Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FS-22-00031386-0000 Date: 2025-09-17 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: Lorena Ann Mason, Applicant – and – Matthew Ryan Thompson, Respondent

Counsel:

• Sheila R. Gibb and Rhea Kamin, for the Applicant
• Not present, pleadings struck

Heard: May 20 and June 13, 2025

Newton-Smith, J.

Overview

[1] This matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

[2] The Applicant, Lorena Mason, and the Respondent, Matthew Thompson, were married on September 22, 2018. There is one child of the marriage, E.P., who was born in April of 2019. The parties separated on May 8, 2022.

[3] The Applicant commenced these proceedings in August of 2022.

[4] Since separation, E.P. has resided primarily with the Applicant.

[5] During their relationship, the Respondent was aggressive, threatening and sometimes violent. This behaviour continued post-separation. During the course of these proceedings, the Respondent has been the subject of a restraining order and numerous judicial cautions and warnings.

[6] The parties entered into a Consent Order on September 16, 2022. The terms of the order gave the Respondent supervised parenting time with E.P. on Thursdays from 4–8 pm and Saturdays from 12–8 pm. The Respondent's behaviour worsened and in March of 2024, the Applicant brought a motion seeking various orders including that the Respondent's parenting time be professionally supervised and a restraining order. On March 7, 2024, Justice Nakonechny ordered that the Respondent's parenting time be professionally supervised. Since that order, the Respondent has not made arrangements for professionally supervised parenting and has chosen not to exercise any parenting time with E.P.

The Striking of the Respondent's Pleadings

[7] On March 19, 2025, the Respondent's pleadings were struck by Justice Mathen. In her endorsement, Justice Mathen summarised the history of the proceedings including many of the orders to which the Respondent was subject:

[11] Matthew has been subject to many court orders including:

a. Justice Black on February 28, 2023, ordered that Matthew was not entitled to participate in a motion for exclusive possession, granting Lorena exclusive possession, ordering police enforcement, and awarding costs of $10,537.25;

b. Justice Brownstone on May 30, 2023, awarded costs of $4,500 after Lorena brought a motion dispensing with Matthew's consent to register their child in junior kindergarten, to which Matthew consented at the last minute;

c. Justice Kristjanson on June 6, 2023, ordered that Matthew could not bring any further motions without paying outstanding court orders and seeking leave of the Court; and awarded costs against him of $7,500;

d. Justice Nakonechny on April 4, 2024, found that Matthew acted in bad faith and awarded costs of $9,000;

e. Justice Nakonechny on September 25, 2024, ordered Matthew to pay $30,000 security for costs into court within 30 days for costs of her order of April 4, 2024, the Exit Pre Trial and the trial.

[8] Justice Mathen found the Respondent to be in breach of the following orders:

a. Justice Nakonechny's costs orders of respectively, $9,000 on April 4, 2024, and $7,500 on September 25, 2024;

b. Justice Nakonechny's security for costs order in September 2024;

c. Justice Black's February 2023 order preventing Matthew from attending at the matrimonial home;

d. Justice Black's and Justice Brownstone's orders restraining Matthew from communicating with the child's daycare and school except in limited circumstances.

[9] In finding that the Applicant had "more than met" the test for striking the Respondent's pleadings, Justice Mathen found that the Respondent had used the court process to threaten the Applicant, displayed disregard for the court and created enormous harm to the Applicant and their daughter.

The Orders Requested by the Applicant

[10] The Applicant now seeks an Order for sole decision-making and primary care of E.P., limited and continued professional supervised parenting time for the Respondent, a final restraining order, retroactive and prospective child support, occupation rent and damages for defamation. The Applicant also seeks costs.

The Evidence

[11] The Applicant and Respondent began dating in 2016 and married in 2018. The Respondent had two children from a previous relationship who spent time with them as a family.

[12] Around the time of their marriage, the Applicant purchased a home. The home, which is solely in her name, is where they lived during the marriage. Prior to marrying, the parties entered into a marriage contract in which they agreed to waive spousal support. It was also agreed that if they separated, the Applicant would receive a date of marriage deduction for the home.

[13] The difficulties in their marriage began shortly after the wedding.

[14] The Applicant was pregnant with E.P. when they married. After E.P. was born in 2019, the Applicant found herself responsible for the care of E.P., as well as all of the household chores. The Respondent's other two children spent time with them and were in the Applicant's care. The Respondent took on almost no parenting responsibilities and was verbally abusive of the Applicant while she cared for the children.

[15] When E.P. cried, the Respondent would yell at her. He called E.P. a bitch and threatened to kill her. He yelled at the Applicant in front of the children calling her a "stupid bitch", "stupid cunt", "super cunt" and "dumb fuck". The Respondent was also verbally abusive to his two other children who were often with them. He called his 11-year-old son "weak" and "useless".

[16] The Applicant worked full time as an accountant and paid for all of the household and E.P.'s expenses. The Respondent's employment was sporadic. At the beginning of their relationship, he was employed with CIBC Mellon. He left that job for a job at Citco, but at the end of his probationary period, in November of 2019, Citco terminated him.

[17] In March of 2021, the Respondent got a job working in retail at PetSmart. He kept his income for his own personal use. He also used a joint credit card, which the Applicant was responsible for paying, to buy video games, concert tickets and other non-essential items.

[18] The Respondent became increasingly volatile often exploding in violent outbursts. He punched a hole in their kitchen wall and threw things, sometimes at the Applicant.

[19] When the Applicant told the Respondent that she wanted a divorce, he became verbally abusive, threatening her and damaging her car. The Applicant who had no family in Toronto to turn to, fled to a hotel.

[20] After the Applicant left, the Respondent reported to police that she had kidnapped E.P. The police investigated and no charges were laid.

[21] After two weeks, the Applicant returned home because she was unable to continue paying for a hotel. The threatening and abusive behaviour continued. The Respondent installed a video camera in the home and watched what the Applicant was doing.

[22] On August 13, 2022, the Respondent began screaming at the Applicant and demanding money from her. The argument escalated and the Applicant locked herself in a bedroom with E.P. and called her parents. The Respondent kicked the door hard enough to split the door frame. The Applicant's parents called the police. The Respondent agreed to leave but returned the next morning.

[23] On August 19, 2022, the Applicant, fearing for the safety of herself and E.P., moved out with E.P. and commenced her Application in this court.

[24] The Respondent remained in the home and refused to leave. His abusive behavior continued. He refused to sign travel consents and demanded money in exchange. He filed complaints against the Applicant with her professional governing body, the CPA, and sent threatening messages. He was disruptive at E.P.'s daycare and refused to consent to E.P.'s kindergarten registration.

[25] In February of 2023, the Applicant brought a motion for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and a restraining order, both of which were granted by Justice Black on February 28, 2023.

[26] The Applicant was finally able to return to her home on April 1, 2023. When the Respondent vacated the home on March 31, 2023, he left it uninhabitable. Pictures taken of the home after the Respondent left show dog feces, urine and garbage throughout the house including in the children's room. The Respondent had unplugged the freezer leaving food to rot. He also left bags of dog feces in the freezer. Knobs were removed from the dressers so that they could not be opened, other furniture was broken, lego built by E.P. was smashed, and the Applicant's personal effects were found burnt in the firepit.

[27] The Applicant had to spend $20,000 having the house professionally cleaned and repaired. Security cameras installed by the Applicant show the Respondent returning to the home on 3 occasions after Justice Black had granted her exclusive possession.

[28] In evidence at trial is an affidavit from Diana Knight, a real estate agent. Ms. Knight's evidence was that market rent for the home during the time that the Respondent occupied it was either $3,300 for the entire house, or $2,800 for the upstairs and $1,300 for the basement unit, with utilities excluded.

[29] The Applicant was forced to bring motions to dispense with the Respondent's consent so that she could register E.P. for school and to prevent him from communicating with the school because of his threatening and inappropriate communications.

[30] The Respondent in turn served a motion seeking 13 different orders against the Applicant. Justice Kristjanson found that the Respondent was acting in bad faith, dismissed his motion and ordered that he not bring any further motions without leave of the court.

[31] The Respondent's behaviour continued. He threatened to have the Applicant's passport suspended and send letters to the RCMP, Air Canada, the CBSA and other entities saying that the Applicant had kidnapped E.P. He reported the Applicant, who is a professional accountant, and her father who is also an accountant, to their professional regulating body.

[32] The Respondent made a public Facebook post that included E.P.'s photograph and accused the Applicant of kidnapping her.

[33] The Respondent also created a fake profile of the Applicant on LinkedIn which stated, "Paid in cash via cheques and or e-transfer so that I do not have to report the earnings to CRA", and "Denied all involvement with PASS while under oath on multiple occasions because I know the Superior Court of Justice won't do anything to women".

[34] This profile was viewed by a user named "Lorena M." on January 15, 2024.

[35] In February of 2024, the Applicant brought a motion before Justice Nakonechny asking that the Respondent's parenting time be supervised and asking for a restraining order. Justice Nakonechny granted the motion and ordered that the Respondent's parenting time be professionally supervised. In doing so, she made the following findings:

31. I am satisfied that the Respondent's parenting time must continue to be supervised. The Respondent's behaviour toward the Applicant and the child has been aggressive, demeaning and threatening. He jeopardized the Applicant's employment and professional standing which put the child's financial well being at risk. He has attempted to intimidate the Applicant and her professional advisors with threats of professional reporting and criminal charges. He behaved aggressively towards persons at the child's school and her day care. He denigrated the Applicant and the maternal grandmother in front of the child and involved the child in the dispute between the parents which has caused her distress. Despite the clear terms of the Order of Justice Black, the Respondent caused damage and destrnction to the contents and the home where the child resided.

32. Having considered those circumstances and the evidence before me, I conclude that it is E's best interests that the Respondent's parenting time with her be supervised. The Respondent has been instructed by other judges of this Court to modify his behaviour. He has not done so. In fact, it appears his aggression toward the Applicant has escalated. In my view this puts the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well being at risk.

[36] Justice Nakonechny also granted the restraining order, finding:

35. The Respondent's conduct demonstrates a lack of self-control and poor judgment. There is evidence of aggression and violence toward the Applicant and the child which is persistent harassing and threatening conduct. Court orders were required to stop the father from having inappropriate communication with the child's day care and school.

36. In McLellan v. Birbilis, 2021 ONSC 7084 at para. 27, Justice Tellier held that the definition of family violence was a non exhaustive list which allowed the Court to consider conduct including cyber-bulling. I find that the Respondent's social media posts and his threatening communication, along with his demonstrated violent and bullying behaviour are the direct cause of the Applicant's fear: Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154.

37. The Respondent's behaviour causes the Applicant to fear for her safety and E's safety. I find this fear is legitimate and the Applicant has established both an objective and subjective basis for this fear. A no contact order under s. 47.1 of the FLA would not be sufficient to protect the Applicant and the child. I am satisfied there is sufficient evidence before me to meet the threshold for granting a restraining order: McCall v. Res, 2013 ONCJ 254.

38. The Applicant asks that this order be enforceable by the police. Police enforcement orders should be orders of last resort to be made sparingly and in exceptional circumstances. Police enforcement can frighten children and polarize a difficult situation: see Klinkhammer v. Dolan, 2009 ONCJ 630 at para. 61 and Patterson v. Powell, 2014 ONSC 1419.

39. I am mindful that the child has already been subjected to the acrimony between her parents and her father's aggression. However, there are serious concerns raised by the Respondent's behaviour at this stage which warrant a temporary without prejudice police enforcement clause.

[37] With the exception of an observational meeting with the OCL in July of 2024, the Respondent has not seen E.P. since February of 2024.

[38] The Applicant has maintained a relationship with the Respondent's two other children who are close with E.P. The children continue to spend time with the Applicant and E.P. The Respondent is only permitted supervised access to his older daughter and his son no longer sees him.

The Recommendations of the OCL

[39] An OCL report, dated November 29, 2024, was prepared by Nicole Perryman. On May 8, 2024, Ms. Perryman prepared an addendum to her report and on May 20, 2025, she testified at trial.

[40] It is the recommendation of the OCL that the Applicant have sole decision-making for, and primary residence of, E.P. It was recommended that any parenting time for the Respondent be in a formal supervised setting, and that the Respondent engage in, and successfully complete, various therapies including parent-child therapy and Families in Transition and individual counselling as a prerequisite to any parenting time.

[41] Ms. Perryman testified that she had reviewed the draft Order sought by the Applicant at trial and supported all of the orders sought.

[42] To Ms. Perryman's knowledge, as of the time of trial, the Respondent had not engaged in any of the recommended therapies.

Law and Analysis

Issue One: Decision-Making and Parenting

[43] The paramount consideration when it comes to determining parenting issues is the best interests of the child: Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) The principles to be applied by the court deciding parenting issues are set out in section 16 of the Divorce Act:

• Section 16(1) states that the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child.
• Section 16(2) directs the court to give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
• Section 16(3) sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when determining the child's best interests.
• Section 16(4) sets out the principle of maximum parenting time. A child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with their best interests.

[44] Answering the question of what is in the best interests of the child requires a highly contextual analysis that is dependent on the unique features of every child and every case.

[45] The law with respect to the best interests test was thoroughly canvassed and summarised by Kraft J. in Predotka v. Dudek, 2023 ONSC 7025, at paras. 20–21:

The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the analysis of the child's best interests in the context of parenting disputes must be undertaken from the lens of the child rather than the parents' perspectives; parental preferences and rights do not play a role in the analysis except to the extent that they are necessary to ensure the best interests of the child (Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), at paras. 74 and 202; Gordon, at pp. 50, 54, 68; F. v. N., 2022 SCC 51 (S.C.C.), at para. 61).

As the Supreme Court of Canada stated in King v. Low, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 87 (S.C.C.), at para. 101, the ultimate aim of the courts in resolving parenting disputes is "to choose the course which will best provide for the healthy growth, development and education of the child so that he will be equipped to face the problems of life as a mature adult." However, the court has also recognized that "a child's best interests are furthered by a well-functioning and happy parent" and that this symbiotic connection must therefore be considered as part of the best interests assessment (Barendregt, at para. 169).

[46] Where necessary for the child's physical, psychological and emotional safety, the Divorce Act permits a court to limit, suspend or terminate parenting time and, where necessary, make supervision orders.

[47] Having considered the factors set out in s. 16(3) of the Divorce Act, it is clear that it is in E.P.'s best interests that her mother has primary residence and sole decision-making.

[48] E.P. is a young child who has always been cared for primarily by her mother. Her father has chosen not to exercise any parenting time with her since February of 2024.

[49] There is no history of any willingness on the part of the father to communicate and cooperate in a respectful and appropriate manner that fosters E.P.'s development and relationship with both parents.

[50] During and after the relationship, the Respondent engaged in abusive and threatening behaviour, terrifying the Applicant and E.P.

[51] Since February of 2024, the father has been allowed only professionally supervised parenting time with E.P. He has chosen not to exercise that time.

[52] The OCL has recommended that the Applicant have sole decision-making and primary residence. The OCL has further recommended that the father's parenting time occur only in a formal supervised setting, and not until he has meaningfully engaged with therapeutic interventions. Those recommendations are well grounded in the evidence.

[53] This is a case where sole decision-making and primary residence should rest with the Applicant. It is clear that this is in E.P.'s best interests.

Issue Two: Final Restraining Order

[54] Section 35 of the Children's Law Reform Act permits the court to make a final restraining order where there the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety or the safety of any child in her custody.

[55] Section 28 of the CLRA also permits the court to make broad and purposive parenting orders, including to prevent a party from making negative social media postings.

[56] The test for imposing a restraining order is both objective and subjective. The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the Applicant to fear for the physical or psychological safety of herself or E.P. The standard for the imposition of a restraining order under the CLRA or the Family Law Act is not only lower than the criminal standard, but also lower than the civil standard of balance of probabilities. What is required is that there be a legitimate basis for the fear: J.P.C. v. R.R.L.C., [2023] O.J. No. 1279 (S.C.J.), at paras. 3–4.

[57] In this case, the Applicant, through the evidence presented and her testimony at trial, has clearly established a legitimate basis for her fear. The Respondent has repeatedly terrorized, threatened and intimidated the Applicant. The condition in which he left her home is overwhelming evidence of his campaign to intimidate and harass her.

[58] He has already been subject to numerous court orders aimed at restraining his behaviour. The history of court orders and endorsements in these proceedings detail the relentlessness of Respondent's bullying behaviour.

[59] The test for imposing a final restraining order has been more than met by the Applicant.

Issue Three: Child Support and Section 7 Expenses

[60] Parents have an obligation to support their children in a way that is commensurate with their income. The obligation of parents to support their children, and the children's right to be supported by their parents, exist independent of any legislative enactment or court order. D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37, at paras. 38–40, 48 and 54.

[61] Section 34(1)(f) of the Family Law Act gives the court the power to require that support be paid in respect of any date before the date of the order.

[62] Section 3 of the Child Support Guidelines sets out a presumptive rule which requires that child support be paid in accordance with the amounts set out in the Guidelines. Those amounts, referred to as "table child support", are based upon income.

[63] Rule 13 of the Family Law Rules and s. 21(2) of the Child Support Guidelines create a legal obligation to provide income information.

[64] Section 16 of the Guidelines provides that income for support purposes is determined by the parties Line 15000 income. Section 19 of the Guidelines grants the court broad discretion to impute income to a spouse, and specifically where a spouse has failed to provide income information where under a legal obligation to do so.

[65] Prior to his pleadings being struck, the Respondent breached court orders requiring him to make financial disclosure. The most recent information in evidence with respect to his income comes from the Applicant's affidavit wherein she states that, "Matthew told my lawyer that he found work in September 2024. He refused to provide a copy of his employment agreement or any of his pay stubs. He told my lawyer that his base salary was $75,000."

[66] There is also evidence that during the course of their relationship, the Respondent was employed with CIBC and Citco where his compensation was structured with bonuses and other incentivized compensation.

[67] The Applicant asks that the Respondent's income be imputed to $85,000 per year for support purposes. She has provided an evidentiary basis for this imputation. The Respondent, on the other hand, has failed to comply with his disclosure obligations.

[68] The Respondent has never paid child support and is in arrears. The Applicant asks that his income for 2022 and 2023 be imputed at $65,000 and for 2024, it be imputed at $75,000. The requested imputed income is based on the very limited financial disclosure made by Respondent and is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

[69] The Applicant's 2024 income was $144,000.

[70] In making a child support order, the court may order that a parent pay their proportionate share of any special or extraordinary expenses incurred for the child. Section 7 of the Child Support Guidelines sets out the criteria for such special expenses, known as "section 7 expenses".

[71] The Applicant has set out a list of section 7 expenses for E.P. as follows:

• a. health and dental expenses not covered by insurance;
• b. childcare, summer camp and March Break camp expenses;
• c. ball and ice hockey expenses, including registration fees and equipment;
• d. soccer expenses, including registration fees and ancillary fees;
• e. gymnastics expenses;
• f. swimming expenses; and
• g. RESP contributions.

[72] I am satisfied that those expenses are necessary in relation to E.P.'s best interest, and reasonable in relation to the means of the parties and E.P. and the family's spending pattern prior to separation.

[73] The total of those expenses in 2024 was $1,162.00 per month, not including any deductions. According to the Guidelines, the Respondent's proportionate share of s. 7 expenses is 31.8%.

[74] The Applicant asks that the Respondent's contribution to E.P.'s section 7 expenses be fixed at $250 a month and enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office. Given his history of failing to abide by court orders, this is fair and reasonable.

[75] Based on the imputed incomes set out above, the Respondent owes $23,437 in retroactive child support to August of 2022 and $11,303 in retroactive section 7 expenses. Given the Respondent's history of disobeying court orders and failing to pay support, a lump sum payment is appropriate to address his arrears. I am setting the lump sum at $30,000.

Issue Four: Damages for Defamation

[76] The Applicant is asking for damages for defamation.

[77] The applicable test to obtain damages for defamation was articulated by the Supreme Court in Grant v. Torstar Corporation, 2009 SCC 61, at paras. 28–29. A plaintiff must prove a) the impugned words were defamatory, such that they would tend to lower the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person, b) the words referred to the plaintiff and c) the words were published (meaning they were communicated to at least one other person). Once these three elements are established by the plaintiff, the Court can presume falsity and damage, and the onus shifts to the defendant to advance a defense.

[78] The Facebook post in which the Respondent claimed that the Applicant had kidnapped E.P., and the fake LinkedIn profile, both clearly refer to the Applicant. They were both published and are clearly defamatory.

[79] These posts caused significant stress and embarrassment for the Applicant who is a professional accountant. She has had to explain the situation to her employer, her governing body and other organisations with which she is involved. While she did not lose her employment, the posts jeopardised her professional status, her career prospects and her ability to earn income to support herself and E.P. The Applicant lives in fear of the Respondent and requires ongoing counselling to support her.

[80] The Applicant characterises the Respondent's behaviour as "reprehensible and relentless". I agree.

[81] Where the "reprehensible or outrageous nature of the defendant's conduct causes a loss of dignity, humiliation, additional psychological injury, or harm to the plaintiff's feelings" aggravating damages may be awarded: Plester v. Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Co., at para. 62.

[82] The Applicant seeks damages for defamation in the amount of $30,000. While I agree that the Respondent's behaviour is reprehensible and relentless, the amount of damages sought by the Applicant is excessive. While the Respondent was successful in his attempt to humiliate and embarrass her, the Applicant did not lose any employment or otherwise lose income as a result of the posts. Nor has she pointed to any expenses that she was forced to incur as a result of the posts. In the circumstances of this case, damages in the amount of $10,000 are appropriate.

Issue Five: Occupation Rent and Damages to the House

[83] Applicant seeks occupation rent in the amount of $31,500 for the period from September 2022 until March 2023 when Respondent resided exclusively in the matrimonial home.

[84] The Ontario Court of Appeal has affirmed that a court has discretion to order occupation rent as a remedy between spouses when it is reasonable and equitable to do so. An Order for occupation rent need not be exceptional: Qu v. Zhang, 2025 ONCA 391, at para. 33.

[85] The relevant factors to be considered in a claim for occupation rent, as set out in Qu v. Zhang, are as follows:

• a. timing of the claim for occupation rent;
• b. the duration of the occupancy;
• c. the inability of the non-resident spouse to realize on their equity in the property;
• d. any reasonable credits to be set off against occupation rent, and
• e. any other competing claims in the litigation.

[86] The Applicant fled her home because of Respondent's violent, aggressive and threatening behaviour. She states that she was unable to return for 7 months because he refused to leave. While Respondent resided there, the Applicant was forced to rent accommodations for herself and E.P. at the cost of $4,900 a month. Meanwhile, she continued to pay the carrying costs for the home of approximately $3,500 a month.

[87] When the Applicant returned to the home, having obtained a court order evicting Respondent, she discovered that he had left the house uninhabitable. The Applicant had to spend over $19,000 repairing the damage and returning the home to a livable state.

[88] The Applicant has presented evidence from a realtor with respect to the rent she could have expected to receive had the house been rented on the open market. If the home had rented for $3,300 per month, as the realtor estimated, the total rent for 7 months would have been $23,000.

[89] While the Applicant states in her affidavit that she "hoped that Matthew would leave....but he refused", she did not bring an application for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home until February of 2023. Other than stating that she asked him to leave, and he refused, there is little evidence with respect to the efforts made by the Applicant to evict the Respondent, and the positions of the parties with respect to the home, prior to February of 2023. Given that this was the matrimonial home, I am not prepared to grant the Applicant's request for occupation rent for the entirety of the 7 months at $31,500.

[90] In considering the factors set out in Qu, the Applicant is entitled to some occupation rent. I will order occupation rent in the amount of $19,800 which represents 6 months of rent at $3,300 per month. She is also entitled to compensation for the damage he inflicted on her home.

Issue Six: Restrictions on Future Proceedings

[91] Applicant seeks an Order under Rule 1(8)(e) of the Family Law Rules precluding the Respondent from commencing further proceedings against her without paying outstanding costs orders and payment orders owed to Applicant, and obtaining leave of the Court.

[92] Rule 1(8) grants a Court broad authority to make "any" Order it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter where a party is in breach of a Court Order. Such Orders include "an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise". This includes, an Order precluding a party from commencing a further proceeding while in breach of costs orders, and without seeking leave in advance.

[93] The Respondent has already been the subject of court orders limiting his ability to litigate. His conduct has been so egregious that his pleadings were struck.

[94] In all of the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to limit the Respondent's ability to commence further proceedings until such time as he has paid his outstanding costs orders and sought leave of the court.

Costs

[95] The Applicant is entitled to costs. The Applicant may, within 7 days, file written submissions on costs of no longer than 2 typed pages, double spaced, and include her bill of costs and any offers to settle.

The Honourable Justice Newton-Smith

Released: September 17, 2025