David Quayat

The moving defendants sought to vary a case management order requiring related actions to proceed together, to set aside a longstanding Mareva injunction, or alternatively to vary the injunction to permit asset sales and access to funds.

The court refused to sever the consolidated trial process and declined to vacate the Mareva order, finding the delay was not solely attributable to the plaintiff, the factual basis for the injunction had not materially changed, and the moving defendants had provided contradictory and incomplete financial disclosure.

Applying the established injunction and Mareva variation frameworks, the court held the moving defendants had not discharged their heavy burden for broad relief.

Limited variation was granted to allow supervised sale of properties and potential funding of a tax appeal, with any further living or legal expense relief made conditional on compliance and meaningful disclosure.

Appeal from the Consent and Capacity Board arising from a finding that the appellant met the criteria for involuntary patient status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant no longer challenged the involuntary admission criteria but sought Charter relief based on an alleged non-consensual injection administered while detained, including a declaration under s. 7 and rescission of a certificate of renewal nunc pro tunc.

The court held the declaration could not be granted because it had not been properly raised before the Board or in the notice of appeal and would be procedurally unfair on the existing record.

The rescission issue was moot because the appellant had been discharged and the certificate had expired.

In any event, the requested remedy lacked the necessary nexus to the statutory issue before the Board.

A partnership sought the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1991 following the withdrawal of a former partner and the issuance of a notice of arbitration alleging breaches of the partnership agreement.

The former partner moved to stay the arbitration pending resolution of a separate civil action involving other former partners and raised counterclaims challenging the validity of provisions in the partnership agreement.

The court held that the arbitration clause in the partnership agreement was broad and that the disputes raised by the partnership clearly fell within its scope.

The court found that the respondent’s counterclaim in the civil action was a colourable attempt to sidetrack the arbitration and that the issues could properly be determined by an arbitrator.

The motion to stay the arbitration was dismissed, the respondent’s counterclaim in the civil action was stayed, and the court appointed an arbitrator pursuant to the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for non-compliance with the Limitations Act, 2002.

She argued the respondent should be precluded from relying on the limitation period defence due to fraudulent concealment and misrepresentations intended to induce her to forebear from enforcing her rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that fraudulent concealment was not pleaded at trial and the record did not support a conscious plan to deceive.

Furthermore, any oral acknowledgments of the debt could not revive it, as the Act requires acknowledgments to be in writing.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing the motion judge erred in accepting the respondent's expert evidence on the interpretation of the commercial reasonableness standard under the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to accept the expert's opinion, especially since the appellants chose not to put forward any expert evidence of their own.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the expert's alleged bias.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering them to pay $25,000 to the respondents.

The respondents had loaned $35,000 to a deceased family member, and the appellants had signed a written acknowledgment to repay the loan from the proceeds of a house sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the action was not statute-barred due to the written acknowledgment and the date of discovery.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding of a constructive trust over the sale proceeds and concluded that the trial judge's interventions during the self-represented trial did not amount to bias.

A secured lender brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of accounts receivable assigned to it following borrower default.

The moving party relied on security agreements governed by Virginia law and the Uniform Commercial Code, asserting a right to collect accounts receivable directly from an account debtor.

The responding parties argued the lender’s decision to collect receivables rather than realize on other collateral was commercially unreasonable and raised triable issues.

The court accepted expert evidence on Virginia law and held the UCC’s commercial reasonableness requirement applied to the manner of collection, not the decision to pursue accounts receivable over other collateral.

The court further held that cause of action estoppel barred the applicants’ claims due to prior litigation in the United States.

Summary judgment was granted and the related application dismissed.

The plaintiff, an artist, brought an action for copyright infringement against the defendant, another artist, alleging that the defendant's paintings of crumpled paper infringed the copyright in the plaintiff's 'Classical Series' of paintings.

The court found that while copyright subsisted in the plaintiff's individual paintings, it did not subsist in the series as a whole.

The court dismissed the action, concluding that the defendant's works were not substantial copies or colourable imitations of the plaintiff's works, as the similarities were based on commonplace artistic techniques.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendant had independently created his works using his own photographic models.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement reflected in minutes of settlement.

They argued that a term requiring execution of a release satisfactory to all parties made the settlement conditional, ambiguous, and unenforceable.

The court rejected those submissions, holding that the motion judge found the parties had agreed to the form of release and that finding was not challenged.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondents.

The defendant brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The claim arose from assigned accounts receivable after two U.S. corporations defaulted on credit facilities granted by the plaintiff bank.

The defendant argued the pleading improperly relied on Virginia law and lacked privity of contract under Ontario law.

The court held that, properly understood, the claim was simply an action on assigned debts owed by the defendant to the assignor companies, with foreign law relevant only to the factual basis of the assignment.

As it was not plain and obvious that the claim could not succeed, the motion to strike was dismissed.

The defendants moved to enforce Minutes of Settlement reached at a civil pre‑trial requiring payment of $100,000 and execution of a release.

The plaintiffs argued the settlement was not binding because the wording of the release had not been finalized and alleged their former solicitor lacked authority and exerted undue influence.

The court held that a settlement agreement is a binding contract once essential terms are agreed, and the requirement for a release does not prevent formation of a binding agreement.

The court also reaffirmed that a solicitor of record has ostensible authority to bind clients in settlement absent clear notice to the contrary.

The motion was granted and the settlement enforced, with the plaintiffs ordered to deliver the executed release and the defendants to pay the settlement funds.

The plaintiff moved to dismiss the action against a settling defendant following a partial settlement in a copyright and passing off action between two artists and an art gallery.

The non-settling defendant opposed dismissal unless the court imposed a term requiring the plaintiff to undertake damages for alleged interference with the defendant’s contractual relationship with the gallery.

The court held that partial settlements must be reviewed for fairness and potential prejudice to non-settling defendants, even if formal approval is not required.

On the evidence, the settlement term restricting the gallery from selling certain works did not prejudice the non-settling defendant because the gallery had already ceased selling those works prior to the settlement due to the allegations in the litigation.

The court dismissed the action against the settling defendant and refused to impose the undertaking sought by the non-settling defendant.

The appellant sought to certify a class proceeding on behalf of York University students whose classes were disrupted by a 2008 strike, alleging breach of contract, breach of the Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion, finding the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action because the claims improperly interfered with the university's academic discretion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's conclusion that the claims were barred by academic discretion and that the pleadings were insufficient to establish a contractual or statutory cause of action.