Bari Crackower

The defendants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, pleaded guilty to cocaine trafficking offences.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the substantial quantities of cocaine involved and their high-level involvement in the drug trade, and mitigating factors such as their guilty pleas, personal circumstances, restrictive bail conditions, and the anonymous surrender of firearms.

For Johnson, the court also considered his testimony at another trial.

The Crown proposed sentences of five years for Brown and seven years for Johnson.

The court imposed sentences of four years and seven months for Brown and six years and five months for Johnson, granting modest additional credit for restrictive bail conditions and the surrender of firearms, and limited credit for Johnson's testimony, which was found to be of little assistance to the prosecution.

Ancillary orders for DNA samples and firearm prohibitions were also imposed.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing a six-hour delay in accessing counsel violated his s. 10(b) rights.

The court found the police violated the accused's s. 10(b) rights due to inadequate resource allocation, which constituted a serious institutional disregard for Charter rights.

The evidence was found to be temporally and contextually connected to the breach.

Applying the *Grant* factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, thus excluding the heroin and other items seized from the vehicle.

The accused, Sabrullah Khan, was charged with trafficking heroin.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the transfer of a package containing 991.36 grams of heroin to an individual (Mr. Rilling) whom Khan did not know, in suspicious circumstances.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Khan knew the package contained heroin or was wilfully blind to its contents.

The court considered the totality of circumstantial evidence, including the absence of direct evidence and the evidence that Mr. Hatemi (the drug network leader) often employed "blind couriers." The court found that while an inference of knowledge was reasonable, it was not the *only* reasonable inference, as it was also plausible that Khan was an unwitting courier.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove knowledge or wilful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt, and Khan was found not guilty.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of trafficking cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marijuana.

He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on three grounds: that the trial judge reversed the onus by drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his employer as a witness; that the trial judge improperly relied on cross-examination on an affidavit sworn as part of a Rowbotham application; and that the trial judge made adverse factual findings insufficiently grounded in the evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in not imposing a conditional sentence and failed to consider the over-representation of African-Canadians in the prison system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The applicant, who was facing drug trafficking charges, brought an application under s. 490(10) of the Criminal Code for the return of $11,700 and US$20 seized from his parents' home.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because it intended to seek forfeiture of the funds if a conviction was obtained.

The court held that a bare assertion of future intent to seek forfeiture, without any evidence connecting the funds to the alleged offence, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to order the return of property.

As the applicant provided uncontradicted evidence that the funds were from a lawful business, the application was granted and the funds were ordered returned.

The appellant appealed his conviction on counts one and two, as well as the sentence imposed.

The trial judge committed two errors: first, using CPIC records to contradict the appellant's testimony about his name usage, which had no logical relevance; and second, using the appellant's rejected and fabricated evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found the second error to be fatal and quashed the convictions on counts one and two, ordering a new trial.

The conviction on count three (breach of probation) was upheld with a concurrent sentence of 120 days, and the firearm prohibition was set aside while the DNA order was maintained.

The applicant, charged with trafficking methamphetamine, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was over 38 months.

The court found that the Crown's decision to prosecute the applicant jointly with other co-accused in a larger investigation unnecessarily complicated and delayed his straightforward case.

Applying the frameworks from both Morin and Jordan, the court concluded the delay was unreasonable and directed a stay of proceedings.

The accused brought an application for judicial interim release (bail) following his arrest in connection with Project Harrington, a multi-police force investigation into large-scale cocaine importation into eastern Canada.

The accused faced multiple charges including conspiracy to import and trafficking in cocaine, with an alleged role as a facilitator who made introductions and coordinated between participants.

The court found substantial concerns under the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

The proposed release plan, consisting of house arrest with the accused's mother as sole surety and electronic bracelet monitoring, was found to be deficient and inadequate to address the court's concerns.

The application for bail was denied.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence in a cocaine trafficking investigation.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain contained misleading information and failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged drug trafficking activities and the residence searched.

The court found that surveillance, intercepted communications, and investigative observations provided a reasonable basis to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be located at the residence.

The court further held that even if a Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would have been admitted under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed their conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing alibi and eyewitness evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably characterized the alibi evidence as vague and properly weighed its late disclosure.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's reliance on the recognition evidence from two independent witnesses.

Following jury convictions for conspiracy to import and importation of large quantities of opium, the court determined appropriate sentences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Criminal Code.

The offences involved three sophisticated shipments of opium concealed in commercial goods imported from Iran, totalling more than 120 kilograms and valued in the millions of dollars.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the scale of the operation, the organized nature of the scheme, and the dangerous nature of Schedule I drugs.

Mitigating factors included the offenders’ lack of prior criminal records, family support, and time spent in harsh pre‑sentence custody conditions.

Global sentences of 14 years’ imprisonment for one offender and 12 years’ imprisonment for the other were imposed, with enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of 72 methadone pills contrary to s. 4 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after bringing the pills into Canada without a valid Canadian prescription.

The offender was a 41‑year‑old first offender who claimed the medication had been obtained in Iran to address an opium addiction and argued that an absolute discharge was necessary to avoid losing his employment.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, emphasizing general deterrence and the deliberate importation of controlled drugs into Canada.

The court found that an absolute discharge would undermine general deterrence but that a suspended sentence was excessive given the offender’s lack of record and addiction‑related motivation.

A conditional discharge with probationary conditions was imposed.

The Crown applied to qualify a translator as an expert to provide opinion evidence interpreting intercepted Farsi audio recordings into English in a criminal prosecution.

The defence challenged the proposed expert’s qualifications and alleged potential bias arising from his role assisting police investigators.

Applying the admissibility test for expert opinion evidence from R. v. Mohan, the court found the translator possessed sufficient proficiency in both Farsi and English and had relevant training and experience conducting translations for police wiretap investigations.

The court rejected the allegation of bias and concluded the translation evidence was necessary for the jury to understand the intercepted communications.

The translator was therefore qualified to provide expert opinion evidence interpreting the Farsi recordings.

In a criminal voir dire, the Crown sought a ruling that a videotaped statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for drug trafficking offences involving the importation of large quantities of opium was voluntary and therefore admissible.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary because he had not been cautioned that his words could be used against him.

Applying the principles from R. v. Oickle, the court considered whether the statement resulted from threats, promises, oppression, or whether the accused lacked an operating mind.

The court found the accused had consulted counsel shortly before the interview, understood he was speaking to a police officer during a criminal investigation, and was aware of the potential consequences of speaking.

The statement was largely exculpatory, made without inducement or coercion, and the accused demonstrated an operating mind.

The court concluded the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and admitted the statement at trial.

The accused brought a Charter motion seeking exclusion of intercepted communications on the basis that police installed a probe in a rental vehicle without a warrant, allegedly violating the right against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 of the Charter.

The defence argued there were no reasonable grounds to believe the accused would be driving the vehicle when the probe was installed.

The court reviewed surveillance evidence, rental records, and intercepted communications indicating the accused had been driving the prior rental vehicle and was listed as a driver on the lease.

The court found police had reasonable grounds to believe the accused would use the replacement rental vehicle.

The Charter application was dismissed and the intercepted evidence was not excluded.

The accused brought an application seeking leave to cross-examine a police affiant on an affidavit supporting a wiretap authorization under sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code.

They argued the affidavit lacked full and frank disclosure, relied improperly on confidential informants without adequate credibility assessments, contained unsupported assertions, and failed to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The court reviewed the Garofoli framework and held that cross‑examination is only permitted where there is a reasonable likelihood that questioning would undermine a statutory precondition to the authorization.

The court found the affidavit sufficiently corroborated by independent police investigation and shipments of seized opium, and held informer privilege limited further disclosure about confidential sources.

Concluding that the applicants failed to establish any reasonable likelihood that cross‑examination would discredit the basis for the authorization, the court dismissed the application.

In a criminal sentencing decision following trial convictions under ss. 5(2) and 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court addressed large-scale production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA, methamphetamine, and ketamine from a clandestine laboratory.

The evidence established a high-capacity operation with significant public-safety and health risks, including deceptive marketing of tablets containing highly addictive methamphetamine.

The court treated denunciation and general deterrence as paramount, relying on comparator jurisprudence and the seriousness of domestic synthetic-drug production.

Applying aggravating and mitigating factors individually, the court imposed lengthy penitentiary terms on all three offenders, with concurrent sentences on each count and ancillary DNA and firearms-prohibition orders.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence of cocaine found in a knapsack the accused threw away while fleeing police, finding violations of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the accused was not detained when the police chase began, and by the time he was tackled, police had reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

Furthermore, the accused abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the knapsack when he threw it away.

A new trial was ordered.