Reasons for Judgment

Court File No.: FC-18-1469
Date: 2025/06/02
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
Domna Koliniati, Applicant
– and –
Jhone Manolessos, Respondent

Applicant: Self-represented
Respondent Counsel: Ceilidh Joan Henderson
Heard: January 20, 21, and 22, 2025

Justice: M. Fraser

Part 1 - Introduction

[1] The outstanding issues to be determined by me following the trial of this matter are as follows:

1. The parenting arrangement for the parties’ daughter C.M. who is presently 14;
2. Who should have decision-making authority over C.M. and upon what terms; and
3. Whether income should be imputed to the Applicant and the determination of the child support amount.

Part 2 - Background

[2] The Applicant, Domna Koliniati (“Koliniati”) and the Respondent, Jhone Manolessos (“Manolessos”) both lived in Greece during their early years of childhood although Manolessos was born in Canada. He moved to Greece with his family when he was about two years old. His family moved back to Canada approximately 10 years later.

[3] Both parties met while attending university in Greece in or around 2009/2010. They were both students and they both ultimately obtained their bachelor’s degrees in human resources.

[4] After cohabiting together for approximately three years, the parties married in Greece on December 30, 2007.

[5] The parties have one child from this relationship, namely C.M. born in 2011.

[6] The parties moved to Canada within a year or so following C.M.’s birth. They then began to live in Ottawa, Ontario.

[7] The parties separated on March 1, 2016. C.M. was 4 years old at the time.

Parenting

[8] Initially the parties resided in separate apartments which were located within a close distance to each other. The parenting arrangement was managed by the parties informally and was, as described by Manolessos, very “fluid” during this time. C.M. would go back and forth between the parties as arranged and agreed upon by them.

[9] Manolessos asserts that Koliniati became gradually more restrictive in sharing the parenting of C.M. According to Manolessos, this coincided with when he moved, approximately a year and one-half following their separation, to a townhouse. It was about a ten-minute drive from Koliniati’s home. After this point, the parties were no longer able to mutually agree upon a parenting arrangement.

[10] According to Manolessos, Koliniati was no longer willing to agree to a “shared” arrangement. She would only agree to Manolessos having more restricted parenting time with C.M. every weekend from Friday night to Sunday evening.

[11] As a result, this application was commenced in 2018.

[12] This proceeding has been outstanding for approximately 7 years. C.M. was approximately 8 years old when this proceeding was commenced. She had just turned 14 years of age by the time this matter reached trial.

[13] There have been several temporary orders made in this proceeding. However, even with some changes, there is no dispute Koliniati has always been the primary caregiver for C.M. Manolessos has, for the most part, exercised his parenting time with C.M. every second weekend from Friday after school until Tuesday morning.

[14] For the summer of 2024, Manolessos’ parenting time was expanded and the parties shared parenting on a week-about basis through the summer. For the commencement of the school year in September 2024, Koliniati wished the parties to return to the prior routine in which C.M. was in Koliniati’s primary care. C.M. did initially return to the parenting schedule that had been in place prior to the summer week-about shared arrangement. However, this lasted for one week. C.M. took matters in hand and thereafter began residing one week with Koliniati and on the alternate week with Manolessos.

[15] C.M. did this by simply not returning to Koliniati at the conclusion of the parenting weekend with Manolessos. Koliniati’s response to this was to call the police. She asked the police to conduct a wellness check respecting C.M. advising that she was concerned that C.M. was being coerced to remain with Manolessos. The police attended at Manolessos’ home. Manolessos was at work. One of his roommates called him and asked him to come home, which he did. At that time the police officer met with C.M. who also had a friend over with her at the time. The police officer confirmed that C.M. was happy and he concluded, based upon his discussions with C.M., that she wished to remain with Manolessos. He advised both parties that no further action would be taken.

[16] Therefore C.M. has been residing with Koliniati and Manolessos on a week on/week off basis since that time. It appears that both parties have felt compelled to respect the new status quo which appears to have been imposed upon them by C.M. given her views.

[17] Notwithstanding this change, Koliniati opposes an order that this shared parenting arrangement continue.

[18] Koliniati objects to a shared parenting arrangement because of two incidents which she says demonstrate that Manolessos is irresponsible. She asserts that it would be inappropriate for him to have an expanded parenting role based on these incidents.

[19] The first incident occurred when Manolessos brought C.M. to Greek Fest. It was a hot sunny day and C.M. became dehydrated and overheated. She began vomiting. Manolessos brought C.M. to CHEO for medical care and C.M. recovered without complication. Koliniati asserts that Manolessos acted irresponsibly because he failed to apply sunscreen to C.M. or ensure she was wearing a sunhat.

[20] Koliniati also referred to an occasion when Manolessos brought C.M. to a festival in Blackburn Hamlet. He permitted C.M. to play laser tag. A young boy was running (which was not permitted) and he ran into C.M. The boy’s glasses hit C.M. in the forehead causing a cut which has resulted in C.M. having a scar over her eye. When the incident occurred, Manolessos sought medical care for C.M. and the injury was appropriately cared for. Koliniati is critical of the fact that Manolessos allowed C.M. to play laser tag in the first place. Manolessos, in turn, asserts that this activity was professionally organized and that C.M. had met the age and height restrictions.

[21] C.M. is about to start high school in September 2025. Both parties are aware of and agree upon the high school she will be attending. That said, it is clear Koliniati made the decision respecting where C.M. would attend on her own. Koliniati unilaterally arranged to go to an Open House at this high school to show this school to C.M. Koliniati admitted in her evidence that she did not advise or attempt in any way to include or consult with Manolessos with respect to this decision.

[22] In her testimony Koliniati made a point of suggesting that Manolessos does not even know what high school C.M. is going to as though she felt this reflected negatively upon Manolessos as a parent. Manolessos, however, was aware of the choice which had been made as C.M. told him after the fact. He did his research and satisfied himself that this was an appropriate school for C.M. It is not the case that he was disinterested in the issue.

[23] Koliniati’s evidence is that she has informed C.M. that if C.M. continues to exercise a week-about parenting arrangement, that when C.M. attends high school, which is physically beside Koliniati’s home, Koliniati will not permit C.M. to visit with her (Koliniati) even informally for lunch or such, during the weeks C.M. is scheduled to reside with Manolessos. Koliniati suggests that she takes this position because she “abides” by court orders and therefore could not possibly allow C.M. to deviate from the terms of any Order.

[24] Ms. Kapasky, a Clinician with the Office of the Children’s Lawyer interviewed C.M. and authored a Voice of the Child Report dated March 20, 2023. This report was filed with the Court. Ms. Kapasky testified at the trial.

[25] Ms. Kapasky interviewed C.M. on two occasions. C.M. was 12 years old at the time. In Ms. Kapasky’s view, C.M. presented as social, articulate, quite intelligent and insightful. C.M. appeared capable of seeing the issues from both of her parents’ perspectives. Ms. Kapasky felt that C.M. spoke of the issues using age-appropriate language. C.M. was very clear in her stated views and preferences regarding the parenting schedule that she wants to exercise an equal week on/week off schedule with her parents.

[26] While C.M. understood that Ms. Kapasky’s role was to determine C.M.’s views and preferences on the issue of the parenting schedule, C.M. volunteered and was very clear that she also wants her parents to stop the fighting. C.M. made it evident to Ms. Kapasky that she loves both of her parents and that she wants to spend equivalent amounts of time with both. She advised that her desire to enjoy a week-about shared parenting arrangement is not an indication that she does not want to spend time with her mother. Rather, her preference is owing to the fact that she wants to spend more time with her father. She wants to be able to have an equivalent relationship with him.

[27] Ms. Kapasky was of the view that C.M.’s stated views and preferences were both informed and independent.

[28] C.M. also shared with Ms. Kapasky that she is not comfortable being questioned by her mother after spending time with her father. C.M. pointed out that her father does not ask questions about the time she spends with her mother.

[29] Ms. Kapasky testified that it was apparent to her, based upon C.M.’s reporting to her, that C.M. has been exposed to conflict between her parents. For example, C.M. shared that on her birthday, when she wanted to spend more time with her father, her mother “freaked out.” This then led to another “big fight” between her parents. C.M. felt that it ruined her birthday.

[30] C.M. hopes to avoid a reoccurrence of this conflict by spending the night before her birthday until 3:00 pm the next day (her birthday) with one parent and then going to the other parent for the remainder of that day and overnight. This is, according to C.M., similar to the arrangement for Christmas and she feels this has worked well.

[31] C.M. also advised Ms. Kapasky that for Hallowe’en, she has usually gone “trick or treating” with her mother and that she has traditionally met up with friends. She would like this tradition to continue, regardless of which parent she is residing with that week.

[32] Finally, Manolessos asserts that Koliniati has tried to control communications between he and C.M. He believes that Koliniati has used the telephone provided to C.M. as a tool to manipulate her. His response was to purchase a phone for C.M. that would be hers to use and provided by him so that Koliniati would not be able to confiscate it from C.M.

[33] Koliniati, on the other hand, asserts that Manolessos could have saved her the earlier expense of the phone she had purchased C.M. and suggests that this new phone will not permit her to phone C.M. She suggests that the number has been blocked. Manolessos denies this. He maintained that he has no control over the phone and that it is C.M.’s to use.

Income

[34] Manolessos is employed at Loblaws. He is the deli and seafood manager. His income for 2023 was $58,000. He believes his income for 2024 will approximate $60,000.

[35] Manolessos began to pay Koliniati child support in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) immediately upon separation and he has continued to adjust his payment to accord with the Guidelines to date.

[36] Manolessos’ obligation to pay child support was incorporated into an interim order by Summers J. on June 22, 2022. At the time of trial, Manolessos was paying Koliniati monthly child support in the amount of $504 per month and the support was being collected through the Family Responsibility Office.

[37] At the time of trial, Koliniati advised that she was not presently working. It is noted that Koliniati has not complied with the most recent disclosure orders made in this proceeding. Despite having been ordered to produce an up-to-date financial statement for trial, Koliniati did not do so. She has not provided a copy of her resume or evidence of any employment search made by her to support what efforts she has made to find employment.

[38] Koliniati does not have a significant work history. She completed her bachelor’s degree in human resources in 2010. C.M. was born in 2011. The parties moved to Canada in 2012. She assumed a role as a caregiver for C.M. during that time.

[39] Koliniati’s most recent employment was for GoodLife Fitness on a part-time basis. The income she earned from this supplemented the social assistance she received. The financial statement which she filed in this proceeding in July 2018 disclosed that she was at that time earning $606.66 per month for employment income, $843.67 per month for social assistance, and $573.00 per month for the child tax benefit.

[40] Koliniati filed a further sworn financial statement dated December 11, 2023. At that time, she indicated that she had last worked in November 2020 and that she had been unemployed since then. At the time of trial, she advised that her unemployed status had not changed.

Part 3 - Legal Framework for Parenting Arrangement and Decision-Making

[41] The parenting issues in this proceeding are governed by the Divorce Act.

[42] The main legislative provisions that govern the parenting issues in this case are sections 16.1 to 16.4 of the Divorce Act, which outline the court's jurisdiction to make "parenting orders." The term "parenting order" encompasses two key concepts, namely "decision-making responsibility" respecting children and "parenting time."

[43] Section 2(1) of the Divorce Act defines the terms "decision-making responsibility" and "parenting time" which are the two key components of a parenting order, as follows:

decision-making responsibility means the responsibility for making significant decisions about a child's well-being, including in respect of
a) health;
b) education;
c) culture, language, religion and spirituality; and
d) significant extracurricular activities

parenting time means the time that a child of the marriage spends in the care of a person referred to in subsection 16.1(1), whether or not the child is physically with that person during that entire time.

[44] Section 16.1(4) of the Divorce Act addresses the permitted contents of a parenting order as follows:

The court may, in the order,
a) allocate parenting time in accordance with section 16.2;
b) allocate decision-making responsibility in accordance with section 16.3;
c) include requirements with respect to any means of communication, that is to occur during the parenting time allocated to a person, between a child and another person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility is allocated; and
d) provide for any other matter that the court considers appropriate.

(5) Terms and conditions - The court may make an order for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose any terms, conditions and restrictions that it considers appropriate.

(6) Family dispute resolution process - Subject to provincial law, the order may direct the parties to attend a family dispute resolution process.

(7) Relocation - The order may authorize or prohibit the relocation of the child.

(8) Supervision - The order may require that parenting time or the transfer of the child from one person to another be supervised.

(9) Prohibition on removal of child - The order may prohibit the removal of a child from a specified geographic area without the written consent of any specified person or without a court order authorizing the removal.

[45] Decision-making responsibility in respect of a child, or any aspect of that responsibility, may be allocated to either spouse, to both spouses, to a person described in paragraph 16.1(1)(b), or to any combination of those persons.

[46] Section 16.1(4)(a) directs that in making a parenting order, the court may "allocate parenting time in accordance with section 16.2." Section 16.2(1) provides that parenting time may be allocated by way of a schedule. Section 16.2(2) stipulates that the concept of parenting time includes the exclusive authority to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child during that time:

Day-to-day decisions
16.2(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom parenting time is allocated under paragraph 16.1(4)(a) has exclusive authority to make, during that time, day-to-day decisions affecting the child.

[47] Further, section 16(1) of the Divorce Act directs that I shall consider only the best interests of the child in making a parenting order. This section directs that I give primary consideration to C.M.'s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

[48] Section 16(3) sets out the following factors that the court must consider in determining the child's best interests:

Factors to be considered
16(3) In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, including,
a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;
b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each spouse, each of the child's siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;
c) each spouse's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other spouse;
d) the history of care of the child;
e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
g) any plans for the child's care;
h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
i. the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
ii. the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

[49] The wide array of factors relevant to the “best interests” analysis under the Divorce Act allows for a uniquely tailored analysis of the parenting issues, woven from the particular condition, means, needs and circumstances of the child whose well-being is under consideration. The weight that should be accorded to each factor will vary depending on the unique features of every child and case.

[50] Section 16.3 of the Divorce Act provides that the court may allocate decision-making responsibility in respect of a child, or any aspect of that responsibility, to either spouse, to both spouses, to another person authorized to seek a parenting order or to any combination of those persons. This provision gives the court a wide discretion to craft a tailor-made decision-making responsibility framework that supports and promotes the best interests of the child before the court, taking into consideration the unique facts of each case.

[51] The options available to me include the following:

1. I could grant sole decision-making responsibility in all areas to one spouse.
2. I could grant joint decision-making responsibility in all areas to both spouses.
3. I could grant joint decision-making responsibility to both spouses in one or more areas of responsibility but give sole decision-making authority in the other areas to one spouse or allocate those other areas of decision-making between the spouses.
4. Alternatively, I could allocate each party sole decision-making responsibility in separate specified areas, with no provision for joint decision-making in any areas.
5. Another option open to me is to require the parties to engage in all reasonable efforts to make some or all significant decisions jointly, but to designate which party has final say in each area of decision-making in the event of disagreement.

[52] In deciding on an appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, I am required to consider all possible options, and not simply those proposed by the parties.
(Chomos v. Hamilton, 2016 ONSC 5208, para 109; Jackson v. Mayerle, 2016 ONSC 72; Ruffudeen v. Coutts, 2016 ONSC 3359)

[53] The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis set out the following principles which should be considered when determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order (formerly custody order) is appropriate:

1. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.
2. It cannot be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.
3. Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.
4. The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.
5. No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.
6. The younger the child, the more important communication is.

[54] Chappel J., in McBennett v. Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, conducted a thorough review of the case law and set out the factors which have historically been considered when determining what decision-making regime is in the best interests of a child. Those considerations included the following:

1. The strength of the parties' respective ties with the child.
2. The relative parenting abilities of each parent and the quality of their decision-making respecting the child are also important considerations.
3. A desire to ensure formal equality of influence between the parents is not in and of itself sufficient to support a claim for dividing up aspects of significant decision-making.
4. A history of family violence or any evidence suggesting that there is a significant power imbalance between the parties.
5. An order allocating aspects of decision-making between the parties will not be considered appropriate where the evidence indicates that one party is seeking this arrangement solely as a means of controlling the other parent, rather than as a means of fostering the child's best interests.
6. Is each parent able to place the needs of the child above their own needs and interests?
7. Whether an order allocating areas of decision-making between the parties would render it more likely to de-escalate the conflict between the parties or inflame it?
8. Whether the parties are likely to at least be able to navigate basic issues such as scheduling and interpretation of the order under a regime that separates out the various aspects of decision-making?
9. With respect to parental conflict, is one party the major cause of discord between the parties?
10. Is there evidence which would suggest that one or both of the parties will never be able to disengage from combat?
11. Is this an instance where one or both of the parties has a history of failing to comply with court orders or processes?
12. Is there a party who is interfering with or not supporting contact between the child and the other parent, alienating the child from the other parent or marginalizing the other parent's role:
    • Where the parent with primary care has engaged in this type of conduct, but that parent is otherwise very loving and competent, the courts have often considered a reversal of decision-making responsibility as too drastic a measure and have opted for a division of areas of decision-making as a means of protecting the other parent's role and influence in the child's life;
    • Where the non-primary parent is loving and attentive but has engaged in undermining or alienating behavior, this is often a factor that tips the scales in favour of sole decision-making responsibility to the other parent if they are also competent; and
    • If both parties are involved in severe alienating and undermining conduct, the court may conclude that neither can be trusted to exercise sole decision-making responsibly. In such circumstances, if both parties are equally competent and loving parents, allocating the incidents of parental decision-making between the parties may provide an effective means of keeping both of them in check, protecting the child from exposure to damaging parental conflict and ensuring that the child benefits from the contributions that both parents can make to decision-making.

[55] No one factor listed in section 16(3) of the Divorce Act is dispositive, and not every parenting dispute will contain every factor. Each parenting dispute must be decided on its own facts, in relation to the factors that are present with the primary consideration being the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being. (M.Q. v. R.C., 2022 ONSC 1753)

Part 4 - Analysis with Respect to the Parenting Issues

[56] C.M. is now 14 years old. She is a healthy, well-adjusted, bright, articulate young teenager.

[57] C.M. has benefitted from the care, guidance, and love that both of her parents have provided to her to date.

[58] Both parties clearly have a strong and loving relationship with C.M.

[59] While C.M. was a very young child, and since 2018, there is no doubt that Koliniati has been C.M.’s primary caregiver and that she provided for C.M.’s daily needs. The care she has provided to C.M. appears to have been completely and indisputably appropriate. It is evident that C.M. has benefitted from Koliniati’s love and guidance and that Koliniati has appropriately ensured that C.M.’s physical, emotional and psychological needs were met.

[60] C.M. has also benefitted from the positive relationship that she has had throughout her life with Manolessos. He has been an active, engaged parent as well, notwithstanding that his parenting time with C.M. was more restricted from at least 2018 onward. Manolessos has clearly been committed to and he has managed to keep engaged with C.M.

[61] Koliniati testified that she considers Manolessos to have acted irresponsibly when parenting C.M. She referred to two isolated incidents. The first concerned a day when C.M. became dehydrated while with Manolessos at Greek Fest. The second occasion occurred when Manolessos brought C.M. to a festival in Blackburn Hamlet to play laser tag and C.M. was injured.

[62] I consider these incidents to be isolated and mishaps which could occur even under the watchful eyes of most able parents. I do not accept that these occurrences demonstrate a lack of parenting skill by Manolessos. To the contrary, I found Manolessos, in his testimony, to readily accept responsibility for his decisions as a parent, and it was clear from his testimony that he had the insight to learn from such mishaps. He established, in my view, that he is informed as to age-appropriate parenting, and insightful with respect to challenges he and the parties together have encountered.

[63] I therefore conclude that Manolessos is also attuned to C.M.’s physical, emotional and psychological needs and that he is also very much capable of providing the care, guidance and love that is consistent with C.M.’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

[64] Koliniati finds it difficult to support C.M.’s relationship with Manolessos. She asks that in making any order for parenting time that I provide Manolessos with the “minimal parenting time as might be permitted”. She does not support Manolessos sharing a week about arrangement. Yet, other than Koliniati’s reference to the two incidents I have just mentioned as justifying her position, she simply expressed a generalized view that he is undeserving of this role based upon his being “irresponsible”. She warned that she does not believe he will be able to appropriately parent C.M. through the “challenging teen years” ahead. She is concerned that there are “bigger storms ahead of us”. She feels she, alone, is equipped with the skills necessary to navigate these challenges in parenting C.M.

[65] Koliniati’s unwillingness to support Manolessos’ participation as a parent was glaringly apparent in her evidence when she spoke of which high school she intended C.M. to attend next year. She made it clear she thought that Manolessos would not know what school C.M. was going to attend as though this supported the conclusion that Manolessos was not properly or adequately engaged as a parent and that he was not attuned to these important future events and decisions which needed to be made for C.M. To the contrary, this evidence, in my view, supported the conclusion that Koliniati was not supporting or recognizing Manolessos’ right or desire as a parent to be consulted or even informed of important decisions that needed to be made for C.M. I conclude that she clearly failed to consult with or even inform Manolessos of the steps she was taking to make educational decisions for C.M. I found Koliniati, in her evidence, did not respect or value Manolessos’ past and potential future contributions as a parent to C.M.

[66] While Koliniati has resisted the suggestion that Manolessos has an ability to play an important role in C.M.’s life, Manolessos, in contrast, has expressed a respectful acknowledgement of the important role that Koliniati has played and should continue to play in C.M.’s parenting. He does not seek to exclude her involvement and indeed expressed an openness and a desire to be flexible. He asserted that he knew C.M. loves her mother and that he recognized it was important to support C.M.’s relationship with her mother. He asserted the view that should C.M. express a desire or need to be with Koliniati during Manolessos’ parenting time (ie. to attend church with Koliniati), he would ensure this happens.

[67] Koliniati’s testimony to the effect that if C.M. continued to exercise a week-about parenting arrangement, that she would not permit C.M. to visit with her (Koliniati), even informally for lunch or such, during the weeks C.M. is intended to reside with Manolessos is very concerning to me. I consider Koliniati’s position on this aspect of her evidence to be quite manipulative and designed to pressure C.M. to reconsider her views and preferences.

[68] Koliniati’s refusal to acknowledge that the parties could exercise flexibility in C.M.’s parenting arrangement because she feels compelled to comply with the strict terms of a court order simply does not ring true in the face of her non-compliance with the disclosure orders which were made in this proceeding.

[69] C.M.’s views have been consistent and longstanding that she would like to reside on a week on / week off basis with her parents. She has clearly maintained this view for a while. She expressed this view when she met with Ms. Kapasky at the age of 12 and she continues to express this view through her actions at the age of 14. She effectively has made a decision respecting the parenting arrangement, when her parents could not resolve it on their own, by continuing the week-about parenting arrangement this past school year.

[70] Ms. Kapasky reports and indeed both parties report that C.M. is bright and articulate. She has, I conclude, formed her own views and preferences, independently and with a maturity of thought. She clearly loves both of her parents and wishes through a shared arrangement to have the opportunity to foster her relationship with both parents.

[71] No issues of family violence were advanced by either party during this proceeding or at trial.

[72] I note that while the conflict between the parties must seem and feel significant to them, the issues requiring my determination in this proceeding would be considered by many to be relatively minor in contrast to the struggles most litigants in family proceedings experience. This court is frequently tasked with making decisions when there seems to be no ready solution to end the issues of poverty, addiction and family violence often seen to permeate a child’s family constellation. Some parents are often left to raise a child as that child’s sole means of guidance and financial support, often without the benefit and support from extended family. We frequently see parents with mental health and addiction issues which seriously undermine their ability to parent. Sometimes it is the geographic distance between the parents which severely limits the options for parenting a child.

[73] None of those factors are present in this instance. For that reason, the parties need to understand how very fortunate they are notwithstanding their inability to agree on the issues before me.

[74] I am firmly of the view that it is in C.M.’s best interests to continue to enjoy a week-about shared arrangement between her parents. That arrangement is consistent with C.M.’s views and preferences. Her views have been longstanding and consistent and should be accorded a significant amount of weight given that I do not accept Koliniati’s basis for why the parenting arrangement should be otherwise. The benefit C.M. will gain by enjoying frequent and substantial time with both her parents, in my view, is best for C.M.’s physical, psychological and emotional well-being. It secures for her the best opportunity to grow into a young adult surrounded by individuals who can support and provide for her.

[75] Additionally, there was already a final order consented to by the parties respecting a sharing of holiday time. That order continues. However, additionally I am ordering that the parties share time on C.M.’s birthday in the manner C.M. has proposed, namely, by spending the night before her birthday until 3:00 pm the next day (her birthday) with one parent and then going to the other parent for remainder of that day and overnight.

[76] I am additionally ordering that C.M., unless C.M. decides otherwise, shall be able to continue her tradition at Hallowe’en and go to her mother’s house for the night and to meet up with friends for trick or treating.

[77] With respect to the decision-making responsibility for C.M., while I am satisfied that both Koliniati and Manolessos would hope to comply with and carry out the terms of any order on decision-making, they have both reported that neither of them believes that they have been able to communicate and cooperate sufficiently with each other such that they could effectively co-parent with joint decision-making.

[78] Ironically, both of them appear to be quite similar in their substantive approach to parenting C.M. However, while I would hope that they will someday find a way to improve their ability to communicate with each so that they could work together in decision-making, I do not believe they are at the point where they could manage to do so without some mechanism in place for what is to occur if and when they are unable to agree.

[79] In my view, it would be in C.M.’s best interests that each party make the daily decisions for C.M. when C.M. is in his or her care. Each of the parties shall decide what extra curricular activities, if any, that C.M. shall participate in during the weeks C.M. is residing with them, taking into account C.M.’s views and preferences.

[80] I conclude that with respect to decision-making on issues concerning C.M.’s medical and health care needs and her education that either party is capable of making those decisions as needed in C.M.’s best interests. On this basis the decision-making should be joint. Both parties should be entitled to be informed and involved in making significant decisions concerning C.M., including all medical and educational decisions.

[81] The parties shall engage in all reasonable efforts to make some or all of those significant decisions jointly.

[82] In the event they are unable to agree, then Koliniati shall be entitled to the final say over medical and health care issues concerning C.M. and Manolessos shall have final say over issues concerning C.M.’s education.

[83] My hope is that both parties will use their very best effort to include and consider the views of the other when making any decision concerning C.M. as this will impact the willingness of the other to work likewise consult with them when making the decisions over which they have authority.

Part 5 - Child Support

[84] Manolessos has paid child support to Koliniati in accordance with the Guidelines. However, he submits that the obligation to continue to pay the full table amount should be changed to reflect a shared parenting arrangement. He asks that an order issue imputing income to Koliniati and he submits that there should be a set off of the table amount each would pay the other based upon their respective incomes.

[85] I will first address the issue of imputing income to Koliniati.

[86] Section 1 of the Guidelines stipulates that one of its objectives is to establish a fair standard of support for children to ensure that they benefit from the financial means of both parents after separation.

[87] Imputing income is one method by which the court gives effect to the joint and ongoing obligation of parents to support their children. In order to meet this legal obligation, a parent must earn what he or she is capable of earning.

[88] The issue in contention in this instance is whether it is appropriate to impute income to Koliniati on the basis she is intentionally unemployed within the scope of section 19(1)(a) of the Guidelines which provides as follows:

(1) the court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, which circumstances include the following:
(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed or unemployed, other than where the under-employment or unemployment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage or any child under the age of majority or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse

[89] In applying section 19, the following three questions should be considered:

1. Is the spouse intentionally under-employed or unemployed?
2. If so, is the intentional under-employment or unemployment required by virtue of the needs of the child or the spouse’s reasonable educational or health needs?
3. If the answer to (2) is negative, what income is appropriately imputed in the circumstances?

[90] Koliniati did not comply with the interim disclosure orders made in this proceeding.

[91] It is clear, however, based upon her evidence at trial, that Koliniati is not presently employed and supported by the financial statements were filed by her in this proceeding, it would seem she has not been employed since her part-time position with GoodLife Fitness came to an end in November 2020.

[92] Koliniati has not provided a copy of her resume or evidence of any employment search made by her to support what efforts she has made to find employment.

[93] I find that Koliniati is therefore intentionally unemployed.

[94] C.M. has been residing with the parties on a de facto shared week about basis since September 2024. There has been no evidence led by either party to suggest that C.M.’s needs would require that either of them be unemployed or under-employed in order to provide for C.M.’s care.

[95] Koliniati does not have a significant work history. Notwithstanding, she completed her bachelor’s degree in human resources in 2010 and Koliniati has not suggested nor indeed produced any evidence to support a conclusion that she is unable by reason of her educational or health needs to work at this time.

[96] I conclude therefore that Koliniati’s unemployment is not required by virtue of the needs of C.M. or by Koliniati’s reasonable educational or health needs.

[97] I bear in mind that given Koliniati’s lack of a significant work history, her employment opportunities may be limited. Further, a court cannot select an arbitrary figure as imputed income. (Drygala v. Pauli, para 44)

[98] In Bak v. Dobell, 2007 ONCA 304, para 36 Lang J.A. for the court held that:

When considering whether a circumstance is an appropriate one in which to impute income, a court will bear in mind the objectives of the Guidelines to establish fair support based on the means of the parents in an objective manner that reduces conflict, ensures consistency and encourages resolution.

[99] Koliniati has a duty to seek employment and maximize her ability to contribute toward the support of C.M. She has not provided any evidence of reasonable efforts to work to her full potential and to contribute to the extent she is capable of doing so toward the support of C.M. In my view, Koliniati has not made an appropriate effort to find employment. She has been employed in the past. I am satisfied that Koliniati could be earning at least a minimum wage.

[100] I am prepared therefore to impute a salary of $34,000.00 per year to Koliniati, which approximates what could be earned by her if she had made reasonable efforts to find gainful employment. As such, for the purpose of calculating child support moving forward, Koliniati’s income shall be based upon her Total Income from the prior tax year or an imputed income of $34,000.00, whichever is the greater.

[101] Given that Koliniati’s obligation to potentially pay support has only arisen as a result of the transition by C.M. to a shared parenting arrangement and given that that parenting arrangement is only being formally confirmed by this decision, I am of the view that it would be fair and reasonable to attribute the imputed income to her prospectively and not retroactive to September 2024 or indeed to the date of trial.

[102] With respect to the manner in which child support shall be calculated moving forward, section 9 of the Guidelines provides as follows:

9. Shared parenting time – Where each parent or spouse exercises parenting time with respect to a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the order for the support of a child must be determined by taking into account
   (a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the parents or spouses;
   (b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and
   (c) the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of each parent or spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.

[103] The framework of section 9 requires a two-part determination: first, establishing that the 40 per cent threshold has been met; and second, where it has been met, determining the appropriate amount of support based on a budget. The specific language of section 9 warrants emphasis on flexibility and fairness. (Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63)

[104] Given the parenting arrangement I am ordering, the 40 per cent threshold has been met and it is only the determination of the appropriate amount of support that I need to consider.

Amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses

[105] The table amount which Manolessos would be required to pay to Koliniati based upon his reported income approximates $556.00 per month. His 2024 income information was not determined when this matter proceeded to trial. However, he estimated the amount to be $60,000.00. For 2025 purposes, Manolessos’ 2024 income as reported as his “Total Income” in his T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency shall be used.

[106] The table amount Koliniati would be required to pay to Manolessos based upon an imputed income of $34,000.00 is $292.00 per month.

[107] As such, a set off of the amounts otherwise payable to each other approximates $264.00 per month payable by Manolessos to Koliniati.

Increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements

[108] No evidence adduced in this proceeding or contained in the financial statements filed in this proceeding would suggest that there will be increased costs globally as a result of the shared arrangement.

Condition, means, needs and other circumstances

[109] Both parties have clearly managed commendably to provide for C.M. to date with modest income and financial ability. They have both clearly sacrificed to place C.M.’s interests before their own. Neither have re-partnered. C.M. is the only child for both parties. In my view, there are no other special circumstances which would render one party’s living circumstances distinct from the other. I conclude there will be no apparent disparity between their respective financial positions once a set off of the respective table amounts either would be required to pay the other is performed.

[110] Therefore, in my view, child support for C.M. should be paid based upon a pro-rated set off of the table amount each would be required to pay the other, using the Total Income amount reported by each for the tax year immediately preceding the year for which the support is payable, or, in the instance of Koliniati, based upon an imputed income to her of $34,000.00 or her Total Income reported to the Canada Revenue Agency, whichever is greater.

Part 6 - Disposition

[111] On the basis of the above, and additionally incorporating terms for parenting which were requested and not opposed, the following order should issue:

1. Koliniati and Manolessos shall have a shared parenting arrangement with C.M. based upon C.M. residing with each of the parties on an alternating week-about basis.
2. The final order of Summers J. dated June 22, 2022 previously made in this proceeding respecting the division of holidays and vacation time continues.
3. Additional to those terms, however, it is ordered that for C.M.’s birthday, the parties share time with C.M. in the manner C.M. has proposed, namely, by spending the night before her birthday until 3:00 pm the next day (her birthday) with one parent and then going to the other parent for remainder of that day and overnight. Also, unless C.M. decides otherwise, she shall be able to continue her tradition at Hallowe’en and go to her mother’s house for the night and to meet up with friends for trick-or-treating.
4. To clarify and in accordance with C.M.’s wishes, the provision for the sharing of Easter and Greek Orthodox Easter shall be clarified so that Manolessos shall have C.M. on the Ontario school calendar Easter weekend from pick up from school on Thursday until the following Saturday at 7:00 pm. Koliniati shall have C.M. on the Ontario school calendar Easter weekend from Saturday at 7:00 pm until Tuesday drop off at school.
5. Both parties shall have the ability to travel outside of Canada with C.M. after giving 30 days’ written notice and providing a detailed itinerary in writing to the other party. Consent shall not be unreasonably withheld by either party.
6. Manolessos shall hold C.M.’s passport but shall provide it to Koliniati before her intended travel with C.M. Manolessos may apply for a new passport for C.M. Koliniati shall sign and return the necessary passport documentation to Manolessos within five (5) days of receipt.
7. Neither party shall remove C.M.’s residence from the Ottawa region without written consent from the other or a court order.
8. The parties shall be entitled to direct access to C.M.'s teachers, extracurricular leaders, health care providers, counsellors, and other such persons involved in providing C.M. with care and guidance.
9. Both parties will continue to make the daily decisions for C.M. when C.M. is in his or her care.
10. Either party may arrange for C.M.’s involvement in after school and extracurricular activities on their scheduled time. Any scheduled activity which needs to occur over days in which C.M. is with the other party is not permitted except with that other party’s written consent.
11. The final decision-making authority over C.M.’s medical and health care needs shall be joint but if, after consultation and discussion, the parties are unable to agree, then Koliniati shall have the final decision-making authority over matters which concern C.M.’s medical and health care needs.
12. The final decision-making authority over C.M.’s education shall also be joint. However, in the event the parties are unable to agree, after consultation and discussion between them, then Manolessos shall have the final decision-making authority over such matters.
13. There shall be an order that both parties shall exchange their income tax returns annually for the prior income tax year by June 1 of each year.
14. Child support for C.M. shall be calculated based on a set off of the respective table amount each would pay the other pursuant to the Guidelines using the Total Income amount reported by each for the tax year immediately preceding the year for which the support is payable, or in the instance of Koliniati, based upon an imputed income to her of $34,000.00 or her Total Income reported to the Canada Revenue Agency, whichever is greater.
15. As such, commencing February 1, 2025, and payable on the 1st day of each month thereafter, child support shall be payable by Manolessos to Koliniati in the amount of $264.00 per month calculated by setting off of the table amount payable by Manolessos of $556.00 based upon his estimated 2024 income of $60,000.00 and a table amount payable by Koliniati of $292.00 based upon an income imputed to her of $34,000. The quantum of support payable herein is subject to adjustment once their income information for 2024 has been exchanged. Manolessos is to be credited for any overpayment made by him from February 1, 2025 to date pursuant to the interim order made in this proceeding.
16. The parties have also agreed upon a number of additional terms which should be incorporated into the final order on a consent basis, including the divorce. The parties are asked to remit for my review a draft order which incorporates those terms on consent into a final order along with the terms set out in my disposition above within 30 days. If they are unable to arrive at a draft order which is approved by both of them, then they are to remit their proposed draft order within that time frame and I will settle the terms.
17. A divorce shall issue upon filing the application for divorce and any other supporting documents.

[112] If the parties are unable to settle the issue of costs between them, they may provide written submissions to me. Submissions shall not exceed 5 pages, excluding bills of costs, offers to settle, and case law. Manolessos’ submissions shall be delivered within 30 days, and Koliniati’s submissions shall be delivered within 45 days, with ten days to reply by Manolessos.

M. Fraser
Released: June 02, 2025