Linda Tang

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his 10-month sentence.

He argued that the trial judge was biased, the verdict was unreasonable, and his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to call him or other witnesses to testify and for abandoning a section 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that the verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, and that trial counsel's decisions fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

In a criminal sentencing decision following trial convictions under ss. 5(2) and 7(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court addressed large-scale production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in MDMA, methamphetamine, and ketamine from a clandestine laboratory.

The evidence established a high-capacity operation with significant public-safety and health risks, including deceptive marketing of tablets containing highly addictive methamphetamine.

The court treated denunciation and general deterrence as paramount, relying on comparator jurisprudence and the seriousness of domestic synthetic-drug production.

Applying aggravating and mitigating factors individually, the court imposed lengthy penitentiary terms on all three offenders, with concurrent sentences on each count and ancillary DNA and firearms-prohibition orders.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed for operating a large-scale residential marijuana grow operation involving more than 1,400 plants, a hydro bypass, and theft of electricity.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by refusing to apply the Criminal Code and binding jurisprudence requiring consideration of general and specific deterrence, and by relying on personal views about drug policy.

The court further held that a 12-month conditional sentence followed by probation was unfit and that this was not one of the rare production cases warranting a conditional sentence.

However, because the respondent had already completely served the sentence, the appeal was dismissed in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed a decision striking a separate claim for discrimination from their pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that discrimination claims do not give rise to a civil cause of action and must be addressed by the Human Rights Commission, though allegations of discrimination may still be pleaded as material facts supporting other causes of action.