Allan Rouben

The Applicants brought an application to vary freeze directions issued by the Ontario Securities Commission to allow for the payment of $250,000 in legal fees.

The Commission dismissed the application, finding that the frozen funds were raised from investors and that the primary purpose of freeze directions is to preserve assets for potential recovery by investors.

The Commission held that it would be prejudicial to the public interest to allow investor funds to be used to fund the Applicants' legal defence, noting that there is no general right to legal counsel and that the Applicants failed to provide sufficient evidence of a lack of financial means.

The plaintiff was injured in a skiing accident and underwent a vocational assessment.

The defendant sought an order requiring the plaintiff to undergo a further assessment by a vocational assessor of its choosing.

The motion judge granted the order, and the Divisional Court upheld it.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act does not occupy the field, and the Superior Court retains inherent jurisdiction to order an assessment by someone who is not a 'health practitioner' to ensure fairness and justice between the parties.

The applicant securities regulator sought continuation of freeze directions issued against corporate respondents and an individual respondent during an ongoing investigation into alleged unregistered trading and illegal distributions.

The court held that the 2014 enactment of s. 126(5.1) of the Securities Act displaced the prior Mareva-like Sextant test, although that framework remained a useful guide.

Applying s. 126(5.1), the court found a serious issue to be tried, a sufficient connection between the frozen assets and the alleged misconduct, and a demonstrated need to preserve assets for the due administration of securities law and protection of investors.

The application to continue the freeze directions was granted, the respondents' motion to revoke or vary them was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and no costs were ordered.

The appellant was receiving long-term disability benefits from the respondent insurer.

The parties had previously settled a dispute regarding the calculation of benefits, executing Minutes of Settlement and a Release that affirmed the policy continued to apply.

The appellant later received retroactive Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits, and the insurer sought to deduct these from her long-term disability benefits as a direct offset under the policy.

The appellant applied for a declaration that the Minutes of Settlement precluded this deduction.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the settlement did not modify the policy's CPP offset provision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the contractual interpretation was correct and the policy's offset provisions remained in effect.

The defendants in a personal injury action appealed a costs award of $578,742.28 following a jury trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $144,013.07 in damages.

The defendants had made an offer to settle for $145,000 plus prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal found that while the offer was timely, the defendants failed to prove it exceeded the judgment due to uncertainty regarding the prejudgment interest rate.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the offer under Rule 49.13 and by ignoring the vast disparity between the amount claimed ($1.9 million) and the amount recovered.

The costs award was wholly disproportionate and was reduced to $100,000.

Applicants brought an application challenging the validity of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 2002 Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Roadways under the Municipal Act, 2001, asserting that the regulation was ultra vires.

The challenge arose in the context of a personal injury action alleging negligent winter road maintenance.

After the Court of Appeal’s decision in Giuliani limited the scope of the regulation and the municipality withdrew reliance on it as a defence, the respondents moved to strike the application as moot.

The court held that no live controversy remained between the parties and declined to exercise discretion to hear the matter, emphasizing judicial economy and the limited relevance of the impugned provisions following amendments and appellate guidance.

The respondent sought weekly benefits from the appellant insurer pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule 1990.

The insurer terminated benefits, and the respondent sued for past and ongoing benefits, including interest on overdue amounts under s. 24(4).

The insurer brought a motion to determine whether s. 24(4) provides for simple or compound interest.

The motion judge found it provides for compound interest, and the insurer appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 24(4) unambiguously provides for compound interest when read in its entire context and harmoniously with the legislative scheme.

The defendants moved to set aside ex parte Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions obtained by the plaintiff in a fraud action involving alleged misappropriation of corporate funds and improper commissions.

The court reviewed the strict legal requirements for such extraordinary remedies and emphasized the obligation of full, fair, and frank disclosure on without‑notice motions.

It found the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts, including ongoing communications with certain defendants, repayment negotiations, employment relationships, and other contextual facts that could have influenced the original decision.

The court also found insufficient evidence that certain defendants possessed incriminating documents or posed a real risk of asset dissipation.

As a result, the Anton Piller orders and Mareva injunctions were set aside against all defendants.

A related motion by one defendant to strike portions of the statement of claim was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking to exclude an individual from attending the continued examination for discovery of a corporate representative.

The plaintiffs argued that a corporation could not have another representative present when the adverse party had selected a specific individual for discovery, and that the individual’s presence risked influencing the witness’s evidence.

The court held that a corporation, as a separate legal entity, is entitled to have a representative present at discoveries to assist with litigation decision‑making even if that person is not the discovery witness.

The evidence relied on by the plaintiffs did not demonstrate any risk of tampering with the discovery evidence.

The motion to exclude the individual from the continued examination for discovery was therefore dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking a stay of a wrongful dismissal action in favour of arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the employment contract.

The plaintiff argued the contract containing the arbitration clause was void for lack of consideration because it was signed years after the employment relationship began.

The court held that under the Arbitration Act, 1991, arbitration agreements are severable from the main contract and that arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to determine questions relating to the validity of the agreement.

The court found the dispute clearly fell within the scope of the arbitration clause and exercised its discretion to stay the action so that the arbitration panel could determine the issues, including jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $19,263.30 for breach of a contract to supply school uniforms.

The trial judge found the appellant breached an agreement to purchase the respondent's remaining inventory and that the respondent had reasonably mitigated its damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or assessment of mitigation.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award, noting it was a reasonable exercise of discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing a motion to transfer an application to the Divisional Court.

The underlying application sought a declaration that the Minimum Maintenance Standards regulation was ultra vires and invalid, arising from a motor vehicle accident tort action against a municipality.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that under section 8 of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, the motion judge had the discretion to retain jurisdiction over the application rather than transferring it, and that this discretion was exercised reasonably to facilitate judicial economy.

The plaintiffs appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action against two paramedics and an ambulance service.

The motion judge had found that while the standard of care was a genuine issue for trial, causation was not, relying on the defendants' expert opinion that the patient's survival rate was only 2.4 percent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in relying on the defendants' expert opinion because it did not address the plaintiffs' theory of the case, which posited that the patient would have survived had she been transported to the hospital immediately while she still had a heartbeat.

The Court concluded that both standard of care and causation were genuine issues requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable, inconsistent with his acquittal on a proceeds of crime charge, and that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on police note collaboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the jury to convict based on the totality of the evidence and that the trial judge's instructions adequately addressed the risks of police collaboration.

The defendant brought a motion under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a defamation action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The action arose from a letter alleging that the plaintiffs would be in a conflict of interest while representing a professional association in regulatory consultations.

The court held that allegations of conflict of interest could potentially be defamatory and that determining whether the statement was defamatory required resolution of contested facts.

Given significant factual disputes and the availability of defences such as qualified privilege and fair comment, the court found the claim raised real issues requiring trial.

The motion to dismiss was therefore denied.

The respondent was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident after losing control of her vehicle on a snow and ice-covered municipal road.

The trial judge found the appellant municipalities liable for failing to maintain the road, apportioned liability 50/50 due to the respondent's contributory negligence, and rejected the municipalities' defence under the Minimum Maintenance Standards (MMS).

On appeal, the municipalities argued the MMS provided a complete defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the specific MMS provisions for snow accumulation and icy roadways did not apply to the municipalities' failure to monitor weather and deploy resources before the road became icy.

The respondent's cross-appeal on the 50/50 apportionment of liability was also dismissed.

The appellant's action was dismissed by the motion judge for failing to comply with discovery undertakings to produce an allergist's medical records.

The motion judge found the respondents were prejudiced because the records were allegedly destroyed after the 2006 discovery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the dismissal, finding no evidence to support the assertion that the records were destroyed during that specific time period, and thus no basis for the finding of actual or potential prejudice.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that extinguished their title to two strips of land between adjoining properties due to the respondents' adverse possession, and awarded damages for trespass.

The trial judge found that a fence and sidewalk were constructed based on a mutual mistake regarding the property line.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on adverse possession or trespass damages.

The respondents agreed to grant a permanent easement for the appellants' roof overhang.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was denied.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action following the death of their infant son from a bowel obstruction shortly after being discharged from the emergency room.

The trial judge had made adverse credibility findings against the appellants, accepted the respondent physician's evidence, and relied on the respondent's expert opinion that the standard of care was met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or his assessment of the expert evidence regarding the standard of care.

The plaintiffs' medical malpractice action was dismissed at trial, but the trial judge assessed damages totalling $35,000 across multiple plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Divisional Court, which transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal due to the total assessed amount exceeding its $25,000 monetary jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs moved to quash the appeal and transfer it back to the Divisional Court, arguing that each plaintiff's individual claim was under $25,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that all dismissed claims must be added together to determine the total assessed amount for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction under section 19 of the Courts of Justice Act.