozza's license and license renewals. I appreciate that he may have no such files in his possession.
3.	206	63-64	To produce the file related to the decision to grant Mr. Rathore a provisional/preliminary mortgage agent's licence in 2015.	Irrelevant, fishing expedition.	The defendants refuse this question on the grounds that questions about Fortress are irrelevant. Though there's no reference to Jawad Rathore in Monid's affidavit, there's no dispute that Mr. Rathore was involved with Fortress. For the same reasons as above, I endorse an order that Monid shall produce the files in his possession related to Mr. Rathore's license and license renewals. I appreciate that he may have no such files in his possession.
4.	206	64	To advise if Mr. Monid thinks that Mr. Petrozza was an appropriate person to be licensed.	Irrelevant.	The defendants object to this question on the grounds that questions about Mr. Petrozza are irrelevant. For the reasons discussed above, I disagree. As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall advise whether he believes Mr. Petrozza was an appropriate person to be licensed as a mortgage agent.
5.	310	92	To produce FSCO's file related to RBC's allegations against Tier 1.	Disproportionate, fishing expedition.	Monid deposes that RBC contacted FSCO in August 2014 about its investigation of several SMIs. Monid has produced two emails between RBC and FSCO, and a copy of notes from the meeting. According to Monid, RBC believed that Tier 1 was part of a Ponzi scheme, but RBC didn't disclose this evidence to FSCO. Monid concludes that FSCO didn't have sufficient information in 2014 to apply for the appointment of a trustee or to issue regulatory orders against Tier 1. The plaintiffs request production of FSCO's entire file relating to RBC's investigation against Tier 1. The defendants argue that it would be disproportionate to produce their file. That said, the defendants baldly state this claim—they have provided no evidence of the time, expense, or prejudice that would be involved in producing these documents. Monid's evidence does not make all FSCO's file relevant. To require FSCO to produce all its internal documents discussing RBC's disclosure would be, on its face, disproportionate and like a discovery. But it does make any documents that RBC provided to FSCO relevant. Monid's affidavit is unclear whether RBC provided any such documents but, if so, I endorse an order that Monid shall produce any the documents in his possession to the plaintiffs. I appreciate that he may have no such documents in his possession.
6.	103	33	To look at the risk assessment documents and advise if FSCO considered Tier 1 and its associated brokerages to be high risk in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 and produce those documents.	Disproportionate, fishing expedition.	Monid's evidence is that he could determine whether he considered Tier 1 and its associated brokerages to be high risk by looking at the "risk assessment document". The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' request is a "fishing expedition" and disproportionate. Again, the defendants have adduced no evidence about the time, expense, or prejudice associated with reviewing these documents. They also haven't shown how producing this information would be a "fishing expedition". As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall advise whether he, in his capacity as a FSCO employee, considered Tier 1 and its associated brokerages to be high risk in 2012 to 2015, and to produce the documents he relies upon, to the extent they are in his possession, in giving this information.
7.	458	133	To advise if Mr. Rabidoux's tweets about SMIs made their way into someone's file for consideration.	Irrelevant, disproportionate.	The plaintiffs rely on an affidavit from Ben Rabidoux. Mr. Rabidoux says he tweeted about SMIs between 2013 and 2015. He speculates that "individuals within FSCO" would have seen the tweets because FSCO's Twitter account was "very active during that time". Monid says he didn't see the tweets. Though these questions are relevant, Monid isn't obligated to make inquires of FSCO or search FSCO's files. It's also disproportionate (even absent the defendants' evidence on proportionality) to ask FSCO to determine whether someone, somewhere inside FSCO copied these into a file, even if only in 2013 or 2014. As a result, I endorse an order that this refusal was proper.
8.	459	134	To advise if anyone at FSCO considered Mr. Rabidoux's tweets about SMIs in 2013 and 2014.	Irrelevant, disproportionate.	(See disposition for Question 7 above.)
9.	465	137	Make inquiries as to whether Manon Azar communicated with Mr. Hardcorevalue and what steps were taken in response to the email expressing concerns about SMIs (at Exhibit F of Mr. Rabidoux's affidavit).	Irrelevant, disproportionate, fishing expedition.	As best I can tell from the materials filed on this motion, someone named Hardcorevalue emailed FSCO in 2015. They exchanged emails with Manon Azar, a compliance officer. The plaintiffs request information from Mr. Azar about these emails. Again, it's improper to ask Monid to get information from a third party. He's only obligated to disclose information in his possession. As a result, I endorse an order that this refusal was proper.
10.	476	143 (lines 15 and 23)	To advise if in June 2014, Mr. Monid was made aware by one or more FSCO employees (including Ms. Zingel) that they had concerns about SMIs because of 21 MBLAA contraventions and 3 LTCA contraventions that were taking place.	Vague, too broad, disproportionate.	The defendants refused this question on several grounds. First, its concern about vagueness is moot given my ruling that Monid can only be asked about his information. Second, the defendants argue that the question is too broad because it asks about other SMIs. I don't agree with this objection. Monid's affidavit discusses, at length, the regulation of SMIs generally, including the "risk posed by SMIs for unsophisticated investors". As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose whether, in June 2014, he was advised by any FSCO employee that they had concerns about SMIs because of contraventions of the relevant statutes.
11.	600	182	To advise if the fact that Ms. Wei bought the SMI is an indication why FSCO is supposed to be involved and if FSCO is there to provide regulation because Ms. Wei "didn't have the sophistication to say …there's something wrong with this thing."	Argument.	At questions 598-99, Monid testified that it would be high risk for anyone but a high net worth individual to enter into a mortgage with a 100 percent loan-to-value ratio. Monid's personal view on whether FSCO is "there to provide regulation" because there are such investors isn't relevant. His personal view doesn't make that fact more or less probable. I endorse an order that this refusal was proper.
12.	650	197-198	To advise if an examination of First Commonwealth or the Tier 1 brokerage was supposed to have occurred in the summer or fall of 2014 but was then cancelled, what the extent of the examination was to be and why it was cancelled. Produce the related file.	Disproportionate.	The premise for the plaintiffs' question is that FSCO was supposed to do a "more thorough" examination of Tier 1 or First Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. in Fall 2014 but the examination was cancelled. Monid has no direct knowledge of this examination or reasons for its cancellation. In response, the plaintiffs request that Monid produce the "entire file" for the examination. The plaintiffs' questions are relevant given Monid's evidence about FSCO's role in the regulation of SMIs, but a request for the entire file is disproportionate. The plaintiffs haven't laid a foundation for disclosure of the "entire file". In any event, Monid's answers on his knowledge of the examination suggest he does not have the file in his possession. To the extent he has the file, I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose his information, from a review of the file, the scope of the examinations and why they were cancelled.
13.	668	201-203	To advise if anyone at FSCO looked into Fortress's Collier Centre project and followed the CCAA filing related to that project.	Irrelevant.	The plaintiffs allege, without evidence, that Fortress arranged mortgage financing for the Collier Centre project. Given the plaintiffs' theory of the case, this question is relevant. But, again, the scope is too broad. I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose whether he looked into the Collier Centre project after the court appointed a trustee.
14.	679	206	To advise if Mr. Monid was aware that the independent legal advice given to investors was given by a lawyer paid for by either the developer or Fortress.	Irrelevant.	Given the plaintiffs' theory of the case, these questions are relevant. But, again, the scope is too broad. I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose: • whether he knew that investors were being given ILA by Fortress's or the developer's lawyer • whether he knew that the appraisals obtained by Fortress for the Collier Centre project were "based on prospective value" but represented as "as-is appraisals" • whether he is aware of any examinations of any of the four brokerages associated with Fortress between Spring 2015 and April 2018
15.	680	207	To advise if Mr. Monid was aware that the appraisals obtained by Fortress were the same type as were reviewed earlier in the cross-examination and represented as-is appraisals but were actually appraisals based on prospective value.	Irrelevant.	(See disposition for Question 14 above.)
16.	685	209	To advise if between the Collier events in the spring of 2015 and the examination of Fortress in 2018, whether FSCO conducted any examinations of the four brokerages involved with Fortress in the syndicated mortgages business. If there was an examination, advise the date and brokerage.	Irrelevant.	(See disposition for Question 14 above.)
17.	696	212	To advise if Mr. Monid agrees that he went to FSCO lawyers because he wanted to be very careful with any steps taken with respect to Fortress and have Is dotted and Ts crossed since Fortress was known to be aggressive in terms of anyone challenging its business and the way it operated its business.	Irrelevant.	The premise of the plaintiffs' question is that Monid sought legal counsel on Fortress matters specifically because Fortress was known for being aggressive. The plaintiffs want to argue that the court should draw an inference that Fortress's aggressive strategy caused FSCO not to do its job. Monid's reasons for seeking legal advice about Fortress matters might make this fact more or less likely to be true. I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose whether he sought legal counsel on the Fortress matters specifically because Fortress was known to be aggressive.
18.	731-732	223	To confirm if FSCO compliance staff initiated at least 17 Fortress-related investigations, as reported in the Reuters article (appended as Exhibit M to Peter Lantos' affidavit (Vol. 2, tab 6)).	Irrelevant, disproportionate, fishing expedition.	Monid has answered this question—he doesn't know if this fact is true. The plaintiffs' request for Monid to confirm the number is too broad. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
19.	737	226	To make inquiries and advise if the following paragraph (on page 4 of the Reuters article under the heading "Impatience Within") is correct: "Documents seen by Reuters show that in 2013, FSCO staff opened an investigation after the federal tax collector, the Canada Revenue Agency, sent information it said suggested that Fortress syndicated mortgages were in effect a Ponzi scheme. Less than a month later, FSCO investigators closed the file for lack of valid or reliable information to support further investigation."	Irrelevant, disproportionate, fishing expedition.	Monid has answered this question—he doesn't know if this fact is true. The plaintiffs' request for Monid to make inquiries is too broad. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
20.	742	227	To advise why Mr. Monid thought FSCO was wound up and FSRA created.	Irrelevant.	This question is irrelevant. Monid's personal view on why FSCO was wound up doesn't make that fact more or less true. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
21.	748	230	To advise if the following paragraph in the Reuters article is correct: "…was why FSCO in 2013 investigated Petrozza's application to renew his mortgage broker's licence. According to three sources, his licence was ultimately renewed on the condition that he undertake a period of supervision by another broker."	Irrelevant.	As held above, questions about Mr. Petrozza's and Mr. Rathore's licenses are relevant. As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose his information: • whether Mr. Petrozza's license was renewed on the condition that he undertake a period of supervision by another broker • whether Mr. Petrozza's failed to mention the "OSC issues" in his licensing and renewal applications • whether Mr. Rathore received a preliminary license approval from FSCO in 2015
22.	749	231	To advise if Mr. Monid is aware that Mr. Petrozza did not mention the OSC issues on his original application or his renewal application.	Irrelevant.	(See disposition for Question 21 above.)
23.	750	231	To answer the next paragraph (in the Reuters article) dealing with Mr. Rathore.	Improper/undiscernible question, irrelevant.	(See disposition for Question 21 above.)
24.	752	232	To advise if a proactive FSCO investigator or compliance officer could have found out how Fortress initially began its business relationship with Olympia.	Irrelevant, argument.	This question isn't relevant. Monid's personal opinion on whether a "proactive FSCO investigator or compliance officer" could have discovered how business developed between Fortress and Olympia Trust Co. doesn't make that fact more or less true. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
25.	761	235	To advise if Mr. Monid was aware that Fortress was taking 35% of funds raised off the top.	Irrelevant.	As held above, questions about Fortress are relevant. As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose his information about whether Fortress "was taking 35 percent of the funds raised off the top."
26.	793	246	To advise if there were any examinations of four Fortress brokerages (BDMC, FDS, FMP and FFM) before April 2018. If there were any examinations, advise dates and which brokerage.	Irrelevant, fishing expedition.	Monid has answered this question. He does not know whether there were examinations of brokerages related to Fortress. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
27.	815-822	256-258	Re Exhibit 36 of Mr. Monid's affidavit: (i) advise if the step referenced in para (c) in Mr. Bailey's email was taken; (ii) advise if the step referenced in para (d) of Mr. Bailey's email was taken; and (iii) produce a copy of the binder referenced in para 2 of Mr. Bailey's email (to Terry, Krista and Izabel).	Disproportionate, fishing expedition.	Monid has answered this question. He does not know whether FSCO got information from a Fortress broker or Mr. Anderson. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
28.	897	282	To advise what information FSCO obtained between 2015 and 2017 that led FSCO to conclude that it was in a position to insist that Olympia cease doing business in Ontario.	Disproportionate, fishing expedition.	Questions about Olympia are relevant given that Olympia was the trustee for the SMIs promoted by Fortress. As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose his information about what allowed FSCO to "feel that it was in a position to insist that Olympia cease doing business in Ontario."
29.	916	288-289	To advise if FSCO disciplined Mr. Monid in connection with matters related to this proceeding.	Irrelevant.	This question is relevant. The plaintiffs are alleging misconduct by Monid. Whether he was disciplined by FSCO about the matters in the case may be relevant to the issue on the leave motion. I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose whether FSCO disciplined him in connection with the regulation of SMIs generally, and Tier 1 specifically.
30.	916	289	To provide Mr. Monid's employment file.	Irrelevant.	Monid's employee file isn't relevant. Many or most of the documents in the file are likely unrelated to potential discipline. As a result, I endorse an order that the refusal is proper.
31.	917	289	To advise if Mr. Monid's two-year leave was related to the winding-up of FSCO.	Irrelevant.	Monid testified that he went on a leave of absence in 2019, at the same time that FSCO was replaced by FSRA. He then quit the OPS in 2021. To the extent that Monid went on a leave of absence because of the matters in this case, it may be relevant to the issue on the leave motion. As a result, I endorse an order that Monid shall disclose whether his leave of absence was in connection with the regulation of SMIs generally, and Tier 1 specifically.
32.	922	292	To advise if Mr. Monid was promised the Deputy Minister of Finance job if he took a lax approach to the regulation of syndicated mortgages.	Irrelevant.	This question is irrelevant. The plaintiffs are relying on a rumour. The issue is not raised in any of the affidavits.