ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
CITATION: Shah v. Romero, 2026 ONCJ 55 DATE: January 30, 2026 COURT FILE No.: Toronto DFO-24-45487-00
BETWEEN:
Hitesh Chandrahas Shah Applicant
— AND —
Alondra Vazquez Romero Respondent
Before Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin
Heard on January 19-21, and 23, 2026.
Reasons for Judgement released on January 30, 2026, and Amended on February 5, 2026.
Jasmeet Dhaliwal................................................................................... counsel for the applicant Maria Elka Zagazeta Garcia............................................................. counsel for the respondent
Amended to correct clerical error at subparagraph 196, which was unintentionally, partially deleted.
Part One – Introduction
1.1 Overview
1This is a parenting, relocation, and child support trial involving the parties’ one-and-a-half-year-old daughter (the child).
2The central issue is whether it is in the child’s best interests to permit the respondent (the mother) to relocate with the child to Puebla, Mexico.
3The applicant (the father) opposes relocation.
4If the mother remains in Canada, the father seeks an expanded parenting schedule moving toward a shared parenting schedule, including overnights, together with a joint decision-making arrangement.
5If the mother cannot or does not remain in Canada and returns to Mexico, the father asks that the child remain in Canada and primarily reside with him. In that event, he proposes virtual contact for the mother and offers to pay for the mother to travel to Canada at least three times each year to facilitate in-person time with the child.
6The father also seeks an order that the child remain solely a citizen of Canada, and that if relocation to Mexico is authorized, the child may obtain permanent resident status in Mexico but not Mexican citizenship.
7The father presented no plan for parenting time in the event the child was permitted to relocate.
8The mother seeks permission to relocate with the child to Mexico, with the child’s primary residence remaining with her. While she remains in Canada, she seeks an order for joint decision‑making responsibility with the father and a defined parenting time schedule.
9If relocation is authorized and occurs, the mother seeks final decision‑making responsibility after consultation with the father. She also seeks an order dispensing with his consent or signature, if required, to apply for and obtain Mexican citizenship for the child.
10The mother also seeks orders that the father have daily virtual parenting time, together with in‑person parenting time as arranged between the parties when he travels to Mexico and during any visits by the mother and child to Canada.
11Both parties also seek additional terms addressing incidents of decision-making responsibility, information sharing, and parenting time.
12The parties never cohabited.
13The child has lived with the mother since birth. The father has temporary parenting time under the current parenting order but has not exercised any parenting time since December 18, 2025.
14Both parties provided affidavit evidence and testified. Each called collateral witnesses: the father called his housemate, and the mother called her mother and aunt, with the aunt testifying from Mexico.
15In closing submissions, the parties agreed that if the child remains primarily resident with the mother, that the father will pay child support as follows:
(1) $150 each month until March 31, 2026, consistent with the existing temporary order of Justice Szandtner made on consent on January 13, 2025; and
(2) $297 per month commencing April 1, 2026. This is the Child Support Guidelines (the Guidelines) table amount for one child based on an annual imputed income to the father of $36,608.1
1.2 Current Parenting Orders
16On June 24, 2025, on consent, Justice Szandtner endorsed partial Final Minutes of Settlement. Among other terms, the parties agreed that the child would reside primarily with the mother and secondarily with the father while in Canada, and primarily with the mother while in Mexico. They also agreed that the child would solely be a citizen of Canada and a permanent resident of Mexico.
17On October 24, 2025, on consent, Justice Szandtner ordered a temporary two-week rotating parenting schedule for the father.
(1) In Week 1, the father has parenting time on Mondays and Wednesdays from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and on Saturdays and Sundays from 11:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.
(2) In Week 2, the father has parenting time on Mondays and Wednesdays from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and on Saturdays from 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
18The parties also consented to communicate using the co-parenting application “Talking Parents”.
1.3 Child’s Citizenship and Relocation
19At the outset of trial, the court noted that the term of the June 24, 2025 endorsed final Minutes of Settlement limiting the child’s status to Canadian citizenship and Mexican permanent residence intersects with the central relocation issue and could affect the feasibility of implementing any relocation order.
20Accordingly, to ensure procedural fairness and to permit a complete record on an issue bearing directly on the relocation relief sought, the parties were permitted to lead evidence and were directed to make submissions on the citizenship/status term, including its practical implications for any relocation order and whether any ancillary relief would be required to implement such an order, and whether that specific term in the June 24, 2025 order should be changed.
1.4 Issues to be Determined
21What parenting orders are in the child’s best interests? In particular:
(1) With which parent should the child have her primary residence?
(2) If the court determines that the child should have her primary residence with the mother, is it in the child’s best interests to permit the mother to relocate with the child to Puebla, Mexico?
(3) What decision-making responsibility orders are in the child’s best interests?
(4) What parenting time orders are in the child’s best interests?
Part Two – Background Facts and Litigation History
2.1 The Father’s Background
22The father is 24 years old and is a citizen of the United Republic of Tanzania (Tanzania). He says he has been in Canada on a study permit that expired in March 2026 after obtaining an Advanced Diploma in Computer System Technology at Seneca College. He has applied for a Post‑Graduation Work Permit and says he also holds a multiple‑entry visitor (tourist) visa (or a “Temporary Resident Visa”) valid until 2029. He follows the Hindu religion.
23The father is currently eligible to work in Canada, but is not working. He is entirely financially supported by his father in Tanzania who provides him with a monthly allowance of approximately $800 and who pays his rent, and by his paternal aunt who lives in Toronto, who pays his groceries, meals outside the home, and entertainment.
24The father may not be eligible to work in Canada if his Post-Graduation Work Permit is not approved.
25In December 2025, the father started charging a monthly subscription for his Telegram channel2, where he works as a teacher and mentor, broadcasting recommendations on when to purchase and sell Magic Internet Money (MIM coins).3 That venture was temporarily suspended in January 2026, but the father anticipates resuming this business in March 2026, for at least as long as he is working to obtain the necessary certifications to be eligible to apply for an entry-level role in cybersecurity.
26The father rents a room in a condominium townhouse, which he shares with four other men.
27It is the father’s hope that he will be able to remain in Canada, long term.
2.2 The Mother’s Background
28The mother is 26 years old and is a citizen of Mexico. She came to Canada in or about May 2023 on a visitor (tourist) visa, to visit with her mother and stepfather who reside in Toronto. She has applied for and received two extensions of her visitor visa since these proceedings were commenced. She has applied for a third extension, the decision for which was pending at the time of trial. The mother follows the Catholic religion.
29The mother has two children from a previous relationship. They currently live with the mother’s maternal aunt (their great-aunt), and across the street from their father. The mother co-parents the children with their father.
30Before coming to Canada, the mother worked as an assistant cook at a restaurant called Tierra Mestiza, in Puebla, Mexico, earning approximately the local minimum wage.
31The mother and the child reside in a basement apartment in the home of the maternal grandmother and step‑grandfather (the maternal grandparents), who provide the mother with financial support. The father pays $150 per month in child support under the existing temporary order. The mother also acknowledges the father has made additional in‑kind contributions for the child, including items such as milk, a crib, and clothing.
32The mother is ineligible to work in Canada. She speaks limited English.
33It has always been the mother’s plan to return to Mexico.
2.3 Family History
34The parties met on August 30, 2023, through Instagram. They never lived together.
35The parties communicated largely through text message, with the assistance of a translation application. They still communicate this way.
36The parties’ relationship lasted approximately two-and-half months, until the parties separated near to the end of November 2023.
37The mother attributes the breakup to incompatibility and concerns about the father’s abusive behaviour, controlling conduct, and communications with other women. The father denies that characterization and says the relationship fell apart due to the language barrier and that the mother abruptly withdrew communication without explanation.
38On November 17, 2023, the parties exchanged messages about the possibility of pregnancy. The father relies on those messages to assert the mother was aware she might be pregnant and spoke about leaving Canada for Mexico and hiding from him if she were. The mother says that she made the Mexico comment jokingly, and that she did not take a pregnancy test at that time and ignored symptoms. At trial, the mother acknowledged in cross‑examination that this statement could reasonably have caused the father concern.
39In March 2024, after ignoring her pregnancy symptoms until fetal movement could no longer be ignored, the mother took a home pregnancy test and contacted the father on March 17, 2024 to advise him of the pregnancy.
40The father was initially supportive, promising to help the mother and share half the cost of prenatal care with her family.
41The parties both attended the Pregnancy Care Centre on March 28, 2024 to seek information about lower-cost supports because the mother lacked medical insurance. The mother returned on March 31, 2024 for her first ultrasound.
42In April 2024, the parties had discussions about next steps. The father proposed resuming the relationship, marrying and renting accommodation together in Canada. The mother declined, stating she needed to return to Mexico to care for her children. Thereafter, the father asked for a paternity test, retracted his offer to share pre-natal expenses, and refused to contribute until paternity was confirmed.
43Apart from the appointment on March 28, 2024, the father did not participate in the pre-natal planning or care for the child.
44On July 10, 2024, the father wrote to ask the mother if the child had been born. The mother responded that she hadn’t, but that she would message him when she did.
45The child was born on July […], 2024, and named Cloe Vazquez Romero.
46The mother did not immediately notify the father of the child’s birth. She explained that she needed time to recover and that she was concerned about how the father would react in light of her unsettled immigration status.
47The mother notified the father of the child’s birth on August 12, 2024, and facilitated a meeting between the child and the father on August 14, 2024. The father renewed the request for paternity testing. The mother agreed to the testing, but preferred a laboratory test over a home kit as proposed by the father.
2.4 Parenting and Litigation History
a) Year One Overview
48The father issued his application on September 6, 2024, and brought an urgent motion for paternity testing, a non-removal order, police enforcement, “equal parenting time and decision-making responsibility”, and primary residence in the event the mother left the country. On consent, the motion did not proceed as the mother had already consented to the paternity testing, had retained counsel and the parties required time for the exchange of disclosure and settlement discussions.
49The father’s was confirmed as the child’s biological parent on October 10, 2024.
50The father amended his application on November 21, 2024. The mother filed her answer/claim on November 28, 2024.
51Between the child’s date of birth and January 13, 2025, parenting time had been occurring as agreed between the parties. Both report difficulties in communication and arguments about when and where parenting time ought to occur.
52On January 13, 2025, the parties agreed that the father’s parenting time would occur at the maternal grandparents home every Saturday between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., and every Wednesday between 11:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., in the presence of the mother.
53Between February and April 2025, the parties relationship and communication had improved. The father was exercising parenting time more consistently both in the maternal grandparents home and in the community, and occasionally at the father’s home, including sporadic overnights. The mother remained present throughout to assist in feeding, changing, settling the child, and putting the child to bed.
54By May 2025, the parties’ discussions about reconciliation had ended.
55During the father’s parenting time at the mother’s home, the mother testified that he did not respect her decision to end the relationship or her physical boundaries. On June 2, 2025, the mother contacted police for guidance. Police then contacted the father and cautioned him.
56The next day, the father messaged the mother seeking unsupervised parenting time in a public place.
57While the mother initially objected, seeking to follow the terms of the order, on June 24, 2025, the parties agreed that parenting time would occur in public locations, initially at the Mexican Consulate and later in parks and shopping malls.
58During June and July 2025, the father exercised additional overnight parenting time at his residence. The mother stayed in an adjacent room to assist as needed, and both parties testified that, when the child woke during the night, the mother helped settle her and return her to bed.
59On September 15, 2025, the parties agreed to a graduated expansion toward unsupervised parenting time, beginning with community‑based visits with the mother present and progressing in stages to fully unsupervised time. Notice of any need to reschedule would be provided twenty-four hours in advance, except in the case of an emergency where three hours notice would be sufficient.
60No specific concerns were identified with the father’s care of the child during parenting time; however, in the period that followed, the parties’ communication deteriorated and the father’s exercise of parenting time significantly declined.
b) September 24, 2025
61On September 24, 2025, the father was scheduled to have parenting time with the child from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. at a public location with the mother present. The mother did not attend, as planned, but exchanged the child at the scheduled time.
62At approximately 11:45 a.m., the father noticed a small injury on the child’s finger and messaged the mother to ask about its cause. The mother denied causing the injury and said it occurred during the father’s time. Both perceived the other as assigning blame, and the messaging became contentious.
63The father’s evidence was that he consulted a doctor in Tanzania who recommended medication, and immediately went to a nearby pharmacy where he was advised a prescription was required given the child’s age.
64At approximately 4:25 p.m., the father advised the mother he would take the child to a walk‑in clinic for assessment and would be late returning her. The mother objected, asked that the child be returned, and warned she would contact police if she was not.
65Over the next several hours, the messaging and calls continued. The father advised he was at the clinic at 5:39 p.m., and demanded the child’s health card. The mother declined, explaining that the prior card was invalid following the child’s recent name change and that the father had not yet provided the updated birth certificate. The mother requested the clinic’s name and address and the doctor’s name. The doctor’s name and a nearby intersection were provided, but the clinic’s name and street address were not.
66The mother contacted police for assistance and notified the father when she was at the station. In addition to seeking the immediate return of the child, the mother reported concerns about the father, including that he was withholding the child’s documents and that there had been incidents of physical aggression.
67By 6:45 p.m., the father advised he was going to obtain the child’s medication. At 7:30 p.m., he messaged that the bus would depart at 7:45 p.m. and that he expected to arrive at the mother’s home in forty five minutes. Sometime after that he blocked the mother’s number.
68Following the parties’ interaction with police on September 24, 2025, the father testified that he understood he had been “threatened” with criminal charges if he communicated with the mother other than by email. He acknowledged he was not charged and received no written conditions, but said he was told that contacting the mother directly—or through a third party—would result in charges. On that basis, he treated the direction as binding and limited his communications to email, often copying counsel to avoid further police involvement.
c) October 2025 to Trial
69From October 2025 to trial, the regularity of the father’s parenting time declined; communication between the parties remained strained; and conflict during exchanges escalated.
70The father cancelled scheduled visits citing weather and travel practicalities—including consecutive Saturdays—with notice sometimes given close to the exchange time. While the father acknowledged at trial that these missed visits were not because the mother prevented parenting time, his evidence was:
“Given the cold and extreme weather conditions, travel has become very difficult and unsafe. On several occasions, the Applicant was forced to cancel parenting visits due to extreme weather conditions, as continued travel in such conditions posed risks to both the Applicant’s and the child’s safety”.
71On the second consecutive Saturday the father cancelled, the mother wrote to the father, attaching a screenshot of the current and forecast temperature and weather for the week. That day, the “cold and extreme weather conditions” which precipitated the father’s cancellation of parenting time was partially cloudy, with a low of twelve-degrees, and a high of eighteen degrees.
72Coordination at hand‑offs was strained.
(1) The father’s sometimes early arrivals were accompanied by loud and persistent knocking which was disruptive to neighbours, and which prompted requests that he call or message on arrival.
(2) After indicating he would not attend a scheduled visit, he nonetheless attended shortly thereafter, again knocking persistently.
(3) One mid‑week visit was not attended despite the mother waiting with the child.
73Notwithstanding these difficulties, the parties agreed to a further expansion of the father’s parenting time on October 24, 2025, and implemented the current parenting schedule.
74On October 24, 2025, the father had brought a motion for overnight parenting time. That motion was adjourned for further evidence until December 18, 2025.
75Under the expanded schedule set on October 24th, the father’s exercise of parenting time through mid‑December remained irregular. Several visits did not proceed, including early‑November dates not exercised, a mid‑November cancellation citing weather, and a November date the mother cancelled due to the child’s fever following vaccinations.
76Late in November and early in December 2025, the child’s health needs4 prompted the mother to cancel two visits. The father’s communications became accusatory, but on December 6, 2025, although the father attended, he observed the child’s discomfort and opted not to proceed with the visit.
77On the morning of December 8, 2025, the father made multiple calls to the mother more than an hour-and-a-half before the 11:00 a.m. parenting exchange to insist that the mother should already be awake and preparing the child for the visit. The mother prepared the child for the cold weather with appropriate winter clothing and provided extra blankets.
78Disagreement arose at the door about the child’s clothing—specifically her gloves—and the father initially left, refusing the child’s gloves and extra blankets the mother had packed in case they were needed. The father returned shortly after to request the gloves.
79The discussion escalated again when the father questioned the adequacy of the child’s clothing and asked for the OHIP card notwithstanding that a copy had previously been provided.
80When the mother asked the father to stop shouting and whether he intended to proceed with the visit, he stated that he would not and left.
81On December 10, 2025, the father cancelled parenting time due to weather. He did not attend on December 14 and 15, 2025. He did not attend on December 17, 2025.
82On December 18, 2025, the father’s motion for overnight parenting time was heard and dismissed, and the matter was scheduled for a priority trial during the January 2026 trial sittings.
83On December 19, 2025, the father cancelled all parenting time until his paperwork for trial was submitted on January 2, 2026.
84On January 3 and 12, 2026, the mother messaged the father noting the dates he had cancelled or not attended parenting time. The father did not initially respond, and on January 12, 2026, he stated that she was harassing him and that he would advise when he would next exercise parenting time, adding:
“I will not risk my daughter’s health by exposing her to cold and extreme weather conditions”.
85Between December 1, 2025 and the first day of trial on January 19, 2026, the father attended at four of twenty-four potential parenting exchanges, and exercised parenting time twice.
Part Three – The Parties’ Narratives and Positions
3.1 The Father’s Narrative
86The father’s narrative frames the case as one about preventing a loss of the child’s relationship with him and securing a stable, enforceable parenting regime in Canada. He says he has consistently sought to be involved in the child’s life and to move parenting time toward a shared schedule (including overnights), but he describes the parties’ conflict as leaving him vulnerable to being cut out of the child’s life. He says that he fears that, if the child relocates to Mexico, he will have little practical ability to maintain contact, to ensure follow‑through on parenting arrangements, or to enforce Canadian orders.
87The father emphasizes the mother’s precarious status in Canada and his fear that she will leave Canada with the child without his consent. He expresses skepticism that the mother will facilitate meaningful parenting time if the child is in Mexico, and he ties that skepticism to what he describes as a broader risk of non‑compliance, informed by events he says escalated his concerns, including a September 24, 2025 incident between the parties and the resulting police involvement, and later conflict surrounding the passport process for the child.
88The father relies heavily on what he describes as a pattern of:
(1) False statements or allegations. In his account, the mother (and, at times, her family) make false statements or allegations that he says expose him to criminal jeopardy and impede his ability to communicate or to expand parenting time. He links this to his fear that, in Mexico, he would be unable to respond effectively to allegations or to protect his relationship with the child.
(2) Resistance and refusal to provide (accurate) documents and information relating to the child. He describes repeated conflict over government documentation and information‑sharing, including disputes about the child’s health card and other documents, and he points to the passport process as a key escalation, including his concern about the address discrepancy and his insistence on further information (such as guarantor details).
(3) Failure to comply with court orders. He alleges that the mother has not complied with court‑ordered obligations in relation to document and information‑sharing, and he relies on this asserted history to argue that she will not reliably comply with a cross‑border regime that depends on voluntary follow‑through (especially virtual and in-person contact and timely sharing of information).
(4) Failing to facilitate meaningful parenting time. He says the mother restricts parenting time in ways that prevent the relationship from developing, including by limiting the manner and scope of contact, and by taking positions that he experiences as controlling or rigid.
(5) Poor family relations. He relies on his view that conflict and blocked communications within the mother’s family demonstrate a risk that his relationship with the child will be undermined if the child is in Mexico.
89The father acknowledges that his position would separate the child from her primary caregiver, but he says it is nonetheless in the child’s best interests to remain in Canada because, on his account, relocation to Mexico creates an unacceptable risk that his relationship with the child will be lost or permanently diminished and that compliance with any parenting regime would be difficult to enforce across borders. He submits that virtual parenting time is a poor substitute for a relationship with a child this young, and he says he has little confidence that the mother will reliably facilitate meaningful contact in Mexico given what he characterizes as a history of non‑compliance, false statements/allegations, and conflict that escalated after police involvement.
90The father also relies on stability‑based considerations: he emphasizes that the child has lived in Canada since birth and that, Canada offers a clearer and more secure pathway to services and opportunities, including public health care, whereas he characterizes the mother’s Mexico plan as uncertain and financially insecure. He points, for example, to the absence of a Mexican bank account and broader financial insecurity as factors undermining reliability.
91The father says that keeping the child in Canada also better preserves the child’s Canadian connections and supports, including his relationship with the child and the child’s relationships in Canada, and he raises practical concerns about language and the realism of maintaining meaningful involvement at a distance.
92Finally, the father; proposes that, if the mother returns to Mexico without the child, the child should primarily reside with him in Canada with a structured plan to preserve the mother’s relationship through virtual contact and in‑person time in Canada, supported by his offer to fund the mother’s travel multiple times per year and, more broadly, his asserted ability to contribute to travel costs, and willingness to comply with court orders.
3.2 The Mother’s Narrative and Position
93The mother’s narrative frames the case as one about maintaining continuity of care with the child’s primary caregiver and authorizing a relocation that she says is necessary and child‑focused.
94The mother describes herself as the child’s primary caregiver since birth and says the child’s stability, routine, and day‑to‑day needs are anchored in her care. She submits that her parenting plan is designed to preserve the child’s primary attachment relationship while also maintaining and supporting the father’s relationship in a developmentally appropriate way.
95The mother’s theory of the case is that relocation to Puebla, Mexico is in the child’s best interests because, on her account, she cannot remain in Canada on a long‑term basis and cannot build a stable, self‑sustaining life here. She emphasizes that her status in Canada is unstable, that she cannot work lawfully in Canada on her current status, and that she needs to return to Mexico to work and provide financially for herself, the child of this relationship, and for her children of her previous relationship. She characterizes her request as driven by necessity and by the child’s need for stable caregiving, rather than by a desire to diminish the father’s role.
96In the mother’s narrative, the child’s best interests are met by remaining primarily resident with her, whether in Canada or Mexico. She contrasts that with the father’s position that the child should remain in Canada with him if the mother returns to Mexico, and she submits that such an outcome would remove a very young child from the child’s primary caregiver and place the child with a parent who, in her account, has not demonstrated readiness for overnight care. She also relies on her concern about the parties’ conflict and communication difficulties as undermining the practicality of the father’s proposed shared parenting schedule at this stage.
97The mother’s narrative emphasizes that she has a concrete plan in Mexico and a support network there. She says she will reside in Puebla with her aunt and the mother’s two older children, and she describes her aunt and sister as key supports who can assist with childcare while she becomes re‑established. She also sets out a financial plan tied to that relocation. She says she cannot lawfully work in Canada on her current status and needs to return to Mexico to work and support herself and the child. She describes her intended work in Mexico (including work as a chef assistant), and says that while she is stabilizing financially, her parents will assist her until she “recovers financially,” with her sister and aunt providing practical childcare support as needed.
98The mother adds that, once re‑established, she expects to be able to contribute to the child’s needs through her employment in Mexico together with ongoing child support, and she links this plan to the child’s stability and the child’s opportunity to maintain meaningful connections with extended maternal family and half‑siblings in Mexico and in Canada, as well as to the father and the extended paternal family in Canada and Tanzania.
99On parenting arrangements, the mother’s position is that the father can maintain a meaningful relationship with the child after relocation through a combination of regular virtual contact, information‑sharing, and in‑person parenting time in Mexico (and in Canada, when she and the travel can travel to Canada). She submits that she is prepared to facilitate contact, including by providing updates and access to information, and she says the father has the means to travel to Mexico to exercise parenting time there. She also addresses language and culture by proposing steps to preserve the child’s connections, including English‑language learning as the child grows, and encouraging and facilitating the child’s exposure to Tanzanian culture.
100In summary, the mother’s theory is that the child’s welfare is best protected by preserving continuity of residence with the child’s primary caregiver, authorizing relocation so she can work and establish stability in Mexico, and crafting enforceable parenting terms that preserve the father’s relationship through predictable virtual contact, meaningful in‑person time anchored on the child’s age and stage of development, and robust information‑sharing.
Part Four – Credibility and Reliability
101The court assesses credibility and reliability by addressing two distinct questions: first, whether a witness tried to tell the truth as they understood it; and second, whether the evidence was accurate and dependable on the material points. In answering those questions, the court considered internal consistency, consistency over time, plausibility in light of the surrounding circumstances, and the degree to which the evidence aligned with the contemporaneous record. The court also considered the parties’ interests in the outcome, while avoiding an all‑or‑nothing approach to credibility. The court was mindful that interpretation, translation, and language barriers can affect precision and tone. Those limits were not treated as markers of dishonesty.
102Both parties were generally credible in the sense that each described events in a way that reflected their lived involvement in the relationship, the litigation, and the parenting arrangements, and each made some concessions against interest.
(1) The father acknowledged key facts that did not assist his position, including that the mother has always been the primary caregiver to the child, and should continue to be if she remains in Canada, that he voluntarily did not exercise parenting time for a period and that the parties’ communication is conflictual.
(2) The mother acknowledged mistakes, including that her conduct sometimes escalated conflict beyond what she would have preferred, and she accepted that her conduct contributed to the parties’ difficulties.
103These concessions supported the conclusion that neither parent advanced a wholly fabricated narrative.
104The court nevertheless identified meaningful reliability gaps in both parties’ evidence. Those gaps differed in nature and significance.
105The mother’s reliability wavered at times when she could not provide specific timelines for particular events or could not clearly explain delays in relaying information or documents. The court also found that the mother has, at times, been quick to temper and quick to resort to extreme positions or threats that escalate conflict. The record includes an example of this dynamic in the parties’ early messages about Mexico and, later, in the September 24, 2025 exchange when the mother warned she would call police if the child was not returned at the scheduled time.
106Additionally, the mother’s justifications for some delays and decisions were not always adequate, and she did not consistently take steps to explain or mitigate the consequences of delay once conflict took hold. However, the court found that the mother’s evidence was more candid about her own shortcomings and more willing to acknowledge that her approach contributed to conflict.
107The father’s evidence raised more pronounced reliability concerns, not because his evidence was devoid of truthful elements, but because his presentation and reasoning were frequently shaped by a skewed view of events and by a persistent focus on vindication.
108The father frequently did not answer questions directly and instead added commentary, even after repeated redirection, which made it difficult to isolate his evidence on the issues the court had to decide. He also demonstrated limited practical knowledge of the child’s routines and developmental needs in areas where the court would expect a parent seeking expanded parenting time, primary residence, and decision‑making involvement to demonstrate concrete familiarity and planning.
109A central reliability concern was the father’s limited insight into his own role in the conflict and the impact of his conduct on the child’s experience. The record reflects that the parties’ communication and the father’s approach to conflict deteriorated materially after the September 24, 2025 police involvement. Prior to that period, the parties’ relationship and communication improved for a time, parenting time occurred more consistently, and the parties had agreed in the June 24, 2025 Minutes of Settlement that the child would reside primarily with the mother while in Mexico.
110After September 24, 2025, the father treated perceived injustices as requiring escalation and rule‑enforcement. He testified that, following police involvement, he understood himself to have been “threatened” with criminal charges if he communicated with the mother other than by email, and he adopted a more formal, adversarial posture in communications (including copying counsel on all correspondence to the mother), rather than focusing on child‑centred problem‑solving.
111The father’s conduct around government documentation illustrates this dynamic. The record shows that, after the child’s name change, documentation became a recurring subject of dispute. With respect to the amended birth certificate, the father initially shared only a partial photo and declined to provide the document when the mother requested it for related paperwork, including OHIP registration. He later conceded that he did not provide the amended birth certificate immediately and offered an explanation that he first received only a partial copy and later obtained the version with parents’ information.
112The same pattern carried forward into the passport process. Both parties attended Service Canada to initiate and correct the passport application, but after signing, the father treated an address discrepancy as suspicious, contacted immigration/passport authorities to halt the application, demanded further information about guarantors and proof of residence, and accused the mother of fraud.
113The conduct continued, even when the mother’s counsel confirmed that the mother would retrieve the passport and file it with the court as ordered, the father filed a motion to permit him to collect the passport himself because he did not trust the mother to follow through. This approach reflected a persistent focus on finding fault and seeking vindication, rather than advancing workable, child‑focused solutions.
114The father’s evidence also contained clear examples of misstatement, exaggeration, and selective framing. For example, he deposed that “cold and extreme weather conditions” made travel unsafe and forced cancellations. Yet the contemporaneous record described in the reasons includes an instance where the “cold and extreme weather conditions” relied upon to cancel a visit were partially cloudy conditions with a low of 12 degrees and a high of 18 degrees.
115The broader pattern described in the evidence included cancellations with notice close to exchange times, early arrivals with loud, persistent knocking prompting neighbour complaints and requests that he call or message on arrival, and occasions where he said he would not attend but appeared shortly thereafter.
116These incidents, viewed in context, supported the conclusion that the father’s perception of events was often filtered through an assumption of wrongdoing by the mother, and that he sometimes appeared to create or amplify conflictual situations that he later relied upon to support his narrative.
117A further reliability concern was the father’s disconnect between stated intentions and demonstrated follow‑through on preserving the child’s relationship with him.
118In December 2025, after his motion for overnight parenting time was dismissed and the trial was scheduled, the father cancelled all parenting time until his trial paperwork was filed. Between December 1, 2025, and the first day of trial on January 19, 2026, he attended four of twenty‑four potential exchanges and exercised parenting time twice. This record undermined the reliability of assertions that he was doing everything within his power to preserve and build the relationship while simultaneously attributing the lack of progress primarily to the mother’s alleged obstruction.
119None of this is to suggest that the mother is without fault. The record demonstrates that both parties contributed to conflict escalation.
120On September 24, 2025, both parties quickly assumed the other was assigning blame for the child’s injury, and the communication deteriorated into contentious messaging and calls. The mother made a police report that included allegations beyond the immediate return of the child, and the father responded by blocking communication and later treating the police direction as an enduring constraint that shaped his approach to communication. The parties’ mutual assumptions, combined with the language barrier and reliance on translation applications, compounded the likelihood of misunderstanding and escalation.
121On balance, however, the court found the mother’s evidence more reliable on the central disputed issues. Her evidence provided a more coherent account of the child’s caregiving history and day‑to‑day realities and aligned more closely with a developmentally appropriate focus for a toddler. The father’s evidence lost persuasive force where it reflected a persistent focus on vindication, fault‑finding, and impugning the mother’s credibility, rather than grappling with the practical realities that neither party currently has a secure, reliable pathway to remain in Canada and that the child, at present, is both parties’ primary anchor to Canada. The court therefore preferred the mother’s evidence on the central disputed issues because it proved more dependable overall, not because the father’s evidence lacked truthful elements.
122As to the parties’ witnesses, the court found the witnesses to be generally credible but placed limited weight on the father’s witness where that evidence was offered to prove the quality or consistency of parenting time, because the witness’s observations were brief and episodic. By contrast, the court found the mother’s aunt to be a reliable witness because her evidence was grounded in direct, practical involvement, was delivered in a straightforward manner, and she was appropriately candid about what she did and did not personally observe. The court also found the mother’s mother to be generally reliable on issues within her direct knowledge.
123The analysis that follows is conducted in the context of these credibility and reliability findings.
Part Five – Summary of Material Findings of Facts in Dispute
124The court sets out the following summary of material findings on the disputed issues that inform the best‑interests of the child analysis:
(1) The mother has been the child’s primary caregiver. She has been responsible for making most decisions for the child and has done so in a responsible manner.
(2) The child has her closes connection with the mother.
(3) The father did not establish that the mother has poor family relations.
(4) The mother was not found to be lying about her residential address in Mexico. The court believed her account of the discrepancy between the address provided by counsel to the father and the address used on the child’s passport application.
(5) Both parents escalate the conflict at times, and the record includes conduct by both that engages the family‑violence considerations.
(6) The mother reacts quickly at times, adopts extreme positions or threats, and escalates conflict through poor judgment.
(7) The mother delays providing some information or documents, and she does not always give clear timelines or mitigate the consequences of delay once conflict takes hold.
(8) The mother facilitates reasonable expansion of the father’s parenting time notwithstanding strained exchanges and the father’s inconsistent attendance.
(9) The father drives much of the decline in his parenting time by cancelling or not attending scheduled visits. The mother is not preventing parenting time.
(10) The father adopts an adversarial communication posture.
(11) The father frames disputes in rights‑based, compliance‑driven terms and pursues vindication and fault‑finding rather than child‑centred problem‑solving.
(12) The father shows a skewed view of events, particularly as they relate to the decline of his parenting time.
(13) The father shows limited insight into his own role in the conflict and the impact of his conduct on the child’s experience.
(14) The father engages in gatekeeping and overvigilance in documentation and administrative disputes, including by providing only partial disclosure, delaying production, and escalating issues through authorities and litigation steps.
Part Six – Primary Residence
6.1 Legal Framework
125Subsection 24 (2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act (the Act) directs that, in determining a child’s best interests, the court must give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
126Subsection 24 (3) of the Act sets out a non‑exclusive list of factors related to the circumstances of the child that the court must consider. It reads as follows:
Factors
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(k) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(l) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and
(m) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
127Subsection 24 (4) of the Act identifies additional considerations that inform the court’s assessment of the impact of family violence. It reads as follows:
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
128The best interests considerations in the Act are not exhaustive.5 Nor are they a checklist to be scored, with the “highest score” prevailing. Rather, they require a holistic assessment of the child, the child’s needs, and the caregiving and relational context in which the child lives.6
129The child’s best interests must be assessed from the child’s perspective, not the parents’.7 Adult preferences or asserted “rights” do not drive the analysis, except to the extent they are relevant to determining what arrangement best meets the child’s interests.8
130A fundamental starting point in assessing a child’s best interests in parenting determinations is whether the child will be physically and emotionally safe. Relatedly, when making a parenting time order, it is in a child’s best interests that the child’s caregiver be physically and emotionally safe.9
131In Barendregt v. Grebliunis10, the Supreme Court of Canada wrote the following about the maximum time principle at paragraphs 134 and 135:
134Although Gordon placed emphasis on the "maximum contact principle", it was clear that the best interests of the child are the sole consideration in relocation cases, and "if other factors show that it would not be in the child’s best interests, the court can and should restrict contact": Gordon, at para. 24; see also para. 49. But in the years since Gordon, some courts have interpreted what is known as the "maximum contact principle" as effectively creating a presumption in favour of shared parenting arrangements, equal parenting time, or regular access: Folahan v. Folahan, 2013 ONSC 2966, at para. 14; Slade v. Slade, 2002 YKSC 40, at para. 10; see also F. Kelly, "Enforcing a Parent/Child Relationship At All Cost? Supervised Access Orders in the Canadian Courts" (2011), 49 Osgoode Hall L.J. 277, at pp. 278 and 296-98. Indeed, the term "maximum contact principle" seems to imply that as much contact with both parents as possible will necessarily be in the best interests of the child.
135These interpretations overreach. It is worth repeating that what is known as the maximum contact principle is only significant to the extent that it is in the child’s best interests; it must not be used to detract from this inquiry. It is notable that the amended Divorce Act recasts the "maximum contact principle" as "[p]arenting time consistent with best interests of child": s. 16(6). This shift in language is more neutral and affirms the child-centric nature of the inquiry. Indeed, going forward, the "maximum contact principle" is better referred to as the "parenting time factor".
132An equal parenting time plan typically requires a high level of communication and coordination between the parents, particularly when a child is very young. The parents must be able to coordinate schooling, medical appointments and extra-curricular activities. Where the evidence shows that the parties’ dynamics make such coordination unlikely, ordering an equal parenting time arrangement may invite conflict and instability, to the detriment of the child.11
133Financially supporting one’s children in a responsible manner is an important aspect of parenting. A failure to do so may militate against a joint or shared parenting order, as it can reflect poor judgment and an inability to prioritize the child’s interests.12
6.2 Analysis and Conclusion
134The parties agree that the child’s primary residence should continue to be with the mother, if in Canada. If the mother the mother cannot or does not remain in Canada and returns to Mexico, the father asks that the child remain in Canada and primarily reside with him.
135Both parties plainly love and care about the child. They each want what’s best for her.
136The father, understandably, wants to be much more involved in the child’s life. However, primary residence must be determined from the child’s perspective, with primary consideration to her physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being, having regard to her age and stage of development and the caregiving realities reflected in the record.
137On this record, the child should have her primary residence with the mother for the following reasons:
(1) The child has lived with the mother since birth and has her closes connection with her. Continuity of care with the child’s primary caregiver is a central stability consideration for a one-and-a-half-year-old child.
(2) The parties’ consent and temporary orders have consistently anchored the child’s primary residence with the mother, including the June 24, 2025, consent final order, which expressly contemplated the child residing primarily with the mother whether she is in Canada or Mexico.
(3) The father has not exercised any parenting time since December 18, 2025. In the period leading into trial, his exercise of parenting time became markedly irregular, including a period in which he attended at four of twenty-four potential exchanges and exercised parenting time twice. This history weighs against a shift in primary residence away from the mother and against a rapid move toward a shared parenting structure for a toddler.
(4) The parties’ communication and coordination deteriorated significantly after September 24, 2025, and conflict around exchanges escalated. The record reflects repeated disputes about cancellations, timing, hand-offs, and communication practices. A primary-residence determination must account for the parties’ demonstrated ability to implement any regime without exposing the child to ongoing adult conflict.
(5) The father’s evidence raised meaningful concerns about follow-through and child-focused problem-solving. After September 24, 2025, he adopted an increasingly adversarial posture and tended to treat perceived injustices as requiring escalation and rule-enforcement. His approach to disputes about documentation and the passport process illustrates a pattern of mistrust and fault-finding that undermines the practical workability primary-residence shift for a very young child at this stage.
(6) The mother’s evidence was more reliable on the core caregiving and day-to-day realities relevant to a toddler’s best interests. Her evidence was more coherent on the child’s routine and caregiving history and was more consistent with a developmentally appropriate focus. The court therefore preferred the mother’s evidence on the central disputed issues bearing on primary residence.
(7) The father’s alternative position—primary residence with him in Canada if the mother returns to Mexico—would remove a very young child from her primary caregiver. On this record, and in light of the father’s recent non-exercise of parenting time and the parties’ high conflict and mistrust, such a disruption is not in the child’s best interests.
(8) In the result, the child having her primary residence with the mother best meets the child’s need for stability and best protects her physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being on the evidence before the court.
138It is in the best interests of the child that she remain primarily resident with the mother.
Part Seven – Relocation
7.1 Legal Framework
139In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court must consider the child’s best interests in accordance with section 24 of the Act, together with the relocation-specific factors in subsection 39.4 (3) of the Act, which are as follows:
(a) the reasons for the relocation;
(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;
(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;
(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and
(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
140In Barendregt v. Grebliunis13, the court interpreted these relocation provisions as follows:
The parent who cares for the child on a daily basis is in a unique position to assess what is in their best interests: Gordon, at para. 48. This logic applies to both parents in a shared parenting arrangement, and accordingly, both of their views are entitled to great respect in an assessment of the child’s best interests. This makes sense: a court always pays careful attention to the views of the parents. In my view, it adds little value to this analysis to label it a separate principle of "great respect". See: paragraph 119.
The court should avoid casting judgment on a parent’s reasons for moving. A moving parent need not prove the move is justified. A lack of a compelling reason for the move, in and of itself, should not count against a parent unless it reflects adversely on a parent’s ability to meet the needs of the child. Ultimately, the moving parent’s reasons for relocating must not deflect from the focus of relocation applications — they must be considered only to the extent they are relevant to the best interests of the child. See: paragraphs 129-130.
Avoiding family violence or acrimony can be an important best interests factor in determining relocation. See: paragraph 147.
The court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, which may include the child’s views and preferences, the history of caregiving, any incidents of family violence, or a child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage. A court shall also consider each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent, and shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent, as is consistent with the best interests of the child. These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. See: paragraph 153.
At paragraph 154 the court writes:
154However, traditional considerations bearing on the best interests of the child must be considered in the context of the unique challenges posed by relocation cases. In addition to the factors that a court will generally consider when determining the best interest of the child and any applicable notice requirements, a court should also consider:
the reasons for the relocation;
the impact of the relocation on the child;
the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or a pending application for a parenting order and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;
the existence of an order, arbitral award, or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;
the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of parenting time, decision making responsibility or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new place of residence and the travel expenses; and
whether each person who has parenting time or decision-making responsibility or a pending application for a parenting order has complied with their obligations under family law legislation, an order, arbitral award, agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.
The court should not consider how the outcome of an application would affect either party’s relocation plans - for example, whether the person who intends to move with the child would relocation without the child or not relocate..."
The mother’s need for emotional support was an important factor. Courts have frequently recognized that a child’s best interests are furthered by a well-functioning and happy parent. See: paragraph 169.
Relocation that provides a parent with more education, employment opportunities, and economic stability can contribute to a child’s wellbeing. These considerations all have direct or indirect bearing on the best interests of the child assessment. See: paragraph 171.
The additional support of family and community at the new location can enhance the parent’s ability to care for the children. See: paragraph 172.
It is often difficult to disentangle the interests of a parent from the interests of a child. Indeed, "the reality that the nurture of children is inextricably intertwined with the well-being of the nurturing parent" is far from novel. A child’s welfare is often advanced in tandem with improvements in the parent’s financial, social, and emotional circumstances. The trial judge found this to be the case here. See: paragraph 173.
141Courts have also recognized that modern technology can assist in maintaining and facilitating parenting time and contact where there is geographic distance, and may mitigate some of the practical challenges created by relocation.14
7.2 Analysis and Conclusion
142In determining whether to authorize the proposed relocation of the child with the mother to Puebla, Mexico, the court has considered the best interests of the child under section 24 of the Act together with the relocation-specific factors in subsection 39.4(3), and the parties’ evidence and submissions on workability, compliance, and the preservation of the parent-child relationship across borders.
143The parties agreed that they both bear the onus of establishing whether the proposed relocation is or is not in the child’s best interests pursuant to subsection 39.4(7) of the Act.
144There are factors that weigh against permitting the relocation:
(1) The child has lived in Canada since birth and has a current routine and caregiving environment here. Any relocation carries some risk of disrupting a child’s stability and attachments.
(2) Relocation will reduce the frequency of in-person parenting time with the father and will require the father to maintain the relationship through a combination of virtual contact and travel-based in-person time. The father submits that virtual parenting time is a poor substitute for an in-relationship with a child this young, and he expresses concern about practical enforceability and follow-through if the child is in Mexico. These concerns are not unreasonable. The father’s relationship with the child may be adversely affected if she is permitted to relocate with the mother to Mexico.
(3) The child has maternal and paternal connections in Toronto.
(4) The parties’ communication is conflictual, and their disputes have escalated at times. Those dynamics create a risk that parenting arrangements could be further strained if the child relocates.
(5) There are some uncertainties for the child if the mother relocates with her to Mexico. Will the mother be able to find a job quickly? Will she continue to be supported by her family as she hopes? Will the child have access affordable child care, education, and health care?
145The court finds that these concerns are outweighed by the following factors supporting an order permitting the child to relocate with the mother to Puebla, Mexico.
(1) The starting point is continuity of care. The child has lived with the mother since birth, and the court has found that the child’s primary residence should continue to be with her. Relocation must therefore be assessed in the context of maintaining that stable primary-care arrangement for a one-and-a-half-year-old child.
(2) The parties’ consent final order of June 24, 2025 is a significant contextual factor. On consent, they expressly agreed that the child would reside primarily with the mother and secondarily with the father while in Canada, and primarily with the mother while in Mexico. That agreement reflects that, at a time when the parties were able to reach terms, they contemplated the child’s primary residence with the mother in Mexico as a workable and child-focused arrangement.
(3) The mother is ineligible to work in Canada on her current status, and she has consistently maintained that she cannot build a stable, self-sustaining life in Canada on a long-term basis. Relocation to Mexico is tied, in her evidence, to the ability to work lawfully and to provide stability for the child.15
(4) The mother has a concrete support network in Mexico. She proposes to reside in Puebla with her aunt, alongside her two older children who are currently living with the aunt, and she describes her aunt and sister as practical childcare supports. The evidence supports that this plan is grounded in actual family arrangements and is not merely aspirational.
(5) The mother’s current circumstances in Canada are constrained by her inability to work and by reliance on extended family support. By contrast, relocation would allow her to work in Mexico and to re-establish a lawful income-earning pathway, with interim support from her family as she stabilizes. Those realities bear directly on the child’s stability and the mother’s ability to meet the child’s needs over time.
(6) The child’s best interests in relocation cases are often intertwined with the stability and well-being of the primary caregiver. Here, the mother’s evidence is that she cannot lawfully work in Canada and cannot achieve long-term stability here, whereas relocation to Mexico provides a realistic pathway to lawful work, family support, and a sustainable caregiving plan. Authorizing relocation better aligns the child’s day-to-day stability with the mother’s ability to function as a stable primary caregiver.
(7) The father’s recent parenting time history is relevant to the practical impact of relocation. The father has not exercised any parenting time since December 18, 2025. In the period leading into trial, his attendance and exercise of parenting time became markedly irregular. That record undermines the force of the submission that relocation will be the decisive cause of a lost relationship, and it supports the conclusion that the relationship requires intentional structure and follow-through regardless of geography.
(8) The mother’s proposal addresses preservation of the father-child relationship through regular virtual contact, ongoing information sharing, and in-person parenting time as arranged when the father travels to Mexico and during any visits by the mother and child to Canada. While this cannot replicate the frequency of in-person time available if the child remained in Ontario, the court is satisfied that, with clear minimum terms and enforceable information-sharing obligations, it can preserve and support a meaningful relationship in a manner that is realistic for a toddler.
(9) The father has not presented a concrete, workable plan to preserve the mother’s ongoing relationship with the child in the event his proposed outcome is ordered. While he included proposed terms in his draft order for trial addressing primary residence and residency, his evidence did not set out a practical plan for the mother’s ongoing contact and role, beyond general assertions. This gap is particularly significant given the child’s age and the inevitability of distance if the mother returns to Mexico.
(10) The father’s proposal that the child remain in Canada with him depends on assumptions that are themselves uncertain. The father’s study permit expired in March 2026; his post‑graduation work permit remains pending; and the record reflects that his ability to work and remain in Canada may depend on approvals that were not yet resolved at trial. His plan to remain in Canada long term is therefore aspirational rather than established on this record.
(11) The broader immigration reality affects both parties. The mother’s status in Canada is also unstable: she is in Canada on a visitor status, has required extensions, has a further extension pending, and is ineligible to work in Canada. In that context, the court must evaluate relocation on the footing that neither parent has a clear, proven pathway to long‑term permanence in Canada, and that the child’s stability is most reliably anchored in the primary caregiver’s realistic ability to live and work lawfully and sustainably.
(12) Although neither parent has perfectly complied with court orders and expectations, the evidence gives the court greater confidence in the mother’s likelihood to facilitate and encourage the child’s relationship with the father going forward. The mother continued to agree to expansions of the father’s parenting time notwithstanding the increasingly strained exchanges and the father’s pattern of cancellations and inconsistent exercise of parenting time. In stark contrast, the father’s conduct reflected escalating rigidity and distrust—blocking the mother’s number, adopting an adversarial communication posture, and repeatedly cancelling or failing to attend scheduled parenting time for reasons that were not borne out by the contemporaneous circumstances. Taken together, this record supports a greater degree of confidence that the mother will comply with and implement structured order terms, and will continue to facilitate the father’s relationship with the child, whereas the father’s conduct demonstrates less reliable follow‑through and a greater tendency to escalate conflict in ways that impede practical implementation.
146The court has also considered the family violence factors in subsections 24(3)(j) and 24(4) of the Act. The evidentiary record includes allegations and examples of conduct by both parents that engage those considerations.
147While these dynamics inform the court’s assessment of the parties’ communication, trust, and the need for clear protective terms in any parenting regime, they are not the reason the court is permitting relocation. The relocation determination turns on the child’s best interests viewed holistically, including the child’s age, continuity of care with the primary caregiver, and the practical realities bearing on stability and workability in the proposed location.
148In the result, weighing all the circumstances, including both parents’ plan for the child’s ongoing relationship with the other parent, and having primary regard to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being, the court finds it is in the child’s best interests to permit the mother to relocate with the child to Puebla, Mexico.
Part Eight – Decision-making Responsibility
8.1 Legal Framework
149The court has considered the best interest factors set out in Part 5.1 above in determining the appropriate decision-making responsibility order.
150The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis16 sets out the following principles in determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate:
There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.
It can't be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.
Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.
The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.
No matter how detailed the custody order is, there will always be gaps and unexpected situations; when they arise, they must be addressed on an ongoing basis.
The younger the child, the more important communication is.
151Courts do not expect communication between separated parties to be easy or comfortable, or free of conflict. A standard of perfection is not required and is obviously not achievable.17 The issue is whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place, and is achievable in the future, so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis.18
152The Ontario Court of Appeal has upheld a joint decision-making responsibility order even in the absence of reasonably effective communication where it was necessary to sustain a child's relationship with a parent in the face of alienation. For example, such an order was upheld where a mother had established a pattern of resisting the father's access and was found by the trial court to be unable to appreciate the importance of the father's relationship with the children.19
153Mutual trust and respect are basic elements for a joint decision-making responsibility order to work effectively.20
154In paragraph 504 of Izyuk v. Bilousov21, the court writes:
In the wrong family circumstances, a joint custody order can perpetuate hostilities, indecision, and power struggles. Children- particularly children already exposed to the upset of family breakdown- look to their parents for love, guidance, stability, protection, and consistency. They need to have confidence that adult decisions will be made quickly, properly and uneventfully.
155In S. (S.) v. K. (S.)22, Sherr J. wrote that courts should assess the dynamics of a family when determining if a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate. In particular, the court should examine whether the granting of such an order is:
a) more or less likely to de-escalate or inflame the parents' conflict; or
b) more or less likely to expose the child to parental conflict.
156In S.S., the court further stated that courts should also examine whether a parent is seeking the order as a mechanism to inappropriately control the other parent. Parents who seek such orders for the purpose of asserting control over their former spouse and children tend to be rights-based, overly litigious, and unbending, and the best interests of their children can become secondary considerations. For such parents, a joint custody order can be a recipe for disaster. It can become a springboard to assert control and make the lives of their former partner and children much more difficult.
157Section 28 of the Act sets out the types of parenting orders the court can make. Clause 28(1)(c) of the Act reads as follows:
(c) may make any additional order the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,
(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child,
(ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child,
(iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child's residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court,
(iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court,
(v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child's passport, the child's health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify,
(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the child's well-being, including in relation to the child's health and education, to another party or other person specified by the court, or
vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.
8.2 Analysis and Conclusion
a) Decision-making Responsibility
158Given the relocation finding, the court must determine what decision-making responsibility and related terms best protect the child’s interests in a cross-border parenting regime.
159The mother seeks an order that she have sole decision-making responsibility for the child after consultation with the father. She also seeks ancillary terms that permit her to obtain and manage the child’s Canadian and Mexican government documentation so the relocation order can be implemented, and so the child can travel as required under the parenting regime.
160The father seeks an order for joint decision-making responsibility and opposes dispensing with his consent for documentation and travel. He also asks for an order that “the child shall remain solely a citizen of Canada, and no actions will be taken to alter or add to the child’s citizenship status.”
161A joint decision-making responsibility order is not in the child’s best interests and is not workable on this record. The evidence demonstrates persistent conflict and mistrust that escalated after September 24, 2025, including conflict about communication, exchanges, and the child’s documents. In this context, a joint regime would predictably generate delay and gridlock on time-sensitive decisions for a very young child and would increase the child’s exposure to adult conflict.
162The court is also concerned that joint authority, or a requirement for the father’s consent, would operate as a practical veto and would invite renewed conflict in precisely the areas where the parties have already demonstrated entrenched mistrust. The passport process illustrates the problem. After both parents attended to initiate and correct the child’s passport application, the father treated an address discrepancy as suspicious and contacted immigration/passport authorities to halt the application. The conflict then continued through demands for guarantor information and proof of residence, and escalated even after the court made consent-based protective terms requiring the passport to be delivered into court.
163In the result, the mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the child following relocation, with an express obligation to consult the father before making major decisions and to consider his input in good faith.
164To support workability and minimize future disputes, the order will include a communication protocol on the terms set out in the order, below.
165Each parent practises a different religion. It is in the child’s best interests to be supported in knowing, understanding, and experiencing the religious and cultural traditions of both parents, in an age‑appropriate and child‑focused way. The child should be free to participate in each parent’s religious observances during that parent’s parenting time.
b) Terms of Decision-Making Responsibility
166The parties agreed that they should have the same access to information relating to the child, and to make inquiries of third-party service providers for the child. An order shall issue accordingly, subject to the terms set out below.
167The child’s immigration status in Mexico was a central issue before this court.
168The father relied on McQuabbie v. Noel23 for the proposition that this court’s task is to determine decision-making responsibility, parenting time, and incidents of parenting (then custody, access, and incidents of access”) in the child’s best interests, and that it is not this court’s function to decide a party’s immigration status or whether a party should remain in Canada.
169The court agrees with that principle. In doing so, the court notes that McQuabbie arose in a materially different context, including an existing deportation order and an evidentiary record engaging immigration enforcement realities. Here, the record does not include a deportation order or participation by immigration authorities, and the mother’s presence in Canada has always been as a visitor with the stated intention of returning to Mexico.
170As a result, the court will not make any order purporting to determine citizenship or immigration status, including the father’s requested term that “the child shall remain solely a citizen of Canada, and no actions will be taken to alter or add to the child’s citizenship status.” It simply has no jurisdiction to do so.
171At the same time, once relocation is authorized, the court must make the parenting and ancillary orders necessary to implement that relocation in a child‑focused and workable way, consistent with its mandate under the Children’s Law Reform Act. The court’s task is to determine—and then to give practical effect to—orders that are in the child’s best interests within the scope of a legitimately contested parenting dispute. To refrain from making the implementation orders required to operationalize the relocation finding would be to abdicate the court’s statutory duty to decide and protect the child’s best interests in this proceeding.
172To that end, the parties were put on notice at the outset of trial that the citizenship/status term in the June 24, 2025 order intersected with the relocation relief sought and could affect feasibility, and the court directed evidence and submissions on that issue.
173The father nevertheless asks for an order that “the child shall remain solely a citizen of Canada, and no actions will be taken to alter or add to the child’s citizenship status.” He argues, in substance, that there is no proper basis to revisit the citizenship/status term, including because the June 24, 2025 consent order was final and he should not be “penalized” for the mother’s lack of research when that consent term was agreed, and he maintains that altering the child’s status in Mexico is unnecessary and unfair to him.
174The court does not accept that framing.
175Once relocation is authorized, the court must make the parenting and ancillary orders necessary to implement the relocation in a child-focused, workable way and in accordance with the court’s best-interests mandate in this proceeding.
176The relocation finding itself materially changes the child’s lived reality: the child will be residing in Mexico with her primary caregiver. In that context, the question is not whether the father should be “penalized,” but whether the orders will maximize the child’s stability and access to essential, affordable services in the place where she will live. Granting the mother authority to apply for the child’s Mexican documentation and status is not punitive; it is directed to the child’s best interests by maximizing the child’s realistic access to affordable services in Mexico (including health care, childcare, and education) and ensuring the relocation order can be implemented smoothly rather than in a manner that risks avoidable delay, disruption, or increased private cost.
177A further practical consideration informs both the documentation and travel terms. A parent who has decision-making responsibility does not automatically acquire the right to obtain government documentation for a child or to travel internationally with the child without the other parent’s consent.24 Those issues are distinct and require clear order terms where consent is not realistically achievable.25
178On this record, requiring the father’s consent for documentation and related steps would create a significant risk of delay and renewed conflict. The passport application history demonstrates that risk.
179For the same practical reasons, the mother will be permitted to travel internationally with the child on advance notice to the father, but without requiring his consent. Requiring consent would invite avoidable delay and leverage-based dispute in circumstances where timely travel and documentation may be necessary to implement the relocation order and to meet the child’s needs.
180This asymmetric term reflects the child’s primary residence with the mother following relocation and the child’s age and stage of development. The child is only one-and-a-half years old, and her relationship with the father at the time any travel request is made will depend on the pattern of contact that is actually being exercised—both the consistency and quality of in‑person parenting time when available, and the regularity and reliability of virtual parenting time once the child is in Mexico.
181Where the record shows that parenting time has not been exercised consistently, including the father’s non‑exercise of parenting time since December 18, 2025, the mother’s ability to assess developmental readiness, disruption to routine, travel logistics, and concrete safeguards becomes especially important for this toddler.
182At the same time, the “not to be unreasonably withheld” standard preserves the father’s ability to travel with the child where the request is child‑focused and realistic at the time it is made—supported by clear notice, a specific itinerary and return plan, appropriate accommodations, and a proposal that aligns with the child’s routine and the existing relationship the father has been actively maintaining through in‑person and virtual contact.
Part Nine – Parenting Time
9.1 Legal Framework
183In determining the father’s parenting time, the court must consider the relevant best interests considerations set out in Part 5.1 above.
184In particular, subsection 24 (6) of the Act provides that, in allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
185In Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette26, on appeal, the court held that although the AFCC‑Ontario Parenting Plan Guide (the Parenting Plan Guide) is not binding law, Ontario courts have accepted the social science underpinning it when crafting parenting orders that serve the best interests of young children.27 Where a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science reflected in the Parenting Guide, reasons are required to justify that departure.28
186Where there is significant geographic distance between the parents’ homes, the court may structure parenting time so that it occurs less frequently but for longer periods, in a manner that remains consistent with the child’s best interests.29
9.2 Analysis and Conclusion
187The mother proposes that, while the child remains in Canada pending relocation, the father’s parenting time continue under the existing rotating schedule. When relocation occurs, she proposes that the father have regular virtual parenting time and that in‑person parenting time occur when the father travels to Mexico and during any visits by the mother and child to Canada, together with robust information sharing.
188The father’s primary focus at trial was opposing relocation and, in the alternative, seeking that the child remain in Canada with him if the mother returns to Mexico, with a plan for the mother to have virtual contact and funded travel to Canada several times per year. He did not put forward a detailed, child‑development‑anchored parenting plan for how his own parenting time would be structured and sustained if the child relocates to Mexico, beyond generalized assertions about enforcement concerns and the limits of virtual contact with a child this young.
189The court finds the mother’s proposed parenting time framework, with focused refinements, is in the child’s best interests. The child is one‑and‑a‑half years old. At this age, parenting time orders must prioritize predictability, routine, and stability, while preserving and supporting the child’s relationship with both parents in a developmentally appropriate way. The court has already found that the child’s primary residence should remain with the mother and that relocation to Mexico is in the child’s best interests. The parenting time orders must therefore be crafted to implement that outcome in a workable manner and to preserve the father‑child relationship to the greatest extent consistent with the child’s best interests.
190In assessing what is realistic and child‑focused, the court has considered the quantity and quality of parenting time that has actually been exercised in the recent period. The father has temporary parenting time under the current order, but has not exercised any parenting time since December 18, 2025. The record also reflects that, in the period leading into trial, his exercise of parenting time became irregular, including repeated cancellations and missed visits that he acknowledged were not, in general, because the mother prevented parenting time. This history matters because it demonstrates that, even with an in‑person schedule available in Ontario, consistency has been a challenge. That reality informs what structure is required post‑relocation to preserve the relationship in a reliable way.
191While the child remains in Canada pending relocation, the existing parenting time schedule will continue. On this record, there is not a sufficient foundation to order a significant expansion or a move toward overnights in the short period before relocation. The parties’ communication remains strained, exchanges have been a source of conflict, and the father has not recently exercised the parenting time currently available to him. A staged, realistic approach that prioritizes stability is therefore in the child’s best interests.
192Following relocation, the court finds it is in the child’s best interests that the father have structured, regular virtual parenting time as a minimum guaranteed baseline. The order will provide that the father shall have virtual parenting time at least three times per week on specified terms. This recognizes that virtual contact does not replace in‑person parenting time, but it can preserve continuity and familiarity for a toddler if it is regular, predictable, and reliably implemented.
193The court also accepts the mother’s proposal that the father’s in‑person parenting time post‑relocation occur when he travels to Mexico and during any visits by the mother and child to Canada. Given the child’s age, the parties’ conflict, and the father’s limited recent exercise of parenting time, it is not in the child’s best interests to impose rigid long‑block schedules detached from the realities of travel, finances, and the child’s ability to tolerate extended separations from her primary caregiver. Instead, the order will provide that in‑person parenting time will be arranged between the parties, as determined by the mother in a manner that is not to be exercised unreasonably, taking into account the child’s age and stage of development, the location of the visit, the time since the last in‑person contact, and any other factor relevant to the child’s needs at the time.
194To support workability and reduce avoidable conflict, the order will also include practical notice and coordination terms tied to travel.
195Given this child’s very young age and evolving developmental needs, a flexible framework that prioritizes routine and stability is preferable to rigid bare minimum at this time. Further, the recent record of irregular attendance—including the father’s non‑exercise of parenting time since December 18, 2025—introduces genuine uncertainty about what pattern is realistic to implement without generating further conflict. In these circumstances, the court departs—deliberately and for articulated, child‑focused reasons—from the Guide’s usual level of specificity.
Part Ten – Orders and Costs
196A final order shall issue on the following terms:
Primary Residence, Relocation, and Decision-Making Responsibility
(1) Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Final Order of Justice Szandtner dated June 24, 2025, are terminated are replaced with the following:
(a) The child shall have her primary residence with the mother.
(2) The child shall relocate with the mother to Puebla, Mexico.
(3) Save as set out below, the mother shall have sole decision-making responsibility for the child, including health, religion, major extracurricular activities and education.
(4) The mother shall consult with the father before making any major decisions for the child.
(5) Each parent may expose the child to their respective religions.
(6) The mother shall make best efforts to enroll the child in English language programming, whether at school or as an extracurricular program.
(7) The father may obtain information about the child directly from any of her schools, doctors or other service providers. The mother shall execute whatever documentation is required to facilitate this. If any translation of documents is required, the party requesting the documents shall be responsible for the cost of translation.
Communication
(8) The parties shall communicate in writing only through the parenting communication application Talking Parents or a similar application if Talking Parents is discontinued.
(9) The mother shall keep the father informed of the names and contact information for all professional third-party services providers for the school, including but not limited to the child’s school, daycare, healthcare providers, etc.
(10) The communications between the parties should be brief, respectful, and only relate to issues pertaining to the child.
(11) Each party shall respond within 48 hours of any communication from the other party, provided it is related to the child, unless in the case of an emergency.
(12) Written communication between the parties should be no more frequent than once a day.
(13) Each party shall keep the other advised of their current residential address and shall provide written notice of any change of address within twenty‑four (24) hours of the change.
(14) If the child becomes ill or in need of medical assistance while in the care of one party, that party will notify the other party as soon as it is reasonably possible.
(15) Neither party shall make negative comments about the other party in the presence of the child or discuss past or present legal proceedings with the child.
(16) The parties shall use their best efforts to ensure that their friends and family members do not speak negatively about the other party in the presence of the child.
(17) The parties shall encourage the child to have a good relationship with each other and the other party's extended family.
(18) The mother shall make reasonable efforts to expose the child to opportunities to learn the English language.
Travel and Government Documents
(19) Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the final order of Justice Szandtner dated June 24, 2025, are terminated.
(20) Paragraph 9, 10, and 11 of the of the final order of Justice Szandtner dated June 24, 2025, are terminated and replaced with the following:
(a) The mother may apply for an obtain Mexican documentation for the child, including passports, birth certificates and health cards, and Mexican citizenship without the father’s consent. The mother shall provide copies of all documents obtained to the father.
(b) The mother shall apply for an renew the child’s Canadian passport for the child with the signature of the father. The mother shall provide the father with the necessary forms for renewal of the child’s passport by Talking Parents. If the father fails to provide his signature on the required forms within fourteen days of being notified of the need to renew the child’s passport, the mother may renew the child’s passport without the signature of the father.
(c) The parties will cooperate to sign all forms necessary to apply for or renew all other Canadian documentation for the child.
(d) The mother shall have the child’s Canadian and Mexican government documents in her possession for safe keeping. The mother shall provide the father with copies of all the child’s Canadian and Mexican legal and government documents by Talking Parents.
(21) The child’s Canadian passport presently held by the court shall be released to the mother forthwith (or to her counsel for delivery to her).
(22) Neither party shall apply for or obtain government documentation for the child from any country other than Canada or Mexico without the other party’s prior written consent or a further order of the court.
(23) The mother may travel outside of Canada and abroad with the child, without the consent of the father. The mother shall provide the father with a detailed itinerary of any vacation, including destination, address, mode of travel and emergency contact number, at least 30 days before travel.
(24) The father shall not travel with the child without the prior notarized signed consent of the mother; such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The cost of the notarized signed travel consent shall be borne by the father.
(25) If the father intends to travel with the child, he shall provide the mother with a detailed itinerary of any vacation, including destination, address, mode of travel and emergency contact number, at least 60 days before travel. If travel is agreed to, the mother shall provide the child's passport to the father prior to travel, and the father shall return the child's passport to the mother upon the return of the child to her care.
Parenting Time
(26) Until the child relocates to Mexico, the father shall have parenting time with the child in accordance with the terms of paragraph 1 of the temporary order of Justice Szandtner dated October 24, 2025. The following terms shall apply:
(a) Pick-ups and drop-off shall occur at the mother’s residence.
(b) The father shall provide at least 24 hours’ notice of any need to cancel parenting time, through Talking Parents. In the event of cancellation, no make-up visit will be scheduled.
(c) The mother shall make best efforts to provide no less than 24 hours’ notice of any need to cancel parenting time. In the event of a cancellation, the mother shall make best efforts to provide make-up parenting time.
(27) Once the child relocates to Mexico, the father shall have parenting time with the child as follows:
(a) Video parenting time with the child not less than three (3) times per week, for up to thirty (30) minutes per call, at consistent times coordinated having regard to the child’s regular schedule.
(b) In person parenting time shall be arranged between the parties. The mother shall determine the location, duration, frequency, and level of supervision or assistance, and shall not exercise that discretion unreasonably, having regard to the child’s age and stage of development, the location of the visit, the time since the last in‑person parenting time, and any other factor relevant to the child’s needs at the time.
(c) A party who intends to travel to the country where the other parent resides at the time shall provide not less than thirty (30) days’ written notice through Talking Parents, and shall include the anticipated travel dates and the city/town of stay.
Child Support
(28) On consent, continuing February 1, 2026 and terminating on March 31, 2026, the father shall pay child support to the mother in the amount of $150 per month.
(29) On consent, commencing April 1, 2026, and continuing the first of each month thereafter, the father shall pay child support to the mother in the amount of $297 per month, based on an imputed annual minimum wage income of $36,608, and in accordance with the Guidelines.
(30) Pending the commencement of child support enforcement by the Director’s Office of the Family Responsibility Office (FRO), child support shall be paid directly by the father to the mother via e-transfer. Once FRO enforcement begins, payments shall be made through FRO as per standard procedure. The mother shall acknowledge receipt of any direct payments to ensure that the father receives appropriate credit for all payments made.
(31) A Support Deduction Order and Support Deduction Order Information Form
Other Orders
(32) All other claims by the parties not dealt with above are dismissed.
197Ms. Garcia is directed to prepare the draft order for issuing, promptly.
Costs
198If the mother seeks costs, she shall serve and file written costs submissions by February 12, 2026. The father will then have until February 26, 2026, to serve and file his written response (not to make their own submissions). There shall be no reply without leave. The submissions shall be no more than 3 pages, not including any bill of costs or offer to settle.
199The court thanks counsel for their courtesy and professionalism.
Part Eleven – Interpreters
200Competent interpreters play a critical role in the fair and effective administration of justice in family court. Where parties or witnesses face language barriers, accurate and skilled interpretation is essential to ensure they can understand the proceedings, communicate their evidence and positions, and meaningfully participate in decisions affecting their children and their rights. Without competent interpretation, credibility assessments, procedural fairness, and informed consent to orders may be compromised, and language barriers risk becoming a hidden obstacle to access to justice rather than a neutral logistical reality.
201The court wishes to express its sincere appreciation to the six Spanish‑language interpreters who assisted throughout the trial. Their professionalism and sustained care were essential to the orderly conduct of the proceedings, to the accurate communication of the evidence, and to ensuring that language did not become a barrier to the parties’ meaningful participation or to the fairness of the adjudicative process.
Released: January 30, 2026
Amended: February 5, 2026
Signed: Justice Jennifer S. Daudlin
Footnotes
- The current minimum wage in Ontario.
- A one-way broadcasting feed where administrators post updates to an unlimited number of subscribers.
- A crypto-collateralized (crypto-backed) “stablecoin” (cryptocurrencies) designed to maintain value close to the US$1.
- The child had a persistent diaper rash which caused discomfort and required medication.
- White v. Kozun, 2021 ONSC 41; Pereira v. Ramos, 2021 ONSC 1736.
- Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480.
- Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 191 (SCC).
- Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC); E.M.B. v. M.F.B., 2021 ONSC 4264; Dayboll v. Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510.
- I.A. v. M.Z., 2016 ONCJ 615. Also see: Armstrong v. Coupland, 2023 ONSC 5451; J.N. v. A.S., 2020 ONSC 5292; A.L.M. v. V.L.S., 2020 ONCJ 502; M.R.-J. v. K.J., 2020 ONCJ 305; Abbas v. Downey, 2020 ONCJ 283; N.D. v. R.K., 2020 ONCJ 266.
- 2022 SCC 22.
- L.B. v. P.E., 2021 ONCJ 114; L.I.O. v. I.K.A., 2019 ONCJ 962.
- Jama v. Mohamed, [2015] ONCJ 619; T.P. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 6022; McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610; J.T. v. E.J., 2022 ONSC 4956; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057.
- Supra., footnote 11.
- Hussein v. Dirie, 2018 ONCJ 781, per: Justice Roselyn Zisman; Ryall v. Ryall, 2009 ONCJ 687, per: Justice Carole Curtis; Lepine-Maynard v. Majstorovic, 2022 ONSC 656, per: Justice Kiran Sah; M.K. v. J.K., 2020 ONCJ 387, per Justice Stephen Paull.
- J.G. v. F.I., 2025 ONCJ 699.
- 2005 1625 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 275.
- Griffiths v. Griffiths 2005 ONCJ 235, 2005 CarswellOnt 3209 (OCJ).
- Warcop v. Warcop, 2009 6423 (ON S.C.).
- Andrade v. Kennelly, 2007 ONCA 898.
- G.T.C. v. S.M.G., 2020 ONCJ 511; T.P. v. A.E., 2021 ONSC 6022; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi, 2022 ONSC 5057; Jacobs and Coulombe v. Blair and Amyotte, 2022 ONSC 3159; El Khatib v. Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667.
- 2011 ONSC 6451, 2011 CarswellOnt 12097 (SCJ).
- 2013 CarswellOnt 10801, 2013 ONCJ 432, (Ont. C.J.).
- 2010 ONCJ 775, at para.16 and 36.
- R.B.J. v. B.N.R.J., 2020 ONCJ 399; D.E.S.A. v. N.B., 2025 ONCJ 279; Dessye v. Lopez, 2025 ONCJ 429.
- A.M. v. C.H., 2019 ONCA 764; M.P.M. v. A.L.M., 2021 ONCA 465.
- 2025 ONSC 6273 (Div. Ct.)
- Hatab v. Abuhatab, 2022 ONSC 1560, at para. 61.
- Supra, footnote 23, at para. 40.
- Trudel v. Ward, 2019 ONSC 5047.