Christopher I. R. Morrison

The plaintiff contractor performed emergency and restoration services on a property insured by the defendant insurer after a flood.

The property owner went bankrupt before paying the contractor for the restoration work.

The contractor sued the insurer for the unpaid amounts, alleging breach of contract, negligence, conversion, and unjust enrichment, arguing the insurer should have paid the contractor directly or issued co-payable cheques.

The insurer moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no contract existed between the insurer and the contractor, the insurer owed no duty of care to the contractor to ensure payment, the contractor had no ownership interest in the insurance proceeds to support a conversion claim, and the insurer was not unjustly enriched.

Michael Beaudin, severely injured in a dirt bike motocross competition, sought statutory accident benefits from Travelers Insurance.

Travelers denied coverage, arguing the dirt bike was not an "automobile" under the Insurance Act and Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) because it was exempt from the Off-Road Vehicles Act (ORVA) insurance requirement.

The core issue on appeal was whether the ORVA exemption for closed course competitions applied only if the competition was sponsored by a motorcycle association.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the ORVA exemption applies only to sponsored competitions.

Consequently, the dirt bike was not exempt and was considered an "automobile" entitling Beaudin to benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to increase the prayer for relief from $7.5 million to $57.5 million and to specifically plead personal damage claims on behalf of the individual plaintiffs arising from the forced sale of an apartment building following an explosion.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing prejudice and that the individual plaintiffs, as shareholders of holding companies, had no personal cause of action under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the significant delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed prejudice that was not rebutted, and that the proposed amendments failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The appellants, plaintiffs in the underlying action, brought a motion before a single judge of the Court of Appeal seeking an order to compel the Regional Senior Judge to set an expedited four-week trial date.

This motion followed a previous Court of Appeal order that had set aside a partial summary judgment and directed the action to be restored to the trial list on an expedited basis.

The appellants argued that the action had not been restored as ordered.

The motion judge, assuming jurisdiction without deciding the *functus officio* argument, dismissed the motion.

The judge found that the previous order had not been breached and emphasized the inappropriateness of interfering with the trial judge's ongoing case management, who was actively preparing the case for trial.

Electek Power Services Inc. sought full indemnity costs of $616,312.06 for an arbitration hearing and a subsequent court application to set aside an arbitral decision on jurisdiction.

The court had previously granted Electek's application, finding the arbitrators erred in assuming jurisdiction.

Greenfield Energy Centre Limited Partnership proposed a lower partial indemnity award of $145,000.

The court awarded Electek $425,000 in total, comprising $300,000 for the arbitration and $125,000 for the court application, both on a partial indemnity basis, finding no conduct warranting a punitive or full indemnity award.

The applicant brought an application under s. 17(8) of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to set aside an arbitral tribunal's preliminary ruling that it had jurisdiction to decide a dispute between the parties.

The dispute arose from emergency repair work performed by the applicant at the respondent's power plant, which allegedly caused $10 million in damages.

The respondent initiated arbitration based on a 2009 'Purchase Order General Terms and Conditions' document signed by the applicant.

The court conducted a hearing de novo and found that the 2009 document was an inchoate agreement that was never incorporated into the 2018 purchase order for the repair work.

Applying the objective theory of contract formation, the court concluded there was no consensus ad idem regarding an arbitration agreement.

The arbitral tribunal's decision was set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from the decision of J. Steele J. dated July 7, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

This appeal concerned a medical negligence action where the appellant gynecologist failed to perform an endometrial biopsy on the deceased, Armineh Hacopian-Armen, in 2009, leading to a delayed diagnosis of Stage IV uterine leiomyosarcoma (uLMS) and her subsequent death.

The trial judge found the gynecologist liable for breaching the standard of care and for factual and legal causation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the findings on causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's negligence caused the harm, emphasizing the deference owed to a trial judge's assessment of expert evidence and the foreseeability of the type of harm.

The plaintiff sued her insurer following a fire loss and a disputed appraisal process under section 128 of the Insurance Act.

The defendant insurer brought a Rule 21 motion seeking to force the plaintiff to elect whether she was challenging the appraisal itself (which would require judicial review at the Divisional Court) or proceeding with the action.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding it was not brought promptly under Rule 2.02 and Rule 21.02, as the defendant had been aware of the jurisdictional issue since the outset of the litigation and had already participated in a summary judgment motion.

The appellants sought to overturn a jury verdict finding them negligent for a fatal fire and challenging the quantum of damages awarded for loss of care, guidance, companionship, mental distress, and future costs of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the jury's findings of negligence based on fire safety violations and affirming the damages awards, finding they did not "shock the conscience of the court" despite being high.

The court also clarified that Section 76 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act does not immunize landlords from negligence related to fire safety precautions, even if the fire's origin is accidental.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for breach of an insurance contract and bad faith following a house fire.

The parties had previously engaged in an appraisal process under s. 128 of the Insurance Act but disagreed on the interpretation of the resulting report, specifically regarding deductions for prior payments and entitlement to replacement cost value versus actual cash value.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of credibility regarding the appraisal discussions, the cause of the delay in rebuilding, and the bad faith allegations that required a trial.

The court also granted in part the defendant's motion to strike certain paragraphs of the plaintiff's Reply.

The Court of Appeal fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $90,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant physician appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for negligent management of a twin pregnancy, which resulted in premature birth and brain damage to one of the twins.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict on causation was unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that the required treatment, amnioreduction, was available at the referral hospital in 1991.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding adverse inferences, the characterization of expert evidence, and the failure to instruct on loss of chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's conclusion on causation and that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and legally correct.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence actions arising from a fire that destroyed an historic mansion shortly after a plumber repaired a leaking pipe using a blowtorch.

At trial, the appellants did not call expert evidence on the standard of care, arguing the plumber's conduct was egregious.

The trial judge found the plumber's conduct was not egregious and that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care for soldering.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

The minor plaintiff tripped and fell over a raised concrete edge of a buried metal transformer box owned by the defendant hydro company, located on a municipally-owned driveway apron adjacent to the moving defendants' properties.

The moving defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them, arguing they were not 'occupiers' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court granted the motions, finding no genuine issue for trial as the moving defendants did not exercise sufficient control over the municipal property to be deemed occupiers under the 'special circumstances' exception, nor did the 'flow exception' apply.

The action and cross-claims against the moving defendants were dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that his homeowner's insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify him in an underlying action arising from an incident at a summer camp.

The underlying claim alleged that the applicant pulled the plaintiff's head back, kneed him, and punched him, pleading both negligence and assault and battery.

The insurer denied coverage based on an intentional acts exclusion.

The court dismissed the application, finding the duty to indemnify was premature and the duty to defend was not triggered because the negligence claim was entirely derivative of the intentional tort of battery, which fell squarely within the policy's exclusion clause.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent plaintiff claimed chronic pain, anxiety, and depression resulting from a relatively minor collision.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged prejudicial evidence regarding the respondent's complaints about defence counsel's conduct, and (2) the trial judge erred in allowing an amendment to the statement of claim following the jury's verdict to reflect the full damages awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant purchased land from the respondents with a vendor take-back mortgage.

The purchase agreement and mortgage provided that if the official plan was not amended to change the zoning designation to "Business Commercial" prior to June 17, 2018, the principal amount would be reduced by $600,000.

The mortgage also contained a standard charge term providing that if the lands were sold without the respondents' consent, all amounts owing plus a three-month interest bonus would immediately become due.

The appellant sold the property in February 2017 without consent and paid $600,000 into court, arguing the price reduction applied.

The application judge dismissed the application, and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the plain language of the mortgage clearly stipulated the June 17, 2018 deadline and that the appellant's sale triggered the obligation to pay all monies owing including the interest bonus.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent challenged the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, arguing that the order was interlocutory and therefore required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant contended that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction because the parties had reached a settlement agreement that the motion judge lacked authority to decline to enforce, making it a final decision.

The Court of Appeal found the cases relied upon by the appellant distinguishable and determined that the order was interlocutory as it did not finally dispose of the action or finally determine any claim, defence, or substantive right.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.