Daniel J. Michaluk

The applicant sought a sealing order for her medical and educational records in the context of an application for judicial review against the Information and Privacy Commissioner and Toronto Metropolitan University.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the sealing order for the applicant's medical and highly sensitive biographical information, finding it necessary to protect her dignity.

However, the court declined to seal her academic transcripts, concluding that concerns about embarrassment did not outweigh the open court principle.

Following the dismissal of the applicants' challenge to Western University's COVID-19 vaccine mandate, the university sought partial indemnity costs of $97,721.11.

The applicants argued no costs should be awarded as the case was public interest litigation.

The court rejected this argument, finding the case lacked the exceptional nature required to deviate from the usual costs rules, and noted the applicants were backed by a litigation fund.

The court awarded the university costs fixed at $75,000.

The applicant students sought declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against the respondent university's COVID-19 Vaccination Policy, arguing that the collection of proof of vaccination violated s. 38(2) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The court found that the university's broad statutory powers authorized the Policy as a 'lawfully authorized activity' and that the collection of proof of vaccination was 'necessary' to properly administer and enforce the mandate.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of HRTO decisions dismissing his human rights application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The HRTO found that the substance of his allegations had been appropriately dealt with in a prior labour arbitration, even though the union declined to advance Code-based arguments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the HRTO's application of s. 45.1 was reasonable, as the arbitrator's factual findings precluded any finding of Code violations.

The court also rejected the applicant's claims of procedural fairness denial and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The City of Brockville applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of redacted legal fee invoices related to collective bargaining.

The city argued the records were entirely excluded from the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under the labour relations exclusion in s. 52(3)2.

Applying the Vavilov reasonableness standard, the Divisional Court upheld the adjudicator's decision, finding it was reasonable to conclude that the connection between labour relations and accounting documents detailing public expenditures was insufficient to trigger the exclusion.

The applicant municipality brought a motion for civil contempt against the respondent, a former mayor, for breaching a prior court order by disclosing confidential information during public town hall meetings.

The court found that the respondent had indeed breached the order by revealing personal information of employees from a confidential binder, and that the breach was intentional as per the legal test for civil contempt.

However, the court exercised its discretion to decline a formal finding of contempt, considering factors such as the respondent's honest belief (a mistake of law without contumacious intent), reliance on legal advice, the context of political discourse during an election campaign, the cessation of the conduct post-election, and the fundamental importance of freedom of expression.

The motion for contempt was dismissed, with each party bearing its own costs.

The plaintiff brought a motion regarding discovery issues in a constructive dismissal action.

The primary remaining issue was whether the plaintiff and the third party, whose interests were aligned against the defendant, should be permitted to review each other's examination for discovery transcripts before being examined themselves.

The court found a real possibility of collusion and tailoring of evidence given their close relationship and aligned pleadings.

The court ordered that the plaintiff and third party be excluded from knowing each other's discovery evidence until both examinations were completed.

The respondent sought costs following a proceeding.

The court found the time spent and rates claimed by the respondent's counsel to be reasonable.

However, the court made a downward adjustment to the costs claimed because the court had appointed amicus curiae, which raised real legal issues that the respondent was obliged to address.

Costs were fixed at $6,250 payable by the opposing party to the respondent.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an adjudicator at the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.

The applicant had requested information from the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation regarding a $20 million winning lottery ticket he claimed was stolen from him.

The adjudicator upheld the OLGC's redaction of a Draw Report and found that the OLGC had conducted a reasonable search for records in its custody or control.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the OLGC was not required to obtain records from third parties like Lotto Québec or the Interprovincial Lottery Corporation, as it did not have control over those records.

The City of Vaughan sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of an employee's entry and exit points on the 407 ETR highway.

The City had reimbursed the employee for the toll charges but redacted the location and timing data from the disclosed invoices, arguing it was personal information.

The Commissioner found that while it was personal information, it fell under the exception for information disclosing an employee 'benefit' under s. 14(4)(a) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's decision, finding that the entry and exit points defined the quantum of the benefit and were subject to disclosure to ensure government accountability.

The respondent employer brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision on the basis of delay.

The applicant had delayed 26 months in filing his application and a further three months in perfecting it, without providing a cogent explanation.

The court found that the delay caused actual prejudice to the respondents, as a key witness had since been dismissed and another respondent had already undergone a full hearing on related issues.

The motion was granted and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant employer was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after an employee was injured by a reversing truck unit that did not have an attached trailer.

The trial judge acquitted the employer, finding the truck was not 'material handling equipment' under s. 56 of the Industrial Establishments Regulation.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal, holding that s. 56 applies only to vehicles that constitute material handling equipment, and not to road vehicles that are not actually or typically used to handle materials.

The moving party employer sought leave to appeal a conviction under the Occupational Health and Safety Act for failing to provide a signaller when a worker was injured by a reversing truck.

The employer argued that the regulation only applied if the vehicle was engaged as material handling equipment and challenged the regulation as unconstitutionally overbroad.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the proper interpretation of the legislative provision raised issues essential to the public interest in workplace safety.