Nastaran Roushan

The applicants applied for permanent residence based on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds after their refugee claims were found to be fraudulent.

The Officer refused the application, finding insufficient evidence of future harm from a former spouse in Israel, that their establishment in Canada was typical, and that returning to Israel would not adversely impact the children's best interests.

On judicial review, the Federal Court held that the Officer's decision was reasonable, noting that past abuse was not presented as a predictor of future harm in the submissions to the Officer, and that the Officer adequately assessed establishment and the best interests of the children.

The applicants, citizens of the Czech Republic of Roma ethnicity, applied for permanent residence from within Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

A senior immigration officer refused their application, finding they had not demonstrated exceptional establishment or hardship, and giving little weight to their history of discrimination and domestic abuse.

The applicants sought judicial review of this decision.

The Federal Court allowed the application, finding the officer's decision unreasonable.

The officer erred by failing to consider the totality of the applicants' circumstances (particularly the female applicant's previous refugee claim and choice to withdraw to be with her partner), by applying the wrong legal test in requiring "exceptional" hardship, and by making unreasonable factual findings regarding discrimination and the availability of family support in the Czech Republic.

The applicant, a licensed immigration consultant, brought a motion to stay a 6-month licence suspension imposed by the Discipline Committee of the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council pending judicial review.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion on the ground of prematurity.

Applying the general rule that judicial review should not be brought until all available and adequate administrative recourses are pursued, the Court found the applicant had failed to seek relief from the interim suspension by presenting a motion to the Discipline Committee as permitted by the order.

Without exhausting this remedy, the applicant failed to demonstrate a serious issue for trial under the RJR-MacDonald test.

The applicant sought an extension of time and judicial review of a negative pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA).

The applicant, a citizen of Jamaica, alleged he faced a personalized risk from gang violence.

The Officer found the applicant failed to establish a personalized risk or rebut the presumption of state protection, attributing little weight to uncorroborated assertions without making adverse credibility findings.

The Federal Court dismissed the applications, finding the decision was procedurally fair without an oral hearing and reasonable on the merits.

The extension of time was refused because the underlying application lacked sufficient merit.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Delegate's decision to issue an exclusion order against him for presenting a false passport upon entry.

The applicant claimed he lacked the mental capacity to understand the proceedings, relying on a cognitive assessment conducted weeks later, and argued this breached his procedural fairness and Charter rights.

The Federal Court dismissed the application, finding the Delegate's assessment of capacity reasonable and the evidence insufficient to establish a Charter breach.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for trading in securities without registration and while subject to a prior cease-trade order.

They argued the trial judge erred in finding they had knowledge of the order, that the Ontario Securities Commission lacked jurisdiction because the trades involved foreign companies and investors, and that the custodial sentences were unfit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the offences were strict liability, that a real and substantial connection to Ontario gave the province jurisdiction under the Libman test, and that the sentences were appropriate given the appellants' moral blameworthiness and prior breaches.

The plaintiff, an artist, brought an action for copyright infringement against the defendant, another artist, alleging that the defendant's paintings of crumpled paper infringed the copyright in the plaintiff's 'Classical Series' of paintings.

The court found that while copyright subsisted in the plaintiff's individual paintings, it did not subsist in the series as a whole.

The court dismissed the action, concluding that the defendant's works were not substantial copies or colourable imitations of the plaintiff's works, as the similarities were based on commonplace artistic techniques.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendant had independently created his works using his own photographic models.

The plaintiff sold shares of a real estate brokerage to the defendant purchaser under a share purchase agreement and promissory note for $490,000.

After making several instalment payments, the purchaser stopped paying and alleged numerous misrepresentations and breaches of warranty relating to financial statements, agent rosters, liabilities, and business operations, seeking damages and repayment through a counterclaim.

The court found that the purchaser was a sophisticated businessperson who conducted limited due diligence and knowingly proceeded without contractual protections or price adjustments.

Alleged misrepresentations regarding financial statements, agent numbers, liabilities, and business practices were unsupported, and the purchaser did not rely on them when entering the agreement.

Although the vendor breached the agreement by failing to provide audited financial statements, the breach caused no damage and was effectively waived.

The vendor was therefore entitled to recover the outstanding balance under the promissory note and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claim.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent doctor met his disclosure obligations before the appellant elected to have heel surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the doctor provided sufficient information for informed consent was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The plaintiff objected to the admissibility of a proposed accounting expert retained by the defendants in a commercial dispute involving alleged irregularities in corporate financial records and the valuation of shares.

The objection was based on allegations that the expert lacked independence due to a professional relationship with a trustee in bankruptcy connected to the underlying corporation and that the expert lacked sufficient expertise in industry standards.

The court considered the effect of Rules 4.1 and 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and whether those provisions impose a higher duty of independence than at common law.

The court held that alleged institutional bias arising from professional connections generally affects the weight of expert evidence rather than its admissibility.

Finding the expert met the Mohan admissibility criteria and possessed sufficient expertise, the court permitted the expert to testify.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal based on disability against her employer, her union, and three personal respondents.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine whether the application should be dismissed against the union and the personal respondents.

The Tribunal found no reasonable prospect of success against the union, as the assignment of hours was a management prerogative and there was no evidence the union participated in the decision.

The Tribunal also removed the personal respondents, applying the Persaud test, as the corporate respondents accepted full vicarious liability and were capable of remedying any infringement.

The applicant, a university student with a disability, filed human rights complaints against the university and two student unions, alleging discrimination because her disability prevented her from taking enough credits for full-time status, thereby denying her certain benefits.

The university and one student union requested dismissal of the applications under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code and as an abuse of process, arguing the matter had already been dealt with by the university's internal Anti-Discrimination Tribunal.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario found that the internal tribunal hearing constituted a 'proceeding' that appropriately dealt with the substance of the application against the university.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application against the student union as an abuse of process, noting the internal tribunal had recorded that complaint as resolved.