Joanna H. Weiss

Mr. Paspalovski appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Agrawal.

The appeal raised three issues: whether the Board erred in applying the test for incapacity, whether it misapprehended the evidence, and whether the CTO was invalid due to the 72-hour rule for Community Treatment Plans (CTPs).

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the test for capacity, did not make a palpable and overriding error in assessing evidence, and that the 72-hour rule in the Mental Health Act does not require all parties to sign the CTP within that timeframe, only that the physician be satisfied the criteria are met and treatment is available.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding her incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication and a community treatment plan (CTP).

The appeal raised three grounds: the CTP's reference to a prospective referral to CMHA-Peel, the alleged withdrawal of the substitute decision-maker, and the Board's brevity in assessing the appellant's capacity.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable on all grounds.

The appellant, who has a long history of schizophrenia, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider her preference for homeopathic treatments and her views on the traditional medical model.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding ample evidence that the appellant's mental illness prevented her from recognizing her condition and appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

L.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that confirmed a finding of incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to insufficient medical evidence regarding L.W.'s capacity at the time of the hearing and the Board's failure to address the corroboration requirement for the physician's opinion.

While the court upheld the Board's discretionary decision to refuse an adjournment, it ultimately set aside the Board's finding of incapacity and ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted panel based on an updated record.

The appellant, J.S., appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) dated November 11, 2015, and another confirming her lack of capacity to consent to treatment prescribed under her Community Treatment Plan.

The Superior Court reviewed the Board's findings on the validity of the CTO, the reasonableness of its confirmation, and the finding of incapacity.

The court dismissed both appeals, upholding the Board's decisions, finding that a technical error on the CTO form was not fatal, the Board reasonably concluded that without the CTO, the appellant was likely to suffer substantial mental deterioration, and the finding of incapacity was reasonable given the appellant's inability to appreciate her mental illness due to the disorder itself.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board concluded that although the appellant understood the information relevant to treatment decisions, he was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant argued that the Board misapprehended evidence, lacked proof of treatment benefits, and failed to properly address risks and benefits of the medication.

The court held that the Board’s findings were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the appellant’s persistent denial of mental illness and inability to appreciate the purpose and consequences of treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of reasonable outcomes.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a psychiatrist’s finding that the patient was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic and related medications.

The appeal concerned the statutory test for incapacity under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act and whether the Board’s findings were reasonable.

Applying the reasonableness standard from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held the Board reasonably concluded that the patient could not understand relevant treatment information or appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment due to a mental disorder.

The Board was entitled to rely on the psychiatrist’s evidence and aspects of the patient’s testimony demonstrating lack of insight into the illness.

No basis existed for judicial interference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment for a mental disorder under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment due to delusional beliefs preventing appreciation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication.

The court held that the Board’s finding of incapacity with respect to anti‑psychotic medication and related side‑effect medication was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the evidentiary record contained insufficient information regarding benzodiazepines and cholinergic medication.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the matter remitted to the Board for a rehearing on those medications before a differently constituted panel.

Appeal from two Consent and Capacity Board decisions confirming involuntary status and treatment incapacity for a psychiatric patient.

The court held the involuntary admission appeal was moot after the appellant's discharge under a Community Treatment Order and declined to exercise discretion to hear it.

On the treatment incapacity appeal, the court applied the s. 4 Health Care Consent Act, 1996 test and found the Board's conclusion on the first branch was unreasonable, but upheld the second branch for antipsychotic and mood stabilizing treatment.

The appeal succeeded only in relation to benzodiazepines and related side effect medication and lab tests because the evidentiary record was insufficient, and that issue was remitted to the Board for re-hearing.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order and her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Community Treatment Order expired and was not renewed.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion and quashed the appeals, finding that there was no longer a live controversy and a decision would have no practical effect.

Appeal from two Consent and Capacity Board decisions finding the appellant incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment and incapable of managing property.

The court held that the Board reasonably applied the statutory tests under the Health Care Consent Act and the Substitute Decisions Act, and did not improperly substitute a best interests analysis for the legal test for capacity.

The court also upheld the Board’s finding that the Mental Health Act transmission requirements for the certificate of incapacity and financial statement had been met.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed two Consent and Capacity Board decisions confirming incapacity to consent to treatment and renewing a Community Treatment Order.

Applying the reasonableness standard to the predominantly factual issues, the court held that the Board reasonably found the appellant could understand treatment information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that the Board reasonably found compliance with the statutory requirements for CTO renewal under the Mental Health Act, including the provision of required documents, consultation on the treatment plan, physician assessment, and substitute decision-maker consent.

Both appeals were dismissed.