ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
J.A.
Applicant
— AND —
S.M.
Respondent
Before Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin
Heard on November 5, 2025.
Endorsement released on November 18, 2025
J.A. ....................................................................................................................... self-representing
Aron David counsel for the respondent
J.S. DAUDLIN J.:
Part One – Introduction
1This matter came before the court on November 5, 2025, for the hearing of the mother’s motion for temporary decision-making responsibility and the ability to obtain government documents for the child, M. (born […], 2024) (the child), and the father’s cross-motion regarding a non-removal order. The court had previously granted both parties permission to proceed with their respective motions, subject to time limits and procedural directions set out in the endorsement dated August 21, 2025.
2The mother seeks the following temporary orders:
(1) Sole decision-making responsibility for the child; and,
(2) Authority to apply for and renew passports and other government documents for the child without the father’s consent.
3The father’s cross-motion seeks temporary orders for:
(1) Joint decision-making responsibility.
(2) Direct access information from all professionals and institutions involved in the child’s care, equal to the mother’s.
(3) A prohibition against either parent removing the child from Ontario without the other’s written consent or a court order.
(4) Requiring both parents to cooperate in applying for and maintaining the child’s passport, including deadlines for signing the application and providing copies once issued.
(5) The child’s passport to be exchanged with her at each parenting exchange, or alternatively stored with a neutral third party if both parents agree.
(6) A prohibition against either parent concealing, renewing, or using the child’s passport for travel outside Ontario or Canada without the other’s written consent or a court order.
(7) Terms for the child’s travel.
(8) A declaration confirming that both parents have equal legal status as guardians, with the same rights to make decisions for the child, access her records, and represent her in any official or government matters.
(9) A communication protocol between the parties.
(10) A prohibition against and exclusion of:
(a) all references to police involvement, criminal charges, or bail conditions within and from these family law proceedings, and
(b) any reliance on any ongoing criminal matters in their family law filings or arguments.
(11) Non-disclosure of personal details, court documents, or information about these proceedings with anyone else, except when necessary for childcare, medical needs, or legal purposes.
(12) Terms of relocation.
(13) Terms of parenting exchanges.
4Orally, the father also made a request for the expansion of parenting time.
5At the outset of the hearing the mother opposed hearing any part of the father’s motion that went beyond the issues identified for this attendance—namely, her claims for decision-making responsibility and passport or government document dispensations, and the father’s request for a non-removal order.
6The mother consented to two passport-related issues: that each parent receives a copy of the child’s passport once issued, and that the court determine which parent will hold the passport.
7After speaking with Duty Counsel, the father withdrew his request for an order prohibiting reference to the criminal proceedings.1
8The court declined to hear the father’s request for access to information from third parties, as a temporary without prejudice granting the same relief had already been made on consent on June 13, 2025.
9The court heard submissions on whether to proceed with the remaining issues in the father’s motion, including travel restrictions for the child, passport use, a communication protocol, declaration of equal parental rights, non-disclosure of personal and court-related information, and terms for relocation and parenting exchanges.
10The court found that establishing a communication protocol fell within the scope of decision-making responsibility. After making submissions on the remaining issues, the father acknowledged they were outside the scope of the motion and withdrew them.
11During submissions, the father clarified that the non-removal order he sought was, in substance, a prohibition against the mother taking the child to hotels anywhere in the world. There was no evidence in his affidavit to support either a non-removal order or the specific relief he was actually seeking. While the father indicated that he had brought additional material to court, none of this evidence had been served on the mother or filed with the court. In these circumstances, the father’s cross-motion is dismissed, without prejudice.
12The remaining issues for the court to determine on this motion are:
(1) Is it in the best interests of the child to make a temporary decision-making responsibility order? If so, what order is in their best interests?
(2) Is it in the child’s best interests to authorize one party to apply for and renew the child’s passport and other government documents without the other party’s consent?
(3) Which party should hold the child’s passport once issued?
Part Two – Background Facts
2.1. Family History
13The father is 45 years old. The mother is 36 years old.
14The mother and the father were previously in a relationship that began sometime in 2020. The precise start date of the relationship is in dispute.
15The parties also dispute the periods of cohabitation. The mother states that cohabitation began in March 2024, while the father asserts that the mother moved in during her pregnancy, sometime in 2023.
16The parties separated on or about April 24, 2024. The child has lived with the mother since the parties’ separation.
17The mother alleges that the separation resulted from ongoing domestic violence, including two incidents in which the father physically assaulted her while she was holding the child. She states that these incidents led to criminal charges.
2.2. Family and Criminal Litigation History
18The father currently faces 18 criminal charges.
19On April 25, 2024, the father was charged with four counts of assault, two counts of uttering threats of death or bodily harm, and one count of forcible confinement. His release conditions prohibited direct or indirect contact with the mother, except through a mutually agreed third party or a family court order for parenting time or child-related matters. He was also prohibited from being within 100 metres of the mother, except for court appearances.
20The father issued his application on December 20, 2024.2
21The mother filed her answer/claim on February 3, 2025.3
22On the same date, the parties agreed to a temporary without prejudice order granting the father supervised parenting time with the child twice weekly for two hours, in a public location, supervised by the maternal grandmother.
23On July 13, 2025, the parties agreed to a further temporary without prejudice order expanding the father’s parenting time to three days in alternating weeks and two days in intervening weeks, for visits lasting between two-and-a-half and four hours, unsupervised. They also agreed to communicate via AppClose for essential updates regarding the child, and parenting time scheduling.
24On July 25, 2025, the father was charged with eleven additional offences, including four counts of failing to comply with a release order, failing to attend court, two counts of mischief under $5,000, assault with a weapon, and three counts of extortion. His release conditions were further restricted, prohibiting all contact or communication with the mother except through a mutually agreed third party for childcare purposes, and requiring him to remain at least 100 metres away from her except through a mutually agreed upon third party.
25The previous exception permitting contact pursuant to a family court order no longer applies.
26The father vehemently denies all allegations and takes the position that the court should not refer to or rely on the criminal proceedings in these family law matters, as he considers them irrelevant to the parenting issues before the court.
Part Three – Temporary Decision-making Responsibility
3.1. Legal Considerations and Governing Principles
a) Decision-making Responsibility and Best Interests of the Child
27Subsection 18(1) of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act) defines “decision-making responsibility” as the authority to make significant decisions regarding a child’s well-being, including matters related to health, education, culture, religion, and extracurricular activities.
28Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:
Equal entitlement to decision-making responsibility
20 (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Part, a child’s parents are equally entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child.
Rights and responsibilities
(2) A person entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to a child has the rights and responsibilities of a parent in respect of the child, and must exercise those rights and responsibilities in the best interests of the child.
Authority to act
(3) If more than one person is entitled to decision-making responsibility with respect to a child, any one of them may exercise the rights and accept the responsibilities of a parent on behalf of them in respect of the child.
If parents separate
(4) If the parents of a child live separate and apart and the child lives with one of them with the consent, implied consent or acquiescence of the other, the right of the other to exercise the entitlement to decision-making responsibility with respect to the child, but not the entitlement to parenting time, is suspended until a separation agreement or order provides otherwise.
Parenting time
(5) The entitlement to parenting time with respect to a child includes the right to visit with and be visited by the child, and includes the same right as a parent to make inquiries and to be given information about the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education.
Marriage of child
(6) The entitlement to decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child terminates on the marriage of the child.
Entitlement subject to agreement or order
(7) Any entitlement to decision-making responsibility or parenting time under this section is subject to alteration by an order of the court or by a separation agreement.
29Subsection 21(1) of the Act permits a parent to apply to the court for a parenting order respecting decision-making responsibility and parenting time with respect to the child.
30Any proceeding involving children must be determined in accordance with the best interests of the particular child before the court, as set out in section 24 of the Act. The court has considered these factors, where relevant.
31Subsection 24(2) of the Act requires the court to give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being when determining the child’s best interests.
32Subsection 24(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors related to the child’s circumstances that the court must consider in determining best interests. It reads as follows:
Factors
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(k) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(l) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(m) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
33The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive.4 It is not a checklist to be scored, with the highest total prevailing. Rather, it requires the court to take a holistic view of the child, their needs, and the individuals involved in the child’s life.5
34An assessment of the child’s best interests must reflect all relevant circumstances, including the child’s needs and each parent’s ability to meet those needs.6
35The determination of best interests must be made from the child’s perspective, not that of the parents.7 Adult preferences or “rights” are not part of the analysis except to the extent that they bear upon the child’s best interests.8
36In assessing a child’s best interests, it is often critical to determine whether a parent will comply with court orders designed to ensure the child’s safety and protection.9
37A party’s failure to shield a child from conflict may be a significant factor in awarding primary residence or decision-making responsibility to the other parent.10
38Section 28 of the Act sets out the different types of parenting orders that a court can make, including, among other things, orders for decision-making responsibility, as well as any additional terms the court considers necessary and appropriate.
39Subsection 33.1(2) of the Act underscores the duty of parties to protect children from conflict arising from the proceeding, requiring each party to do so to the best of their ability.
a) Joint Decision-making Responsibility
40The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis11, articulated key principles for determining the appropriateness of a joint decision-making responsibility order:
(1) There must be evidence of historical and appropriate communication between the parents.
(2) Joint decision-making responsibility should not be ordered in the hope that communication will improve.
(3) The fitness of both parents does not, on its own, justify a joint custody order.
(4) A parent’s professed inability to communicate does not automatically preclude a joint custody order.
(5) Even the most detailed parenting order will leave gaps; parents must be able to address unforeseen issues collaboratively.
(6) The younger the child, the more critical effective communication becomes.
41Courts do not require communication between separated parties to be easy, conflict-free, or ideal. A standard of perfection is neither expected nor attainable.12 The relevant question is whether a reasonable level of communication and cooperation exists—or can be achieved—to support the child’s best interests on an ongoing basis.13
42Mutual trust and respect are foundational to the effective functioning of a joint decision-making responsibility order.14
43Families requiring frequent intervention by child protection authorities or police due to high conflict are generally unsuitable candidates for joint decision-making responsibility or parallel parenting arrangements.15
44In Izyuk v. Bilousov16, at paragraph 504, the court observed:
In the wrong family circumstances, a joint custody order can perpetuate hostilities, indecision, and power struggles. Children—particularly those already exposed to the upset of family breakdown—look to their parents for love, guidance, stability, protection, and consistency. They need to have confidence that adult decisions will be made quickly, properly and uneventfully.
45In S. (S.) v. K. (S.)17, the court emphasized the importance of assessing family dynamics when considering a joint decision-making responsibility order. Specifically, the court should examine whether such an order is:
(a) more or less likely to de-escalate or inflame parental conflict; and
(b) more or less likely to expose the child to that conflict.
46In S.S., the court further cautioned that it must consider whether a parent is seeking joint decision-making responsibility as a means of exerting inappropriate control over the other parent. Parents who pursue such orders for control tend to be rights-focused, litigious, inflexible, and may subordinate the child’s best interests. In such cases, a joint custody order may become a mechanism for conflict, rather than cooperation.
47Impulse control and self-regulation are essential parenting qualities. Children learn by observing their parents; when a parent lacks regulation, there is a strong likelihood the child will internalize and replicate that behaviour. Equally important is a parent’s ability to listen and process information, which contributes meaningfully to effective parenting.18
48Ultimately, the court must determine whether a joint decision-making responsibility order—or an order allocating decision-making authority between the parties—is in the child’s best interests. Where appropriate, the court may also choose to leave some or all aspects of decision-making responsibility undefined, if doing so better serves the child’s needs. The court is required to consider all possible frameworks, not solely those proposed by the parties.19
c) Family Violence
49The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunis20, made several important observations regarding family violence:
The recent amendments to the Divorce Act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis (para. 146).
The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioural problems throughout their lives: Department of Justice, Risk Factors for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce (February 2014), at p. 12. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: S. Artz et al., “A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for Children and Youth” (2014), 5 I.J.C.Y.F.S. 493, at p. 497. (para. 145).
Domestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove. Family violence often takes place behind closed doors and may lack corroborating evidence. Thus, proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim or may overlap with and enhance the significance of other factors, such as the need for limited contact or support (para. 145).
50Justice Deborah Chappel emphasized the significance of family violence in the best interests analysis in McBennett v. Danis21, at para. 86:
The broad definition of family violence and the specific inclusion of this factor as a mandatory consideration in determining the best interests of children recognize the profound effects that all forms of family violence can have on children. These consequences can be both direct, if a child is exposed to the family violence, or indirect, if the victimized parent’s physical, emotional and psychological well-being are compromised, since these consequences in turn often negatively impact their ability to meet the child’s physical and emotional needs.
51In cases involving family violence—particularly spousal violence—the court must carefully assess whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate. A victim may be unable to co-parent due to trauma or ongoing fear, and such arrangements may create opportunities for further abuse.22
52Family violence can be insidious and multifaceted, often involving coercive and controlling behaviours that are difficult to prove due to their private nature. Abusers may be manipulative, persuasive, and capable of presenting a misleading public persona. Victims are frequently the only witnesses and may struggle to substantiate their claims with objective evidence.23
3.2. Analysis and Conclusion
53The court’s task on a motion for temporary decision-making responsibility is to determine the arrangements that best promote the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well‑being on an interim basis. Applying the best interests considerations already set out in these reasons to the evidentiary record on this motion, the court finds that the child requires timely, consistent, and child‑centred decision‑making. The present level of parental conflict, the inability of the parties to communicate directly due to the father’s criminal release conditions, and the documented pattern of conflict‑laden exchanges when communication has occurred together make joint decision‑making unworkable at this time.
54The court makes no finding regarding the merits of the criminal charges. That is the responsibility of the criminal courts. However, the court is required to—and has—considered the existence of those charges and the associated release conditions as part of the best interests analysis. The present constraints materially limit the parties’ ability to consult on important decisions for the child. Even in the absence of a finding of criminal wrongdoing, the practical reality of the release conditions weighs heavily against any order that would require ongoing bilateral consultation for routine or time‑sensitive decisions affecting the child.
55The parties have no ability to communicate except as permitted by the father’s criminal release conditions. That limitation is not a mere inconvenience; it renders joint decision‑making impractical and exposes the child to the risk of delay, uncertainty, and adult conflict bleeding into the child’s world.
56Children benefit from clear, predictable lines of parental authority. Where the necessary consultation cannot occur in a timely or reliable fashion, the child’s interests are better served by conferring temporary decision‑making responsibility on one parent, with corresponding information‑sharing obligations to maintain transparency.
57Even if the release conditions were varied to allow more direct communication, it would remain in the child’s best interests to limit parental communications in the interim to provide a cooling‑off period. The record demonstrates that when communication has occurred, it has not been effective or child‑focused and has required court intervention. A period of structured, minimal, and strictly child‑related communication is necessary to reduce conflict and to protect the child from the spillover effects of parental disputes.
58On this motion record, the court finds that the father’s approach has been rights‑based rather than child‑centred. The father emphasizes parental entitlements and positions, presses for compliance on his terms, and communicates in a manner that escalates rather than resolves issues. The court finds the father’s communications to be improper and rise to the level of family violence because they:
(1) Adopt an accusatory and confrontational tone rather than a problem‑solving one.
(2) Focus on blame, fault, and past grievances rather than the child’s current needs.
(3) Demand immediate responses, set unilateral deadlines, or issue directives; and
(4) Threaten further litigation or consequences instead of proposing practical, child‑focused solutions.
59The concern is not only the tone of the father’s messages but their relentless frequency. The volume of communication is excessive and disproportionate to the circumstances, creating pressure rather than cooperation. This barrage of messages overwhelms the mother, escalates conflict, and leaves little room for constructive dialogue. The persistent pattern of high‑volume communication contributes to an atmosphere of control and intimidation, which the court considers a factor in its finding of family violence. It also weighs heavily in the best interests analysis because it destabilizes the mother’s ability to focus on the child’s needs and exposes the child to ongoing parental discord.
60This pattern undermines cooperative decision‑making, erodes trust, and turns routine matters into disputes. It places the mother in a defensive posture and diverts attention from the child’s day‑to‑day needs. The foreseeable effect on the child is increased instability and exposure to parental conflict—outcomes contrary to the child’s best interests.
61The father also demonstrates a lack of insight into the impact of his communication style and frequency on the mother and, by extension, on the child. His explanations—framed as necessary to assert his rights or ensure compliance—are not sufficient. They fail to acknowledge that accusatory, repetitive, and urgent messaging entrenches conflict rather than advancing cooperative parenting. This escalating pattern is evident throughout the record and shows no sign of self‑correction. Without stricter court intervention, meaningful change is unlikely. His inability to recognize how his approach undermines the child’s stability and the mother’s capacity to focus on the child reinforces the need to limit communication and confer temporary decision‑making responsibility on the mother.
62An interim allocation of decision‑making responsibility to the mother will promote stability, reduce harmful conflict, and ensure decisions about the child’s health, education, and welfare are made promptly and consistently. This is a temporary measure tailored to current communication barriers and the father’s litigation posture, not a final determination of parental capacity or long‑term arrangements. It is designed to shield the child from parental conflict while preserving the father’s role through prompt information‑sharing and opportunities to provide input in a structured, low‑conflict manner.
63The court anticipates the possibility that the father’s release conditions may be varied. Even then, it remains in the child’s best interests to limit parental communication for a defined interim period and confine it to a structured channel with clear expectations. A cooling‑off period is necessary to reset expectations, reduce conflict, and re‑centre the child’s needs.
64The court will order that the mother hold temporary decision‑making responsibility. Subject to any variation of the father’s release conditions, the court will further order that the mother keep the father reasonably informed of significant decisions affecting the child and invite his input where practicable, on the terms set out below.
Part Four – Government Documentation
65The mother seeks an order dispensing with the father’s consent to obtain or renew government documentation for the child, which the father opposes.
66Granting decision-making responsibility does not automatically confer the right to obtain government documentation for the child or to travel outside Canada without the other parent’s consent. These rights are distinct, and, absent a court dispensation order, government authorities generally require the consent of the parenting time parent. Such rights are significant and should not be dispensed with lightly.24 The primary caregiver will presumptively retain the child’s essential papers.25
67The parties agree that the child should have a passport. The mother brought this motion because, despite being given an opportunity to cooperate and sign the application, the father did not do so. While the father advised in court that he would sign the application, he refused to allow the mother to reapply without his signature and consent if the application were rejected. This position creates unnecessary uncertainty and delay.
68The mother has good reason to seek this order even though there are no imminent plans to travel. A passport is an essential document for a child, and the inability to obtain one because of parental conflict is contrary to the child’s best interests. The father’s refusal to provide consent for a reapplication, combined with his release conditions that preclude communication except for childcare purposes, makes cooperation impractical. These circumstances justify court intervention.
69The court will grant the mother’s motion, in part. The order will be limited to authorizing the mother to apply for the child’s passport and, if necessary, reapply in the event of a denial. The request for authority to renew the passport is premature and can be addressed at a later date.
70The court will also order that the mother hold the child’s passport once issued, as she is the primary caregiver.
Part Five – Next Steps
71One of the functions of a case management judge in family law is to give parties a clear and honest account of what must change—not only in their behaviour, but in their understanding of their circumstances, the impact those circumstances have had on their child, and what is realistically required before the court will consider altering parenting arrangements. Avoiding difficult truths does not serve the parties or the child; the court must be direct about what is required and why. 26
72The court acknowledges that this decision may be difficult for the father to accept. He may perceive it as unfair or unjustified. However, the reality is that the child’s best interests have been compromised by persistent parental conflict, ineffective communication, and a pattern of behaviour that places adult priorities ahead of the child’s needs.
73The court’s orders are intended to address these risks and provide the child with stability. However, these measures alone will not resolve the underlying issues. Meaningful change requires the father to take concrete steps, including:
(1) Demonstrating compliance with all court orders promptly, consistently, and without resistance or attempts to circumvent their intent.
(2) Gaining insight into the impact of his conduct, recognizing how his approach to communication, decision-making, and cooperation has affected and can affect the child and the mother, and taking responsibility for making necessary changes.
(3) Prioritizing the child’s needs over personal grievances or perceived injustices, focusing on what is best for the child, rather than on adult entitlements or disputes.
(4) Reducing conflict and respecting boundaries, limiting communication to essential, child-related matters, and refraining from excessive, repetitive, or accusatory messaging.
74The court expects the father to reflect honestly on these issues and to begin making meaningful and sustained progress. Compliance with these expectations is not optional; it is essential to the child’s well-being and to any future consideration of expanded decision-making or access.
75Failure to comply with the court’s orders, or to demonstrate genuine insight and change, may result in further restrictions or adverse orders.
Part Six – Orders
76For the reasons outlined above, the following temporary orders shall issue:
(1) The mother shall have temporary sole decision-making responsibility for the child.
(2) The mother is authorized to apply for a Canadian passport a without the father’s signature or consent, and to reapply if the initial application is denied.
(3) The mother shall hold the child’s passport for the child once issued.
(4) The mother shall post a copy of the child’s passport to AppClose promptly after issuance.
(5) The mother’s request for authority to renew the child’s passport and other documentation for the child is dismissed, without prejudice.
(6) The mother is authorized to apply for and hold other government documents for the child as necessary, subject to any further order.
(7) The following communication orders are subject to the terms of the father’s criminal release conditions. For greater certainty, where there is a conflict between the terms of the criminal release conditions and the terms of this order, the terms of the criminal release conditions supersede the terms of this order.
(a) Communication between the mother and the father regarding the child shall be limited to essential, child-related matters and conducted through AppClose.
(b) Except to notify of any unforeseen changes to parenting exchanges (for example, lateness or the child’s illness), or to advise of and acknowledge receipt of tasks that must occur during the father’s parenting time (for example, the administration of medication), the father’s communication shall be limited to one message to the mother by AppClose on Monday. The mother shall communicate any response on Thursdays.
(c) The mother shall keep the father reasonably informed of significant decisions affecting the child and invite his input where practicable. The mother shall provide this information on Thursdays, except where the significant decision is pressing or urgent and requires immediate action.
(d) Should the father’s criminal release conditions be varied to permit direct communication, the interim limitation on parental communication shall remain in place until further written agreement or order of the court.
(8) The father’s request for an order for access to information from third parties, a non-removal order and an order prohibiting the mother from taking the child to hotels anywhere in the world are dismissed without prejudice.
(9) The father’s request for an order prohibiting reference to the criminal proceedings, travel restrictions for the child, passport use, a declaration of equal parental rights, non-disclosure of personal and court-related information, terms for relocation, increased parenting time and terms for parenting exchanges are withdrawn.
77The mother is entitled to her costs as the successful party on this motion. The matter is scheduled for the delivery of reasons at 12:30 p.m. today, at which time the court will address the issue of costs, instead. In an agreement on costs of the motion cannot be reached, brief submissions will be received.
78Mr. David shall prepare the draft order for issuing, promptly. The father’s approval as to form and content of the draft order is dispensed with.
Released: November 18, 2025
Signed: Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin
Footnotes
- Before the hearing, the father was given an opportunity to obtain summary legal advice from Duty Counsel, Peter Hutcheon, regarding the relief sought in the mother’s motion and his own cross-motion.
- Amended on April 10, 2025.
- Amended on May 13, 2025.
- White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41; Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736.
- Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.
- Mokhov v. Ratayeva, 2021 ONSC 5454 (SCJ).
- Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC).
- Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC); E.M.B. v. M.F.B., 2021 ONSC 4264; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.
- Wiafe v. Afoakwa-Yeboah, 2021 ONCJ 201; Seyad v. Pathan, 2022 ONCJ 501; Mulik v. McFarlane, 2023 ONCJ 148.
- Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510; I.A. v. I.G., 2023 ONCJ 523.
- 2005 CanLII 1625 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 275.
- Griffiths v. Griffiths, 2005 ONCJ 235, 2005 CarswellOnt 3209 (OCJ).
- Warcop v. Warcop, 2009 CanLII 6423 (ON S.C.).
- G.T.C. v. S.M.G., 2020 ONCJ 511; T.P. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 6022; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057; Jacobs and Coulombe v. Blair and Amyotte, 2022 ONSC 3159; El Khatib v. Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667.
- S.A. v. Y.M., 2020 ONCJ 147.
- 2011 ONSC 6451, 2011 CarswellOnt 12097 (SCJ).
- 2013 CarswellOnt 10801, 2013 ONCJ 432
- D.E.S.A. v. N.B., 2025 ONCJ 279.
- M. v. F., 2015 ONCA 277; Chomos v. Hamilton, 2015 ONSC 5208 (S.C.J.); Koliniati v. Manolessos, 2025 ONSC 3274.
- 2022 SCC 22.
- 2021 ONSC 3610.
- Bell v. Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3353.
- Volgemut v. Decristoforo, 2021 ONSC 7382.
- R.B.J. v. B.N.R.J., 2020 ONCJ 399; D.E.S.A. v. N.B., 2025 ONCJ 279; Dessye v. Lopez, 2025 ONCJ 429.
- Hachani v. Mauger, 2024 ONSC 3912; Botros v. Botros, 2022 ONSC 5911.
- Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. T.S., 2025 ONCJ 566.