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The Court of Appeal affirmed convictions and a 15-year sentence for importing fentanyl, confirming wilful blindness applies to both the nature and origin of the drug.
The appellant, convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed his convictions and sentence.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's application of wilful blindness to both the nature and origin of the controlled substance.
The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 15-year global sentence, finding the comparison of fentanyl to heroin for sentencing purposes to be apt, and emphasizing the principles of denunciation and general deterrence given the drug's extreme danger and quantity.
The victim surcharge was set aside.
Pre-trial motion granted in part; statements to RCMP excluded for s. 10(b) breach, but cocaine admitted.
The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson Airport from Colombia.
He was referred to secondary inspection as a contraband target.
A border services officer searched his luggage and found cocaine in a rum bottle.
The accused brought a pre-trial motion to exclude his statements and the cocaine, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b).
The court found that the accused was detained when the officer formed a strong and particularized suspicion, and that his s. 10 rights were breached by a subsequent question.
The court also found that the RCMP breached his s. 10(b) rights by failing to facilitate contact with a lawyer of his choosing.
Statements made after the breaches were excluded under s. 24(2), but the cocaine and earlier statements were admitted.
Offender sentenced to 3.5 years net custody for importing 2.5 kilograms of cocaine.
The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 2.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.
At sentencing, the offender argued for a conditional sentence, citing systemic racism, a difficult childhood, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions including segregation and lockdowns.
The court acknowledged the offender's difficult background and the existence of systemic racism, which justified a sentence slightly below the standard 6-8 year Cunningham range.
However, the court found that the seriousness of the offence required a period of incarceration.
The court imposed a base sentence of 4.5 years, reduced to 3.5 years after applying Summers credit for pre-sentence custody.
Accused sentenced to 8 years for possessing 15kg of cocaine; post-trial s. 11(b) delay application dismissed.
The accused was convicted of possession of 15 kilograms of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a sting operation involving the US-DEA and RCMP.
Prior to sentencing, the accused brought an application alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The court dismissed the Charter application, finding that the failure to bring it prior to trial was fatal and that the net delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.
The court sentenced the accused to 8 years' imprisonment, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the large quantity and high purity of the cocaine.
Accused charged with terrorism offences granted bail on strict conditions after s. 525 detention review.
The accused, charged with terrorism offences for allegedly attempting to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State, appeared for a mandatory detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.
The court conducted a bail hearing 'from the ground up'.
The court found that the Crown's case was not overwhelmingly strong, as there was no direct evidence the accused intended to enhance the terrorist group's ability to carry out terrorist activities, nor any history of violence.
The court concluded that the accused's detention was not justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds, and ordered her release on a $100,000 surety bail with strict conditions, including a ban on social media and internet monitoring.
The court dismissed the accused's application to exclude evidence, finding the search warrant was lawfully obtained despite minor errors in the information to obtain.
The accused, Samuel Oduro, brought a pre-trial application to exclude cocaine evidence found in his car, alleging a violation of his Section 8 Charter rights.
He argued the search warrant was unlawfully obtained due to baseless generalizations, incomplete disclosure, failure to meet telewarrant preconditions, and insufficient information regarding the confidential informant's credibility.
The court dismissed the application, finding that while the affiant made minor errors, they were in good faith and did not mislead the issuing justice.
The court concluded that the information to obtain the warrant, as amplified and redacted, provided reasonable grounds for its issuance, rendering the search lawful and no Charter breach.
Convictions for uttering forged prescriptions upheld, but possession of stolen property conviction quashed due to misdirection.
The appellant appealed her convictions for uttering forged prescriptions and possession of stolen property, as well as her 18-month sentence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals for uttering forged documents, finding no fatal errors in the Crown's examination of an accomplice or the trial judge's Vetrovec warning.
However, the court allowed the appeal on the possession of stolen property charge and ordered a new trial, as the jury was not properly instructed on the elements of theft, specifically 'fraudulently' and 'without colour of right'.
The sentence for the uttering charges was varied to a 12-month conditional sentence.
New surety and legal errors justified release on bail review.
On a section 525 bail detention review, the accused sought release by advancing a new surety plan after detention on secondary and tertiary grounds at the original hearing.
The court held that the availability of a surety constituted a material change in circumstances and also found two errors of law in the original decision: misapprehension of the secondary ground as turning solely on substantial likelihood of further offending, and failure to make a sufficient finding on the strength of the Crown's case.
Applying the proper bail principles, the court found the prosecution case to be of medium strength, accepted that the allegations were serious, and concluded that a surety-supervised house arrest plan adequately addressed both secondary and tertiary concerns.
Release was ordered on a recognizance with sureties and strict conditions.
Appeal allowed and new trial ordered due to inadmissible anecdotal expert evidence regarding courier knowledge.
The appellant appealed his conviction for importing opium into Canada.
At trial, the Crown's expert witness testified that in his experience, it was 'one hundred percent true' that the person bringing the shipment had knowledge of the illicit substance.
The Crown conceded on appeal that this anecdotal evidence was inadmissible and highly prejudicial, running afoul of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Sekhon.
Because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.
Conviction appeal allowed and new trial ordered due to self-represented accused's lack of access to disclosure.
The self-represented appellant was convicted of fentanyl trafficking, conspiracy, and uttering forged documents.
He appealed on the basis that he was denied access to the Crown's digital disclosure while incarcerated during the trial.
The Crown conceded the trial was unfair and the appeal should be allowed, but argued for a new trial.
The appellant sought acquittals, arguing he had already served part of his sentence and the verdict was unreasonable.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding there was sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict.
Phone numbers are virtual places — reasonable suspicion required before dial-a-dope opportunities.
Two consolidated appeals arising from dial-a-dope drug investigations in which undercover officers, acting on unsubstantiated tips, telephoned phone numbers alleged to be associated with drug trafficking and arranged purchases of cocaine.
The majority affirmed the entrapment framework established in R. v. Mack and R. v. Barnes, holding that police must form reasonable suspicion — whether individualized to a person or tethered to a sufficiently particularized virtual location such as a phone number — before offering an accused the opportunity to commit a criminal offence.
In the first appellant's case, the majority upheld his convictions, finding that reasonable suspicion had crystallized during the call before the opportunity to traffic was extended, as the accused's use of drug-subculture slang corroborated the tip.
In the second appellant's case, the majority found entrapment had occurred because the opportunity to traffic was provided before reasonable suspicion was established, and accordingly reinstated the stay of proceedings.
The minority would have revised the bona fide inquiry prong to require only a factually-grounded investigation into a tightly circumscribed location motivated by genuine law enforcement purposes, under which both appeals would have been dismissed.
First-time offender sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for acting as a courier importing heroin.
The offender was convicted by a jury of importing 203.5 grams of heroin, conspiracy to import, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and pled guilty to using a forged document.
The court found the offender was a mere courier motivated by financial need to support his family, and that he knew the imported substance was heroin.
Weighing the significant mitigating factors, including his status as a first-time offender with strong community support, against the aggravating nature of heroin, the court sentenced the offender to 5 years' imprisonment.
Conviction appeal dismissed; overwhelming circumstantial evidence supported findings of guilt for cocaine importation.
The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to import cocaine after a controlled delivery of a package containing over 3.5 kilograms of cocaine.
On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the law on importing and post-offence conduct, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made minor factual errors, they were not essential to the convictions given the overwhelming circumstantial evidence of guilt, including the appellant's possession of shipping details, phone records, and flight from police.
Accused acquitted of importing cocaine after raising reasonable doubt that drugs were planted in luggage.
The three accused were charged with importing cocaine after returning from a vacation in Jamaica.
Border Services Officers found approximately half a kilo of cocaine hidden inside cocoa powder cans in each of their checked suitcases.
The accused immediately disavowed knowledge of the drugs, claiming they were planted by unknown persons.
The court rejected the Crown's argument that 'Occam's Razor' proved guilt and found that the accused's immediate disavowals and testimony raised a reasonable doubt regarding their knowledge of the drugs.
All three accused were found not guilty.
Section 36(1) of the MLACMA admits foreign hearsay records without proving necessity or threshold reliability.
The appellant was convicted of drug offences arising from his participation in a conspiracy to import cocaine from Costa Rica to Toronto.
The conspiracy was thwarted and drugs were seized by Panamanian authorities.
The trial judge admitted laboratory evidence from Panamanian authorities obtained pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request, which established that the seized substance was cocaine.
The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge misinterpreted section 36(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and that the provision was unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that section 36(1) properly permits the admission of foreign records containing hearsay and opinion evidence without requiring proof of necessity or threshold reliability, and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the constitutional challenge raised for the first time on appeal.
The Court of Appeal upheld the mandatory minimum for large-scale fraud and increased the offender's sentence.
The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following the respondent's guilty plea to fraud exceeding $41 million.
The respondent had fraudulently redirected GST refunds from the Canada Revenue Agency by submitting false RC366 Direct Deposit Request Forms.
The sentencing judge struck down the mandatory two-year minimum sentence under section 380(1.1) of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional and imposed 18 months imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the constitutional question (with a dissent), found the sentence manifestly inadequate, and imposed a three-year sentence.
However, the court declined to re-incarcerate the respondent as he had already served the original sentence and demonstrated rehabilitation.
The accused was acquitted of importing cocaine because evidence of common luggage-sharing practices raised a reasonable doubt.
Natalia Giselle Smith was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.
Her co-accused, Charita Maryah Johnson, was convicted.
The Crown relied on actual knowledge to establish Smith's liability, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith knew she was importing a prohibited substance.
The court admitted Johnson's videotaped statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding it necessary due to Johnson's hostile testimony and reliable due to corroborating evidence and voluntariness.
Despite circumstantial evidence linking Smith to the cocaine, including possession of luggage tags and paying excess fees, the court found that the possibility of luggage sharing and Johnson's inconsistent testimony created a reasonable doubt.
Smith was found not guilty of all charges.
A stay of proceedings was granted for unreasonable delay below the Jordan ceiling due to late Crown disclosure.
The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under Section 11(b) of the Charter, stemming from the Crown's late disclosure of 12,000 pages of cell phone data on the eve of trial.
This disclosure failure caused an 8-month adjournment, extending the total delay to 28 months and 10 days, just under the 30-month Jordan ceiling.
The court found the delay markedly excessive due to Crown negligence in obtaining and disclosing the evidence, and that the defence had taken reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings despite a minor misstep in not explicitly raising delay concerns at a set date.
The application was granted, and the charge was stayed.
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial after the Crown conceded the trial judge failed to assist the self-represented accused with Charter issues.
The appellant appealed his conviction entered on April 23, 2015 and sentence imposed on August 4, 2015 by the Superior Court of Justice.
The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to provide reasonable assistance to the appellant in respect of Charter views.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.
The offender was sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment for possessing crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
The offender, Elidio Moran, was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking a Schedule 1 controlled substance (crack cocaine).
The court considered an application to exclude evidence based on an alleged s.8 Charter violation, which was denied.
In sentencing, the court weighed aggravating factors, including the nature and quantity of the drug and the offender's significant criminal record with prior drug offences and probation breaches, against mitigating factors such as the efficient conduct of his defence.
The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the Defence proposed 13 months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.
The court imposed a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment, followed by one year of probation, with credit for pre-trial custody and house arrest.
Mandatory weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge were also ordered.