Mara Greene

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of the appellant's propensity for violence while intoxicated.

The trial judge did not provide a specific limiting instruction to the jury regarding this evidence.

Additionally, the trial judge permitted both counsel to comment on the evidence to the jury after the jury charge was completed.

The Court of Appeal held that the propensity evidence was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, and the failure to provide a limiting instruction was a reversible error.

The post-charge comments by counsel were also found to be improper.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants, both sixteen at the time of the alleged offence, were charged with second-degree murder following a group assault.

They appealed a youth court judge's decision dismissing their applications to have the charges proceed in youth court rather than adult court.

The Court of Appeal upheld the youth court judge's findings that the appellants were a danger to the public and had not demonstrated they could be rehabilitated within the youth court disposition period.

The youth court judge was entitled to reject the appellants' psychiatric evidence because the experts were instructed not to discuss the circumstances of the offence with the appellants.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences and trafficking in cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in excluding defence evidence that demonstrated a key Crown witness's ongoing animus towards the appellant.

This evidence was admissible under an established exception to the collateral fact rule.

Because the witness's credibility was central to the findings on both the firearm and cocaine charges, the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and new trials were ordered on all counts.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board directing his detention at a mental health facility with limited community access and a driving prohibition.

The disposition was made despite expert evidence indicating the appellant's risk of violence from alcohol abuse could be managed through supervised administration of antabuse while living in the community.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the expert evidence and did not explain why the imposed conditions satisfied the criteria under section 672.54(c) of the Criminal Code.

A new hearing was ordered.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for first degree murder after forcibly confining his former partner and subsequently stabbing her tenant to death.

The preliminary inquiry judge found that s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, which classifies murder as first degree if committed while committing an enumerated offence (here, forcible confinement), does not require the victim of the murder and the enumerated offence to be the same person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while such an alleged error by a preliminary inquiry judge is jurisdictional and reviewable on certiorari, the judge did not err in his interpretation.

Section 231(5) only requires a close temporal and causal connection between the murder and the enumerated offence, not that the victims be identical.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had a long history of psychiatric disorders and was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions governing the disposition of NCR accused.

He argued that section 672.54 of the Criminal Code violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada, relying on its concurrent decision in Winko, held that the provisions do not violate the Charter as they are carefully crafted to protect the liberty of the NCR accused while ensuring public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.