Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FC-25-00061203-0000 Date: 2025-12-24 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between:
Goran Gjorsovski, Applicant
-- and --
Jelena Krajisnik, Respondent
Counsel:
Daryl Gelgoot, Counsel for the Applicant
Heidi Popovic, Counsel for the Respondent
Heard: December 17, 2025
The honourable justice J. Breithaupt Smith
Reasons on motion
Background
[1] The Applicant, Goran Gjorsovski ("Father") brings a motion for a defined parenting schedule with the parties' three-year-old son, Danilo. The Respondent, Jelena Krajisnik ("Mother"), brings a cross-motion seeking sole decision-making responsibility and child support. The parties agree that child support is payable, and in fact Father has been making payments pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines in accordance with Temporary Without Prejudice Minutes of Settlement filed with Justice Mountford on October 31, 2025. A Support Deduction Order was made by the Court on that date and the parties do not seek a further order for child support at this time. Only the parenting issues were live for this hearing.
[2] The only relevant test in considering parenting arrangements for children is their best interests. The consideration is the same whether the court is making a Temporary Order on motion or a Final Order at trial. There is no presumption of equal parenting; there is no presumption that younger children should remain in their mother's care (the "Tender Years" concept). The legislation governing married and unmarried parents is almost identical in Ontario.
Legislative Framework
[3] These parties were married and thus sections 16, 16.1 through 16.4 and 16.6 of the Divorce Act apply. The sections in their entirety are attached as Appendix "A" to this decision. The factors for consideration, distilled from these sections, not all of which are directly applicable in this matter on this motion for temporary relief, are:
a. each child's needs having regard to his or her developmental stage;
b. each child's relationship(s) with each of the parents, extended family members and other people special to him or her;
c. each parent's willingness to support the other's role in the child's life;
d. the history of care for the child;
e. each child's views and preferences;
f. each child's cultural heritage, inclusive of language and faith as applicable;
g. any plans for the child's care;
h. each parent's ability and willingness to meet each child's needs;
i. the parents' ability to communicate and co-operate with one another;
j. an assessment of family violence, taking into account:
i. the timing, severity and frequency of the incidents;
ii. any pattern of coercive or controlling behaviour;
iii. whether the child was subjected to or witnessed aspects of the violence;
iv. the harm or risk of harm to the child;
v. other compromises to the safety of the child or another family member;
vi. current fear experienced by the child or another family member arising from the family violence;
vii. any remedial steps taken by the violent parent; and
viii. any other relevant factor;
k. the impact, if any, of family violence on the ability of the offending parent to care for and meet the needs of each child;
l. the impact, if any, of family violence on the parents' co-operation moving forward;
m. any legally-founded order, condition or measure relevant to the child's safety, security and well-being;
n. past conduct only insofar as it is relevant to a parent's participation in decision-making for, or parenting time with, the child;
o. the child's entitlement to as much time with each parent as is consistent with his or her best interests;
p. a presumption that day-to-day decisions are to be made by the parent caring for the child at the time the decision arises, unless otherwise ordered by the court;
q. the best allocation of decision-making responsibility (regarding major decisions) as between the parents and/or any other participating individual;
r. the means by which information regarding each child's health and education is to be sourced, i.e. whether as between the parents or from third parties directly;
s. the existence of a parenting plan submitted jointly by the parents to the court.
Decision-Making
[4] Dealing first with the issue of decision-making, it is undisputed that Danilo resides primarily with Mother who has stayed home with him on an almost full-time basis since his birth. She has been able to register him in daycare to facilitate her work schedule. Both parties have noted that daycare has had a positive impact on Danilo's growth and development. Danilo is in good health; other than enrolling him in Junior Kindergarten for the 2025-2026 school year, no upcoming major decisions for him were identified in the materials.
[5] Prior courts have warned against the making of a Temporary Order for decision-making, particularly in high-conflict cases and matters already on track for trial. I agree with Justice Zisman's comments at paragraph 28 of *Perchaluk v. Perchaluk*, 2012 ONCJ 525:
In considering these factors at a temporary stage in the proceedings, the most relevant factor the court must keep in mind is the principle of maintaining the status quo pending trial. Temporary orders are by their nature based on limited evidence without the scrutiny of cross-examination and are only intended to provide a reasonable acceptable solution to a difficult problem until trial. After a full investigation of the facts, a trial judge may very well come to a different conclusion.
[6] Similarly, in *Goodyear v. Burton*, 2016 ONSC 4583 at paragraphs 44; 46; and 48, Justice Doyle declined to make any order regarding decision-making where there was contradictory evidence regarding which parent was responsible for causing disruption to the care plans for the child (in that case, missed and altered parenting time). Her Honour expressed concern that an order for sole custody would have the effect of declaring a "winner" in the litigation and that an order for joint custody was problematic "when there may not have been a history of good communication on major issues dealing with the child."
[7] Here, Danilo does not have any medical conditions that will require upcoming decisions. He is enrolled in daycare and there is no evidence that either parent will stand in the way of important decisions regarding his health, education or welfare. As a result of the current criminal prohibition on contact, the parties are restricted to communication through the Our Family Wizard platform, but there was no evidence presented showing that communications have been unreasonable or toxic. Simply stated, decision-making is not a pressing issue.
[8] I am mindful of the need to enrol Danilo in Junior Kindergarten, which process starts in early 2026. So as to avoid any hiccups in that process, I will order that Mother may enroll Danilo in the school in her catchment area for Junior Kindergarten commencing September 2026 provided that she lists Father as the second emergency contact person on all school records. Otherwise, the question of decision-making can wait until trial or can be addressed as may be required if further major decisions arise.
Parenting Time
[9] This leaves the parenting time arrangements for Danilo. Danilo currently resides primarily with Mother and, at an early case conference on October 31, 2025, the parties agreed that he would have roughly alternate weekend parenting time (from Fridays at 8:00 a.m. to Sundays at 7:00 p.m.) consistent with Father's work schedule through November and into December. Their agreement included parenting time from December 25th at 9:00 a.m. to December 26th at 7:00 p.m. Nothing further was specified. This motion was argued on December 17, 2025.
[10] Father seeks a 4-week schedule which has Danilo in his care 2 consecutive overnights in each week. In weeks 1 and 2, the overnights are on weekdays; in weeks 3 and 4, the overnights are over the weekends. Father further seeks to increase this schedule ("Phase 1") after three months to add a day at the end of weekend 1 in week 3 and at the start of weekend 2 in week 4 ("Phase 2"). This plan is said to maximize Danilo's time in Father's care while accommodating Father's employment schedule. In Phase 2, there is no pattern within the four-week repeating schedule. In Phase 1, Danilo is with Father 203.5 hours out of 672 (28 days x 24 hours), including time spent asleep. In Phase 2, that figure is 240 hours out of 672, including time spent sleeping. In Phase 1, Father proposes that Danilo would not attend daycare but would be in his care on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Fridays in Week 1 and on Wednesdays in Week 2 (i.e. four days out of twenty). Danilo would miss an additional day of daycare in Phase 2, namely the Friday before weekend 2 in Week 4.
[11] Mother responds to seek a two-weekend-on, two-weekend-off schedule. Danilo would be in Father's care from Friday pick up at daycare through to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. on the weekends when he is not working (i.e. Weeks 3 and 4). Mother suggests a review of this schedule by June 1, 2026.
[12] The parties agree that exchanges should take place at daycare wherever possible and alternatively at the matrimonial home (where Mother and Danilo reside).
[13] The following evidence is central to the analysis of Danilo's best interests:
a. The parties started living together in 2018 and were married on October 12, 2019.
b. Danilo was born on September 12, 2022. He has always lived in Waterloo Region. He continues to live with Mother in the matrimonial home.
c. The parties separated on August 1, 2025. Mother alleges that Father attempted to strangle her on that date. Father was arrested and charged with Assault and Uttering Threats. Father's responding evidence is that he "became upset" and "lost my temper, made some inappropriate comments which I now regret, and invaded [Mother's] personal space." Father does not specifically deny Mother's description of the events of August 1, 2025, although I appreciate that he is under no obligation to provide an alternate explanation as the criminal proceeding is ongoing and he has a constitutional right to silence.
d. The parties communicate via the Our Family Wizard platform, which is a permitted exception to the existing criminal no-contact order.
e. Mother intends to remain in Kitchener where she has the support of her sister and friends.
f. Father has moved temporarily to his parents' residence in Markham but intends to return to Kitchener as soon as possible using his equity in the matrimonial home.
g. Danilo has a sister Natalia, age 10, from Mother's prior relationship with another person. They are closely bonded. Danilo also spends regular and frequent time with his maternal aunt and her teenage son.
h. Danilo has historically seen his paternal grandparents roughly once monthly; language and communication between Danilo and paternal grandparents is a consideration.
i. Father has worked full-time throughout Danilo's life. He works 12-hour shifts in Markham that begin at 7:30 a.m. or 7:30 p.m. It is undisputed that he would at times reside with his parents between shifts due to the commute, sometimes being away from home for five or six consecutive days. Mother's counsel has reviewed Father's proposed parenting plan in detail and has determined that there are multiple occasions where his 2026 employment schedule will conflict with his proposed parenting plan. This submission was undisputed.
j. Danilo has been in Mother's care since birth; Mother is increasing her employment as an Occasional Designated Early Childhood Educator. She works three to five shifts weekly, depending on availability, and personally transports Danilo to and from daycare.
k. Danilo was registered in daycare and in a school-preparation program called "Strong Start" by Mother without Father's participation or consent. Both parents agree that Danilo's development has improved since starting daycare. Danilo is not currently enrolled in any extra-curricular activities. It is expected that Danilo will start Junior Kindergarten in September 2026.
l. It is unclear whether Danilo witnessed the events of August 1st, however Mother alleges that both Danilo and Natalia have been exposed to family violence directed toward her by Father, including name-calling, emotional abuse and physical aggression. Child protection services has become involved as a result of the criminal proceeding.
m. Mother expresses concern about Father's anger management issues but agrees that Father has not been directly aggressive with Danilo. She acknowledges that she does not have concerns about Father caring for Danilo overnight.
n. Father acknowledges his verbally/emotionally abusive behaviour. He attests:
I acknowledge that at times I lost my temper and communicated with [Mother] in a way that was ugly, disrespectful, and highly inappropriate. I am ashamed of some of the names I called her and understand now how hurtful my words must have been. I recognize that I need to make changes in order to be an effective coparent, and I have taken steps to do so.
o. Father has been attending counselling since October; he has completed a one-on-one "Domestic Violence Intervention Program" and an anger management program. He is registered for the Caring Dads Program (recommended by child protection services) to commence mid-January. He states: "I am committed to continuing with therapy and working to improve myself for Danilo's benefit."
p. Both parties clearly love Danilo very much. While they disagree about the primary care arrangements pre-separation, neither appears concerned about the activities or care provided to Danilo by the other at this point.
q. Mother's primary concerns are around Father's "emotional stability and capacity to provide appropriate care" and "his unpredictable mental state." Without excusing any abusive behaviour, I note that the evidence of Father's volatility arises in the context of the parties' relationship, which appears to have abated as a result of their separation.
[14] As noted above, the applicable legislation is the Divorce Act, and specifically sections 16, 16.1 through 16.4 and 16.6. That analysis generally proceeds by assessing the available evidence using the applicable factors, with the understanding that: (1) the intention of a Temporary Order is to create a status quo that cannot be lightly changed before trial; and (2) the situation must be approached with caution as the evidence is presented without the benefit of cross-examination.
The Divisional Court and the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide
[15] Before applying the best interests analysis under the Divorce Act to the evidence provided by these parents regarding their family history and parenting proposals, I must contend with the Divisional Court's recent decision of *Tremblay-Chartier v. Blanchette*, 2025 ONSC 6273, which deals with the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide.
[16] The AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide (the "Guide") is an excellent tool intended to assist separating families in crafting a division of post-separation parenting time which minimizes the impact of the dissolution of the family unit upon children who have no agency in the situation. Its usage augments the toolkit of all who assist families in navigating their post-separation realities. The following is a highly laudable non-exhaustive list of insights from the Guide regarding parenting time considerations:
a. It emphasizes the importance of a good co-parenting relationship, and speaks to the identity shift for parents, who have gone from a family unit to co-parents who are sharing familial responsibilities while otherwise pursuing separate lives.
b. It provides foundational goals to establish children's post-separation success, such as supportive and stable parenting involvement and the maintenance of existing routines, relationships and activities.
c. It speaks directly to the harm experienced by children who witness or are drawn into adult conflict.
d. It alerts parents to the prospect of stress or anxiety at parenting exchanges and suggests practical solutions to minimize these negative impacts on children.
e. It acknowledges the unique challenges for both parents when one has no personal parenting experience or has had little or no contact with the children.
f. It provides solid guidance on respectful and effective communication.
g. It cautions against restrictive gatekeeping by a primary care parent who may behave possessively about the children.
h. It provides broad parameters and ideas for non-shared parenting plans and charts for shared parenting options associated with the developmental ages of the children (i.e. 2-2-3 for toddlers and preschoolers; 5-5-2-2 for school-aged children).
i. It emphasizes the importance of a "united front" in parenting teens post-separation and underscores the need both to consult older children and to "maintain clear rules about safety and respect."
j. It provides practical options for parents in navigating statutory and school holidays and encourages flexibility and "uninterrupted time" with each parent during the summer break.
k. It notes that "children are more likely to remember, and be distressed by, parental arguments around holidays, than to have strong positive memories of festive family dinners."
l. It encourages flexibility for unexpected situations and the inclusion of terms in a parenting plan to set out any procedures around a "right of first refusal" for childcare or "make up time" for missed parenting time.
m. It highlights virtual or telephone parenting time, including the use of social media, as considerations to be negotiated.
n. It underscores the importance of personal items, siblings, extended family and child-related events to a child's healthy post-separation development.
[17] However, with one sentence, in the context of a decision that was in fact focused on the sufficiency of reasons (a tense balancing act in busy family motions courts where children's lives depend on efficient decision-making), the Divisional Court appears to have elevated this useful tool to the level of definitive authority. The Divisional Court wrote, at paragraph 40 [my emphasis]:
40. While the AFCC-O Guidelines are not binding law, Ontario courts have accepted the social science behind the guidelines when making parenting orders in the best interests of young children: Hatab, at para. 61. If a judge departs from the established and widely accepted social science research, reasons are needed to depart from same. None were given in this case.
[18] This directive recalls the comments of the Court of Appeal in its discussion of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines ("SSAG") at paragraph 103 of *Fisher v. Fisher*, 2008 ONCA 11:
103. In my view, when counsel fully address the [SSAG] in argument, and a trial judge decides to award a quantum of support outside the suggested range, appellate review will be assisted by the inclusion of reasons explaining why the [SSAG] do not provide an appropriate result. This is no different than a trial court distinguishing a significant authority relied upon by a party.
[19] As a result of the Court of Appeal's direction in Fisher, not only is it common practice for the SSAG to form part of arguments made by counsel in spousal support matters, but we as Ontario judges of first instance routinely rely upon that tool where one or both parties are self-representing and do not produce their own calculations. Three years ago, Aaron Franks and Michael Zalev noted in the June 27, 2022 edition of This Week in Family Law [internal citations omitted]:
Today, although still not law, appellate courts have expressed the view that the SSAGs should not be lightly departed from because, without them, it is very difficult to establish a principled basis for spousal support. The SSAGs are now the presumptive starting point and any departure requires adequate explanation.
In other words, what started out as "guidelines" is now essentially presumptive. We all watched it happen. Some 15 years after their release, a failure to consult the SSAGs now constitutes a legal error. The SSAGs have now essentially become the equivalent of binding judicial authority that must be distinguished if not used.
[20] After expressing approval of the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide (the "Guide") as an useful tool (as do I), these authors pointed out that the Guide is "at best, equivalent to social science literature" about which courts have been cautious.
[21] It is significant to review the language of *Hatab v. Abuhatab*, 2022 ONSC 1560 referenced by the Divisional Court, which was not included in the Tremblay-Chartier decision. At paragraph 61, Justice Kraft writes [internal citations omitted]:
61. The parenting plan guide produced by the Association of Family and [Conciliation] Courts - Ontario ("AFCC-O") has been found by many courts to be of great assistance in determining parenting schedules that are in a child's best interests, depending on the age of the child and his/her developmental stage. While not binding on the courts, the Guide provides a great deal of helpful information and reflects a professional consensus in Ontario about the [significance] of current child development research for post-separation parenting.
[22] Justice Kraft continues to reference the same comments by Justice Chappel as are highlighted by the Divisional Court. Taken together with the comments of Justices Chappel and McGee, all three use terms like: "great assistance," "helpful information" and "suggestions and guidance." However, none of these motions- or trial-court judges opine that the AFCC-O Parenting Plan Guide should be universally applied, with every family's facts being held up to it as a yardstick of developmentally-appropriate parenting time arrangements. And yet this is now the apparent directive of the Divisional Court, absent the Court of Appeal's prerequisite in Fisher that reference to the tool must be made in argument before a judge must address it. The only interpretation of Tremblay-Chartier is as an obligation: going forward, all assessments of the best interests of children vis-à-vis the division of parenting time between their two households must account for the Guide. If this is correct, then the Guide is no longer seen as helpful guidance, but is now a mandatory consideration.
[23] It is important to again reflect upon the purpose of the Guide, which it self-defines as "to assist parents and their professional advisors in developing child-focused, realistic parenting plans." Notably, the Guide quite properly confirms:
The Guide is intended to help parents and professionals deal with the main issues that commonly arise in making a parenting plan, but the discussion here is not exhaustive. Some issues discussed in the Guide ... will not apply to every case, and there may be others not discussed that parents will want to address in their parenting plan.
It goes on to recommend independent legal advice and the benefits gained from mediators, counsellors or therapists in generating a family-specific parenting plan.
[24] We must keep in mind that a number of options are available for a family-specific evaluation of how potential parenting arrangements would serve the best interests of the children. Statutory assessments, the appointment of a clinician through the Office of the Children's Lawyer, or the involvement of a privately retained professional can all assist in this regard. It is entirely possible to have access to family-specific professional recommendations generated through the application of social science principles.
[25] It is also essential to compare and contrast the Guide with the SSAG. The SSAG is a mathematical model generated for the purpose of providing an estimated numerical range for spousal support, taking into account current taxation and government benefit factors. Essentially, it is a series of calculations. It is programmable, repeatable and adjustable. The same input data will always generate the same result.
[26] Comparing the Guide to the SSAG, it is unclear what the input data would be: Ages of the children? Of the parents? Mathematical division of time pre- and post-separation? What about psycho-educational factors, inter-personal relationships, and historic caregiving roles played by the parents and other trusted adults? How are those quantifiable to render the Guide akin to the SSAG in universal applicability?
[27] The SSAG is a very different tool than the Guide, which operates in the space of clinical parenting co-ordination to provide generalized parameters based on ever-evolving developmental research. The Guide cautions the reader that:
The statements in these materials that summarize the social science research reflect the considered views of the Task Force Members. As with similar materials, the Guide does not provide an exhaustive discussion of issues addressed and does not include citations. Interested readers should consult the large, published literature on child development and post-separation parenting in peer-reviewed social science journals.
[28] With every respect to the distinguished 13 Task Force Members, might it be imprudent to assess all potential decisions regarding parenting time apportionment through the lens of a single body of Ontario-based professionals? Further, because of our education, training and experience, most judges of first instance are presumably already considering many of the points raised by the Guide. These points would, of course, be new to recently separated parents, thus making the Guide such an excellent tool, but are regularly discussed in legal literature and at educational conferences. Finally, judicial independence requires each of us to contend with the application of social science literature to our decisions in a manner with which we are individually comfortable.
[29] On this last point, I agree with and adopt the comments of Justice Timms in *Sordi v. Sordi*, 2010 ONSC 2344 (affirmed on other grounds at 2011 ONCA 665) [internal citations omitted]:
[141] I think one must distinguish between the use of academic articles for the purpose of adapting the logic of an argument contained therein, as opposed relying upon the 'findings' of any particular study. I am of course aware of what the Supreme Court of Canada did in Young v. Young and what other courts have done in the other cases cited by counsel for the applicant. Candidly, I have always been troubled by the idea that the court should just accept, at face value, the contents of academic articles submitted during argument, or found by the court on its own. Unlike any person offered as an expert witness during a trial, there is no opportunity to determine the degree of expertise [if any] of the author of the article, or to test the validity of the study, as it relates to the issues at hand. In this post-The Inquiry into Paediatric Pathology in Ontario world, it is my view that trial judges should be very careful about incorporating social science articles into judgments, unless they have been produced in an acceptable fashion during the trial.
[30] The distinction drawn by Justice Timms between academic articles providing a logical argument which can be applied to the case at bar and those which summarize research findings is exactly the distinction that must be drawn between the SSAG and the Guide. The SSAG provides a logical framework that is transferable and can be applied to the specific facts of a particular case; the Guide provides suggestions based on research and best practices.
[31] One wonders whether the Divisional Court's apparent directive is, in fact, stare decisis and binding on all judges of first instance in Ontario for two reasons:
a. Despite expressing deference to the court of first instance as required by *Housen v. Nikolaisen*, 2002 SCC 33, the Divisional Court set out their own parenting plan that purported to cover more than seven months of time until the motion could be re-heard by a different judge. The Divisional Court orders: "Pending return of the motion, the respondent father's parenting time shall be set out in the appellant mother's notice of motion as follows..." Assuming that a short motion on parenting time can be heard within seven months, which surely must be the case, the practical effect of setting out an extended "without prejudice" parenting plan is to define that family's reality on an interim basis. What possible incentive is there for either party to expend resources in returning the motion to court, when the parenting plan has already been defined? Why would Ms. Tremblay-Chartier instruct her lawyer to do anything other than delay the rehearing of the motion by at least seven months? How can a motions judge review this plan before the seven months are up, without plainly declaring the Divisional Court's best interests assessment to be in error? What if the second motions judge's decision was reviewed? Would that go back to another panel of the Divisional Court? The result in Tremblay-Chartier is not an interim, without prejudice order, it is the replacement of a first-instance judge's decision on appeal.
b. Having determined that the legal error was one of insufficient reasons, the Divisional Court listed three other areas of alleged deficiency, meaning that their discussion of the Guide was unnecessary to the analysis, as they had already found the motions judge's reasons to be deficient for: (i) failing to adequately conduct the best interests analysis under the legislation; (ii) failing to address the child's lived experience as the status quo; and (iii) failing to adequately contend with the allegations of family violence. Consequently, the comments are more akin to obitur dicta and may therefore not be binding on courts of first instance.
[32] For the reasons listed above, and particularly because of the clear difference between the SSAG and the Guide, clarification is needed from the Court of Appeal as to whether Tremblay-Chartier in fact changes the import of the Guide and sets it as a mandatory benchmark against which all proposed parenting time structures are to be measured. Again, it must be noted that, unlike the Court of Appeal in Fisher, the Divisional Court did not require that the Guide be argued by counsel before a failure to consider it would trigger a reversible error of law.
[33] With very sincere respect for my distinguished colleagues sitting on the Divisional Court, I disagree that the Guide should be a mandatory consideration, and I decline to apply it to my analysis where counsel have not referred both to its specific content and to the underlying social science upon which a particular recommendation is based. In this matter, both counsel made only vague references to the Guide. Neither undertook any detailed analysis of its applicability; neither took any pains to compare and contrast the parties' proposed schedules with the portions applicable to a preschooler. No underlying social science principles or scholarly articles were cited. No expert opinion specific to this family was tendered. I thus decline to apply the general contents of the Guide in my analysis of Danilo's best interests.
The Divorce Act and the Interim Parenting Plan for Danilo
[34] I turn now to the analysis of Danilo's best interests pursuant to the factors distilled above from the Divorce Act. The following are my conclusions:
a. At three, Danilo needs stability, security and a regular schedule. His lived experience is such that he has been in Mother's primary care throughout his young life. He needs to have regular and frequent contact with Father, including overnight parenting time, to maintain and support their close connection.
b. Danilo has strong bonds with both of his parents, with his sister Natalia, with his maternal aunt and maternal cousin. He has a growing connection with his paternal grandparents. Time with all of these family members is in his best interests.
c. Despite the representations of Father's counsel, I do not find that Mother has intentionally minimized Father's post-separation involvement with Danilo. In the context of very serious family violence allegations, some of which are admitted by Father, Mother has behaved in a cautious but not unreasonable manner.
d. Looking at Father's work schedule and Mother's availability to care for Danilo, there is no question that to date Mother has been the primary care parent.
e. Both parents have sensible and child-focused plans to care for Danilo which include regular time with extended family and support for Danilo's attendance at daycare and the school readiness program.
f. Communication is difficult but is being appropriately managed between the parents using the Our Family Wizard platform in a fashion that addresses the criminal no-contact order.
g. Family violence is a serious concern. An allegation of choking is not to be taken lightly, and the additional incidents reported by Mother are consistent with a pattern of emotional abuse and coercive control. Danilo (and Natalia) have been at risk of emotional harm for having witnessed some of these incidents.
h. Father is taking clear and cogent steps to address the underlying issues that gave rise to his abusive behaviours. While he has just stepped a short way forward on his path of reparation, he should be given the benefit of the doubt at this early motion stage.
i. It is important for Danilo to have as much time as possible in Father's care as meaningful parenting time with Father is in his best interests. Having said this, Father's parenting time will necessarily be limited by his employment schedule and the need for Danilo to have consistency and predictability.
j. I am mindful of the need to generate a schedule that is compatible with Danilo's school attendance. This matter will not be tried on our January sittings and, even if a trial is heard in June, a decision may not be ready in time for the start of school in September. Due to the distance between the parties' current residences, a school-based schedule is challenging. However, once both parties are residing in Kitchener, the schedule will become automatically reviewable.
[35] Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the following schedule is in Danilo's best interests:
a. Week 1: Wednesday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Thursday delivery to school or daycare (or 10:00 a.m.) and Sunday videocall at 1:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule;
b. Week 2: Wednesday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Thursday delivery to school or daycare (or 10:00 a.m.) and Sunday videocall at 1:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule;
c. Week 3: Wednesday videocall at 6:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule and Friday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Sunday delivery to Mother's residence at 5:00 p.m.; and
d. Week 4: Wednesday videocall at 6:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule and Friday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Sunday delivery to Mother's residence at 5:00 p.m.
[36] Parameters for costs submissions are set out below.
[37] Temporary Order to issue:
The child, Danilo Gjorsovski born September 12, 2022, shall reside primarily with the Respondent Mother, Jelena Krajisnik.
The Respondent Mother, Jelena Krajisnik, shall consult with the Applicant Father, Goran Gjorsovski, in writing regarding the enrolment of the child, Danilo Gjorsovski born September 12, 2022, in Junior Kindergarten for September 2026. In the event of a disagreement, or if there is no response within ten (10) days of such consultation, the Respondent Mother shall enroll the child in the public or Catholic school located in her catchment area in the City of Kitchener unless the parties agree otherwise in writing. In enrolling the child, the Respondent Mother shall list the Applicant Father as the secondary emergency contact and shall ensure that he has access to the child's school records and any other communication mechanisms that the school provides (e.g. newsletter, parent email list, etc.).
The child, Danilo Gjorsovski born September 12, 2022, shall reside with the Applicant Father, Goran Gjorsovski, on the following basis commencing with Week 1 of his four-week rotational employment schedule:
a. Week 1: Wednesday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Thursday delivery to school or daycare (or 10:00 a.m.) and Sunday videocall at 1:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule;
b. Week 2: Wednesday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Thursday delivery to school or daycare (or 10:00 a.m.) and Sunday videocall at 1:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule;
c. Week 3: Wednesday videocall at 6:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule and Friday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Sunday delivery to Mother's residence at 5:00 p.m.; and
d. Week 4: Wednesday videocall at 6:00 p.m. or such exact time as can be arranged between the parties in writing having regard to Father's work schedule and Friday pick up from school or daycare (or 3:00 p.m.) to Sunday delivery to Mother's residence at 5:00 p.m.
The child, Danilo Gjorsovski born September 12, 2022, shall have such further and other parenting time with the Applicant Father, Goran Gjorsovski, as the parties may agree upon in advance in writing.
The parenting time schedule shall be reviewable when the Applicant Father, Goran Gjorsovski, secures housing in Kitchener, which will be considered a material change in circumstances.
Per paragraphs 4 and 6 of the Temporary Without Prejudice Minutes of Settlement dated October 31, 2025 and filed with Justice Mountford on that date.
The parties are to provide costs submissions in accordance with Rule 24(19). Submissions are to be directed to: Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca. It is imperative that the covering emails indicate the in the subject line: (1) the court file number; (2) that these are costs submissions; and (3) that they are being sent to the attention of Justice Breithaupt Smith. The parties shall further ensure their costs submissions are filed with the Court.
If no submissions are received by Monday, January 26, 2026, the issue of costs will be deemed settled.
J. Breithaupt Smith, J.
Released: December 24, 2025