Court File and Parties
CITATION: Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 314/25
DATE: 20251113
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BACKHOUSE, LOCOCO, SHORE JJ.
BETWEEN:
Valerie Tremblay-Chartier Appellant (Respondent)
– and –
Kristopher Blanchette Respondent (Applicant)
COUNSEL:
Shannon Beddoe and Zechariah Martin, for the Appellant (Respondent)
Ira Marcovitch, for the Respondent (Applicant)
HEARD: July 7, 2025, by videoconference
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Overview
[1] This appeal is about a very young boy, referred to hereafter as A., and where he is going to live on a temporary basis, until the matter of his residential schedule is resolved by way of a final agreement or a decision at trial.
[2] The appellant mother, Ms. Tremblay-Chartier, is appealing with leave the temporary order of Engelking J. (the “motion judge”) dated April 8, 2025, granting the respondent father, Mr. Blanchette, equal parenting time with the parties’ 15-month-old child on a week-about basis.
[3] For the reasons below, the appeal is granted, and the order of the motion judge is set aside.
Background:
[4] The parties were in a relationship for approximately two years. The parties are the parents of A., who is 15 months old. The parties separated before the child was born.
[5] The mother runs her own business from home. She has a daughter from a previous relationship, who is eight years old.
[6] The father is a correctional officer at a detention centre and works on a week-about basis. During his work weeks, his schedule is 5:30 am until 5:30 pm. He has three children from a previous relationship, ages 15, 12 and 9, who reside with him on a week about basis and specifically during the week he is not working.
[7] A. has had his primary residence with the appellant mother since he was born. Following A.’s birth, the father’s parenting time was initially exercised in the mother’s home, in the presence of the mother. It gradually increased to public spaces, still in the presence of the mother, and finally unsupervised in the father’s home. The father’s parenting time thereafter remained at alternate weekends for four hours on each Saturday and Sunday.
[8] In May 2024, the father served an application seeking joint decision making and a parenting schedule leading to equal parenting time. In December 2024, the father brought a motion for the immediate implementation of an equal parenting schedule. The father sought a week-about parenting plan, which would allow the child to spend time with his half-brothers.
[9] The mother opposed the motion because of the child’s young age and the fact that he was still breast-feeding at night. She was prepared to increase the father’s time in increments, leading to an equal time-sharing arrangement by the time the child started kindergarten. The mother submitted that the child was too young to spend extended time away from their primary caregiver.
[10] The motion was heard on April 8, 2025, with oral reasons being provided the same day. The written endorsement was provided on May 2, 2025, with the transcript from the oral reasons delivered on May 6, 2025. The decision provided for an equal time-sharing arrangement on a week-about basis, with a mid-week overnight visit with the non-residential parent, to be implemented within a six-week period. This is the decision under appeal.
[11] Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on May 16, 2025. The temporary order was stayed and an interim parenting time order was put in place pending this appeal.
Grounds for review:
[12] The appellant submits that the motion judge erred in her application (and understanding) of section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12, by failing to:
a. consider the factors set out in s. 24(3) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, in determining the best interests of the child;
b. give consideration to the status quo;
c. provide sufficient reasons as to why the schedule was in the best interests of the child; and
d. properly consider the impact on the child by ending breastfeeding.
Standard of review:
[13] The parties agree that the standard of review on an issue of law is that of correctness. The standard of review on an issue of fact is that of palpable and overriding error.
[14] The application of correct legal principles to the evidence is a question of mixed fact and law, where the standard of review is palpable and overriding error: Walsh v. Tober, 2023 ONSC 7111 (Div. Ct.), at para. 28.
[15] Absent an error of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact, deference is vital: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at paras. 8, 10, 36 and 39.
[16] Determining the best interests of a child is always fact specific, and a highly discretionary determination. Courts are reluctant to interfere with the exercise of a trial judge’s decision: Diallo v. Bah, 2025 ONSC 2106, 18 R.F.L. (9th) 206 (Div. Ct.), at para. 37, citing, Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 517, at paras. 100, 103-104. However, when the decision is based on a written record, the threshold for appellate intervention may not be as high: King v. Mongrain, 2009 ONCA 486, 66 R.F.L. (6th) 267, at para. 33.
Analysis:
The Law: Best interest of the Child is the sole focus:
[17] When determining parenting schedules for children, each case must be determined based on the specific facts before the court. There is no dispute that parenting decisions are to be based solely on the best interests of the child, as considered from the child’s perspective, in this case, a very young child. Parental preferences or “rights” play no role except in so far as they are necessary to ensure the best interests of the child: Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, at p. 63-65.
[18] In Ontario, there is no presumption of a shared parenting schedule or equal parenting time: Barendregt, at para. 135. Schedules are determined with the sole focus of the best interests of the child. Any judge who deviates from that laser focus of the best interests of the child, commits an error in law.
[19] Section 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act sets out a clear road map to assist judges in determining what is in the best interests of the child. While ss. 24(2) to (6) are not an exhaustive list of factors, failure to consider the listed factors is an error in law. A judge need not address each of the factors in their decision, but it must be apparent that they have turned their mind to them.
[20] Specifically, the relevant provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act provide as follows:
24 (1) In making a parenting order or contact order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with this section.
Primary consideration
(2) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
Factors
(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,
(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;
(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;
(d) the history of care of the child;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;
(g) any plans for the child’s care;
(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;
(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;
(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,
(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and
(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and
(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
Factors relating to family violence
(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,
(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;
(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;
(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;
(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;
(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;
(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and
(h) any other relevant factor.
Past conduct
(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person, unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of the person’s decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child.
Allocation of parenting time
(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.
[21] As stated above, the list of factors is not exhaustive and none of the factors are given priority except for the primary considerations listed in s. 24(2). No single criterion is determinative, the weight given to each one depends on the circumstances of the particular child: Churchill v. Elliot, 2024 ONSC 1907, 3 R.F.L. (9th) 225, at para. 33.
The Motion Judge’s Decision:
[22] The entirety of the motion judge’s reasons are as follows:
Although the mother has made vague statements about the father's parenting capacity and/or his priorities, she has not provided any evidence which would demonstrate that the father is not capable of meeting the needs of [A.]. Indeed, both parents appear to be closely bonded with [A.] and vice versa, and both are clearly able to meet his physical and emotional needs.
Additionally, although the mother has made allegations in the past regarding stalking and controlling behaviours by the father, they have been investigated by the police and come to not. In her materials before the Court on this motion, the mother did not depose as to any specific actions by the father which would trigger an examination of them by the Court, pursuant to s. 24 (3) (j) and 24 (4) of the Children's Law Reform Act.
Additionally, while the mother has referenced the AFCC Guidelines on parenting plans, the father submits that they are not law and that the unique circumstances of his work schedule, as well as the fact that he parents three other children during his off-work weeks, render them less applicable in this case.
I can see no reason in law that the father should not have significantly more parenting time with [A.] than he is currently having. Subsection 24 (6) of the Children's Law Reform Act provides that,
"The Court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much parenting time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child."
I find that it would be in [A.’s] best interest to spend parenting time with his father at the same time that his brothers do, such that his relationships with his paternal relatives can be fostered and grow just as they have with his sister in his mother's care. However, given [A.’s] age I will order a gradual increase to the father's parenting time.
Failure to consider the factors set out in s. 24:
[23] The motion judge’s reasons mentioned only the following factors:
a. Both parties can meet the physical and emotional needs of the child;
b. An investigation into the effect of domestic violence on the child was not triggered by the facts of this case;
c. The AFCC Guidelines are not law and do not apply in this case;
d. There is no reason in law the father should not have maximum contact with the child; and
e. The child should have a relationship with their siblings and extended paternal family.
[24] There was no analysis of many of the factors set out in s. 24(3), which case law has set out as both mandatory and critical to determining the best interests of a child. There is nothing in the reasons to indicate that the judge considered the factors set out in s. 24(3) in arriving at the decision.
[25] For example, there was no mention of the child’s young age, the need for stability, A.’s stage of development, the history of care of the child, or the ability and willingness of each parent to communicate and co-operate with one another on matters affecting the child, among other factors.
[26] While maximizing contact between children and parents is important, it is not an unbridled objective. It is only to be given effect if it is consistent with the best interests of the child. What is missing from the reasons is an explanation of why the judge determined that this schedule is in the best interests of this child. The test is not whether there are reasons in law that the father should not have more time, but what arrangements are in the best interests of this child.
[27] I find the judge’s reasons to be insufficient to understand why moving a very young child from his mother’s primary care to equal parenting time on an interim basis is in the best interest of this child.
Failure to consider the Status Quo:
[28] The motion judge failed to make any mention of the status quo, prior to hearing the motion. There is no consideration in the reasons of the parenting schedule that existed from the child’s birth to the date of the motion, how the child was doing under that schedule, or how a substantial change to the schedule would affect the child. It is a long-standing legal principle that absent evidence of a material change, and that an immediate change is required, the status quo is ordinarily to be maintained until trial: Churchill, at para. 36; Hatab v. Abuhatab, 2022 ONSC 1560, 69 R.F.L. (8th) 18, at para. 33.
[29] A temporary order is meant to provide a reasonably acceptable solution on an expeditious basis for a problem that will be fully canvassed at subsequent conferences or resolved at trial. If the status quo is to be changed on an interim basis, the evidence must show clearly and unequivocally that maintaining the status quo is not in the best interests of the child: Churchill, at paras. 35-36.
[30] The longer the status quo has remained in place, the more likely it is that it should be maintained on an interim basis. This is not a case where an artificial status quo is established.
[31] The order of the motion judge presents a significant shift from the status quo that existed for the child since birth. Prior to the motion, the child was in the mother’s primary care and had two four-hour visits with the father. The child was less than one-year old when the motion was heard. The motion judge’s temporary decision increased the schedule to equal time within a short timespan, especially from the perspective of the child, given the child’s young age, and did not consider the child’s need for stability.
[32] The motion judge offered no analysis on the departure from the status quo on an interim basis, and did not address the departure of stability and predictability for the child, which would affect the psychological and emotional safety of the child: Children’s Law Reform Act, s. 24(2).
[33] I find the judge erred in law in disregarding the status quo parenting arrangement in place for the duration of the child’s life to date.
Effect of Domestic Violence:
[34] Pursuant to s. 24(4), the Court shall take into account a number of factors related to family violence. The motion judge dismissed the claims of domestic violence in this case as follows:
Additionally, although the mother has made allegations in the past regarding stalking and controlling behaviours by the father, they have been investigated by the police and come to not. In her materials before the Court on this motion, the mother did not depose as to any specific actions by the father which would trigger an examination of them by the Court, pursuant to s. 24 (3) (j) and 24 (4) of the Children's Law Reform Act.
[35] In the motion material, there are allegations of the high conflict nature of these proceedings, involvement of the police on multiple occasions, the father being under investigation for hacking into the mother’s emails and invading her privacy, persistent harassment and stalking (electronic and physical), confining her to a car, inappropriate sexual advances, refusal to use Our Family Wizard platform despite an order of the court, control over decision making, and refusal to pay reasonable child support.
[36] Under s. 24(4), the motion judge had an obligation to consider the effect of family violence on the ability and willingness of a person to care for and meet the needs of the child. The judge is required to conduct an analysis of the family violence claims. The motion judge dismissed the claims outright, relying on the police investigation coming “to not” and that no specific actions triggered an examination by the Court.
[37] Although the judge ordered equal parenting for a young child, which would necessitate regular communication between the parties, the motion judge failed to consider the appropriateness of making an order that would require the parents to co-operate on issues affecting the child, in high conflict situations and where there are allegations of family violence.
[38] Failing to conduct a proper analysis under s. 24(4) or failure to consider the effect of the high conflict on equal parenting time is an error of law.
AFCC-O Guidelines:
[39] The motion judge made a finding that the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (“AFCC-O”) Guidelines are not law, and less applicable in this case.
[40] While the AFCC-O Guidelines are not binding law, Ontario courts have accepted the social science behind the Guidelines when making parenting orders in the best interests of young children: Hatab, at para. 61. If a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science research, reasons are needed to depart from same. None were given in this case.
[41] The AFCC-O Guidelines summarize basic social science knowledge about the effects of parental separation on children, provide suggestions and guidance to help improve communication and cooperation between separated parents, and offer guidance about formulating parenting arrangements that meet the needs of children. The Court’s approach to the AFCC-O Guidelines was summarized by McGee J. in Melbourne v. Melbourne, 2022 ONSC 2299, 72 R.F.L. (8th) 84, starting at para. 19:
[19] The AFCC Parenting Guidelines were prepared by the Ontario Chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC-Ontario) to assist parents and their professional advisors in specifically developing the best, child-focused, and realistic parenting plans. As set out in its preamble,
This Guide combines knowledge gained from developmental research on the impact of parental separation and divorce on children, with practical insights about the needs of children with parents living apart. This Guide is intended to be used in conjunction with the AFCC-Ontario Parenting Plan Template, which offers suggestions for specific clauses that can be used or adapted for a parenting plan.
[20] I agree with Justice Chappel in McBennett v. Davis, 2021 ONSC 3610, when she states in paragraph [92]:
The AFCCO-O Guide summarizes basic social science knowledge about the effects of parental separation on children, provides suggestions and guidance to help improve communications and cooperation between separated parents and offers valuable guidance about formulating parenting arrangements that meet the needs of children.
[21] And as further stated by Justice Kraft in H. v. A., 2022 ONSC 1560 at para. 61:
The parenting plan guide produced by the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts - Ontario ("AFCC-O") has been found by many courts to be of great assistance in determining parenting schedules that are in a child's best interests, depending on the age of the child and his/her developmental stage. While not binding on the courts, the Guide provides a great deal of helpful information and reflects a professional consensus in Ontario about the significant (sic) of current child development research for post-separation. [Emphasis added.]
[42] The motion judge ordered a 15-month-old child to spend equal time with both parents, a departure from what is recommended by the AFCC-O Guidelines and social science, with no reasons offered as to why this was in the best interests of the child. The judge emphasized the father’s work schedule but did not address why a departure from recommended age-appropriate parenting schedules met the best interests of this child.
[43] For the reasons above, the appeal is granted, and the decision of the motion judge is set aside.
Costs:
[44] The parties agreed on costs to the successful party in the sum of $11,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, in addition to the costs of $6,000 inclusive granted on the motion for leave to appeal, for total costs to the successful party in the sum of $17,000 inclusive.
Disposition:
[45] The appeal is granted. The motion is sent back to the Superior Court of Justice, to be heard before a different judge.
[46] Pending return of the motion, the respondent father’s parenting time shall be as set out in the appellant mother’s notice of motion as follows:
a. For the next three months:
i. Week One: During the Father's "off" work week, the parenting time shall commence on Monday morning, and the child shall spend daytime hours on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday with the Father and return to the home of the Mother to sleep. On Wednesday, A. will be with the mother from 5:30 pm to Friday morning, and will again spend the daytime hours on Friday, Saturday and Sunday with the Father but return to the home of the Mother to sleep.
ii. Week Two (Father's "on" work week): A. will spend Wednesday from 5:30pm to 7:30pm with the Father.
b. For four months thereafter:
i. Week One (Father's "off" work week): A. will spend Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday from 9 am to 5:30 pm with the Father.
ii. Week Two (Father's "on" work week): A. will spend Wednesday from 5:30pm until Thursday at 9 am with the Father.
c. Thereafter until hearing of the motion:
i. Week One (Father's "off" work week): A. will spend Monday from 9 am to 5:30 pm and Friday from 9 am to Sunday at 5:30 pm with the Father.
ii. Week Two (Father's "on" work week): A. will spend Wednesday from 5:30pm until Thursday at 9am with the Father.
[47] The costs of the motion below, in the sum of $5,000 are set aside. The issue of costs of the motion below is left to be determined by the new judge hearing the motion.
[48] The respondent father shall pay costs to the appellant mother in the sum of $17,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.
SHORE J.
I agree _______________________________
BACKHOUSE J.
I agree _______________________________
LOCOCO J.
Released: November 13, 2025
CITATION: Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette, 2025 ONSC 6273
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 314/25
DATE: 20251113
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BACKHOUSE, LOCOCO, SHORE JJ.
BETWEEN:
Valerie Tremblay-Chartier
Appellant
– and –
Kristopher Blanchette
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Shore J.
Released: November 13, 2025