Alexandra V. Mayeski

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.

Section 3 counsel brought a motion to vary a previous order regarding the guardianship of an elderly mother, after the daughter appointed as guardian of personal care indicated she would seek outside employment and hire full-time professional caregivers unless compensated.

The court found that the daughter's actions escalated the litigation and were money-driven, but recognized that the mother was thriving under her daughter's full-time personal care.

To ensure the mother's best interests were met, the court varied the order to appoint the daughter and one of her brothers as joint guardians of personal care, and ordered that the daughter be compensated for her caregiving services.

Section 3 counsel brought a motion to vary a previous order regarding the guardianship of an incapable person, after the appointed guardian of personal care (the incapable person's daughter) indicated she would seek outside employment and hire professional caregivers instead of providing full-time personal care herself without compensation, contrary to the guardianship plan she had filed.

The court found that the daughter's actions escalated the litigation and that she put her own interests ahead of her mother's.

However, because the mother was thriving under the daughter's full-time care, and the daughter threatened to cease providing care if not appointed guardian and compensated, the court varied its previous order to allow for the daughter's compensation.

To mitigate conflict of interest and ensure the mother's best interests, the court appointed the daughter and one of her brothers as joint guardians of personal care.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order and her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Community Treatment Order expired and was not renewed.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion and quashed the appeals, finding that there was no longer a live controversy and a decision would have no practical effect.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming incapacity to consent to treatment for schizophrenia under a community treatment plan.

The court refused to admit proposed fresh evidence, holding that the pregnancy-related testing and competing psychiatric letter failed the Palmer criteria for relevance, credibility, due diligence, and likely effect on the result.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board’s application of the statutory capacity test, the court held that the Board properly relied on corroborated evidence, including hearsay, and reasonably found that the appellant could understand treatment information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that revocation of the community treatment order did not extinguish the community treatment plan.

The applicant school boards, as Schedule 2 employers, sought judicial review of the WSIB's refusal to disclose medical and employment information from injured workers' claim files.

The applicants sought this information to pursue subrogated claims against US Asbestos Compensation Trust Funds.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the right of subrogation under s. 30(11) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act does not confer a right of access to a worker's personal information.

The Court also held that the applicants' challenge regarding the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act was premature, as they had an adequate alternative remedy through the freedom of information request process.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Hamilton to revoke their adult entertainment parlour licence.

The municipality had passed a by-law to reduce the number of such parlours, allowing revocation if a business was not actively carried on within a reasonable time.

The applicants had not opened for business because they were waiting for a liquor licence, which was delayed due to unpaid retail sales tax from another business.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no procedural unfairness, bias, or bad faith.

The court held that the municipality's finding that the business had not opened within a reasonable time was not patently unreasonable, as the delay in obtaining a liquor licence was not the municipality's responsibility.