citation: "Joseph Dessye v. Ariana Lopez, 2025 ONCJ 429" parties: "Joseph Dessye v. Ariana Lopez" party_moving: "Joseph Dessye" party_responding: "Ariana Lopez" court: "Ontario Court of Justice" court_abbreviation: "ONCJ" jurisdiction: "Ontario" case_type: "trial" date_judgement: "2025-08-19" date_heard:

• "2025-05-05"
• "2025-05-06"
• "2025-05-07"
• "2025-05-08"
• "2025-05-09"
• "2025-05-12" applicant:
• "Joseph Dessye" applicant_counsel:
• "Roger Rowe" respondent:
• "Ariana Lopez" respondent_counsel:
• "Arthur Brown" judge: "Sara Mintz" winning_degree_applicant: 2 winning_degree_respondent: 3 judge_bias_applicant: 1 judge_bias_respondent: 2 year: 2025 decision_number: 429 file_number: "24-00044921-0000" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2025/2025oncj429/2025oncj429.html" cited_cases: legislation:
  • title: "Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/900c11"
  • title: "Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg. 391/97" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/970391" case_law:
  • title: "K. (M.) v. E. (M.), 2016 CarswellNS 1064 (N.S. Fam. Ct.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ns/nsfamilyct/doc/2016/2016canlii1064/2016canlii1064.html"
  • title: "Re: Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ns/nssc/doc/2008/2008nssc283/2008nssc283.html"
  • title: "Faryna v. Chorney, [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1952/1952canlii191/1952canlii191.html"
  • title: "Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, 2005 CanLII 1625 (ON CA)" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2005/1625"
  • title: "Andrade v. Kennelly, 2007 ONCA 898" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2007/898"
  • title: "Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC)" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scc/1996/191"
  • title: "Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC)" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scc/1993/34"
  • title: "E.M.B. v. M.F.B., 2021 ONSC 4264" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2021/4264"
  • title: "Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2022/6510"
  • title: "White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2021/41"
  • title: "Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2021/2021onsc1736/2021onsc1736.html"
  • title: "Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2021/2480"
  • title: "Mokhov v. Ratayeva, 2021 ONSC 5454" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2021/5454"
  • title: "Geremia v. Harb, 2008 CanLII 19764 (Ont. S.C.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2008/2008canlii19764/2008canlii19764.html"
  • title: "S. (S.) v. K. (S.), 2013 CarswellOnt 10801, 2013 ONCJ 432" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2013/432"
  • title: "Chomos v. Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5208" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2015/5208"
  • title: "Koliniati v. Manolessos, 2025 ONSC 3274" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2025/3274"
  • title: "Klymenko v. Klymenko, 2020 ONSC 5451" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2020/5451"
  • title: "Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, 2004 ONCJ 374" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2004/2004oncj374/2004oncj374.html"
  • title: "Tuttle v. Tuttle, 2014 ONSC 5011" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc5011/2014onsc5011.html"
  • title: "C.S. v. K.M., 2023 ONCJ 106" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2023/106"
  • title: "Guadalaxara v. Viau, 2014 ONSC 545" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2014/545"
  • title: "Luke v. Luke, 2014 ONSC 422" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2014/422"
  • title: "Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 ONCJ 274" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/oncj/doc/2006/2006oncj274/2006oncj274.html"
  • title: "R.D.R. v. K.D.N., 2024 CanLII 1 R.F.L. (9th) 396 (Sask. K.B.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skkb/doc/2024/2024canlii1/2024canlii1.html"
  • title: "Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2021/201"
  • title: "Seyad v. Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2022/501"
  • title: "Mulik v. McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2023/148"
  • title: "R.B.J. v. B.N.R.J., 2020 ONCJ 399" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2020/399"
  • title: "Jamieson v. Jamieson, 2020 ONSC 6935" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2020/6935"
  • title: "Jiang v. Zeng, 2019 ONSC 1457" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2019/1457"
  • title: "Drygala v. Pauli, 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA)" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2002/41868"
  • title: "Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2025/200"
  • title: "Smith v. Pellegrini, 2008 CanLII 46927 (ON SC)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2008/2008canlii46927/2008canlii46927.html"
  • title: "Maimone v. Maimone, 2009 CanLII 25981 (ON SC)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2009/2009canlii25981/2009canlii25981.html"
  • title: "Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2016/4719"
  • title: "Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2012/1548"
  • title: "Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2018/4583"
  • title: "Filippetto v. Timpano, 2008 CanLII 3962 (ON SC)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2008/2008canlii3962/2008canlii3962.html"
  • title: "T.L. v. D.S., 2019 ONCJ 809" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2019/809"
  • title: "Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2020/4785"
  • title: "Prillo v. Homer, 2023 ONCJ 8" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/ocj/2023/8"
  • title: "Sobiegraj v. Sobiegraj, 2014 ONSC 2030" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2014/2030"
  • title: "Lu v. Zhao, 2012 ONSC 5354, aff'd 2014 ONCA 12" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/scj/2012/5354"
  • title: "Park v. Thompson, 2005 CanLII 14132 (ON CA)" url: "https://www.minicounsel.ca/oca/2005/14132"
  • title: "Kilrea v. Kilrea, [1998] O.J. No. 3677 (Gen. Div.)" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/1998/1998canlii7701/1998canlii7701.html" summary: > A trial concerning parenting and child support arrangements for a 2.5-year-old child. The applicant sought shared decision-making responsibility and unsupervised parenting time on a graduated schedule. The respondent sought sole decision-making responsibility and indefinite supervised parenting time. The court found that the respondent had unilaterally terminated the applicant's parenting time, minimized his role, and created barriers to his involvement with the child. The court ordered shared decision-making responsibility with the respondent having final decision-making authority in case of disagreement, a graduated schedule of unsupervised parenting time progressing to overnight weekend visits, communication through AppClose, and child support based on imputed income with significant arrears. interesting_citations_summary: > The decision provides important guidance on shared decision-making responsibility in high-conflict family law cases, particularly where one parent has engaged in a campaign of alienation. The court applied the principles from Kaplanis v. Kaplanis and Andrade v. Kennelly, finding that shared decision-making can be ordered despite poor communication when one parent is primarily responsible for the conflict. The decision also addresses the evidentiary challenges of surreptitious recordings in family law proceedings, citing Hameed v. Hameed and R.D.R. v. K.D.N., and establishes that such evidence must be authenticated and sufficiently probative to outweigh prejudicial effects. The court's analysis of income imputation under the Child Support Guidelines, referencing Drygala v. Pauli and Kohli v. Thom, demonstrates the application of intentional underemployment principles and the drawing of adverse inferences for failure to disclose. The decision also addresses the test for supervised parenting time, citing Klymenko v. Klymenko and Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi, establishing that the person seeking supervision bears the burden of proving necessity. final_judgement: > The court orders shared decision-making responsibility for major health, education, and welfare decisions, with the respondent having final decision-making authority in case of disagreement. Religion and spiritual training shall be each party's responsibility while the child is in their care. The applicant shall have a graduated schedule of unsupervised parenting time progressing from four-hour Saturday visits and three-hour Tuesday evening visits to overnight weekend visits and two weekday evening visits by April 2026. The parties shall communicate through AppClose regarding child-related matters only. The applicant shall pay child support of $476 per month based on imputed income of $51,717, with arrears of $12,580 to be paid at $300 per month. The respondent requires leave of court to bring further proceedings, limited to four pages double-spaced. keywords:
• Parenting time
• Decision-making responsibility
• Child support
• Imputed income
• Supervised access
• Alienation
• Family violence
• Credibility assessment
• Surreptitious recordings
• Arrears areas_of_law:
• Family Law
• Parenting Orders
• Child Support
• Decision-Making Responsibility
• Parenting Time

ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE

DATE: August 19, 2025

COURT FILE NO.: 24-00044921-0000

BETWEEN:

JOSEPH DESSYE

Applicant

— AND —

ARIANA LOPEZ

Respondent

Before: Justice Sara Mintz

Heard on: May 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 12, 2025

Reasons for Decision released on: August 19, 2025

Counsel:

• Roger Rowe, for the Applicant
• Arthur Brown, for the Respondent

INTRODUCTION

1This trial was about parenting and child support arrangements for the parties' 2.5 year-old child, J.D.L. ("child"). The most significant issue was the Respondent's ("Mother") request that the Applicant's ("Father") parenting time with the child be supervised.

2The trial lasted six days, being May 5-9, and 12, 2025.

3Both parties filed Affidavits for their evidence in chief. They gave additional oral evidence and were cross examined. The Father called the paternal grandmother, G.D. ("paternal grandmother"). He filed the Affidavit of M.C., but she was not called to testify and was not made available for cross-examination. The Mother called A.T., J.R., and I.D.C. She filed an Affidavit from her son, D.L., but did not call him to testify or make him available for cross-examination. She also unsuccessfully attempted to add a witness, J.H., at the start of trial.

4On the second day of trial, the parties consented to a final order that the child's primary residence shall be with the Mother.

ISSUES

5The issues to be decided and the Court's decision on each issue are as follows:

1. Who should have decision-making responsibility for the child?

The Court orders shared decision-making responsibility for major health, education and welfare decisions, with a process for communications and timelines. If the parties do not agree on an issue, the Mother will make the decision. Religion and spiritual training shall be the responsibility of each party while the child is in their care.

2. What should the schedule be for the Father's parenting time, and should it be supervised or unsupervised?

The Court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to have a graduated schedule of unsupervised parenting time with the Father, progressing to overnight weekend and weekday evening visits.

3. What ancillary parenting orders should be made, including regarding communication, a Restraining Order or no contact order, access to information from the child's third-party care providers, travel, and government identification?

The Court orders that the parties communicate via AppClose. The Court declines to make the order requested by the Mother allowing her to obtain government documentation for the child and travel with the child without the Father's consent. The Court orders the Mother to provide information to the Father regarding the child's third party care providers. The Court further orders that the parties have no contact other than through AppClose and only with respect to the child. The Court declines to make a Restraining Order.

4. What should the child support payments be, both prospectively and retroactively? What is the Father's income for child support purposes?

The Court imputes income to the Father of $51,717 per annum for child support purposes. He shall pay child support from December 1, 2022. The Father has child support arrears of $12,580, which shall be paid at a rate of $300 per month.

BACKGROUND

6The Father is a 30-year-old (at the time of trial) seasonal construction worker. He also works as a subcontractor. He lives in the paternal family home with his parents, who help support him. His mother is a social worker, and his father is a retired social worker. He is currently on Ontario Works. The Father is Christian.

7The Mother is 47 years old. She was born in Hungary and moved to Canada in 1989. She has been married before, and lived with her ex-husband in Sydney, Australia for 8 years. She has two children from two separate relationships, D.L. (approximately 19 years old) and B.L. (approximately 13 years old), who live with her and the child in a four-bedroom home in North York. The Mother re-entered Canada in October 2021. She has her citizenship in Hungary, Canada and Australia.

8The Mother has completed two diplomas from college, for legal assistant and paralegal work. She is presently not working, although she worked previously as a paralegal and as a claims agent for an insurance company. She testified about her paralegal and legal assistant work and her own business. She is in the process of reinstating her paralegal licence, which lapsed, according to her, because she was out of the country for too long and she did not complete her annual reporting requirements.

9The Mother started law school in approximately 2018/2019. She transferred her schooling online when she moved back to Canada. She said she dropped all her courses because of this case, and she expressed she could not keep up. She dropped them in May 2024 around the time of the parenting time motion. She feels that this case is more important than law school. She had registered to recommence classes in May 2025.

10The Mother has not worked in Canada since 2013 when she initially left for Australia. She claims she had a serious car accident in February 2023 and is presently in physiotherapy. She is not on any medication for the accident, although she claims she is unable to work because of it. She receives Ontario Works and government tax benefits, along with child support from her ex-husband and the Father. The ex-husband provides her with approximately $1200 monthly in child support.

11The parties met through an online dating app in late 2021. They dispute when the relationship ended. The Father's position is that the relationship ended in June 2022, prior to the birth of the child. He advised that the Mother wanted the relationship to continue, but he did not. He continued to interact with her to safeguard any relationship with the child. The Mother's position is that she ended the relationship in October 2022. In both positions, the relationship ended around the birth of the child.

12The parties disagree about whether they lived together. The Mother's position is that they were together for two years, and lived together from December 2021 to June 2022. The Father's position is that they never lived together. His account is supported by the testimony of the paternal grandmother.

13The Father stopped seeing the child in September 2023.

14The Father commenced an Application, which was issued on March 15, 2024. The first Case Conference took place on July 29, 2024. At the Case Conference, the parties agreed to a temporary without prejudice order for the Father to pay child support of $204 per month, based on an income of $25,519. The parties were also granted leave to bring motions; the Father for parenting time, and the Mother for decision-making responsibility. Disclosure was dealt with through a Request for Information and if necessary, 14B motion.

15The parties' motions were heard on August 30, 2024. Justice Sherr made temporary orders that the child primarily resides with the Mother and that she have decision-making responsibility. The Father was granted supervised parenting time through Access for Parents and Children in Ontario ("APCO"), and an APCO order was made. Other claims made by the parties were dismissed, namely the Mother's claims for temporary incidents of parenting and to require the Father to attend programs, and the Father's claim to rights to information about the child.

16On December 5, 2024, Justice Sherr made a disclosure order for the Father to provide documents within 45 days.

17The parties attended a further Case Conference on December 20, 2024. In the Endorsement from that appearance, Justice Sherr set the matter down for trial for the April 2025 sittings, noting in his Endorsement that the parties "have wildly different narratives". The Office of the Children's Lawyer had declined to intervene. Temporary without prejudice orders were made ("December Sherr J. Order") under s. 28 of the Children's Law Reform Act ("CLRA" or "Act") for mutual no contact, communication only through counsel or APCO, and that the Father not be within 500 meters of the child except for parenting time.

18The Trial Management Conference was held on February 14, 2025, and orders were made with respect to the conduct of the trial. There were further 14B motions with respect to the trial.

19Since the trial was not reached in the April sittings, it was scheduled to proceed in the May sittings.

THE PARTIES' CREDIBILITY

20As detailed in K. (M.) v. E. (M.), 2016 CarswellNS 1064 (N.S. Fam. Ct.), the following are some of the factors which are balanced when the Court assesses credibility:

a) What were the inconsistencies and weaknesses in the witness' evidence, which include internal inconsistencies, prior inconsistent statements, inconsistencies between the witness testimony, and the documentary evidence, and the testimony of other witnesses: Re: Novak Estate, 2008 NSSC 283 (S.C.);

b) Did the witness have an interest in the outcome or was he/she personally connected to either party;

c) Did the witness have a motive to deceive;

d) Did the witness have the ability to observe the factual matters about which he/she testified;

e) Did the witness have a sufficient power of recollection to provide the Court with an accurate account;

f) Is the testimony in harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a practical and informed person would find reasonable given the particular place and conditions: Faryna v. Chorney [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354;

g) Was there an internal consistency and logical flow to the evidence;

h) Was the evidence provided in a candid and straight forward manner, or was the witness evasive, strategic, hesitant, or biased; and

i) Where appropriate, was the witness capable of making an admission against interest, or was the witness self-serving?

Father

21The Father has credibility issues. He was evasive in answering some questions on cross-examination, including refusing outright to answer a number of questions about communications between the parties. He said he was choosing not to read inappropriate communications put to him and that he has never seen them before. He then denied that the communications were from him. He also blamed mistakes on his counsel, including issues with the direction for banking information.

22With respect to many text messages, the Father noted that the Mother had access to his phone and that she intentionally planted messages and it was not him sending inappropriate messages. The Father also claimed that the Mother had access to his Instagram when she should not have, and stole photos from his phone. He noted that the Mother was building a case against him before the baby was born, and that anything that "looks bad" he did not know about. Along with simply denying he had sent many text messages, he also answered that he did not remember sending the message, but it is definitely a lie.

23When asked what steps the Father took to limit or disconnect the Mother's access to his social media and phone, he advised that he felt the police warning given to her was sufficient. He also testified that he had significant evidence against her, which she deleted.

24The Mother testified that she had been given the passwords by the Father, and that she had only seen his phone three times. There was also a time in approximately early June 2022 where the parties were sharing her phone. She confirmed that he had given her access to the applications such as Instagram and Snapchat, but she had not had access to his phone since March 2023.

25The Court rejects the Father's explanations on the text messages. It is both improbable and implausible that the Mother would have spent years falsifying electronic communications in the event that the relationship did not work out.

26The Father did not recall basic information that one would expect reasonably to be recalled, such as what gifts and supplies he brought for the child. He had difficulties with timelines which have raised concerns about the reliability of his evidence.

27While there are portions of the Father's evidence that are troubling, the Court notes that the Father candidly made admissions against his interest. He acknowledged that he had made mistakes, including criminally and with respect to conflict and communication style with the Mother. He acknowledged using marijuana and alcohol recreationally.

28Accordingly, the Court finds some of the evidence of the Father not credible, and portions unreliable.

Mother

29The Mother had significant issues in providing her evidence to the Court. Portions of her evidence were hearsay and being offered for the truth of its contents. Her counsel advised the Court that he was trying to keep the Mother focused on her direct observations and conversations. The Court has given no weight to hearsay evidence.

30The Mother was combative with the Court after a ruling on hearsay about a third party, J.H., and also cut off her counsel when he tried to assist. She then attempted to blame Sherr J. for not being able to call J.H. because she "put her on the witness list" and "had no idea she needed to be on the Endorsement". She then blamed her lawyer and called it a "procedural issue" that was being held against her son because Justice Sherr did not put J.H.'s name on the Endorsement. She explained that Justice Sherr mistakenly put the witnesses for the parenting time motion on the TMC Endorsement. She then confirmed that although Justice Sherr's TMC Endorsement was incorrect, she took no steps to correct it because she "didn't know".

31The Mother's credibility was impacted by her tendency for hyperbole, and her claims based on conjecture. Early in her Affidavit, she wrote, "I cannot live the next 16 years of my life going in and out of family Court, writing novels like this to defend my child and/or myself, with a recorder strapped to me to exonerate myself against Joseph and his false witnesses, and their wild insane allegations and carefully engineered lies." She also referenced strapping a recorder to the child.

32The Mother repeatedly used exaggerated language to reinforce her concerns, as follows:

a) She alleged that the Father had a "psychotic fit". When that term was deemed inadmissible, she changed her language to "massive fit". She has also stated that the Father is a pathological liar or has some paranoid or delusional mental disorder.

b) She testified about the paternal grandmother refusing to answer health questions about the Father's brother, D.D. ("brother"). The Mother expressed concerns about drug use and mental illness, noting that the way it was described to her sounded like schizophrenia that was not being treated.

c) She referred to a call from Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto as a follow up to a "malicious wellness check".

d) She alleged that the Father is mentally unstable and negligent with the child.

e) She described the Father as being a seasoned con artist, and having no conscience or fear of consequences, danger or authority.

f) She advised the Court that the Father was lying about everything in his testimony with the Court, and that he has been a part of highly sophisticated scams.

g) She behaved as though her beliefs are facts, like the alleged abortions, types of drugs used, and the mental health and treatment status of members of the paternal family.

h) She referred to this proceeding as "a scam".

i) She alleged that the child's neurological development may have been impacted by the Father's "severe psychological abuse during the pregnancy".

j) She alleged that the Father showed up to parent in an inappropriate state that could have caused death, and she felt it would have been negligent of her to allow him to see the child.

k) She alleged that there had been traumatic stress on the child while in utero.

l) She alleged that her agreeing to unsupervised parenting time on a graduated scale would be like signing the child's death certificate.

m) She advised that an unsupervised parenting time order is tantamount to the Court signing the child's death certificate.

33The Mother gave contradictory testimony. Concerning the termination of the relationship, the Mother claims that the parties' relationship ended on October 1, 2023. However, in her evidence in chief, she noted that they broke up in the summer of 2023 for two months, after she had told him there would be no more visits and he could go to Court. She recounted that in August, he duped her into seeing him, but she did not let him in the house. She alleged that the Father became angry because she would not reconcile. These facts support the Father's claim of separating in June 2023.

34The Mother also contradicted herself with her evidence on her schooling. In her trial Affidavit, sworn April 29, 2025, she states, "I am in fact currently in law school…I am taking my courses on zoom". This is not correct. She testified orally that she is not presently taking courses having dropped them almost a year prior, instead preferring to focus on this case. Enrolment and attendance are distinct differences.

35On cross-examination, the Mother was argumentative and often did not answer the questions asked of her. For example, when asked about why she would follow Court orders when she took the law into her own hands, her answer was about the Father and his alleged shortcomings. At times, the Father would have to repeat the question different ways to obtain an answer.

36These are just some of the concerns the Court had with the Mother's credibility and reliability. Other concerning examples will be detailed throughout this decision below.

37The Mother did not acknowledge her responsibility in the communications and conflict with the Father. As such, the Court finds significant portions of the Mother's evidence not credible.

38The Mother's unreasonably emotionally charged and skewed perspective of events made her evidence unreliable. The Court treated her evidence with considerable caution.

WITNESS TESTIMONY AND CREDIBILITY

Paternal Grandmother

39The paternal grandmother is a social worker of 35 years. She lives in a home in Scarborough with her husband, the paternal grandfather and the Father. She recounted the initial interactions between her and the Mother, and her limited interaction with the child. She detailed the Trinidadian and Ethiopian heritage of the family.

40She provided details about concerns of harassing behaviour from the Mother, and the impact of those concerns on her relationship with the Mother and child.

41The paternal grandmother testified in a straightforward and honest manner. She expressed surprise and disappointment upon learning that the Father was driving a motor vehicle while his licence was suspended. She made admissions about the conflict in the relationship that were adverse to the Father's claims for shared decision-making responsibility.

A.T.

42A.T. is a good friend of the Mother's for over 20 years. He refers to her as Carla, which was her prior name. Much of his testimony was hearsay.

43A.T. testified about his involvement with the parties through Jiffy, a home maintenance service provider. He claims that the Father approached him to open a sole proprietorship for Jiffy clients and in return, would teach A.T. construction work. He expressed how he obtained a CIBC bank account with the Mother for Jiffy clients, but did not access the account. He alleged that the CIBC fraud department cautioned him, but he authorized the cashing of a cheque. He alleged that the Father took money and did not complete the work, and accordingly, Jiffy threatened legal action to pay back over $30,000. He alleged that he reached out to the Father about money owed to Jiffy, with the Father responding that he would repay the funds, including at Newmarket traffic Court.

44A.T. expressed that he will be reporting the Father for the fraud for the Jiffy funds. He alleged that the Father was impersonating him to Jiffy clients.

45A.T. did not hold up well under cross-examination. Throughout the various questions, he ended up confirming that the Mother provided much of the information in his Affidavit, including information that the Father spent the Jiffy client deposits. There were a number of pieces of evidence that A.T. did not observe himself or verify independently in his Affidavit.

J.R.

46J.R.'s husband is a former tenant in the paternal family home, residing in the basement. The husband did not testify at trial. Much of her evidence was hearsay about interactions between her husband and the paternal family. She alleged that the paternal grandfather defrauded her and her husband on the sale of a vehicle. She further alleged that the paternal grandfather scams or mistreats immigrants. She testified that the Father is a good person but his family is not good.

47J.R. was not a credible witness. She admitted that she has a bad memory and has problems remembering dates. The alleged scam took place approximately four years prior. There were also differences in her Affidavit and oral evidence. She testified that she is always willing to help another woman who is afraid for her son, and that she will help the Mother or any other woman who is trying to fight to keep her son safe. J.R. explained that she feels empathy as she also has a son.

48When pressed in cross-examination, J.R. could not appropriately explain why she had not taken any steps to report the alleged fraud or attempted through formal channels to get her funds back. She then also testified that she would not try to get all the funds back, just some, because she is very gentle. The Court finds this testimony nonsensical, and it raises serious questions as to the validity of the fraud allegations.

49The bulk of this testimony was about the paternal grandfather, who was not a party to this case and was not a witness. The relevance of any admissible evidence is limited, at best.

I.D.C.

50I.D.C. is the Mother's neighbour. She is a 30-year OPS employee. She testified about the incident that took place between the parties on June 8, 2022. I.D.C. also testified about her caring for the Mother's dog to assist after her car accident.

51I.D.C. testified in an honest and straightforward manner.

EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

52Along with significant hearsay testimony proffered as evidence to the Court, there were several documentary and other evidence issues.

53The Court gives little to no weight to the following:

a) Photographs of the paternal family obtained by the Mother, as there are authenticity and relevance issues;

b) Evidence obtained through surreptitious recordings (detailed below);

c) Communications from persons who were not witnesses at trial, unless the communication was directly to a party, otherwise the evidence is hearsay;

d) Illegible documents, or documents which had portions that were illegible, which includes Ontario Works information;

e) Evidence that breached the rule in Brown v. Dunn, particularly relating to the testimony of the paternal grandmother;

f) Documents referenced in evidence but not properly before the Court for trial, such as Conference Briefs and prior Court materials; and,

g) Affidavits filed of potential witnesses who did not attend Court, since there was no opportunity for the other party to test the evidence.

54The Mother insisted on making closing submissions along with her counsel. For her portion of the closing submissions, the Court has disregarded any new or inadmissible evidence she referred to in her closing.

55The Mother confirmed that she began to surreptitiously record the Father to exonerate herself, and to prove that the parties were in a two-year relationship. She testified that she told the Father that she had put an app on her phone to record the calls. She also put a recording device in her car, which the Father used. She testified that she put the recorder in the car in February 2022, and that she notified the Father of its presence a week or two later, after she caught him doing things she did not approve of, including allegedly dealing drugs in her car in March 2022. Despite this, she allowed him to continue to use her car until the end of May 2022.

56The Mother admitted to recording one of the Father's alleged sexual partners and did not know if the partner was aware she was being recorded.

57The Mother proffered significant information that she alleged she learned through recordings, such as drug use, infidelity, and potential criminal activity, including selling drugs and engaging in sexual activity with a prostitute. At times during her testimony, she alleged that eventually, the Father had admitted some of these things to her. The Father denies the allegations made by the Mother concerning his mental health, giving her sexually transmitted diseases, drug abuse, and fraud. His position is that the Mother is creating a false narrative to interfere with his relationship with the child and for a litigation advantage.

58The Father denied that he was aware he was being recorded. He explains that he discovered that he was being recorded through this Court process. He confirmed that the Mother recorded him without his prior knowledge or consent.

59Electronic recording of parenting exchanges is a growing trend which should be strongly discouraged. It puts the child in the middle. It exacerbates tensions and creates a heightened sense of potential or imminent conflict. It clearly demonstrates that the parent holding the camera is focusing more on the litigation than the emotional well-being of the child. See: Guadalaxara v. Viau, 2014 ONSC 545 (SCJ); Luke v. Luke, 2014 ONSC 422 (OCJ).

60In Hameed v. Hameed, 2006 ONCJ 274, the Court wrote:

Surreptitious recording of telephone calls by litigants in family law matters should be strongly discouraged. There is already enough conflict and mistrust in family law cases, without the parties' worrying about whether the other is secretly taping them. In a constructive family law case, the professionals and the courts work with the family to rebuild trust so that the parties can learn to act together in the best interests of the child. Condoning the secret taping of the other would be destructive to this process.

61The jurisprudence recognizes a need to balance serious systemic prejudice, along with any actual prejudice and potential harm to the family dynamic, with the legitimate desire to have all probative evidence available to the trier of fact. As such, a party tendering improperly obtained evidence must satisfy the Court that the evidence is authentic, unaltered, relevant and sufficiently probative to outweigh any prejudicial effects. See: R.D.R. v. K.D.N. (2024), 1 R.F.L. (9th) 396 (Sask. K.B.).

62The actual recordings, or transcripts of the recordings, were not placed in front of the Court. The Court cannot discern whether the information 'learned' from the recordings is authentic, unaltered, relevant and sufficiently probative to outweigh the prejudicial effects. The Mother simply wants this Court to rely on her recounting of 'dangers' she learned from the recordings. If that is not sufficient, the Mother wants the Court to rely on her vague testimony that the Father admitted to some things, like selling drugs, even though the Father denies doing so.

63The Court places little weight on the evidence gathered by surreptitious recording.

64There were also some financial documents, such as a cheque from Leaside Landscaping in 2021, that were ruled inadmissible because they had not been disclosed prior to the start of trial (and after the Father's direct evidence had been completed). Any testimony about the inadmissible documents was given limited weight.

GENERAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PARENTING ORDERS

65Subsection 18 (1) of the CLRA defines decision-making responsibility as follows:

"decision-making responsibility" means responsibility for making significant decisions about a child's well-being, including with respect to,

(a) health,

(b) education,

(c) culture, language, religion and spirituality, and

(d) significant extra-curricular activities;

66Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:

Equal entitlement to decision-making responsibility

20 (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a child's parents are equally entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child.

Rights and responsibilities

(2) A person entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to a child has the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the child, and must exercise those rights and responsibilities in the best interests of the child.

Authority to act

(3) If more than one person is entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to a child, any one of them may exercise the rights and accept the responsibilities of a parent on behalf of them in respect of the child.

If parents separate

(4) If the parents of a child live separate and apart and the child lives with one of them with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other, the right of the other to exercise the entitlement to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child, but not the entitlement to parenting time, is suspended until a separation agreement or order provides otherwise.

Parenting time

(5) The entitlement to parenting time with respect to a child includes the right to visit with and be visited by the child, and includes the same right as a parent to make inquiries and to be given information about the child's well-being, including in relation to the child's health and education.

Marriage of child

(6) The entitlement to decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child terminates on the marriage of the child.

Entitlement subject to agreement or order

(7) Any entitlement to decision-making responsibility or parenting time under this section is subject to alteration by an order of the Court or by a separation agreement.

67Subsection 21 (1) of the Act reads as follows:

21 (1) A parent of a child may apply to a Court for a parenting order respecting,

(a) decision-making responsibility with respect to the child; and

(b) parenting time with respect to the child.

68Any proceeding with respect to children is determined in the best interests of the particular child before the Court in accordance with the considerations set out in section 24 of the Act. The Court has considered these factors, where relevant.

69Subsection 24 (2) of the Act provides that the Court must give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being in determining best interests.

70Subsection 24 (3) of the Act sets out a list of factors for the Court to consider related to the circumstances of the child. It reads as follows:

Factors

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each parent, each of the child's siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;

(c) each parent's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child's care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(k) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(l) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and

(m) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

71The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. See: White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41; Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736. It is also not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the Court to take a holistic look at the child, his or her needs and the persons around the child. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.

72An assessment of the best interests of the child must take into account all of the relevant circumstances with respect to the needs of the child and the ability of each parent to meet those needs. See: Mokhov v. Ratayeva, 2021 ONSC 5454 (SCJ).

73The Court must ascertain a child's best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. See: Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC). Adult preferences or "rights" do not form part of the analysis except insofar as they are relevant to the determination of the best interests of the child. See: Young v. Young 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC); E.M.B. v. M.F.B. 2021 ONSC 4264; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.

74Section 28 of the Act sets out the different types of parenting orders that a Court can make. The relevant subsections of section 28 for this case are (1), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8). They read as follows:

Parenting Orders and Contact Orders

28 (1) The Court to which an application is made under section 21,

(a) may by order grant,

(i) decision-making responsibility with respect to a child to one or more persons, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (a) or subsection 21 (2),

(ii) parenting time with respect to a child to one or more parents of the child, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (b), or

(iii) contact with respect to a child to one or more persons other than a parent of the child, in the case of an application under subsection 21 (3);

(b) may by order determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, with respect to a child; and

(c) may make any additional order the Court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,

(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child,

(ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child,

(iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child's residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the Court,

(iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the Court,

(v) requiring the delivery, to the Court or to a person or body specified by the Court, of the child's passport, the child's health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the Court may specify,

(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the child's well-being, including in relation to the child's health and education, to another party or other person specified by the Court, or

(vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the Court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.

Allocation of decision-making responsibility

(4) The Court may allocate decision-making responsibility with respect to a child, or any aspect of it, to one or more persons.

Allocation of parenting time

(5) The Court may allocate parenting time with respect to a child by way of a schedule.

Parenting time, day-to-day decisions

(6) Unless the Court orders otherwise, a person to whom the Court allocates parenting time with respect to a child has exclusive authority during that time to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child.

Parenting plan

(7) The Court shall include in a parenting order or contact order any written parenting plan submitted by the parties that contains the elements relating to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact to which the parties agree, subject to any changes the Court may specify if it considers it to be in the best interests of the child to do so.

Right to ask for and receive information

(8) Unless a Court orders otherwise, a person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to a child under a parenting order is entitled to ask for and, subject to any applicable laws, receive information about the child's well-being, including in relation to the child's health and education, from,

(a) any other person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to the child under a parenting order; and

(b) any other person who is likely to have such information.

75Subsection 33.1 (2) of the Act addresses the importance of the parties protecting children from conflict. It reads as follows:

33. 1 Protection of children from conflict

(2) A party to a proceeding under this Part shall, to the best of the party's ability, protect any child from conflict arising from the proceeding.

ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT ON PARENTING

76The Mother's narrative is that the Father is a criminal and too dangerous, and accordingly, she requires full control to keep the child safe. Full control includes making all the decisions for the child, preventing information from flowing to the Father, and supervised parenting time for the Father.

77The Mother believed that the Father wants unsupervised parenting time for his own "sick revenge and control" and financial reasons. She noted that the child is too vulnerable at this time and that is why she is seeking primary decision-making responsibility and supervised parenting time for the Father. She recounted that she had asked the Father to sign over all his parenting rights in exchange that he would not pay any child support.

78The Mother made significant allegations against the Father, including gambling, drug use, affiliation with a number of gangs, and criminal activity. With respect to the gang allegations, the Mother advised that she has connected the pieces after seeing a CBC news article from August 29, 2024. To the Court, parts of the Mother's direct evidence about criminal activity and gangs seems more like investigative tabloid journalism. Admissible facts were few and far between. Speculation of death or injury to the child from gang activities were plentiful.

79The Father's answers about gambling on cross-examination were evasive. With respect to alleged drug use and incident where he left a package of drugs at the Mother's house, the Father's response was so emphatic that it raises the Court's suspicion. He did admit to using marijuana recreationally.

80The Mother claimed that the Father has a history of drug use, and that he admitted to her that he used the drug MDNA/Molly. She then deduced that, with everything she now knows, he is potentially using crack cocaine. She also alleged he is using fentanyl. The Mother detailed in her evidence in chief about alleged drug deals the Father makes. These are serious allegations to make without additional evidence.

81The Mother claimed that she could tell the Father was taking drugs and exhibiting withdrawal symptoms during the trial. She testified that on the first day of trial, the Father was 100% on drugs. She alleged that she saw him clenching his hands continuously, touching his head and speaking quickly. She also testified that she felt he was withdrawing from drugs on Wednesday because when he is withdrawing, he is more hostile. The Court does not agree with her claims.

82The Father's narrative is that the Mother has engaged in a campaign of harassment and threatening behaviour since he refused to reconcile with her. This impacted his ability to co-parent the child, as the Mother made demands and exerted control for the Father to see the child.

83The Father's position is that the Mother was upset that he ended the relationship, and since that time, she has interfered with his relationship with the child, and made allegations to obtain a supervised parenting time order. He alleged that she harassed him and his family.

Father's Involvement with the Child

84The Mother enrolled the child in daycare, and he started in January 2024. She did not notify the Father that she had enrolled the child in daycare, and simply stated that the Father knew the child was in daycare. The Father's evidence is that the Mother did not list him as a primary contact or parent with the child's daycare, and that she refused to provide him contact information for the daycare.

85The Mother was evasive in answering questions on cross-examination about the Father's efforts to co-parent. She repeatedly minimized the Father's role, either through her claims, by her behaviours or her language. She referred to the child as "my child".

86The Father recounted that for approximately a year after the birth of the child, he would spend significant amounts of time, 2-3 times per week, with the child at the Mother's residence. He noted that he was left alone to parent the child, including when the Mother went to have her nails done. His position is that he was unilaterally cut off from seeing the child in October 2023. The Mother confirmed she stopped allowing contact between the child and Father on October 1, 2023.

87The Court finds that the Mother has de facto primary decision-making responsibility for the child since birth because of her actions, and that she intentionally excludes the Father from participating in decisions for the child. The Court further finds that the Mother makes excuses or speculates about future problems to impede the Father's involvement in decision-making responsibility for the child. She has interfered with the Father's relationship with the child and unilaterally terminated the Father's parenting time with the child. The Court finds that the Mother has minimized the Father's role.

88As detailed below, since the re-establishment of parenting time with the child, the Father and the child have developed a relationship, and he is able to parent the child appropriately. Despite the Mother's evidence, the Father is not a danger to the child. There is no independent evidence to support this claim.

Paternal Family

89The Mother's position is that the paternal family has not been supportive, and that is why they have limited contact with the child. She expressed safety concerns over the paternal family home the one time she attended.

90The Court has concerns that the Mother will not foster or encourage a relationship with the paternal family.

91The Mother testified about the only time she went to the paternal family home, which was in December 2022. She was there for about 3 or 4 hours. She described the home as cluttered, and hoarding. She noted that the paternal brother was present and ill in the bathroom. In her evidence in chief, she called the paternal family home a "hoarder palace looney bin".

92The paternal grandmother confirmed in her evidence the little contact she has had with the child, despite her initial efforts to make contact and build a relationship with the Mother and child. The Mother's position is that she initially made efforts, including sending photos, but not since April 2023, as she cannot force herself or the child on the paternal family.

93The Mother attempted at trial to discredit the paternal family. She had select photos including from social media of the family, and alleged that the paternal home was not safe. One showed the Father's brother holding a gun. She testified that she obtained the photograph from a public social media account. The Father testified that it was a prop gun, and that the brother is an artist and posts about art.

94The Mother admitted that she did not feel comfortable going back to the paternal family home. She felt that the paternal family did not reach out enough and include her. She confirmed that the paternal grandmother is not welcome at her residence at this time.

95The Mother also alleged that the paternal grandmother coached the Father to call in a wellness check to the police. The Father advised that the report to the police came about because of alleged stalking behaviour. The Mother alleged the paternal grandmother is helping the Father commit fraud to get out of paying child support. However, the Father agreed that he owes child support, and is paying child support.

96The Mother cross-examined the paternal grandmother on the mental health of the Father's brother and the paternal grandfather. The brother does not reside at the paternal family home.

97The paternal grandmother described her first meeting with the Mother, which took place at the paternal family home. She observed that the Mother seemed apprehensive, but allowed the paternal family to hold the baby. She described herself as welcoming to the Mother and child and that the focus was on the child.

98The Court finds that the Mother will not appropriately support the child's paternal cultural upbringing and heritage. The Father testified that he has been to Trinidad three times in the last 10 years. The Mother recognized that the child is biracial with a black racial heritage from Trinidad and Ethiopia. When asked what steps she takes to connect the child to his black heritage, she responded that her step-father is black African, and that the child spends time with her step-father. She later added that she buys toys and books with black characters, that she has a lot of black friends, and the daycare has multicultural children.

99With the limited interactions between the Mother and paternal family, the Court finds the Mother's concerns about the paternal family unfounded. The Court finds that the Mother intentionally places barriers on the child's relationship with the paternal family, and has taken virtually no steps to engage the paternal family to support the child's heritage.

Conflict

100The paternal grandmother testified that the relationship between the parties was high conflict, and specifically, that she did not think at this time that they could make decisions for the child together. The Court places significant weight on this testimony, because it came from the Father's mother, and did not support his position at trial.

101In submissions, the Father notes he is afraid of the Mother. The Mother alleged that the conflict started after she became pregnant and refused to terminate the pregnancy.

102The Mother advised that she will be suing the Father for slander, and that she will be suing anyone else that makes allegations.

103The Mother recounted that she was physically and verbally abused after she became pregnant, as follows:

a) She alleged that the Father attempted to induce a miscarriage with bleach and cyanide and a turkey baster;

b) She alleged that he deliberately smoked around her;

c) She alleged that she has psychological damage from the Father;

d) She alleged that the Father pretended to kick her in the stomach, and that he would hope that she and the baby would die;

e) She alleged that the Father left her in a car without air conditioning, food or water;

f) She alleged that the Father refused to let her out of the car and would scream at her;

g) She alleged that the Father has threatened her repeatedly, and that he blackmailed her over a video of them fighting;

h) She alleged that the Father broke into her house through the side door in summer 2022; and,

i) She alleged that when she would go to the hospital, the Father would block her and advise that her health was not his problem.

104The Mother alleged that on June 8, 2022, the parties had a large argument where the Father was screaming that he hates her, that he hopes the baby dies, and that she needs to have an abortion. She recounts that this argument went on for 1.5 hours, and that she was unable to call the police because the Father had her phone. She finally was able to call the police from her son's phone, where she advised that she wanted the Father escorted off her property because he refused to leave and was screaming and causing a disturbance. The police asked her if she wanted to charge him, but she said she just wanted him to leave.

105I.D.C. testified that she called the police from her phone that day. She and a visitor heard screaming and saw the Father acting erratically and shouting obscenities. The Mother earlier testified that it was the visitor who called the police.

106The Father admitted that the relationship was tumultuous, and fraught with mistrust, emotional and verbal abuse by the Mother. He alleged that the bulk of the arguments were about him not complying with her demands. He further alleged that at times, the Mother would not allow him to leave or would follow him in her car while he was attempting to disengage. He advised that he jumped out of her window twice to get away. The Mother confirmed that he once jumped out her window.

107The Father recounted a heated argument on June 20, 2022 after learning the Mother hacked his phone and was monitoring all his accounts and personal information. Because of the argument, the Father advised the Mother called the police, and that she was warned by the police to delete all his information from her cell phone.

108The Court finds that there has been significant conflict between the parties which amounts to family violence. The family violence is limited to verbal altercations and is historical. The Court finds that both parties have communicated using inappropriate language with each other, and in front of the child. There has not been any physical violence between the parties. The Court finds the conflict between the parties primarily stems from the Mother's actions.

Following Court Orders

109A significant concern about the Mother is her disinclination to obey Court orders.

110In considering a child's best interests it will often be important to determine if a parent will follow the terms of a Court order that is meant to ensure their safety and protection. See: Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201; Seyad v. Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501; Mulik v. McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148.

111The Mother's behaviour, including during the trial, has left doubts in the Court's mind about her willingness to follow Court orders. She hypothesized in her evidence that if a Court case was not ongoing, then it would be open to her exclusively to determine what the best interests of the child are. She also testified that "of course" she would comply with a Court order. However, she has not complied in the past.

112The Mother did not follow the orders made about the materials for trial. Each party was granted 50 pages, 12 point font double spaced for narrative in their direct evidence Affidavits. She then brought a 14B motion heard April 22, 2025 ("April 22, 2025 Endorsement") to extend the time and the length of her Affidavit, with the trial set for May 5, 2025. She was granted an extension to file until April 29, 2025 and an additional 10 pages (double spaced, 12 point font) by Justice Sherr.

113What was submitted by the Mother was baffling. It was a 380 paragraph, 62 page (60 of narrative) single spaced Affidavit, with double spacing in between the paragraphs. In the Affidavit itself, the Mother called it a "novel". In submissions on her Affidavit, the Court was advised that it was 12 point font double spaced but it was a different font which made it look like it was single spaced. On a generous interpretation, the Mother manipulated the technology to her own advantage. In actuality, the Mother attempted to place a single spaced Affidavit before the Court, with double spacing between the paragraphs. The obviousness of the 'error' was plain to see.

114Despite already receiving a filing extension, the Mother did not file her materials on time. She was granted a further extension on consent to May 1, 2025.

115The Mother attempted to add two late witnesses. The Father agreed to add the first. The Mother attempted to add the second, J.H., on the eve of trial. At the start of trial, the parties made submissions and the Court gave oral reasons refusing to allow this witness.

116Another example of the Mother not following a Court order at trial was with respect to the limits imposed at the Trial Management Conference by the case management judge. In the Trial Management Conference Endorsement dated, February 14, 2025 ("TMC Endorsement"), Justice Sherr granted each party 11 hours to present their case, including opening and closing statements, direct, cross and re-examination, and objections. There was judicial discretion for the trial judge to further extend the time limits, likely with compelling reasons to do so.

117At the start of the third day of trial, the Mother brought an oral motion for an increase to the 11 hour global budget, asking for 5 more hours of Court time to present her case. During the submissions, which the Mother made directly, she admitted that she manipulated the font to submit more evidence through her Affidavit than allowed by Court order. She also submitted that she had been penalized for manipulating the Affidavit requirements when the Court required her to revise her Affidavit to meet the Court order, or to proceed on oral evidence only. For oral reasons given, the Court granted an additional hour to both of the parties.

118Despite the Court providing several time checks to the Mother, and warnings about ensuring she had time to make closing submissions, on the fifth day of trial at the end of the day, the Mother requested an additional 30-60 minutes of time to be added to her global trial time limit. The Father opposed the request. For oral reasons given at trial, the Mother was provided with additional time, a reset from 16 minutes remaining to 60 minutes, to ensure that the Court received closing submissions on several legal issues outlined to both parties.

119It is obvious from how the Mother used her Court time, along with the content of her Affidavit, that her predominant goal for trial was to provide every single potential piece of information to prove that the Father is a bad person. During its ruling on granting additional hours to the Mother, the Court reminded her that more is not better, it is just more. However, it is clear that the Mother believes more is better, and even in her Affidavit, she noted she had over 1000 exhibits that she could submit that "prove every statement I have made in any of my Affidavits about Joseph". Yet again, she demonstrates to the Court that her focus is on the Father and not on the child.

120Despite paragraph 19 of the TMC Endorsement, the Mother did not file a draft order for trial by March 28, 2025, or in advance of trial. Her counsel took the blame, and one was filed at the start of the second day of trial.

121Paragraph 7 of the TMC Endorsement required both parties to provide each other with the names of any other witnesses they intended to call at trial by March 7, 2025. By way of the April 22, 2025 Endorsement, the Mother was permitted to serve and file an additional Affidavit from a witness by April 29, 2025.

122This Court is also concerned with the Father's ability to follow Court orders. He did not fully comply with the disclosure order made on December 5, 2024, and was ordered again to produce some disclosure in the TMC Endorsement.

123More concerning, the Father has also been in breach of other legal requirements, like when he repeatedly drove a motor vehicle while his driver's licence was suspended. In April 2022, he impersonated his brother when he was pulled over by the police, as he was driving with a suspended licence. The Mother alleged he repeatedly shoplifts. The Father has had several charges against him, from two separate occasions. One incident from 2020 involves impaired driving, for which he was fined and received a driving suspension for 12 months. On January 3, 2023, he was charged with uttering threat, driving under suspension (operation of a conveyance while prohibited), personation with intent, and obstructing justice. The Father notes in his 35.1 Affidavit, sworn February 22, 2024 that the charges for utter threats and personation with intent were withdrawn. The Father pled guilty to obstruction charges and received a four-month conditional sentence, which included two months of house arrest.

124The Mother alleged the Father has breached the child support order and he is running one month behind in his payments. The Father disputes that he has breached the child support order.

125The Father also violated Court orders and had contact with the Mother even though there was a no contact order between the parties for approximately 9 months in 2023. He testified that this was because she requested he visit her, and the contact was with her consent. He further testified that the Mother wrote a letter to the Crown to have the no contact term rescinded. The Mother testified that she attempted to lift the no contact order so that he could see the child with her. She asked victim witness service about lifting the no contact order because of the newborn child.

126Both parties did not serve and file facta or caselaw in advance of trial. Just prior to the Mother's evidentiary case closing on day five of the trial, the Court outlined for both parties some legal issues it wanted addressed. The Court allowed the parties to reference caselaw in their closing submissions and to provide the Court with the list of law after the submissions were completed. At closing on Monday, May 12, 2025, the Mother requested to submit more caselaw two days after closing statements were given. This request was declined.

127The Court finds that both parties have not followed Court orders.

128As demonstrated by the Mother, she struggled to adhere to Court orders. While the Court will not hold her to a higher standard of abiding Court orders than the Father, it is noted that she is a paralegal. The Court finds that the Mother will not follow Court orders she does not agree with.

129The Mother admitted that this trial was the most important thing, and that she had put her schooling on hold to focus on it. She worked for 5 months on the trial. The Court is concerned about her focus being on the trial and Father, and not on the child. Her behaviour supports the finding that she is unable to put the child first.

130The Court has the following concerns about the Mother's parenting, and makes additional findings of fact:

a) She is not child focused. The Court is concerned with the content of the Mother's evidence. It was focused on the Father and his transgressions, and not on the child. There was more information about his current girlfriend, M.C., than there was about the child. It is concerning to the Court that the Mother would spend the bulk of the trial trying to convince the Court that the Father is a bad person, and not on the factors that the Court must look at, like the child's needs, the parties' abilities to meet the child's needs, or the child's cultural, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage. This is particularly concerning given her claims that the child may be a special needs child.

b) She does not always ensure the health and well-being of the child. The daycare raised concerns of speech delay several months before the trial. As of trial, the Mother had yet to discuss the issue with the paediatrician. She could not remember timing because she did not agree with the daycare's assessment of the speech delay. There was an assessment early April and the child was placed on a wait list for speech therapy and to have support at daycare. When asked about the child's dentist, she said she would look into what age a child needed a dentist.

c) She puts the child's safety at risk. For example, she continued to have sexual intercourse with the Father during the pregnancy even after she alleged he repeatedly gave her sexually transmitted diseases which were dangerous to the child. She recounted the Father had given her STDs four times during pregnancy and once after, from May to October 2022.

d) She will not keep the Father abreast of information about the child's well-being. She has sought to keep the information concealed in a final order, and she refused to provide the government issued identification without instructions to do so from the Court.

e) She does not know important information about the child's caregivers, for example, the daycare provider's last name.

f) She consistently anticipates the worst outcome (for example, the child being abducted to Ethiopia), and bases her decisions on those to the detriment of the child. This can be seen by her requests for supervised parenting time until the child is 18 years old, and for a Restraining Order for the child.

g) Her mistrust of the Father has interfered with her ability to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the Father. The Mother did not put the Father's name on the birth certificate, and testified she would only share a copy of the government issued identification (birth certificate, passport and health card) if the Court instructs her to do so (and she told the Father's counsel to bring a motion). She did not allow any parenting time unless it took place with her and in the manner she chose until ordered by the Court in August 2024. In her evidence, she testified that she thinks it is important for the child to know the Father, but she has safety concerns and she would like precautions taken.

h) The Mother took steps to limit the rights of the Father, including intentionally not putting his name on the child's birth certificate so that he would not have any legal rights. She testified that he "technically didn't have any rights" because he was not on the birth certificate.

i) She admitted to unilaterally cutting off contact between the child and Father. She did so without coming to Court to seek orders, rather, she took the law into her own hands and forced the Father to start this Application. She did so even with the knowledge from her legal training as a paralegal. Her actions resulted in the Father not seeing the child from October 1, 2023 until the August 30, 2024 Order of Justice Sherr for temporary supervised parenting time. Even after the Court process had started, the Mother would not agree to any parenting time. The Father was forced to bring a motion to obtain the parenting time order. When asked about why she cut off the parenting time, she advised the Court that she had given the Father warnings and ultimatums and that he would not follow through on his promises. The ultimatums were with respect to attending rehab and counselling. She admitted that during the period she unilaterally cut off parenting time, the Father contacted her, but her recollection is that it was about her, and not so much about the child.

ISSUE ONE – DECISION-MAKING RESPONSIBILITY

131The Mother seeks "sole decision-making authority" for the child. The Father seeks that major decisions be shared between the parties, and in the event of a disagreement, the Mother makes the final decision.

132In Kaplanis v. Kaplanis 2005 CanLII 1625 (ON CA), the Court of Appeal set out the following principles in determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate:

1. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.

2. It can't be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.

3. Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.

4. The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.

5. No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.

6. The younger the child, the more important communication is.

133The Court of Appeal has upheld a joint decision-making responsibility order in the absence of reasonably effective communication between the parents where it has been necessary to sustain a child's contact with a parent who has been subjected to a campaign of alienation. For example, such an order was upheld where a mother had established a pattern of resisting the father's access and was found by the trial Court to be unable to appreciate the importance of the father's relationship with their children. See: Andrade v. Kennelly, 2007 ONCA 898.

134The Court finds that shared decision-making responsibility for all aspects of the child's life except religion is in the best interests of the child. This is because the Mother has and continues to take steps to minimize the Father's role in the child's life, the alleged family violence is verbal and historical, and the conflict between the parties is primarily stemming from the actions of the Mother.

135For religion, the Court finds that each party having responsibility for decision-making for religion and spiritual training while the child is in their care is in the best interests of the child. This is because the Father and paternal family is Christian and wishes to have the child brought up in that faith, and the Mother did not provide any evidence about religion.

136The vast majority of the Mother's evidence was focused on the Father, and not on the child.

137There is a history of problematic communication and conflict between the parties.

138The parties ended the relationship before the child was born, so there is no historical basis for shared decision-making. The child is very young, not yet school aged. A number of major decisions will need to be made for him, including education and health care decisions. This is even more so given that the child already has a health issue, his speech delay.

139Where a conflict between parents (such as an inability to communicate effectively) is primarily the fault of one parent, that parent should not be able to use the conflict as justification to oppose a joint or shared parenting order. To do so allows an obdurate parent to engineer a result in his or her favour. However, where the conflict is extreme and there is substantial blame to be leveled against both parents, a joint or shared custody approach is not appropriate. See: Geremia v. Harb 2008 CanLII 19764 (Ont. S.C).

140However, the Court must balance that the conflict seems to be predominately coming from the Mother. For example, during trial, she required that the Father be physically moved to the other side of the Courtroom while she was testifying. She said she felt intimidated having him sit close to the witness box.

141When asked about the Father's proposal that the parties make decisions together, with the Mother making the final decision in the event of a disagreement, she advised that she did not see the point of going back and forth for 10 business days, and that decisions may need to be made on the spot. She does not want to create a back-and-forth communication with the Father. She confirmed on cross-examination that she did not want any involvement from the Father on decisions for the child. She said that it was difficult for her to picture that the communication would be respectful. This evidence supports the Court's findings that she is the one creating barriers for the Father's involvement.

142Notwithstanding the Court's concerns about the Mother generating complications for shared decision-making responsibility, the Court is also concerned about the conflict and communications between the parties, which has been fraught with verbal altercations and inappropriate language.

143The Mother has not detailed a plan with respect to the child's religious needs or cultural needs. The Father is Christian and wants the child to attend Church. He notes that the Mother is an atheist. There was no specific evidence about whether the Mother might interfere with the child attending Church. However, there was significant evidence about the Mother interfering with the child's relationship with the Father and paternal family.

144With respect to decision-making responsibility, the Court finds itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, there is conflict in the relationship and historical family violence. On the other hand, the Court is concerned that the Mother excludes the Father and minimizes his role as the child's father. The most credible witness, the paternal grandmother, notes that the parties should not make decisions together.

145In S. (S.) v. K. (S.) 2013 CarswellOnt 10801, 2013 ONCJ 432, (Ont. C.J.), the Court wrote that Courts should assess the dynamics of a family when determining if a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate. Particularly, the Court should examine if the granting of such an order is:

a) more or less likely to de-escalate or inflame the parents' conflict; or

b) more or less likely to expose the child to parental conflict.

146In S.S., this Court further stated that Courts should also examine whether a parent is seeking the order as a mechanism to inappropriately control the other parent. Parents who seek such orders for the purpose of asserting control over their former spouse and children tend to be rights-based, overly litigious, unbending and the best interests of their children can be secondary considerations.

147This is a very young child with emerging medical needs. Decisions about education, religion and health need to be made. The Mother has historically cut the Father out of decisions and rationalizes it (for example, no legal entitlement because the Father's name is not on the birth certificate). The Court is concerned that she will continue to do so without the Father having some input into the decisions for the child.

148The Court is also aware of the need to protect the child from potential future conflict. There is evidence about the child being exposed to the parties' fighting. Both parties noted that the conflict has reduced with the parties primarily communicating through counsel. The Court does not want a decision-making responsibility order to be the cause of any escalation of conflict. However, it is satisfied that making ancillary orders about communications will assist in ensuring minimum conflict and keeping the child out of the conflict.

149In deciding on the appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, the Court is required to consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties. See: Chomos v. Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5208 (S.C.J.); Koliniati v. Manolessos, 2025 ONSC 3274.

150In considering all possible frameworks, the Court has reflected on the potential for parallel parenting, consultation, or input frameworks, and traditional shared or primary decision-making responsibility.

151The Court orders shared decision-making responsibility, with a process for communications and timelines. This is to ensure that the Father has a role in the decisions, should he choose to exercise it, and that he stays informed of decisions. This will also ensure that the Mother does not minimize the Father's role. If the parties do not agree, the Mother will make the decision.

ISSUE TWO – PARENTING TIME

152The Mother seeks a final supervised parenting time order for the Father for only 1 hour each week at APCO or other similar independent supervised location. She seeks virtual parenting time up to 30 minutes each week. For both in person and virtual parenting time, she requires that it only be the Father who attends, unless agreed by her otherwise in writing. Other terms the Mother seeks include notification or automatic cancellation of in person parenting time and indefinite cancellation of virtual parenting time at the discretion of the Mother for failing to participate three times in a row.

153The Father seeks unsupervised parenting time on a schedule that gradually increases over an eight-month period, ending with alternating weekends from Friday to Sunday, and two mid-week visits. He seeks make up time for missed visits due to holiday or illness of the child, and public exchanges where the paternal grandmother may assist. He seeks a holiday parenting time schedule for in person parenting on major holidays, including a 50/50 sharing of the summer.

154The Court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to have a graduated schedule of unsupervised parenting time with the Father, progressing to overnight weekend and weekday evening visits. This is because of the relationship that has developed between the child and Father as detailed in the APCO supervised parenting time notes, the Mother's unilateral termination of the Father's parenting time, the Mother's lack of support for the child's relationship with the paternal family, the willingness of the parties to follow Court orders. The other significant issue is that the Mother's concerns of danger are either not supported by the admissible evidence or hypothetical in nature.

155The Mother also seeks the right to suspend the Father's parenting time for substance abuse. The Court finds that this request by the Mother was intentionally vague. It states "does not remain free of substance abuse". Does this mean that the Father may not use any substance ever? What about legal substances? What if he uses substances but not during his parenting time? Who determines if the Father is abusing substances? How long is the proposed suspension? The Court is left with many questions, but one thing is clear – the Mother is seeking another means to control the Father's parenting time and to penalize him.

156The Court recognizes the benefit of all parents being sober when parenting a child. On the belief that this is what the Mother was wanting with her vague clause, the Court will make an order that both parties be sober during their parenting time.

Supervised or Unsupervised Parenting Time

157The Mother was asked what it would take for her to agree to unsupervised parenting time. Her first response was that it would take a lot. Specifically, as a pre-requisite for unsupervised parenting time, she requires the Father to successfully complete in-patient rehabilitation for drug use, for the Father to undergo a psychological assessment from CAMH (including CAMH receiving concerns from her and the Court), the Father attending anger management, periodic hair follicle drug testing with a chain of custody, the Father to adhere to a treatment plan, an ongoing demonstration of sobriety with no relapse, that parenting time take place at a safe place (not the paternal family home), that parenting time not be overnight, and more. She also expressed concerns over who would be attending the Father's parenting time, and expressed her need to control who attends when the child is with the Father. The Mother requires to be notified if the paternal family is present during any parenting time, and that she would limit who attends together. The Mother is clearly placing barriers to the Father's parenting time, and to the relationship between the paternal family and child.

158The person seeking supervised access bears the burden of establishing that supervision is necessary. See: Klymenko v. Klymenko, 2020 ONSC 5451.

159Supervised access is not intended to be a long-term arrangement for a child. It is beneficial for children who require gradual reintroduction to a parent, or whose safety requires it until such time as the parent is sufficiently rehabilitated and a child is no longer in danger of physical or emotional harm. See: Najjardizaji v. Mehrjerdi 2004 ONCJ 374 (CanLII).

160Supervised access is usually a temporary arrangement. However, when the Court does not expect the risks addressed by supervision to diminish, it is appropriate to order long-term supervision of access. See: Tuttle v. Tuttle, 2014 ONSC 5011.

Relationship Between the Father and Child

161On August 30, 2024, Justice Sherr made a temporary order that the Father's parenting time should be supervised at APCO. Since that time, the Father has been attending for his parenting time. For trial, APCO notes from supervised parenting time visits October 27, 2024 to February 9, 2025 ("APCO visits notes") were submitted to the Court. The Father continued to have supervised parenting time post February 9, 2025.

162In looking at the APCO visits notes, the Mother was late to three of the visits and cancelled one visit due to the child's illness. She did appropriately request a make-up visit. Two of the scheduled visits did not proceed due to APCO closures for January 5, 2025 and Family Day weekend. The Father appropriately spoke to the program manager when learning of the first closure to see if there was an opportunity to see the child. He did not feel it was fair to wait a month to see the child.

163A review of the eight APCO visits notes showed that the Father parented the child appropriately, and that the child was engaging with him with lots of smiles, babbling, affection, and playing together. The Father took time to explain things to the child, such as colours, car horn and dog noises, the alphabet, not touching the blinds because they are dangerous, how to clean up after playing and what the truck was for (excavator). The Father brought the child lactose free cheese and milk as some of the snacks, which recognize the child's need for a lactose free diet. He also brought clothes and toys for the child which the staff provided to the Mother.

164The Mother testified that she anticipated the APCO visits notes being positive, because the Father is very good at putting on an act and is convincing. She confirmed she had seen the eight reports and that they spoke well of the Father's parenting. Her position is that the APCO visits notes are not an accurate way to assess the Father's parenting. The Mother feels that no one in the paternal family is trustworthy, and they should not supervise parenting time either. She testified she would want to see a rehab report and psychological report. Again, these are more unreasonable barriers from the Mother to the Father's relationship with the child.

165The Mother also confirmed that she is seeking supervised parenting time indefinitely, and that she would be open to increasing the amount of time but did not have specifics. She wants parenting time to be supervised until the child is an adult, which in her view is appropriate in this case where there is drug use.

166When the order was made, the Father had not seen the child since September 2023. Given that lengthy period, a supervised parenting order made sense. Now, the Father has developed a bond with the child – he is no longer a stranger to the child. The APCO visits notes confirm that he is a good father and responds appropriately to the child's needs.

167In the Court's view, the supervised parenting time as ordered on a temporary basis was for a gradual reintroduction to a parent. It is clear from the APCO visits notes that the child and Father have developed a bond and that the child is comfortable with the Father.

Dangers to the Child

168In order for the Court to make a final supervised parenting time order, the Mother would need to show the child is in danger of physical or emotional harm. There is no question that the Mother believes that the child will be in danger of physical or emotional harm if he is left unsupervised with the Father. She was given significant leeway to present all her evidence to make her case.

169The Mother relied on a decision of this Court in C.S. v. K.M., 2023 ONCJ 106 to support a final supervised access order. In that case, Sherr J. ordered final supervised parenting time for the Father by a professional supervised parenting time agency. That case is distinguishable on several grounds. First, the children in C.S. v. K.M. are 13 year old twins. Second, the Court had significant evidence about the views and preferences of the children. Finally, Sherr J. held at paragraph 118 "that the primary best interest factor is that the children feel psychologically and emotionally safe and secure when exercising parenting time". In this case, the child's views and preferences are not before the Court as he is too young to discern them. As detailed above, the APCO notes show the interactions between the child and Father, and they are positive. There is no concern that the child does not feel psychologically and emotionally safe and secure during parenting time.

170The Mother recounted the incident at Mount Sinai hospital shortly after she had given birth. She noted that a nurse came in and asked if she knew someone named Joseph, and she advised that she did not want to speak with him. She said the nurse wanted to conduct a domestic violence screening on her, that security was called to gather information about the Father, and an ankle monitor was put on the child. The Mother does not know what caused these actions, although she speculates that the Father's calls to the hospital prompted these measures.

171The Mother also tendered photographs and screen shots from video of the Father allegedly showing dangerous parenting. In one photograph from a video, she explained her concern when the Father started to dangle the baby by the neck near a window she alleged he jumped out of previously.

172The most compelling evidence was from an incident in June 2023 where the Father allegedly lost a package of drugs in the bedroom. The Mother recounted that the Father was frantically searching, and days later she found a small ziplock of 7-9 capsules against the boxspring on the Father's side of the bed.

173Other concerns the Mother has about the Father's parenting are as follows:

a) The Father leaving the child unattended on a bed to answer a phone call;

b) The Father leaving the child in the high chair unbuckled to answer a phone call;

c) The Father putting gummy worms into the child's mouth;

d) The Father putting chocolate with nuts into the child's mouth;

e) The Father walking on the icy parking lot in running shoes with the child in his arms;

f) The Father putting his own face in the child's diaper;

g) The Father holding the child over his head and drinking the child's drool;

h) The Father making inappropriate sexualized comments and behaviours, such as wanting the child to know what oral sex feels like, and sucking on the child's foot;

i) The Father having phone conversations with inappropriate subject matter; and,

j) The Father having phone calls from sexual partners.

174The Mother also used hypothetical and future concerns to support her claim for supervised parenting time. She explained that some of the concerns would only be concerning if the child was older, such as the Father having calls with a drug dealer or discussing sexual topics. The Mother noted that when something happens to the child, the paternal family will not tell the truth and that no one is trustworthy. She suggested that if the Father had drugs tucked into his belt or pocket or socks, and the Father fell asleep, the baby would ingest the drugs. She is concerned that a future incident could traumatize the child and other children too, if it happened near or at a daycare, school or camp.

175The Mother also expressed concerns that the Father would abduct the child and leave the country. She is concerned that he will flee to Ethiopia, which she says has no extradition back to Canada. She explained that the Father will falsify the documentation to effect an abduction. The Mother's position is that because of two different logos on letters from Elevate Homes, the Father is forging documentation.

176The Mother alleged the Father and his family forged rent letters for Ontario Works. There are other allegations of falsifying documents, including text messages and email dates. She alleged that he falsified work with Elevate Homes so that he could leave during his house arrest.

177The Court does not agree that these show a danger to the child of physical or emotional harm. Hypothetical concerns are not legitimate concerns. Some of the Mother's concerns seemed exaggerated, such as walking outside in icy conditions or sucking on the child's foot. Other concerns, such as drinking the child's drool, outline odd behaviours but not dangerous behaviours. The Court finds the Mother has not met her onus to establish that supervision of the Father's parenting time is necessary.

178As noted earlier, these parties have a history of conflict. While the Mother does not meet the bar for a final supervised parenting time order, the Court is aware of the potential for conflict between the parties. As a result, supervised parenting time exchanges are required.

Other Considerations for the Parenting Time Schedule

179The Mother's motivations for seeking a final supervised parenting time order and Restraining Order are questionable. She testified that she does not want the Father to be alone with the child. She advised that the pregnancy was forced down his throat and that the Father does not care about the child. She has made allegations about potential dangers to the child, and not actual danger.

180The evidence is undermined by the testimony she gave about how long parenting time would be required to be supervised. She advised the Court that parenting time should be supervised for 18 years. The Court prefers the Father's theory of why the Mother is seeking those orders. It is supported by the testimony the Mother gave, wherein she was primarily focused on the Father as opposed to the child. There was a significant amount of evidence proffered by her about other relationships, including with the Father's current girlfriend, M.C., who refused to appear at trial.

181Even when testifying about Jiffy and the funds taken, the Mother ended the explanation with an allegation that the Father was on dating apps "scouring for women".

182The Father has only had parenting time twice per month at APCO since October 2024, and that parenting time has gone very well.

183The Father advised that is building an emotional bond with the child. He is cognizant of the child's Trinidadian and Ethiopian heritage. He outlined his plan for parenting time, which would take place at the paternal family home. It is a four-bedroom house with two bedrooms not in use. One will be the child's bedroom and the other will be the child's playroom. The Father noted that the child already has many toys at the paternal family home. The Father has investigated daycare close to the paternal family home.

184The Father recounted his religious upbringing, and that the paternal family attends River Worship Church in Whitby. He wants the child to attend Church and learn about the Christian faith.

185The paternal grandmother noted that she does not have concerns about the Father's ability to parent the child.

186The Court finds from the Mother's actions that she has historically and intentionally interfered with the Father's relationship with the child. The Court has concerns that this behaviour will continue. This is because when asked if it was important for the child's healthy development to have a positive father-son relationship with his black father, she responded that it is important to have a black father, but not this particular black father (referring to the Father).

187The Mother also testified about what she is willing to do on a go forward basis to support the relationship between the child and Father. She advised that she was willing to take the child to and from supervised visits. She alleged that it was significantly more work than if the Father had unsupervised parenting time and would complete pick ups and drop offs and she could have every second weekend off. She noted there was commuting time and she would sit outside while the visit takes place, and she was willing to do it to protect her child. She said it was an interruption to her day.

188This is in stark contrast to the evidence she gave about her supporting the relationships between her other children and their fathers. She noted that she travels countless times with her son Damian to see his father, and that he has had a phone since he was 10 to communicate with his father whenever he wants. The Father also alleged that the Mother had taken Damian to see his father in jail. The daughter went to visit her father for the summer in 2024, and also has her own phone to speak with her father whenever she wants.

189Despite the Mother's reticence to engage with the paternal family, and her allegations about them personally, the Court finds there is no concerns with the child spending time with the paternal family, being in the care of the paternal family, and being in the paternal family home. The Court further finds that the child would benefit from the exposure to his Ethiopian and Trinidadian heritage, which would take place while he is with the paternal family.

190The Court finds it is in the best interests of the child to have a meaningful relationship with the Father through unsupervised parenting time. As detailed below in the order, given the age of the child, and supervised visits that have taken place, there will be a gradual schedule to increase to overnight weekend parenting time and two evenings per week over the next eight months.

ISSUE THREE – ANCILLARY PARENTING ORDERS

Communication

191The Father seeks communication solely about the child through a parenting app, AppClose. He testified at trial that he wanted a no contact order with the Mother. The Father gave evidence about harassment by the Mother to him, the paternal family, and his current girlfriend, M.C.

192There was evidence given by the Mother that she reached out to M.C., with whom the Father was having sexual relations in June 2022, to compare notes. She described that the Father was playing them both. Since M.C. was not responsive, the Mother did some investigative work on Facebook and contacted another person, E.R., to explain that the Father was dangerous. Later, she also reached out to another person, C.C., whom she thought was M.C.'s father, to alert him about the sexually transmitted diseases she contracted from the Father. Around Christmas 2022, she threatened the Father to give her contact information for M.C. or she would leave him.

193The Mother seeks communication solely about the child through text messages. Based on the requests of the parties, it is clear that they wish communication between them to be in writing and child focused.

194The Court prefers the use of AppClose for communications. This is particularly so in this case where there have been allegations made about the authenticity of text messages. The Court requires evidence that is reliable, and AppClose satisfies this criteria.

Government Identification and Travel

195The Mother seeks orders allowing her to obtain government documentation for the child and travel with the child without the Father's consent.

196The Father is content to allow the Mother to be the custodian of the child's government issued identification, so long as he receives a notarized copy (at his cost). He also seeks a mutual order that neither party remove the child from Ontario without the other's prior written consent.

197The Father noted that he wanted to have input if the Mother was taking the child out of the province. While he was specifying a move, the Court infers that this would relate to leaving Ontario for any reason.

198It does not necessarily follow that if a parent is granted custody of a child that the right to obtain government documentation for the child without the other parent's consent or to travel with the child outside of Canada without the other parent's consent will be ordered. These are parental rights distinct from who has custody of the child, and without a dispensation order from a Court, the consent of an access parent is usually required by government authorities. These are important parental rights that are not to be dispensed with lightly. See: R.B.J. v. B.N.R.J., 2020 ONCJ 399.

199The Mother has not provided sufficient evidence to show why the orders she seeks are in the child's best interests. While she obtained the birth certificate without the Father's knowledge, she still as of trial had yet to provide him with a copy of the birth certificate or any government issued identification. She alleged that the Father wants a mutual non-removal order simply to exert control over her. However, she went to Punta Cana with the child for 10 days.

200The Court will not be dispensing with these parental rights without good reason to do so. The Mother has not provided a good reason to do so. As such, the Court declines to make the orders the Mother seeks. It will, however, make the orders the Father seeks concerning the documents and travel.

Access to Information from Third Party Care Providers

201The Mother seeks to limit information from the child's third-party care providers. The Father seeks to be informed and be able to obtain information from any of the child's third-party care providers.

202In her draft order for trial from May 7, 2025, the Mother notes that she should make the decisions "without having to provide specific information to Joseph relating to [the child's] residence, daycare, school, camp, extracurricular activities, medical professionals' identification, etc., but may, in her discretion, provide redacted documentation relating to these matters." Essentially, she wants full control to be able to keep the Father completely unaware of the professionals involved in caring for the child. She testified that she required redactions because of the Father's mental instability, drug use and concerns that he would traumatize the child or others involved with the child. She alleged that the Father asked her to breach Court orders and lie in Court, and that his character has not changed.

203The Mother has not provided a sufficient evidentiary basis to support her request for redacted information to the Father. Her position is because of the alleged security incident at Mount Sinai hospital that no current or future care provider information be provided to the Father. She is concerned that he will do something erratic. She notes that there is not a good track record to go on. The Court does not agree. There is no track record because she has not provided any information to the Father. The alleged incident at Mount Sinai did not involve the Mother and she did not call witnesses to give evidence about what occurred.

204The Mother's historical behaviour of not providing information to the Father about the child is concerning. She did not notify him about enrolling the child in daycare. She did not notify him about the speech delay being experienced by the child. She said there was no clause requiring her to do so. When asked if she thought it would be important for the Father to know about the speech delay, she explained that she wanted to get more information first. Shockingly, she also admitted that she was waiting to see what the Court would order from this trial in terms of what information she is required to give the Father. She has confirmed that she will only do what a Court orders, and nothing more. This supports the Court's findings of her minimizing the role of the Father.

205The Court finds that the Mother did not share information in the past, and that she is radically and unreasonably opposed to sharing information with the Father. As a result, the Court will make orders to ensure the Father is able to receive information about who the third party care providers are, and to obtain information directly from the third party care providers.

Restraining Order or No Contact Order

206The Father seeks a mutual no contact order, similar to the December Sherr J. Order, with a one-year term. That order was made on a temporary without prejudice basis under s. 28 of the CLRA and not a Restraining Order as described by the Mother. The Mother wants a Restraining Order that the Father not come within 500 meters of any place where the child is known to be, except for parenting time.

207The Father's position is that the Mother did not properly plead the claim for a Restraining Order. In reviewing the Answer, the Mother did not make a claim for a Restraining Order, nor has she amended her pleadings to make a claim for a Restraining Order.

208The Court can award relief not plead when: 1) it is clear that such an order is merited, and 2) that no prejudice would arise from the failure to plead the request for that relief. See: Jamieson v. Jamieson, 2020 ONSC 6935.

209The terms being sought by the Mother in her draft order are substantially similar to the December Sherr J. Order from December, 2024. The TMC Endorsement specifies an issue for trial as the Mother's request for a Restraining Order. The Father was aware of the request in February 2025, and was able to provide direct evidence on the issue in his trial Affidavit. Accordingly, the Court finds no prejudice to the Father for the Court to determine the issue.

210Because it was not properly pled, the Court is taking the terms being sought in the draft order as the claim the Mother is making. In her draft order, the Mother did not seek a Restraining Order involving herself. She seeks an order that the Father not come within 500 meters of any place where the child is known to be, except for parenting time.

211Restraining orders may be granted pursuant to s. 35 of the CLRA. The test is whether the person seeking the order has reasonable grounds to fear for their safety or for the safety of any child in their lawful custody. As detailed in Jiang v. Zeng, 2019 ONSC 1457, in granting a Restraining Order, the Court must be satisfied that there are imminent and reasonable grounds to fear for safety.

212The Mother provided limited evidence on specifically why the child requires a Restraining Order from the Father. The evidence was predominantly the same as her concerns as to why supervised parenting time is necessary. She added that she required the Restraining Order because she disclosed serious criminal information about the Father at the trial. That may explain why she may have sought a Restraining Order for herself, but not for the child.

213The only evidence that the Court felt was specific to the Restraining Order for the child was the Mother's allegations that the Father would abduct the child and take him to the United States or Ethiopia. The Mother testified that a non-removal order would not adequately address the potential for an abduction. The Court finds these concerns exaggerated.

214The Mother was also questioned on why a mutual no contact order was insufficient, and she required a one-sided Restraining Order. She explained that it was because the Father had breached the no contact order made in criminal Court. She also expressed concerns that the Father could shoot her, throw a rock at her, or make gestures at her with a no contact order. Again, the Court finds the Mother intentionally exaggerating in an effort to support her claims.

215The Mother confirmed that since the mutual no contact Order of Justice Sherr, dated December 20, 2024, the Father has not breached the order or contacted the Mother.

216The law is clear that Courts do not make orders based on hypothetical outcomes. There needs to be facts to support orders being made. The Court does not make orders based on conjecture. The Court finds that the Mother's basis for seeking a Restraining Order is conjecture.

217The paternal grandmother's evidence confirmed that there are issues between the parties that would support a minimum or no contact order. The paternal grandmother advised that the relationship was high conflict, with the parties always arguing and that she could hear the Mother yelling and screaming. She recounted about a bombardment of texts from the Mother, the Mother being around her house several times for no reason, the Mother contacting her friends and family and lying to them, and that her and her family were afraid of the Mother. The paternal grandmother testified that she and the family want to have a relationship with the child, but are terrified of the Mother, who is alleged to be capable of anything.

218The paternal grandmother noted a particular incident where the Mother had a car accident by her family's residence on February 15, 2023 late at night. The Mother lives in the west end of Toronto and the Father's family lives in the east end, in Scarborough. The paternal grandmother did not know why the Mother was in the area. The Mother testified she was going to meet with the Father, which is why she was near the paternal family home at 10:00 p.m. in the midst of Winter. She said they were going to meet about the no contact term, him attending anger management, and she was looking for formula for the child.

219The paternal grandmother recounted another incident at APCO, where the Mother drove her car right behind the paternal grandmother and sat behind her for an hour while the child and Father had parenting time. The Mother took photos of the paternal grandmother's car while parked behind her. This was after the Mother alleged that the paternal grandmother had been stalking her and making her feel uncomfortable. The Mother claimed that she was Court ordered to be at APCO. She explained that she did not see any other parking spots, and that spot was the closest to the front door.

220There are some incidents in the direct evidence of the Mother that could be interpreted as troublesome behaviour, including one on September 30, 2023 wherein the Mother drove to the Father's house to "really give him a stern lecturing" about house arrest. There was another incident on October 17, 2023 when the Mother drove to the street of the paternal family home and sat for 10 minutes determining whether to message the Father to come to the driveway. This incident happened weeks after the Mother alleged she ended the relationship.

221The Father wants a mutual no contact order. He has expressed concern about the Mother's actions, including harassment. He claims he felt forced to block her number because at times, she would call up to 100 times in a day. She also messaged his family and friends. He confirmed that he did not provide their contact information to the Mother.

222The Father recounted that the Mother would contact other people to warn them about him. The Mother admitted to doing so through E.R. and M.C.'s father, C.C.

223The Father recounted the last time he saw the child before this Court action was on September 28, 2023. He alleged that when he did not answer the Mother's calls, she came to the paternal family home unannounced. He was there with his girlfriend, M.C. The Father saw that the child was in the vehicle.

224The Father recounted an incident where the Mother posed as a person interested in buying an item he was selling through social media. He alleged that the Mother was yelling obscenities, racial and transphobic slurs at him and M.C.

225The Mother testified that she felt a mutual no contact order implied that she was a safety threat to the Father and would reflect negatively on her. In her view, she does not pose a risk to the Father. However, the evidence confirms that both the Father and the Mother have safety plans in respect of each other as a result of the police reports made by them.

226The Court finds that both parties pose a risk to each other. This is because of the past conflict and police involvement. The Court further finds that the parties past volatile communications pose a risk to the child and to each other.

227Given the conflict between the parties, and the paternal grandmother's testimony, this Court is prepared to make an order requiring that the parties have no contact other than through AppClose and only with respect to the child.

ISSUE FOUR – CHILD SUPPORT

228The Mother seeks child support from the birth of the child (November 16, 2022) to the present, based on an imputed annual income of $70,000 per year to the Father. The Father seeks to pay child support commencing December 1, 2022 (the first month after the birth of the child), in an amount based on his reported income of $25,519. Both parties are agreeable to making annual disclosure, as required under the Child Support Guidelines.

229The Father has been paying child support of $204 per month since the Order of July 29, 2024. He testified that prior to this formal arrangement, he would give the Mother cash for food and clothing for the child, her and her other children. He recounted the child being lactose intolerant, providing formula and funds for formula. The Father noted that once he stopped seeing the child, he stopped providing financial assistance.

230The Mother repeatedly alleged that the Father and paternal grandmother have been attempting either to receive child support or to ensure she does not receive child support. The facts from the start of this matter do not support her allegations. In his Application, the Father seeks an order that he pay ongoing table child support in an amount to be determined.

The Father's Income

231The Father is currently on Ontario Works. He has most recently worked in construction seasonally. He referred to it as part-time employment.

232Based on the Father's Notices of Assessment his line 15000 income is as follows:

a) 2020 - $27,395

b) 2021 - $26,475

c) 2022 - $26,519

233The Father did not provide a Notice of Assessment for 2023, and he did not provide an Income Tax Return or Notice of Assessment for 2024. In his 2023 Income Tax Return, his line 15000 income is $0. However, in his 2022 Income Tax Return, he only showed income of $7,723.85, and the Notice of Assessment showed income of $26,519.

234The paternal grandmother confirmed that the Father had a Jiffy account and worked in construction. She noted that the Father had been a member of the Liuna union and that he had a few union jobs. She would at times drive him to his Jiffy jobs or to get materials.

235The Mother believes that the Father earned more than $70,000 in 2022. She testified that he earned $2500 per week through union jobs from approximately February to March, when he abandoned that for Jiffy work. She noted he took $36,000 from Jiffy in a two month period, and he could have earned more if he had finished jobs.

236The Mother pointed to a tropical trip the Father took in December 2024. The Father testified that he went to the Dominican Republic for three days and that it was paid for by a friend. The paternal grandmother confirmed that the trip was gifted to the Father by a friend. She also pointed to other lifestyle factors, like the Father taking Ubers, attending strip clubs, concerts, designer items, and postings on social media. She advised the Court that the Father spent $100 in gas daily for his Audi Q5 when he was driving, and spent $3000 per month just on fuel. She alleged that the Father had sums in cash that would not be reflected on tax documents.

237The Mother also alleged that the Father is intentionally not disclosing his bank accounts. She pointed to transfers in and out of his KOHO statements to support her position. She submitted that he has not provided the required evidence about Elevate Homes. She advised that the Father bragged about construction workers making $1500 per week, or $78,000 annually.

238The Mother alleged that the Father applied for the Child Tax Benefit for the child, which was done fraudulently.

239The Father testified that he has had difficulties obtaining employment post-October 2023, when he was charged. He also said he has struggled since having his driver's licence suspended. He advised that he earned $2500 through Elevate Homes in 2023. He testified that he is looking for work by calling the union, looking online and sending resumes. He did not provide other evidence to support that, stating that the judge did not request it.

240The Father confirmed that the cheapest labourer would make $20 per hour. He testified that for exterior construction, the work was weather dependent, with some weeks working 5 days and other weeks 2 days.

241The Father owns Blueprint Construction, which has been in existence for the past 5 years. He stated that there was minimal work through the company. He denied the Mother's allegations that substandard work caused jobs to dry up.

242The Mother also stated that the Father was working on construction jobs through Jiffy. She recounted that she introduced the Father and A.T. She would drive the Father to provide quotes for potential jobs. She alleged that the Father impersonated A.T., and that he kept all the Jiffy funds of approximately $36,000.

243The Mother testified that in 2022, the Father worked through the Luina union and Jiffy contracts earning between $10,000-$25,000 per contract. She explained that he would make $2500 per week in cash from the union work, and received $20 per hour when working for an uncle.

244There was significant testimony from A.T., the Mother and the Father regarding the Jiffy account. Again, the Father's protests raised suspicion and concerns about his credibility. The Father did not answer questions about large sums going into and out of bank accounts, saying that it was not all at once and he did not remember the transactions.

245The Father has been paying rent fairly consistently, including to his brother for $600 per month in late 2021, and to his parents otherwise in varying amounts, although the rent amount is $650 per month. The Mother noted that the Father had designer clothing, $400 running shoes, and a gold Rolex. She did not think he would wear fakes or replicas. He also often spent funds gambling at the casino, according to her.

246The Father confirmed he was in good health.

247The Court finds that the Father is able to work full-time.

248Section 19 of the Child Support Guidelines provides that the Court may impute to a spouse "such amount of income … as it considers appropriate" and provides a non-exhaustive list of such circumstances. In this case, the relevant circumstances are subsection (a) with the Father intentionally under-employed or unemployed, and (f) with the Father failing to make full disclosure.

249As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Drygala v. Pauli 2002 CanLII 41868 (ON CA), parties must earn what they are capable of earning, or they will be found to be intentionally underemployed. When determining if parties are earning less than what they are capable of earning, the Court looks at whether it is voluntary and reasonable.

250In Kohli v. Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the following three questions should be answered by a Court in considering a request to impute income:

1. Is the party intentionally under-employed or unemployed?

2. If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of his or her reasonable educational needs, the needs of the child or reasonable health needs?

3. If not, what income is appropriately imputed?

251The Court will usually draw an adverse inference against a party for his or her failure to comply with their disclosure obligations as provided for in section 21 of the Guidelines and impute income. See Smith v. Pellegrini, 2008 CanLII 46927 (ON SC); Maimone v. Maimone, 2009 CanLII 25981 (ON SC). The parent must make full and complete financial disclosure to ensure that the information required to make a decision on the issue is before the Court. Charron v. Carriere, 2016 ONSC 4719

252Where a party fails to provide full financial disclosure relating to their income, the Court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and to impute income to them. See: Szitas v. Szitas, 2012 ONSC 1548; Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583.

253The Father is presently not working and is on social assistance. Even when he was working, he admitted that he works seasonally. He provided insufficient reasons why he could not work all year. The Court notes that many people in the construction field work all year.

254The Father did not provide specific details of a job search, and his testimony was vague and unreliable. Absence of a reasonable job search will also usually leave the Court with no choice but to find that the payor is intentionally under-employed or unemployed. See Filippetto v. Timpano, 2008 CanLII 3962 (ON SC); T.L. v. D.S., 2019 ONCJ 809.

255The Court finds that the Father is deliberately unemployed or underemployed since 2020. He has not made minimum wage in any of the years for which the Court had tax information.

256The Father did not provide any evidence of the unemployment being required by virtue of education, health issues or to care for the child.

257Turning to what income should be imputed to the Father, the Court agrees with the Mother that the Father has not been forthcoming with financial disclosure. On his own evidence, he should be making $20 per hour. On other evidence, including banking records showing multiple months with over $1000 per month loading and over $10,000 in loads in November 2023 (bulk through Elevate Homes) onto his prepaid KOHO card, and large regular deposits and transfers into his CIBC account, the Court concludes that the Father is receiving at least some income in cash.

258The Court may impute income where it finds that a party has hidden or misrepresented relevant information respecting their income to the other party or to the authorities. This includes cases where the evidence indicates that a party earns cash income that they do not declare for income tax purposes. See: Kinsella v. Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785; Prillo v. Homer, 2023 ONCJ 8; Sobiegraj v. Sobiegraj, 2014 ONSC 2030 (S.C.J.); Lu v. Zhao, 2012 ONSC 5354 (S.C.J.), at para. 26, aff'd 2014 ONCA 12 (C.A.), at para. 5.

259The Court finds that his income is $51,717 for child support purposes. This is based on $20 per hour, for 40 hours per week on average. If the Father were receiving the $20 per hour payment as employment income, it would total $41,600. Because the Father receives cash income, the Court has taken an amount of $7,500 as cash received and grossed it up.

Start Date

260The parties agreed that child support should be calculated from the child's birth, and the Court is content for child support to commence on the first day of the first month after the child was born, being December 1, 2022.

261To quantify the amount of retroactive child support owing, based on an imputed income of $51,717, the Father owes $476 per month, commencing December 1, 2022. He shall receive credit for the $204 per month payments pursuant to the July 29, 2024 Order.

262For the period of December 1, 2022 to July 31, 2024, the Father's arrears are $9,044 ($476 X 19 months). From August 1, 2024 to the present, the Father underpaid each month by $272 ($476 - $204). For that period, his arrears are $3,536 ($272 X 13 months). The total amount owing is $12,580.

263The Father did not seek a credit for payments made outside of Court orders.

264The Court recognizes that the imputed income and period of retroactivity amounts to a considerable sum of arrears for the Father. He is of modest means and lives with his parents. Based on the financial information before the Court, there would not be funds available to pay the entire amount of the arrears. Accordingly, the Court is ordering that he make a monthly payment of $300 on account of the arrears, starting September 1, 2025, until the arrears are paid in full. If the Father is more than 30 days late on the monthly arrears payment, then the entire amount of arrears is due and payable.

265The ongoing child support payments and the payment on account of the arrears shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

Special and Extraordinary Expenses

266In the Mother's draft order (which was submitted on the second day of trial), she is seeking a 50% contribution to special and extraordinary expenses pursuant to s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines ("s. 7 expenses") based on an imputed income to the Father of $70,000 per annum. Despite that his imputed income would be greater than hers, the Mother is content to share the special and extraordinary expenses equally. The Court finds her position to be reasonable.

267The Mother has submitted limited and subjective evidence of the s. 7 expenses she is claiming. She provides a list of items totaling $7390 in a self-composed document. In her document brief, and not in her Affidavit, she suggests that she spent closer to $8,000 - $10,000 for the child, and that the items and amounts listed are "very expensive necessities of a newborn". She did not provide independent verification of the price of the items, but noted that those items could be provided on request. The bulk of the items are normal purchase items for a newborn baby, including a crib, bottles, a stroller (although she purchased two), and baby blankets.

268A few of the items being claimed were shocking, and clearly for her benefit and not the child's. She claimed a flight for the child to travel to Punta Cana for a 10 day holiday, "travel expenses" for the child for the holiday including summer clothes, swimming suits, crocs and a travel playpen, $500 in fuel to pick up some of the normal purchase items, and a professional newborn photoshoot at Cave Studios.

269The Mother is also seeking significant s. 7 expense contribution to the child's lactose free diet, in a yearly amount of $2,250, and a retroactive amount of $4000.

270The onus is on the parent seeking the special or extraordinary expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of the categories under s. 7 and that the expenses are necessary and reasonable, having regard to the parental financial circumstances. See Park v. Thompson, 2005 CanLII 14132 (ON CA).

271The list of special and extraordinary expenses under s. 7(1)(a) to (f) is exhaustive. If a claim does not fall within any of the listed categories, it must be dismissed: Kilrea v. Kilrea, [1998] O.J. No. 3677 (Gen. Div.), para. 13; and Park v. Thompson.

272The list in s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines is as follows:

(a) child care expenses incurred as a result of the employment, illness, disability or education or training for employment of the parent or spouse who has the majority of parenting time;

(b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;

(c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses and contact lenses;

(d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child's particular needs;

(e) expenses for post-secondary education; and

(f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities. O. Reg. 391/97, s. 7 (1) ; O. Reg. 446/01, s. 2; O. Reg. 32/21, s. 2.

273Diet or baby formula does not fall within one of those categories. All the items in the Mother's self-composed list do not fall within the one of those categories, except for one. Further, table child support is to be used for the daily expenses of a child, which includes shelter, food, clothing and necessities. Diet or formula would fall under the category of food, and the purpose behind the table amount. Necessities include things like bottles, blankets, and a car seat. Accordingly, this Court declines to order any payment for such an expense.

274The one expense on the list that does fall into the category of a s. 7 expense is the circumcision of the child, which would be a health-related expense. However, the Mother did not provide any independent evidence, like a receipt, or sworn evidence for this expense. As such, the Court declines to make an order.

275Another potential s. 7 expense that the Court wishes to address (although the parties did not) is the child's daycare. Sufficient evidence was not provided concerning the costs of daycare. However, the Court notes in this case, the Mother is not working or going to school. She did not provide evidence that the child was in daycare because of an illness. It is not clear to the Court why the child is in daycare. As such, at this time, the Court will not be ordering contribution to daycare.

276The Court will make an order for future s. 7 expenses in proportion to each parties' income at the relevant time of the expense arising, with the expense to be agreed to in advance in writing through AppClose and payment to be made only after independent receipts have been provided.

PERMISSION OF THE COURT

277The Court will order that the Mother requires leave to bring any further matters to Court. This is because the Mother's litigation was entirely disproportionate to the facts and issues in dispute. She needlessly complicated what should have been a straightforward matter. Her pleadings and materials were not child focused.

278The Court has significant concerns that the Mother will continue to use the legal system to attempt to punish the Father and to bar his relationship with the child. It is imperative that she not be allowed to do so.

279This does not mean that she cannot come back to Court. It just means that the merits of any request will first be closely examined.

280Because of her repeated failures to follow page limits, and her belief that more is better, the Court will be imposing strict limits on leave material.

ORDERS

281The Court makes the following final orders:

Decision-Making Responsibility

1. The parties shall have shared decision-making responsibility for all major health, education, and welfare decisions for the child. Each party shall contact the other in writing through AppClose at least 10 days in advance of the decision being made, and the other party shall provide his or her input within 5 days of the initial contact. For emergency medical decisions only, each party shall contact the other in writing through AppClose and by one text message only, as soon as practicable. In the event of a disagreement by the parties on a major decision for health, education and welfare, the Mother shall make the final decision.

2. The parties shall each have decision-making responsibility for religion and spiritual training while the child is in their care.

3. Day-to-day decisions shall be made by each party when the child is in their care.

Parenting Time – Regular Schedule

4. On consent, the child shall primarily reside with the Mother.

5. The Father shall have in person parenting time on a gradually increasing scale as follows:

a) From the date of this order until October 15, 2025 (approximately a three month period), every Saturday for four hours from 1:00 p.m. until 5:00 p.m., and every Tuesday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.;

b) From October 15, 2025 until December 15, 2025, every Saturday for eight hours from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m., and every Tuesday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.;

c) From December 15, 2025 to February 15, 2026, every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 10:00 a.m., and every Tuesday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.;

d) From February 15, 2026 to April 15, 2026, every Saturday from 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and every Tuesday and Thursday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.; and,

e) From April 15, 2026 onward, every other weekend from Friday after daycare or school until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., and every Tuesday and Thursday from 5:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.

6. The Father shall have weekly virtual parenting time on Thursdays from 5:30 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. until February 15, 2026, when the Thursday parenting time shall be in person. The virtual parenting time shall be initiated by the Father.

7. If the Mother cancels the Father's in person parenting time because the child is ill or she chooses to take the child on holiday, then there shall be make up time on the next day for daytime visits or next weekend for weekend visits.

8. The Mother shall not cancel the Father's virtual parenting time for any reason.

Parenting Time – Holiday Schedule

9. The holiday schedule shall override the regular schedule, as follows:

a) For Christmas, in odd numbered years, the Mother shall have the child from 1:00 p.m. on December 24th to 1:00 p.m. on December 25th, and the Father shall have the child from 1:00 p.m. on December 25th to 1:00 p.m. on December 26th. In even numbered years, the Father shall have the child from 1:00 p.m. on December 24th to 1:00 p.m. on December 25th, and the Mother shall have the child from 1:00 p.m. on December 25th to 1:00 p.m. on December 26th.

b) For the Mother's Day and Father's Day weekends each year, the child shall be with the Mother on Mother's Day weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Saturday to 8:00 p.m. on Sunday, and with the Father on Father's Day weekend from 5:00 p.m. on Saturday to 8:00 p.m. on Sunday.

c) Commencing in 2026, the Father shall have two non-consecutive weeks (5 days each) of holiday parenting time in the summer (July and August). Commencing in 2027, the Father shall have two non-consecutive weeks (7 days each) of holiday parenting time in the summer (July and August). He shall advise the Mother by April 15th of each year of the weeks he wishes to choose for his summer holiday parenting time.

d) Commencing in March 2026, if either party's parenting time is on a weekend where it is a long weekend (statutory holiday or PA day), then their weekend parenting time shall be expanded to include the PA day or statutory holiday.

Ancillary Parenting Orders

10. Both parties shall be sober during their parenting time with the child.

11. The parties shall use AppClose for all communications, which shall be child-focused and respectful. The parties shall refrain from using any derogatory language in their communications with each other.

12. The parties shall not contact each other unless it is about the child through AppClose or by text only in emergency medical situations.

13. The parties shall not speak disparagingly about the other party in the presence of the child.

14. The Mother shall be the custodian of the child's original government issued identification.

15. Within 5 days of the date of this order, the Mother shall provide the Father with a notarized copy of the child's government issued identification, including but not limited to the birth certificate, health card, and passport.

16. Within 5 days of the date of this order, the Mother shall provide to the Father the names, locations and contact information for all third-party care providers, including but not limited to the daycare, paediatrician, specialists, assessors, therapy providers. The Mother shall immediately update the Father whenever a new or additional third-party care provider is engaged to provide care for the child.

17. Each party shall be able to make inquiries and be given information about the child's well-being, including in relation to the child's health and education.

18. Neither party may remove the child from Ontario without the advanced written consent of the other, which shall not be unreasonably withheld.

Child Support

19. Commencing September 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month thereafter, the Father shall pay child support for the child in the amount of $476 per month, based on an imputed income of $51,717.

20. The Father's arrears of child support for the period of December 1, 2022 to August 30, 2025 are fixed at $12,580.

21. Commencing September 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month until the arrears are paid in full, the Father shall pay $300 per month on account of child support arrears.

22. All child support payments shall be enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

23. The Director is requested to adjust its records in accordance with this order.

24. Nothing in this order precludes the Director from collecting arrears from the Father from any government source (such as income tax, GST/HST returns), lottery or prize winnings or inheritances.

25. Starting in 2026, the parties shall provide the other, by June 30th each year, with complete copies of their Income Tax Returns, including all schedules and attachments, and copies of their Notices of Assessment.

26. Support Deduction Order shall be issued.

27. Any future s. 7 expenses shall be paid in proportion to each parties' income at the relevant time of the expense arising, with the expense to be agreed to in advance in writing through AppClose and payment to be made only after independent receipts have been provided.

Permission

28. The Mother may not bring any further Court proceeding, including a Motion To Change or an enforcement proceeding, without leave of this Court. Any request by the Mother for leave of the Court is limited to four pages double spaced, 12 point font, Times New Roman or Arial. If the Mother exceeds this limit, the Court staff is directed not to accept her materials.

282If costs are being sought by either party, then the following applies:

a) The Father shall have until September 2, 2025 to serve and file his cost submissions;

b) The Mother shall have until September 16, 2025 to serve and file her cost submissions;

c) The parties' submissions should clearly set out how they want the Court to apportion costs;

d) The cost submissions shall not exceed four double spaced pages, 12 point font either Times New Roman or Arial, not including any Bills of Costs or Offers to Settle; and,

e) Bills of Costs and Offers to Settle shall be filed with the submissions.

Released: August 19, 2025

____________________

Justice Sara Mintz