DISCIPLINE COMMITTEE OF THE ONTARIO COLLEGE OF TEACHERS

Citation: Ontario College of Teachers v Lemieux 2023 ONOCT 67

Date: 2023-10-11

DECISION AND REASONS ON MOTION

IN THE MATTER OF the Ontario College of Teachers Act, 1996 and the Regulation (Ontario Regulation 437/97) thereunder;

AND IN THE MATTER OF a discipline proceeding against Luc Bernard Lemieux, a member of the Ontario College of Teachers.

BETWEEN:

ONTARIO COLLEGE OF TEACHERS

– and –

LUC BERNARD LEMIEUX (REGISTRATION #428030)

PANEL: Myrna Tulandi, Chair Anne Laflamme, OCT Kelly Marvin, OCT

HEARD: July 27, 2023

Christine Lonsdale and Emilie Bruneau, for the Ontario College of Teachers Jean-Michel Corbeil, for Luc Bernard Lemieux Renée Kopp, Independent Legal Counsel

PUBLICATION BAN: Pursuant to subsection 32.1(3) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act, 1996, no person shall publish the identity of, or any information that could disclose the identity of any person who is under 18 years old and is a witness in a hearing or is the subject of evidence in a hearing.

On July 27, 2023, the Ontario College of Teachers (the “College”) brought a motion before a panel of the Discipline Committee (the “Panel”) to strike Luc Bernard Lemieux’s application for reinstatement. In accordance with Rule 8.01 of the Rules of Procedure of the Disciplinary Committee and Fitness to Practise Committee (the “Rules”), this proceeding was held electronically.

Luc Bernard Lemieux (the “Member”) did not attend the hearing but had legal representation.

Following the hearing on the College’s motion to strike the application for reinstatement, the Panel rendered its decision, which, along with its reasons for the decision, is set out herein. For the reasons that follow, the Panel granted the College’s motion and issued an order striking the Member’s application for reinstatement and forbidding him from submitting another application before December 8, 2025, which is five years following the date on which his certificate was deemed revoked.

A. PUBLICATION BAN

The Panel ordered a publication ban pursuant to subsection 32.1(3) of the Ontario College of Teachers Act, 1996 (the “Act”), which makes such an order mandatory. Accordingly, no person shall publish the identity of, or any information that could disclose the identity of, any person who is under 18 years old and is a witness in a hearing or is the subject of evidence in a hearing.

B. MOTION

In the Notice of Motion dated July 11, 2023, the College filed a motion to obtain the following orders:

1. an order to strike the application for reinstatement submitted by the Member; and

2. an order declaring that the Member’s Certificate of Qualification and Registration cannot be reinstated by a panel of the Discipline Committee tasked with considering an application for reinstatement before December 8, 2025, which is five years after the Member’s certificate was deemed revoked pursuant to section 30.3 of the Act.

In response to the College’s motion, the Member asked for the Panel to reject the motion and for new hearing dates be set to hear his request for reinstatement.

C. Background Information on the File

On April 16, 2015, the Panel found that the Member had engaged in professional misconduct, contrary to Ontario Regulation 437/97, subsections 1(5), 1(7), 1(7.2), 1(7.3), 1(15), 1(18) and 1(19). The Panel further concluded that the Member had abused students sexually as defined in section 1 of the Act, clause (c) (behaviour or remarks of a sexual nature). The Panel made an order requiring that the Member receive a reprimand and take a course on boundary violation and student supervision, and suspending his certificate for a period of 18 months. The Member’s certificate was not revoked at that time.

In December 2020, the new section 30.3 of the Act came into force, which provided that:

30.3 A member’s certificate of qualification and registration is deemed to be revoked as of the day this section comes into force if, before that day, an order was made by the Discipline Committee under subsection 30 (4) or (5) in which the member was found guilty of an act of professional misconduct consisting of or including sexual abuse of a student or a prohibited act involving child pornography and,

a) the Discipline Committee did not order a revocation of the member’s certificate of qualification and registration; or

b) the Discipline Committee ordered a revocation but the member’s certificate of qualification and registration was later reinstated under subsection 33 (6) or 34 (1).

In December 2020, subsection 33(4.1) was also amended to read as follows:

33 (4.1) […] if a person has had a certificate […] deemed revoked pursuant to section 30.3 for committing an act of professional misconduct that consisted of or included any of the following, an application under subsection (1) to have a new certificate issued shall not be made earlier than five years from the date of the order:

1. Sexual abuse of a student, as described in clause (c) of the definition of “sexual abuse” in subsection 1 (1).

2. Sexual misconduct.

3. A prescribed sexual act that does not involve a student.

On December 16, 2020, the Member was informed by the College Registrar that his certificate was deemed revoked as of December 8, 2020, in accordance with section 30.3 of the Act. On March 30, 2021, the Member filed an application for the reinstatement of his certificate under subsection 33(4.1) of the Act. On June 18, 2021, the Registrar determined that the Member could not apply for reinstatement until December 8, 2025, which is five years after the date his certificate was deemed revoked.

In July 2021, the Member filed an application for judicial review with the Divisional Court. On December 14, 2021, the majority of the Divisional Court (the “Divisional Court Decision”) found that there was only one reasonable interpretation of subsection 33(4.1) of the Act in effect at the time, namely that the five-year period was calculated from the date of the Order of the Discipline Committee, rather than from the date on which the certificate was deemed revoked. The Divisional Court directed the Registrar to refer the Member’s application for reinstatement to a panel of the College’s Discipline Committee.

In January 2022, the College filed a motion with the Ontario Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the Divisional Court’s decision, but the motion was denied.

On November 16, 2022, the Member filed an application for reinstatement by delivering a notice pursuant to Rule 17.01 of the Rules. On May 3, 2023, a Notice of Hearing was issued for the Member’s application for reinstatement, advising that the hearing date was set for July 27, 2023.

On June 8, 2023, Bill 98 entitled the Better Schools and Student Outcomes Act, 2023 (“Bill 98”) received Royal Assent from the Ontario Legislature. Bill 98 amends subsection 33(4.1) of the Act to provide for a period of at least five years from the date of the deemed revocation of a certificate before a member whose certificate has been deemed revoked can apply for reinstatement. The College therefore filed a motion requesting that the Panel make an order striking the Member’s application for reinstatement.

D. SUBMISSIONS OF COLLEGE COUNSEL

The College contends that the Member’s application for reinstatement was premature and should therefore be stricken. The College puts forth that the Member’s application cannot be submitted before December 8, 2025, which is five years after his certificate was deemed revoked.

The College presented a historical overview of the facts of the Member’s case and the legislative changes that have come into effect since the Discipline Committee’s order relating to the matter. The College argues that these legislative changes, including those brought about by Bill 98, which received Royal Assent on June 8, 2023, directly affect the Member’s application for reinstatement. Following the amendment to subsection 33(4.1) of the Act, if a member’s certificate has been revoked or deemed revoked, they cannot submit an application for reinstatement earlier than five years after the date of the revocation order or the date on which their certificate was deemed revoked. The College submits that this new amendment applies to the Member’s case. The Member’s certificate was deemed revoked as of December 8, 2020; therefore, the Member cannot apply for reinstatement until December 8, 2025 (five years after the deemed revocation).

In addition, the College referred to the new transitional provision outlined in subsection 63.4(6) of Bill 98, which specifies that the provisions of subsection 33(4.1) of the Act apply to certificates revoked pursuant to an order under section 30 or deemed revoked pursuant to section 30.3 prior to the transition date. The College puts forth that the transitional provision is retroactive, and as such, that it applies to the Member’s case, as his certificate was deemed revoked before the transition date. Finally, the College contends that the new amendments introduced by Bill 98 prevent the Member from submitting an application for reinstatement at the present time, as he cannot submit such an application before December 8, 2025.

The College evoked a number of principles of statutory interpretation to demonstrate that the new provisions of Bill 98 apply to the Member’s case. The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is set out in the Supreme Court of Canada decision Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27 (“Rizzo”). In this decision, the Court explains that statutes must be interpreted based on their wording, which means that the terms of the statute must be read in their overall context, taking into account their ordinary meaning and the legislator’s purpose and intent.

The College submits that the provisions of subsections 33(4.1) and 63.4(6) are clear; the wording of the law clearly states that a period of five years from the revocation order or deemed revocation of the certificate must elapse before an application for reinstatement may be submitted.

Further, the College contends that a review of the parliamentary debates regarding Bill 98 shows that the legislative intent is clear. The debates show that the purpose of the legislative changes is to protect the public, and to this end, the legislator wanted to ensure that a member could not apply to return to teaching until at least five years had elapsed since their certificate was revoked.

The College’s prima facie position is that the Act is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, that it is unnecessary to address the issues the Member raised relating to the presumptions against the retroactive and retrospective application of laws. Nonetheless, the College affirms that these presumptions are rebutted in this case.

First, there is an exception to the presumption when changes to a law merely clarify the existing law. The College argues that the provisions of Bill 98 are declaratory in nature and have the effect of overturning the Divisional Court Decision. The declaratory provisions have immediate effect on all future and pending matters, including the Member’s case. The purpose of the declaratory provision is to clarify the period of time that must elapse before the College can grant a new certificate to a member following the actual or deemed revocation of their certificate for having engaged in sexual behaviour or made remarks of a sexual nature towards students.

Second, the College put forth that there is another exception to the presumption against retroactivity when laws are intended to protect the public interest. The College submits that the amendments to subsection 33(4.1) of the Act are intended to protect the public and, therefore, the presumption against retroactivity does not apply. The College’s argument rests on the Brosseau v. Alberta Securities Commission, 1989 CanLII 121 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 301 (“Brosseau”) decision in which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the presumption against retroactivity did not apply because the provisions in question were intended to protect the public.

Finally, the College submits that the amendments to subsection 33(4.1) are merely procedural and as such, take immediate effect. The College notes that the amendment to the Act does not prevent the Member from submitting his application for reinstatement indefinitely, but simply specifies that he must wait a certain period of time before doing so, that is to say five years from the date his certificate was deemed revoked. Seeing as procedural changes take immediate effect, the new provision also applies to pending cases, including the Member’s case.

E. SUBMISSIONS OF MEMBER’S COUNSEL

The Member’s Counsel began by expressing that he agreed with the historical overview of the facts and legislative changes presented by the College. However, where the Member’s position differs from that of the College is in the interpretation of Bill 98.

Prima facie, the Member argues that the Act is unclear and does not apply to his situation, as his application for reinstatement was already pending at the time the legislative amendments came into effect.

In response to the College’s arguments regarding declaratory legislation, the Member puts forth that the role of a Divisional Court is not to tell the legislator how to draft laws, but merely to interpret them. The Member notes that he submitted his application for reinstatement to the Registrar and Chief Executive Officer of the College on March 30, 2021, when he was indisputably entitled to do so. Therefore, the legal issue on which the Panel must decide is whether the new subsection 33(4.1) applies to the application for reinstatement that had already been initiated by the Member. In other words, do the new amendments to the Act affect a pending application? The Member submits that the new amendments do not apply to pending applications, but rather to any new application brought forth.

Firstly, the Member argues that it is not clear that the legislator intended for the amendments to subsection 33(4.1) to apply to pending cases such as his. Moreover, he argues that the Panel must be convinced, by reading the wording of the law, that the legislator intended by these amendments not only to rectify the prospective time frame in which an application for reinstatement can be submitted, but also specifically to prevent a panel from ruling on pending applications.

At the time the new subsection 33(4.1) of the Act (as amended by Bill 98) came into force, the processing of the Member’s application for reinstatement was already underway (the documents had been filed and the hearing date was set) and all that remained was for the matter to be heard before the Panel.

The Member argues that when a legislator passes laws or amendments to laws, there is a presumption that they are prospective, meaning that there is a presumption against the retroactive and retrospective application of laws that must be applied in this case. The Member’s argument rests on the decision Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, [2017] 2 SCR 289 (“Tran”) in which the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that there is a rule of statutory interpretation providing that a statute shall not be construed as retrospectively imposing an adverse effect on an individual unless such effect is expressly provided for in the statute or necessarily follows from it by implication.

To this point, the Member argues that it is not at all clear that the legislator intended for the amendments to subsection 33(4.1) of the Act to have retroactive effect. It is clear, he says, that the legislator intended to modify the five-year period applicable to new applications for reinstatement, but there is no clear indication in the wording of the Act that this subsection is to apply to pending applications for reinstatement. He maintains that the legislator had the opportunity to clarify its intention in this respect, but did not.

Moreover, he notes that although the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged in Tran that there is an exception to the presumption against retroactivity in cases where the retrospective prejudicial effect of a new law is intended to protect the public, the Supreme Court cautioned against its overuse.

The Member argues that the Panel should only grant the College’s motion if it is satisfied that there are clear and obvious indications in the wording of the Act, or that it can be determined by necessary implication, that the legislator intended by the legislative amendments in question to prevent a member having already initiated an application for reinstatement at a time when they were entitled to do so, from pursuing it before five years from the date of the deemed revocation of their certificate. The Member’s Counsel submits that this is not the case.

Regarding Bill 98’s transitional provision, the Member submits that subsection 63.4(6) of the Act specifies the applicability of new subsection 33(4.1) of the Act and indicates that it applies with respect to certificates revoked or deemed revoked prior to the transition date. However, the transitional provision makes no mention of pending applications for reinstatement. Therefore, as there is no express language on the matter in the wording of the Act, it is not clear that the transitional provision applies to applications for reinstatement pending before a panel.

Finally, the Member contends that the amendments to subsection 33(4.1) are not procedural in nature and that they impact his vested rights to have his application for reinstatement proceed to the hearing stage. To strike his application just as the matter was about to be heard is not a simple change of procedure and it would have a detrimental impact on the Member.

F. COLLEGE’S RESPONSE

In response to the Member’s Counsel, the College argues that there is a clear indication of the legislative intent for the amendments to subsection 33(4.1) of the Act to have retroactive effect. According to the transitional provision, the starting point for calculating the amount of time that must pass before an application for reinstatement can be submitted is the date of revocation or deemed revocation of a certificate. When the application was submitted is completely irrelevant, it only matters when the certificate was revoked. The transitional provision specifies that it applies to certificates revoked or deemed revoked before the transition date. Given that the Member’s certificate was deemed revoked before the transition date, the legislator clearly intended for the Act to have retroactive effect on his application for reinstatement.

G. ADVICE OF INDEPENDENT LEGAL COUNSEL

Independent Legal Counsel indicated that the issue at stake is indeed whether the amended Act, which came into force on June 8, 2023, confers on the Panel the right to process the Member’s pending application in light of the amendments to the Act. The Panel must first determine whether the wording of the new law is clear as to its interpretation and the legislative intent. Independent Legal Counsel puts forth that the Panel should look at the current wording of subsection 33(4.1) of the Act and read it in conjunction with the transitional provision in subsection 63.4(6). According to Independent Legal Counsel, if a member’s certificate was deemed revoked when the new provisions come into force, the application for reinstatement cannot be made less than five years after the date on which the certificate was deemed revoked.

In the view of Independent Legal Counsel, the legislative intent was to provide for a minimum revocation period of five years before a member could apply for reinstatement.

With respect to the transitional provision in subsection 63.4(6), Independent Legal Counsel points out that its legislative intent is based on the status of a member’s certificate (i.e., whether it was revoked or deemed revoked) at the time of the transition (June 8, 2023) rather than on the status of any application for reinstatement as of the transition date. This would mean that the transitional provision applies to any certificate that was revoked or deemed revoked as of June 8, 2023, regardless of whether or when an application for reinstatement was filed. Based on this interpretation, the wording of the law seems clear that a member whose certificate was deemed revoked as of June 8, 2023 cannot apply for reinstatement until five years have elapsed since the date of the deemed revocation.

Independent Legal Counsel also advised the Panel to consider the decision Grimstead v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2023 ONSC 1801 (“Grimstead”) in which the Divisional Court, having considered the Supreme Court decisions Tran and Brosseau, addresses the issue of retrospectivity or the retroactive application of the Act. She points out that the presumption against the retrospective or retroactive application of a law can be rebutted if the legislative intent can be discerned either by words clearly expressed or by necessary implication, or be discerned implicitly.

Moreover, according to Grimstead, if the legislative intent that the law should have retroactive effect is clear in the absence of clearly expressed wording, the law may still have such effect so long as the adverse consequences of its application are intended to protect the public rather than punish the member.

The parties were given the opportunity to comment on the advice of Independent Legal Counsel.

H. College’s Response to Independent Legal Counsel

The College agreed with the Independent Legal Counsel’s advice and found that the Grimstead decision, which addresses Tran and Brosseau, is relevant and useful in terms of understanding the state of the law regarding statutory interpretation and the presumption against retroactivity and retrospectivity.

I. Member’s Counsel’s Response to Independent Legal Counsel

The Member agreed that the Panel should consider the Grimstead decision in its deliberations since it was a recent decision arising from proceedings before a panel of the College’s Discipline Committee. However, while the principles of exception to the presumption against retroactivity and retrospectivity were part of the Divisional Court’s analysis in Grimstead, the Member pointed out that they were not applied in that case, as the Divisional Court found that the wording of the statute was sufficiently clear that it should have retroactive effect.

In addition, the Member stated that he agrees with Independent Legal Counsel’s view that the transitional provision in subsection 63.4(6) is a starting point for the analysis. On the other hand, he doesn’t agree that the wording is clear or that it answers the question of whether the new provision applies to pending cases, such as his own. He reiterates that the specific issue to be decided by the Panel is whether the transitional provision refers to pending applications; in his view, jurisprudence requires that there be clear wording to that effect in the law, which here is not the case.

J. DECISION

Having considered the submissions, motion records and briefs of the parties, as well as the advice of Independent Legal Counsel and the relevant legislation and case law, the Panel grants the College’s motion and makes the following orders:

1. an order striking the Member’s application for reinstatement; and

2. an order prohibiting the Member from presenting a new application for reinstatement before a panel of the College’s Discipline Committee until December 8, 2025, which is five years after the date on which his certificate was deemed revoked.

K. REASONS FOR DECISION

(1) Basic legislative interpretation: The Act is clear and unambiguous

The Panel finds that the Act is clear and unambiguous. The new provision in subsection 33(4.1) of the Act is clear; it applies to the Member’s case, even though his application for reinstatement is pending. The new provisions in subsections 33(4.1) and 63.4(6) clearly refer to the status of a member’s certificate as of the transition date (i.e., June 8, 2023, the date on which Bill 98 received Royal Assent). Subsection 33(4.1) of the Act reads as follows:

33 (4.1) Despite subsections (3) and (4), if a person has had a certificate revoked pursuant to an order made under section 30 or deemed revoked pursuant to section 30.3 for committing an act of professional misconduct that consisted of or included any of the following, an application under subsection (1) to have a new certificate issued shall not be made earlier than five years from the date of the revocation order or the date of the deemed revocation:

1. Sexual abuse of a student, as described in clause (c) of the definition of “sexual abuse” in subsection 1 (1).

2. Sexual misconduct.

3. A prescribed sexual act that does not involve a student.

And the new transitional provision of subsection 63.4(6) of the Act reads as follows:

63.4 (6) For greater certainty, subsection 33 (4.1), as amended by section 8 of Schedule 3 to the Better Schools and Student Outcomes Act, 2023, applies in respect of a certificate revoked before the transition date pursuant to an order made under section 30 or deemed revoked pursuant to section 30.3.

Therefore, in reading the provision set out in subsection 33(4.1) of the Act in conjunction with the provision in subsection 63.4(6) of the Act, it is clear that a member whose certificate was revoked or deemed revoked before June 8, 2023 (the transition date) must wait five years from the date of the revocation order or the date on which the certificate was deemed revoked before applying for reinstatement.

On April 16, 2015, a panel found the Member guilty of professional misconduct, which included sexual abuse as defined in subsection 1(1) of the Act, clause (c) (behaviour or remarks of a sexual nature). At that time, the panel issued an order consistent with the parties’ Joint Submission on Penalty, which included an 18-month suspension, but did not revoke the Member’s certificate. On December 8, 2020, the Member’s certificate was deemed revoked in accordance with section 30.3 of the Act. On November 16, 2022, the Member filed his application for reinstatement. However, on June 8, 2023, the Act was amended and now specifies that a member whose certificate has been revoked or deemed revoked must wait a minimum of five years from the date of revocation or deemed revocation of their certificate before they can apply for reinstatement. It is clear that the Member’s certificate was deemed revoked as of December 8, 2020, and that the status of his certificate was still revoked on the transition date (June 8, 2023); it is therefore clear that he must wait until December 8, 2025, before applying for reinstatement.

The Member raised the argument that the Panel must be convinced that the wording in the Act states clearly and unambiguously that the new provisions also apply to pending cases, such as his. The Panel bases its decision on the words of the Supreme Court in Rizzo: “The words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”¹ The Panel is convinced that the wording of the Act and the legislative intent are clear. The amendments to subsection 33(4.1) leave no doubt as to the legislator’s intention, which is to prevent an application for reinstatement from being submitted earlier than five years following the revocation of a member’s certificate. In addition, the Panel is convinced that the transitional provision in subsection 63.4(6) clarifies that the provision in subsection 33(4.1) applies to any certificate that was revoked or deemed revoked before the transition date.

The Panel believes that the new provisions of the Act, read together, clearly state that the legislator intended them to be strictly interpreted so that the amendments may have immediate effect and so that members whose certificates were revoked must wait a minimum of five years before they can apply for reinstatement.

The Panel is of the opinion that since it found the Act to be clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to address the other principles of interpretation, including the presumptions against retroactivity and retrospectivity. The Panel notes, however, that it would have concluded anyhow that the law has retroactive effect and that the presumption against retroactivity does not apply in this case.

(2) Presumptions against retroactivity and retrospectivity: Refuted

In the Grimstead decision, which encompasses the principles mentioned in Tran and Brosseau, the Divisional Court explains that there are presumptions against the retroactive and retrospective application of laws (principles of non-retroactivity and non-retrospectivity). The presumption against retrospectivity can be rebutted when the legislator’s wording expressly states that the law has retrospective effect, or when this can be inferred by necessary implication.² When the legislator expressly states that a law has retrospective effect, the presumption is rebutted and the law has such effect. In this case, it is the Panel’s view that the presumption against retrospectivity is rebutted, as the wording in subsection 63.4(6) of the Act expressly states that subsection 33(4.1) applies to certificates revoked or deemed revoked prior to the transition date (the date on which Bill 98 received Royal Assent). It also clearly states that the five-year period applies to any member whose certificate was revoked or deemed revoked before June 8, 2023. The Panel is therefore of the opinion that the legislature’s intention for the law to have retrospective effect is clearly expressed in the wording of the law or that it is clearly implicit.

Furthermore, according to the Supreme Court of Canada in Brosseau, the principle of non-retroactivity applies only to laws that have a prejudicial effect; however, if the prejudicial effects of a law are intended to protect the public rather than punish an individual for his actions, then the presumption against retroactivity does not apply. The Supreme Court makes the following statement on the matter:

“In the end, resort must be had to the object of the statute. If the intent is to punish or penalize a person for having done what he did, the presumption applies, because a new consequence is attached to a prior event. But if the new punishment or penalty is intended to protect the public, the presumption does not apply.”³

Having considered the evidence, it is the Panel’s view that the legislative intent in amending the Act was truly the protection of the public rather than the punishment of the member for past behaviour. This intention is further clarified in the parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of Bill 98, to which the College referred during its submissions, and which include the following passage from the Honourable Trevor Jones:

This bill would increase public confidence in the regulation of the teaching professions and the protection of students […] and clarifying certification reinstatement timelines for individuals who have had their licenses revoked, so that it would take five years from the date of revocation before an individual may seek reinstatement from the College.⁴

In the Panel’s view, this passage makes it clear that the purpose of the new provisions is to ensure public confidence in the regulation of the teaching profession and the protection of students by clarifying the period of time (five years) that must elapse before a teacher whose certificate has been revoked or deemed revoked due to engaging in sexual behaviour or making sexual remarks towards students may submit an application for reinstatement. As such, the amendments to the Act seek to ensure the protection of the public for a minimum of five years from the date of revocation.

The College’s motion is carried. Although the Member’s application for reinstatement was pending, the amendments to the Act apply to the Member since the status of his certificate was revoked when the new provisions came into force on June 8, 2023. Therefore, the Member cannot apply for the reinstatement of his certificate before December 8, 2025, which is five years after the date it was deemed revoked.

Date: October 11, 2023

Myrna Tulandi Chair, Discipline Panel

Anne Laflamme, OCT Member, Discipline Panel

Kelly Marvin, OCT Member, Discipline Panel

Footnotes

1. 1Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27, at par. 21.
2. 2Grimstead v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2023 ONSC 1801, at par. 43.
3. 3Brosseau v. Alberta Securities Commission, 1989 CanLII 121 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 301.
4. 4Hansard Transcripts, 43-2, No. 67A of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, dated April 19, 2023, at p. 3690.