Kate Deakon

This is a partial appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, which confirmed the Appellant's incapacity regarding treatment with antipsychotic medications, while revoking his involuntary detention certificate.

The Appellant, representing himself, appealed the incapacity finding, alleging violations of his rights and attributing his issues to his ex-wife and a conspiracy.

The court applied the appellate standard of review, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's decision.

The court affirmed that the Appellant's delusional beliefs prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of treatment or no treatment, as per the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and relevant case law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her involuntary status and finding her incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medications.

The appellant, who represented herself, argued that the Board failed to adequately consider her foresight regarding the risks of the medications and her prior capable wishes.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the palpable and overriding error standard of review and found that the Board made no reviewable errors in concluding that the appellant's mental disorder prevented her from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the treatment decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Omar Kanama, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that upheld a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by Dr. Ian Weinroth.

The CTO was issued after Mr. Kanama's previous CTO lapsed due to administrative error, and he was subsequently assessed for capacity without proper advance notice or full disclosure of his rights.

The Board's majority found no prejudice despite procedural failures, while the dissenting member argued the process was unfair and violated Charter values.

The Superior Court found the assessment process to be procedurally unfair due to multiple failures by the healthcare team, including lack of proper notice, misleading communication through the mother, and delayed provision of mandatory forms.

The court emphasized the importance of procedural fairness, especially for vulnerable individuals, and held that the Board erred in treating procedural fairness as a discretionary matter.

The appeal was allowed, and the CTO was set aside.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming their incapacity to consent to treatment for a mental disorder.

The appellant argued the Board made factual errors, specifically confusing two medications.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Board made minor factual errors, they did not amount to palpable and overriding errors that would vitiate the Board's conclusion regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant, under a detention order from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) following a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) finding, appealed the ORB's decision to continue his detention.

The appellant argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant risk to public safety and sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk, based on psychiatric evidence of likely decompensation and violence if discharged, was reasonable.

The court also found the ORB reasonably considered and rejected a conditional discharge, given the risk of rapid deterioration.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible in 2008 for aggravated assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to continue her detention order.

She sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing the Board failed to adequately explain its finding that she remained a significant threat to public safety and neglected its inquisitorial duty to explore less restrictive dispositions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's reasons transparent and intelligible, and that it had no further inquisitorial duty given the record and the appellant's position that she did not want restrictions.

The plaintiffs commenced a third separate action in Toronto against neonatal care professionals and a hospital for injuries sustained by a newborn, having already commenced two actions in Brampton for the same injuries arising from a car accident and birthing care.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Toronto action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs should have sought leave to add them to the existing Brampton actions.

The court agreed, finding the separate action was a tactical maneuver to avoid the leave requirement and potential limitation period defences.

The court stayed the Toronto action pending a motion to amend in Brampton, while strongly criticizing the parties for engaging in costly and delaying procedural disputes contrary to the culture shift mandated by Hryniak.

The applicant, Lo-Ming Lum, brought two motions before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

These motions arose from an earlier action she initiated, which was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious by the Superior Court, with an order barring her from further proceedings without leave.

The motions sought to set aside an order by a single Divisional Court judge and to obtain leave to appeal another interlocutory order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions, affirming that appeals from a single Divisional Court judge lie to a panel of the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The court also issued an order under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the applicant to obtain leave from a single judge of the Court of Appeal before taking any further steps or proceedings related to this action in that court, citing her disregard for prior orders and procedural misuse.

The appellants, three physicians who practiced in the respondent hospital's urgent care centre, appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal action.

The trial judge dismissed the claim on the ground that it was barred by section 44(5) of the Public Hospitals Act, which immunizes hospitals from liability for acts done in good faith when a hospital board decides to cease providing a service.

The appellants argued that section 44(5) should not apply based on legislative history and the characterization of their status as dependent contractors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that section 44(5) is clear and all-encompassing, barring all proceedings for damages arising from a hospital's decision to cease providing a service, regardless of the legal characterization of the terminated physicians' status.