Christopher I. R. Morrison

A plumber used an open flame torch to repair a leaking pipe in the basement of a heritage mansion.

Shortly after the repair was completed, a massive fire broke out, destroying the house.

The property owner and the condominium corporation's insurers brought a subrogated negligence claim against the plumbing company.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, as there was no evidence the downward-directed flame ignited combustibles in the adjacent joist space.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of the standard of care because they did not call expert evidence on the standard expected of a reasonably prudent plumber performing soldering work.

The appellant, Century Plumbing and Heating, appealed a summary judgment decision that removed the respondents, ADT Security Services Canada Inc. and Intercon Security Limited, from several actions relating to a flood in a Toronto tower.

The appellant argued the motions judge erred in finding the Building Automation System had frozen, in not considering video evidence, and in relying on inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence, including an admission by the building owner that the system had frozen, and that the appellant failed to establish a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The moving party sought an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims and various crossclaims against a defendant business entity whose operator had not been located or served.

The third party opposed the motion, arguing that dismissal would effectively extinguish its contribution and indemnity claim because any new fourth party proceeding would likely be barred by the limitation period.

The court considered the interaction of Rules 28, 29.05, and 29.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle in Rule 1.04 that the rules should be liberally construed to secure determination on the merits.

Although the third party had procedurally advanced its claim by crossclaim rather than fourth party claim, the court declined to eliminate what could be a potentially meritorious claim on purely procedural grounds.

The motion to dismiss the claims against the absent defendant was therefore refused.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring her to post security for costs.

She argued the motions judge failed to properly consider her After the Event (ATE) Legal Expense Insurance as an asset in Ontario.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the motions judge did consider the ATE insurance as one of several factors and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the ATE insurance on the leave application.

The respondents successfully sued the appellants in a jury trial for negligence after a glass Dutch oven shattered, causing severe injuries.

The jury found the appellants 75% liable for failing to adequately warn of the dangers associated with the product.

On appeal, the appellants argued the claim against one defendant was statute-barred, the jury's causation finding lacked an evidentiary basis, and the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the limitation period and liability, finding the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $25,000 aggravated damages award due to an erroneous jury instruction.

The plaintiff brought a motion to add two utility entities as defendants in a personal injury action arising from a pedestrian–vehicle collision, alleging inadequate street lighting contributed to the accident.

The proposed defendants argued the motion was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court considered discoverability and whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in identifying the proposed defendants.

It held that police notes referencing very poor lighting and early evidence about visibility should have prompted investigation into the lighting system within the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in investigating potential liability for street lighting maintenance.

The motion to add the proposed defendants was therefore dismissed as statute‑barred.

Following a prior decision granting summary judgment to one defendant insurer and refusing the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleadings, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful defendant sought costs jointly and severally against the plaintiffs and the co‑defendant insurance broker.

The court determined the appropriate quantum using standard partial indemnity rates and rejected arguments that delay in bringing the summary judgment motion should reduce the award.

Applying the principles governing Bullock and Sanderson orders and the factors articulated in Moore v. Wienecke, the court concluded that a Sanderson order was fair because the broker cross‑claimed against the successful defendant and the plaintiffs reasonably joined both defendants due to uncertainty regarding responsibility for inadequate insurance coverage.

The broker was ordered to pay the successful defendant’s costs.

The plaintiffs moved for leave under Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their statement of claim to allege that the insurer failed to properly assess and adjust their business interruption loss following a fire.

The insurer opposed the amendment, arguing it constituted a new cause of action outside the one‑year contractual limitation period and brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The court held that the proposed amendment introduced a new factual basis for liability—post‑loss adjustment of the claim—distinct from the existing allegation that the defendants failed to place adequate insurance coverage prior to the loss.

As the limitation period had expired, the amendment was barred.

With no viable claim remaining against the insurer, summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim and the broker’s crossclaim was granted.

Following dismissal of a summary judgment motion brought by a co-defendant seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim and a cross-claim, the court addressed costs between the co-defendants.

The responding insurer sought partial-indemnity costs exceeding $13,000 after successfully opposing the motion, arguing the matter involved moderate complexity and significant financial exposure under the Insurance Act.

The moving defendant argued the costs were excessive and should either be reduced or made payable in the cause, particularly given the prematurity of the summary judgment motion and issues surrounding the insurer’s standing.

The court held that the insurer was entitled to costs as the successful party but reduced the amount claimed, finding the requested sum excessive in the circumstances.

Costs were fixed at $6,750 payable by the moving defendant.

The defendant vehicle owner sought leave to appeal the dismissal of its summary judgment motion.

The owner argued that the driver's criminal conviction for operating a motor vehicle without consent precluded re-litigating the issue of consent, making the claims an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the insurer had led evidence to the contrary raising a genuine issue for trial, and that a full appreciation of the evidence required a trial.

The plaintiff commenced an action for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident within the two-year limitation period.

More than six years after the accident, she successfully moved to add family members as plaintiffs to assert derivative claims under the Family Law Act.

The defendant appealed, arguing the derivative claims were statute-barred because they must follow the limitation period of the principal claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that as long as the principal action was commenced in time, each derivative claimant is entitled to have their limitation period determined separately based on the discoverability principle under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendant dealership moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' personal injury claim and the co-defendant insurer's cross-claim, arguing that the driver's prior criminal conviction for taking the vehicle without consent conclusively established a lack of consent.

The co-defendant insurer opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the criminal conviction did not have preclusive effect because the driver faced little jeopardy and there was no robust examination of the facts.

The court also held that the insurer had standing to oppose the motion and maintain its cross-claim despite not yet having indemnified the plaintiffs, in order to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The defendant brought a motion to stay an Ontario action arising from a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Alberta, arguing the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs attempted to establish a presumptive connecting factor based on the fact that the defendant’s insurer was an Ontario corporation and might ultimately be liable under the Insurance Act.

Applying the framework recently articulated in Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, the court held that none of the recognized presumptive connecting factors were present.

The court rejected the proposed new factor relating to the insurer’s domicile, finding it inconsistent with the principles of certainty, order, and predictability in private international law.

The Ontario court therefore lacked jurisdiction and the action was stayed.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding no genuine issue for trial regarding whether a specific individual was an owner of a vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding on the merits.

Additionally, the Court held that the appellant lacked standing to pursue the claim because it had not paid its insured and thus was not subrogated to the plaintiff's rights.

The third party insurer sought leave to appeal a motion judge's comments regarding alternative relief under Rules 20 and 21.

The motion judge had granted the insurer's primary request to stay the main action and third party claim, but commented in obiter that he would have dismissed the alternative relief had he not granted the stay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's hypothetical comments did not constitute an appealable interlocutory order.

The third party appealed a trial judgment finding it 25% liable for a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

The trial judge found that the third party was negligent in failing to adequately warn oncoming traffic of its workers, and that if it had done so, the defendant driver's chances of stopping in time would have increased by one in four.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a 25% chance of avoiding the accident does not satisfy the 'but for' test for causation, which requires proof on a balance of probabilities.

The action against the third party was dismissed.

The applicant sought declaratory or prerogative relief regarding whether she had elected to receive WSIB benefits and whether such an election was valid.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal had not yet decided these issues.

The Court emphasized that the Board should provide election forms to workers as soon as it becomes aware of an illness to ensure they seek legal advice promptly.

Following a boating accident, the appellant faced multiple actions for damages.

He was covered by three insurance policies: a primary boat owner's policy, a home owner's policy, and a personal liability umbrella policy (PLUP).

The application judge ruled that after the primary boat owner's policy was exhausted, the home owner's policy and the PLUP must contribute equally, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Family Insurance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the home owner's policy and the PLUP were not of coordinate obligation.

The PLUP was a true excess policy, while the home owner's policy was primary.

Therefore, the PLUP is not required to respond until the limits of the home owner's policy are exhausted.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the municipality for a motor vehicle accident on a snow-packed road.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment, as the municipality did not put causation in issue and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether it met its standard of care under the Municipal Act.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the matter was directed to trial.

The appellant sued her father for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse.

The father had previously been convicted of criminal offences based on the same conduct.

At the civil trial, the father adduced evidence from his two sons, who claimed they had committed the abuse, not him.

The trial judge accepted this evidence and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in permitting the father to relitigate the underlying facts of his criminal conviction.

The evidence of the sons was not 'fresh evidence' as it was known prior to the criminal trial, and allowing the relitigation constituted an abuse of process.