Arleen Vanessa Huggins

The Appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to enforce a settlement in a failed real estate transaction.

The Appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to exercise discretion not to enforce the settlement, claiming new expert evidence changed the case and their new counsel was unaware of the outstanding offer.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding he properly exercised his discretion by considering all relevant factors and concluding it was not a "rare case" warranting non-enforcement.

The appeal was dismissed.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought permission to bring a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant objected, arguing that allegations of bad faith, mental distress, and discrimination created genuine issues for trial requiring credibility assessments.

The court permitted the plaintiff to proceed with the motion, noting that judges have powers to determine credibility and address contested facts under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and set a timetable for the motion.

The plaintiffs sought to settle the terms of a formal Judgment following a successful motion to enforce a settlement agreement against the defendants.

The parties disagreed on several terms, including payment dates, the declaration of a fraudulent conveyance, the lifting of a Certificate of Pending Litigation, and the exchange of mutual releases.

The court adjusted the payment dates but awarded pre-judgment interest to prevent prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The court also held that the co-defendant was bound by the declaration regarding the fraudulent conveyance, as the settlement offer was made on behalf of both defendants.

The court declined to order mutual releases, noting they were unnecessary now that the settlement terms had become a judgment.

Following a judgment enforcing an offer to settle for $550,000, the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of $36,316.46.

The plaintiffs had previously offered to settle the motion for $500,000.

The court applied Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the plaintiffs were entitled to substantial indemnity costs as they obtained a judgment more favourable than their offer.

The court fixed costs at $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce acceptance of a Rule 49 offer to settle made by the defendants in litigation arising from a failed residential real estate transaction.

The defendants argued the offer was not a Rule 49 offer, lacked an essential term, and that it would be unjust to enforce it due to new expert evidence and a change in counsel.

The court found that the offer complied with Rule 49, was capable of acceptance, and the presumption that Rule 49 applied was not rebutted.

The court also determined that it was not one of those rare cases where it would be unjust to enforce the settlement, emphasizing that changes in case strength or counsel's unawareness do not typically justify non-enforcement.

The motion was granted, and judgment was issued in favour of the plaintiffs.

The appellants, Smiles First Corporation and Union Health and Dental Centre Inc., appealed the dismissal of their application under section 21 of the Commercial Tenancies Act and section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The core dispute involved a head lease assignment dated October 31, 2016, from the intermediate tenant to Smiles First, and the effect of the intermediate tenant's subsequent abandonment of the head lease on Smiles First's sublease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the head lease assignment was ineffective due to lack of landlord consent, Smiles First remained entitled to possession of the premises as a subtenant under the sublease, which survived the head lease surrender.

The respondent was successful on an application involving complex commercial tenancy issues and sought partial indemnity costs of $48,846.92.

The applicants argued for a reduced amount of $27,000, relying on the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay.

The court reduced the respondent's hourly rates by approximately 15 percent but found the time expended to be reasonable.

Applying the principles from Boucher and Rule 57.01(1), the court fixed costs payable by the applicants to the respondent at $42,047.70, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants, who operated a wellness centre as subtenants, sought a declaration that an assignment of the head lease from the tenant to them was valid and binding on the landlord.

Alternatively, they sought relief from forfeiture under the Commercial Tenancies Act and the Courts of Justice Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the assignment was invalid because the contractual precondition of obtaining the landlord's consent was never met.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicants were not entitled to relief from forfeiture because the tenant had voluntarily abandoned the head lease, meaning the landlord was not proceeding to enforce a right of re-entry or forfeiture.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against the defendant for non-compliance with a Master's order regarding discovery refusals and production of documents, which had been upheld on appeal.

While the court declined to hear the contempt aspect due to short notice, it addressed the merits of the outstanding refusal (Refusal #3) and extended the time for the continued examination of the defendant's representative.

The court found the defendant's claim of no documentation for a previously admitted analysis to be incredible and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff due to the defendant's persistent delays and litigation tactics.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing the action as abandoned.

The dismissal occurred after a notice of intent to defend was served but not filed, and the plaintiff had not received notice from the court that the action would be dismissed.

Applying the principles governing restoration of dismissed actions, the court found the delay negligible and the motion brought promptly, with no demonstrated prejudice to the defendants.

The court reinstated the action but imposed terms validating service on one defendant and providing time for that defendant to bring a motion to strike or to defend.

Issues raised about duplicative proceedings and cause of action estoppel were left to be determined on a future motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to appeal a costs order of $39,000 awarded to the defendant following a successful summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff argued the costs award was unreasonable and approximated substantial indemnity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle and emphasizing that leave to appeal costs orders should be granted sparingly and deference must be accorded to the motion judge's discretion.

The appellant commercial tenant brought an application for declaratory relief under the Commercial Tenancies Act regarding responsibility for lease improvements.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant had repeatedly acknowledged responsibility for the improvements and executed promissory notes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's findings were amply supported by the record.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent was wrongfully dismissed and not terminated for cause.

The appellant argued there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge and that the judge erred in assessing credibility and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no error in the credibility assessment, and no reason to interfere with the damages award.

On an appeal in an estate and family property dispute, the court considered whether a separation agreement revoked an earlier beneficiary designation under a deferred profit sharing plan.

The agreement contained mutual releases and specifically provided that the former spouse was entitled to one-half of the benefits under the plan.

Applying Part III of the Succession Law Reform Act, the court held that the separation agreement was an instrument that effectively revoked the earlier designation to the extent necessary to limit the former spouse's entitlement to one-half.

The balance of the plan proceeds was payable to the estate for distribution under the deceased's will.