Ronald Sleightholm

This was a motion for leave to appeal two costs decisions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the motion judge's decision not to award costs against the applicant personally, citing her financial inability to pay, and not to award costs against her former counsel for allegedly initiating a frivolous application or being in a conflict of interest.

The court denied leave, finding that while there might be doubt about the correctness of denying costs based solely on inability to pay, the matter was not of sufficient importance given the applicant's circumstances.

The court also deferred to the motion judge's findings that the application was not frivolous or vexatious and that counsel was not in a conflict of interest warranting personal costs.

The court addressed disputes regarding the interpretation and implementation of Minutes of Settlement in estate litigation between family members and an estate trustee during litigation.

Following earlier endorsements clarifying settlement terms, the judge directed the parties to submit competing draft orders reflecting the intended disposition.

The principal issues concerned the timing of a payment obligation tied to a $500,000 amount from an estate interest and whether provisions addressing the estate trustee’s role should appear in the final order.

Applying a “final offer selection” approach, the court concluded that the draft orders proposed by the estate trustee most accurately reflected the settlement and prior endorsements.

The court therefore signed and entered those orders.

Following the withdrawal of a spousal support application, the estate trustees of the deceased respondent sought a costs order jointly and severally against the applicant and her former lawyer.

The trustees alleged the proceeding was frivolous and vexatious and argued the lawyer had acted in conflict of interest and improperly initiated litigation despite knowing the claim had no chance of success.

The court considered Rules 12(3) and 24(9) of the Family Law Rules and the principles governing personal costs orders against counsel.

The court held the support claim was not clearly devoid of merit because statutory provisions permit setting aside domestic contracts in cases of unconscionability or lack of disclosure.

As the lawyer had acted on instructions and did not run up costs or abuse the court’s process, no personal costs order was warranted.

The plaintiff alleged medical negligence against an orthopaedic surgeon for failing to properly manage and refer a distal biceps tendon rupture in a timely manner, allegedly causing the plaintiff to lose the opportunity for surgical repair.

The court found that the physician diagnosed the condition, advised the patient of treatment options, and offered a referral to a specialist capable of performing the surgery, which the plaintiff declined pending MRI results for other issues.

The court concluded the physician met the applicable standard of care for a referring physician and that the plaintiff's evidence was not credible or reliable.

The court further held that the plaintiff failed to prove causation because there was no expert evidence establishing that earlier surgery would likely have resulted in a better outcome.

The action was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order discharging a lien registered by Legal Aid Ontario against a matrimonial home that had later vested in her pursuant to a family law judgment.

She argued the lien was void ab initio because it did not state a specific monetary amount, contrary to s. 48 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1996 and provisions of the Land Titles Act.

The respondent maintained that the lien properly described the obligation as securing the full and actual cost of legal aid services provided pursuant to a contribution agreement with the applicant’s former spouse.

The court held that the contribution agreement contemplated payment of the full actual costs of services, with $5,000 being merely an estimate rather than a cap, and that the lien’s description therefore complied with the statutory requirements.

As the lien predated the vesting order and was validly registered, it could not be removed absent satisfaction of the debt.

The applicant mother sought an order permitting her to relocate with the parties' child from Halton Region to London, Ontario, to live with her fiancé.

The respondent father opposed the move, arguing it would negatively impact his relationship with the child.

The court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that the move was in the child's best interests, as it would provide financial stability, greater educational support, and more quality time with the mother.

The mother was permitted to relocate with the child, subject to a specified access schedule for the father.

The appellant worked on his family's dairy farm for 24 years, alleging an oral agreement with his parents that he would receive the farm property and assets when they stopped farming.

After his father died without transferring the farm or changing his will, the appellant brought an action for a declaration of beneficial entitlement.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no oral agreement due to the lack of signed documents and rejecting the application of the doctrine of part performance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by requiring written documents for an oral agreement and by incorrectly applying the doctrine of part performance.

A new trial was ordered on all issues.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims for oppression, breach of good faith, and misrepresentation regarding the cost base of certain shares.

The appellants alleged they were not informed that shares were acquired on a tax-deferred basis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the cost base was specifically listed in the circular, which the individual appellant had approved as a director and CFO.

The appeal was dismissed as entirely without merit, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim that the respondent's actions caused a corporation to lose its business and deprived him of management fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the corporation was placed in liquidation by consent court order, which required its replacement as general partner.

The loss of business was occasioned by the consent liquidation, not by any actions of the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their oppression claim against the respondents.

The claim was based on the respondent's refusal to appoint the individual appellant as a co-director of a corporation when he sought to exercise an option to re-acquire shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant had no statutory, contractual, or tort-based entitlement to a directorship.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as an abuse of process, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court had previously determined that the action constituted a collateral attack on earlier decisions of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal and that allegations of conflict of interest and improper conduct against counsel were unsupported by evidence.

The court found that the plaintiff made serious and unfounded allegations impugning the professional integrity of a lawyer and effectively advanced a conspiracy claim without evidentiary foundation.

Given the abusive nature of the proceeding and the seriousness of the unsupported allegations, substantial indemnity costs were warranted.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in significant amounts inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging misconduct related to the loss of a company’s role as general partner of hotel-related limited partnerships.

The plaintiff alleged inducing breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of corporate opportunities after a replacement general partner associated with one defendant was elected following the winding up of the original corporate general partner.

The court held that the claims constituted a collateral attack on earlier court orders confirming the liquidation and the process for electing a new general partner, rendering the action res judicata and an abuse of process.

The court also found no evidence of wrongdoing by the defendants and no proof of damages arising from their conduct.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing an oppression claim brought by shareholders of a corporation operating hospitality assets through related partnerships.

The responding parties alleged that refusal to appoint one shareholder as a director and unilateral management decisions constituted oppression and unfair prejudice.

The court applied the summary judgment framework articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch and considered the reasonable expectations analysis for oppression claims under corporate legislation.

It held that the evidence disclosed no reasonable expectation that the shareholder would be appointed as a director and no conduct amounting to oppression.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a corporate transaction involving the acquisition of a golf course company.

The plaintiffs alleged oppression under the Alberta Business Corporations Act, breach of directors’ duty of good faith, misrepresentation concerning the adjusted cost base of shares, and reimbursement of legal fees.

The court held that the claim relating to legal fees was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process given earlier appellate findings.

On the merits, the court found no oppression, breach of duty, or misrepresentation, noting that the relevant share cost base was disclosed in the transaction circular and the defendants’ dual roles were known and approved by shareholders.

Applying the summary judgment framework from Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch, the court concluded the action was entirely without merit.

The applicant moved for leave to appeal an interim spousal support order and for a stay of the award.

The applicant argued the motion judge erred by refusing an adjournment, considering late-filed materials, and awarding retrospective support.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general importance.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding their conduct oppressive under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act and ordering the cancellation of certain shares.

The dispute centered on the interpretation of a performance escrow agreement and whether 'cash flow' referred to the parent company or its subsidiary.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in finding the agreement unambiguous, as an unappealed interlocutory order had already determined it was ambiguous.

Interpreting the agreement in its factual context, the Court concluded 'cash flow' referred to the parent company, meaning the shares were properly released from escrow.

The appeal was allowed and the oppression application dismissed.

The respondent brought an application for an oppression remedy, alleging that preference shares were improperly released from escrow based on the cash flow of the parent company rather than its subsidiary.

An application judge found the escrow agreement ambiguous and ordered a trial of the issue.

The trial judge subsequently found the agreement clear and unambiguous, concluding the release was improper and constituted oppression.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was bound by the application judge's finding of ambiguity due to issue estoppel.

Interpreting the ambiguous agreement in its factual context, the Court concluded the cash flow reference applied to the parent company.

The release of shares was therefore proper, and the appeal was allowed.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash a decision by the City of Brampton's City Council refusing to renew its body rub parlour license.

The applicant argued that City Council breached procedural fairness by not holding a second hearing after the Licensing Committee recommended granting the license.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Municipal Act, 2001, City Council had only delegated the power to make recommendations to the Licensing Committee, and thus was not required to hold a second hearing.

The court also held that City Council's decision to refuse the license was reasonable given the premises' non-compliance with zoning by-laws and the City's cap on adult entertainment establishments.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding the right of limited partners to vote on the election of a new general partner, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis, awarding $17,000 to Chalmers, $8,000 to the liquidator, and $5,000 to the respondent, plus disbursements and GST, all payable by the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order allowing two limited partners to vote on the election of a new general partner for a limited partnership.

The appellant argued the limited partners were affiliated with and not dealing at arms length with the manager, and thus disqualified from voting under the partnership agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that there was no direct or indirect control establishing affiliation, and that the parties were dealing at arms length.