Gillian Tiffin Hnatiw

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $5,000 all inclusive.

The plaintiff sought costs of a motion for directions regarding the binding nature of an agreed summary of facts from a criminal proceeding.

The defendants sought their costs of the motion, and one defendant sought costs thrown away due to the adjournment of the trial.

The court reserved the costs of the motion to the trial judge, finding that the trial judge would be best placed to assess costs in the context of the final disposition.

The court dismissed the request for costs thrown away, as the adjournment was not the fault of any particular party.

The plaintiffs successfully resisted a summary judgment motion brought by the defendants in a test case.

The plaintiffs sought enhanced partial indemnity costs of $300,000, while the defendants argued for no costs due to divided success or deferral to the trial judge.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments, finding the plaintiffs were wholly successful in resisting the motion despite failing on a 'boomerang' summary judgment request.

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs of $235,768.86, finding the time spent and rates charged were reasonable given the complexity, importance, and high stakes of the test case.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for damages arising from a sexual assault that occurred on December 4, 2017.

The defendant was convicted of the offence in February 2023 and sentenced to six years imprisonment.

The plaintiff claimed general and aggravated damages for sexual assault and battery, breach of privacy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and pecuniary damages including loss of competitive advantage and future care costs.

The defendant did not file responding affidavit material and the parties agreed the case was suitable for summary judgment.

The court found the plaintiff entitled to damages and assessed general and aggravated damages at $225,000, loss of competitive advantage at $25,000, future care costs at $7,500, and an OHIP subrogated claim of $687.

The court also awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

This endorsement addresses costs following an appeal decision.

The appellant, Nathalie Xian Yi Yan, was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to two sets of respondents and substantial indemnity costs to a third respondent, Edward Lawrence Marrocco.

The substantial indemnity costs were awarded due to the appellant's frivolous, vexatious, and unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct, dishonesty, illegality, and conspiracy against Mr. Marrocco.

The appellant, a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner, launched 19 civil claims against individuals involved in disciplinary proceedings against her, including investigators, College counsel, and independent legal counsel to the Discipline Committee.

These claims alleged defamation, professional negligence, evidence tampering, and breach of due process.

The motion judge struck these claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, being barred by statutory immunity under the Regulated Health Professions Act, and constituting an impermissible collateral attack on the tribunal's decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming the application of statutory immunity, absolute privilege for statements in judicial/tribunal proceedings, and the rule against collateral attacks, and denied leave to amend the claims or appeal the costs awards.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal Paragraph 22 of the order of Perell J. dated February 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and directed the parties to arrange a case conference regarding the conduct of the appeal.

The plaintiffs in a certified class action brought a refusals motion to compel the defendant, Bruce Monk, to answer 31 questions refused and 6 questions taken under advisement during his examination for discovery.

The underlying action involves allegations that the defendant took intimate photographs of ballet students.

The refused questions primarily related to photographs of non-class members, including former students and staff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the questions to be immaterial, irrelevant, disproportionate, and an overreaching fishing expedition, noting that discovery in class proceedings is generally restricted to certified common issues.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Royal Winnipeg Ballet and a former instructor/photographer, Bruce Monk.

The plaintiffs alleged that Monk took intimate photographs of students in private settings and disseminated them without consent, constituting sexual assault, breach of fiduciary duty, and invasion of privacy.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed causes of action, there was an identifiable class, and there were 23 common issues.

The court also found that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure and that the representative plaintiffs were suitable.

The certification motion was granted.

The appellant challenged the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued under the Mental Health Act on the grounds that not all participants in the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) signed it within 72 hours of the medical examination.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the CTO valid, holding that only the examining physician was required to sign within the 72-hour period.

The Superior Court appeal judge reversed, finding that all participants must sign within 72 hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 72-hour requirement applies only to the examining physician's entry into the CTP, not to other service providers who indicate their agreement to the plan.

The appellant suffered a crush injury to his forearm requiring amputation when his arm became caught in a loop of rope during a tug-of-war event at a campground owned by the respondent Marina.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the Marina and its principal, excluding key discovery evidence on technical grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in excluding discovery evidence of third parties and in concluding there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding vicarious liability of the Marina and its principal for the actions of the principal's son, who had provided the defective rope.

Justin Mitchell appealed the Consent and Capacity Board's decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Banik's finding of treatment incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of reasonableness, focusing on the appellant's ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof, as per *Starson v. Swayze*.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, noting the appellant's contradictory evidence and disordered thinking, which precluded him from weighing risks and benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Board's finding of incapacity was confirmed for both anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

L.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to insufficient medical evidence regarding L.W.'s capacity at the time of the hearing and the Board's failure to address the corroboration requirement for the physician's opinion.

While the court upheld the Board's discretionary decision to refuse an adjournment, it ultimately set aside the Board's finding of incapacity and ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel based on an updated record.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to anti-psychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan, and confirming a Community Treatment Order.

The Superior Court upheld the Board's finding on incapacity, noting the appellant's lack of insight into her condition.

However, the court granted the appeal regarding the Community Treatment Order, finding it invalid because the Community Treatment Plan was not 'entered into' by all required parties within 72 hours of the physician's examination, as required by the Mental Health Act.

In an undefended civil trial arising from historic childhood sexual assaults by an uncle against two nieces, the court found liability for sexual assault and battery and held that causation flowed from that tort without requiring findings on the remaining pleaded torts.

Relying on expert psychological evidence, the court awarded substantial non-pecuniary, aggravated, punitive, future care, past care, and loss of earning capacity damages for enduring trauma, PTSD-related symptoms, anxiety, depression, and functional impairment.

A family member's derivative claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act failed for lack of evidence.

The plaintiffs also received prejudgment interest and substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants, former senior officers and directors of Hollinger Inc., appealed an order compelling them to submit to questioning by an Inspector appointed under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

They argued that being compelled to answer questions in Canada would violate their Charter rights against self-incrimination, as their answers could be used against them in ongoing criminal proceedings in the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were not entitled to a constitutional exemption because the Canadian inquiry was fact-finding rather than prosecutorial.

The Court also declined to stay the order, noting that the application judge had established a procedure to rule on specific questions and craft protective mechanisms on a case-by-case basis.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, which was based on the finding that the underlying action had been lying dormant since 1996.

The Court of Appeal reviewed new court material not available to the motions judge, which demonstrated the action was not dormant.

The Court set aside the order in the interests of justice, allowing the respondent to renew its motion with full consideration of the delay.