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Motion for leave to appeal dismissed with no order as to costs.
The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Belobaba J. dated December 29, 2022.
The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.
As the responding party did not provide costs submissions, the court made no order as to costs.
The Court of Appeal upheld a summary judgment awarding a 23-year employee 21 months' notice and invalidating a termination clause.
This appeal concerns a wrongful dismissal claim by a former wardrobe stylist and fashion studio manager who worked for the defendant for 23 years (1994-2017).
The motion judge found the employee was a dependent contractor from 1994 to 2004, then became an employee.
The termination clause was found void as it attempted to contract out of minimum standards under the Employment Standards Act.
The court awarded 21 months' pay in lieu of notice, 10 percent of base salary for loss of benefits, compensation for unlawful wage deductions, and damages for loss of cell phone allowance.
The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
Timetable extension granted despite significant delay as responding parties suddenly changed position without warning.
The moving parties (defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim) brought a motion to vary a timetable order and extend the dismissal deadline of December 31, 2018.
The responding parties opposed the extension, arguing the action should be dismissed for delay.
The Master found that while the litigation delay was significant, all parties had previously acquiesced to the leisurely pace and the responding parties had suddenly changed their position without warning.
The motion was granted, allowing a final extension of the timetable.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the striking of a civil claim between unionized workers because the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.
The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her claim under a Rule 21 motion without leave to amend.
The dispute arose from a collective agreement between unionized workers.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the dispute was entirely regulated by the collective agreement and that the arbitrator possessed the necessary remedial powers to address the wrong.
The court also declined to grant leave to appeal the costs award.
The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
The court remitted the issue of motion costs to the trial judge on consent.
This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated September 26, 2017.
The appellants challenged the lower court decision, and the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of costs for the motion below.
The parties agreed that the costs determination should be remitted back to the trial judge for decision at a later time, pending clarification of the value of the claims and the effect of any Rule 49 settlement offers.
The court awarded a senior executive 22 months' reasonable notice and applied Ontario employment standards to his California-based employment due to a choice-of-law clause.
The plaintiff sought summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages after being terminated without cause.
The court found the employment agreement's termination clause to be unclear and incomplete, thus entitling the plaintiff to common law reasonable notice.
The court awarded 22 months' notice, determining the plaintiff held a senior executive role.
It also ruled that the Ontario Employment Standards Act applied to the calculation of lost benefits, despite the plaintiff working in California, due to an Ontario choice-of-law clause in the agreement, rejecting the defendant's public policy argument.
The valuation of lost benefits was deferred for further resolution, and mitigation income was partially offset by $30,000 USD.
The Court of Appeal clarified the timing of Form 1 mass termination notices and the impact of excessive overtime on working notice.
This appeal concerns the closure of a manufacturing plant and the resulting mass termination of employees.
The central issues relate to the timing of Form 1 notice requirements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, the effect of overtime hours on working notice, and the validity of termination notices for employees retained beyond the statutory 13-week temporary work period.
The employer gave employees over one year's notice of termination but failed to file the required Form 1 notice with the director until more than a year later.
The motion judge found the employer's entire notice period invalid.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the Form 1 notice requirement arises only at the beginning of the statutory minimum notice period, not when the employer gives notice to employees.
However, the court upheld findings regarding overtime worked in violation of the ESA and the requirement for fresh notice when temporary work exceeds 13 weeks.
Employer denied credit for working notice in mass termination due to late Form 1 filing.
The plaintiffs, former employees of CTS, brought a summary judgment motion in a class proceeding arising from a mass termination following a plant closure.
CTS provided employees with approximately 12 months' working notice but did not file the required Form 1 notice with the Director of Employment Standards until the final 8 weeks.
The court held that the ESA requires Form 1 notice on the first day of the notice period provided by the employer, not just the statutory minimum period.
Because CTS failed to provide timely Form 1 notice, the working notice provided prior to the Form 1 filing was deemed void for all purposes, depriving CTS of credit for that period.
The court also found that requiring employees to work excessive overtime during the notice period negated the working notice for those weeks.
However, the court dismissed the claim for bad faith damages.
The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of pre-2013 claims as statute-barred but reinstated a 2013 claim.
The appellants appealed the motion judge's order striking their statement of claim without leave to amend on grounds of being time-barred and constituting an abuse of process.
The Court of Appeal found that while most of the claims were properly struck as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, the motion judge erred by not separately considering paragraph 39 of the statement of claim, which alleged a new claim arising from the dissolution of a corporate defendant in 2013.
The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the order with respect to paragraph 39 and remitting the matter for further consideration.