Kathryn Marshall

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim under rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, a lawyer and his law firm, failed to file responding evidence, a factum, or appear at the hearing.

The court found the claim deficient, confusing, and lacking material facts for the pleaded torts.

The motion was granted, the statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend, and the action was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the successful defendants on a substantial indemnity basis due to the frivolous and vexatious nature of the pleading and the plaintiffs' non-compliance with court orders.

The defendant municipality brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff former city councillor's statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The plaintiff had sued for constructive dismissal, alleging she was forced to resign due to workplace harassment by another councillor.

The court found that under municipal law and the statutory framework, an elected city councillor is not an employee of the municipality.

Consequently, the employment-based claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action and were struck, with leave granted to amend the pleadings.

The Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms (JCCF) appealed a motion judge's order requiring it to pay $156,461.99 in costs following an unsuccessful interlocutory injunction motion brought by students against Seneca College's COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Court of Appeal found the costs order fundamentally flawed because the motion judge failed to determine if the litigation was public interest litigation and did not apply the correct legal tests for awarding costs against a non-party (the "person of straw" test or abuse of process).

The Court clarified that fundraising or promoting a case on a website does not constitute abuse of process.

The Court also stated that JCCF's refusal to disclose whether it was indemnifying the students was a relevant consideration for costs.

The appeal was allowed, the costs order set aside, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for a fresh determination.

This is a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal of a costs award made against a non-party public interest organization.

The proposed interveners, a group of three public interest organizations, sought to make submissions on the appropriate legal standard for awarding non-party costs against non-profit and public interest organizations, particularly concerning fundraising activities.

The court granted leave to intervene, finding that while the underlying dispute was private, the issues raised involved broader public policy considerations, and the proposed interveners could offer a useful, non-duplicative contribution to the appeal.

The applicants, students at Seneca College, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the college's mandatory Covid-19 vaccination policy.

They argued the policy violated their rights under sections 2(a), 7, 8, and 15 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to establish a strong prima facie case.

The court held that their objections were based on personal preference rather than a comprehensive moral code, and the policy did not force medical treatment but rather presented a choice with consequences.

The court also found no irreparable harm and held that the balance of convenience favored the public interest in health and safety.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, arguing that his responsibilities had changed following the hiring of a new senior employee, which he contended amounted to a constructive dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's argument directly contradicted the trial judge's factual findings.

The trial judge had expressly found that the appellant maintained his role as general manager, that there was no change in the company's hierarchy, and no evidence of a change in his remuneration or bonus package.

The appellate court concluded that the trial judge made no legal error and that her well-supported factual findings were fatal to the appellant's position.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Master's decision allowing claims for damages by Vivian Bercovici against Katie Telford, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister, to proceed.

The claims arose from Bercovici's dismissal as Canada's Ambassador to Israel and included intentional infliction of mental suffering and bad faith post-termination conduct.

The Master had dismissed the mental suffering claim but allowed the bad faith claim to proceed against Telford personally.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that under Ontario law, only employers can be liable for bad faith conduct committed by their employees within the scope of employment regarding employment contracts.

Consequently, the personal claim against Katie Telford for bad faith post-termination conduct was dismissed.

Leave was granted to Bercovici to amend her Statement of Claim to plead conduct beyond the scope of employment.

The plaintiff, a former ambassador to Israel, commenced an action against the Attorney General of Canada by notice of action.

After the two-year limitation period expired, she attempted to add five individual government officials as defendants by naming them in her statement of claim.

The court held that adding parties requires a court order under Rule 5.04(2) and cannot be done simply by expanding the statement of claim.

The motion to add four of the defendants was dismissed as statute-barred.

The motion to add the fifth defendant, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff, was allowed only in respect of a bad faith claim arising from post-termination conduct that occurred within the limitation period.

The court found the plaintiff failed to plead a tenable claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering against the fifth defendant.

This decision addresses costs arising from a Rule 21 motion to strike a statement of claim based on a limitations defence, and an associated refusals motion.

The plaintiff, Kola Iluyomade, was technically successful on the Rule 21 motion, which was dismissed without prejudice to the defendants reasserting the limitations defence later.

Both parties sought costs; the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendants sought partial indemnity costs for wasted efforts and the refusals motion.

The court found good reason to depart from the normal rule that the successful party is entitled to costs, citing the plaintiff's "pyrrhic victory" on the Rule 21 motion, divided success on the refusals motion, and the non-productive nature of the procedural skirmishes.

The court also deemed the plaintiff's Rule 49 offer to settle "hollow." Ultimately, the court ordered no costs, leaving each party to bear their own.

The defendants brought a motion to strike several causes of action from the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal and workplace harassment claim.

The court struck the claims against the individual defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, failure to provide a safe work environment, harassment, and discrimination under the Human Rights Code, finding they were not properly pleaded as independent torts or lacked material facts.

The claim against the employer for failure to provide a safe work environment was also struck.

The court allowed the claim for intentional infliction of mental suffering against one individual defendant to proceed.

The plaintiff was granted leave to amend the struck claims.

The plaintiff, a former employee of the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC), sued TCHC, several individual TCHC employees, the City of Toronto, and the City Ombudsman for wrongful dismissal and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an investigation into TCHC's eviction practices.

The Ombudsman Defendants and the individual TCHC Defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the Ombudsman Defendants' motion, finding the claim against them was an abuse of process and barred by absolute privilege under the City of Toronto Act.

The court dismissed the individual TCHC Defendants' motion, finding it was arguable that the limitation period for the intentional infliction of mental suffering claim did not begin to run until the plaintiff was dismissed, as a proceeding would not have been an appropriate remedy before that time.

The appellants, three physicians who practiced in the respondent hospital's urgent care centre, appealed the dismissal of their wrongful dismissal action.

The trial judge dismissed the claim on the ground that it was barred by section 44(5) of the Public Hospitals Act, which immunizes hospitals from liability for acts done in good faith when a hospital board decides to cease providing a service.

The appellants argued that section 44(5) should not apply based on legislative history and the characterization of their status as dependent contractors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that section 44(5) is clear and all-encompassing, barring all proceedings for damages arising from a hospital's decision to cease providing a service, regardless of the legal characterization of the terminated physicians' status.