Gillian Tiffin Hnatiw

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for damages arising from a sexual assault that occurred on December 4, 2017.

The defendant was convicted of the offence in February 2023 and sentenced to six years imprisonment.

The plaintiff claimed general and aggravated damages for sexual assault and battery, breach of privacy, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and pecuniary damages including loss of competitive advantage and future care costs.

The defendant did not file responding affidavit material and the parties agreed the case was suitable for summary judgment.

The court found the plaintiff entitled to damages and assessed general and aggravated damages at $225,000, loss of competitive advantage at $25,000, future care costs at $7,500, and an OHIP subrogated claim of $687.

The court also awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

This endorsement addresses costs following an appeal decision.

The appellant, Nathalie Xian Yi Yan, was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to two sets of respondents and substantial indemnity costs to a third respondent, Edward Lawrence Marrocco.

The substantial indemnity costs were awarded due to the appellant's frivolous, vexatious, and unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct, dishonesty, illegality, and conspiracy against Mr. Marrocco.

The appellant, a traditional Chinese medicine practitioner, launched 19 civil claims against individuals involved in disciplinary proceedings against her, including investigators, College counsel, and independent legal counsel to the Discipline Committee.

These claims alleged defamation, professional negligence, evidence tampering, and breach of due process.

The motion judge struck these claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, being barred by statutory immunity under the Regulated Health Professions Act, and constituting an impermissible collateral attack on the tribunal's decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming the application of statutory immunity, absolute privilege for statements in judicial/tribunal proceedings, and the rule against collateral attacks, and denied leave to amend the claims or appeal the costs awards.

The appellant challenged the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued under the Mental Health Act on the grounds that not all participants in the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) signed it within 72 hours of the medical examination.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the CTO valid, holding that only the examining physician was required to sign within the 72-hour period.

The Superior Court appeal judge reversed, finding that all participants must sign within 72 hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 72-hour requirement applies only to the examining physician's entry into the CTP, not to other service providers who indicate their agreement to the plan.

The appellant suffered a crush injury to his forearm requiring amputation when his arm became caught in a loop of rope during a tug-of-war event at a campground owned by the respondent Marina.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the Marina and its principal, excluding key discovery evidence on technical grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in excluding discovery evidence of third parties and in concluding there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding vicarious liability of the Marina and its principal for the actions of the principal's son, who had provided the defective rope.

Justin Mitchell appealed the Consent and Capacity Board's decision that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

The Board had confirmed Dr. Banik's finding of treatment incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of reasonableness, focusing on the appellant's ability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment or lack thereof, as per *Starson v. Swayze*.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, noting the appellant's contradictory evidence and disordered thinking, which precluded him from weighing risks and benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Board's finding of incapacity was confirmed for both anti-psychotic and ancillary medications.

L.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to insufficient medical evidence regarding L.W.'s capacity at the time of the hearing and the Board's failure to address the corroboration requirement for the physician's opinion.

While the court upheld the Board's discretionary decision to refuse an adjournment, it ultimately set aside the Board's finding of incapacity and ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel based on an updated record.