David Quayat

The accused, Samuel Oduro, brought a pre-trial application to exclude cocaine evidence found in his car, alleging a violation of his Section 8 Charter rights.

He argued the search warrant was unlawfully obtained due to baseless generalizations, incomplete disclosure, failure to meet telewarrant preconditions, and insufficient information regarding the confidential informant's credibility.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the affiant made minor errors, they were in good faith and did not mislead the issuing justice.

The court concluded that the information to obtain the warrant, as amplified and redacted, provided reasonable grounds for its issuance, rendering the search lawful and no Charter breach.

The appellant was convicted of drug offences arising from his participation in a conspiracy to import cocaine from Costa Rica to Toronto.

The conspiracy was thwarted and drugs were seized by Panamanian authorities.

The trial judge admitted laboratory evidence from Panamanian authorities obtained pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty request, which established that the seized substance was cocaine.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge misinterpreted section 36(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and that the provision was unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that section 36(1) properly permits the admission of foreign records containing hearsay and opinion evidence without requiring proof of necessity or threshold reliability, and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the constitutional challenge raised for the first time on appeal.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed following the respondent's guilty plea to fraud exceeding $41 million.

The respondent had fraudulently redirected GST refunds from the Canada Revenue Agency by submitting false RC366 Direct Deposit Request Forms.

The sentencing judge struck down the mandatory two-year minimum sentence under section 380(1.1) of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional and imposed 18 months imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the constitutional question (with a dissent), found the sentence manifestly inadequate, and imposed a three-year sentence.

However, the court declined to re-incarcerate the respondent as he had already served the original sentence and demonstrated rehabilitation.

Natalia Giselle Smith was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

Her co-accused, Charita Maryah Johnson, was convicted.

The Crown relied on actual knowledge to establish Smith's liability, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith knew she was importing a prohibited substance.

The court admitted Johnson's videotaped statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding it necessary due to Johnson's hostile testimony and reliable due to corroborating evidence and voluntariness.

Despite circumstantial evidence linking Smith to the cocaine, including possession of luggage tags and paying excess fees, the court found that the possibility of luggage sharing and Johnson's inconsistent testimony created a reasonable doubt.

Smith was found not guilty of all charges.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under Section 11(b) of the Charter, stemming from the Crown's late disclosure of 12,000 pages of cell phone data on the eve of trial.

This disclosure failure caused an 8-month adjournment, extending the total delay to 28 months and 10 days, just under the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court found the delay markedly excessive due to Crown negligence in obtaining and disclosing the evidence, and that the defence had taken reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings despite a minor misstep in not explicitly raising delay concerns at a set date.

The application was granted, and the charge was stayed.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered on April 23, 2015 and sentence imposed on August 4, 2015 by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred by failing to provide reasonable assistance to the appellant in respect of Charter views.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The offender, Elidio Moran, was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking a Schedule 1 controlled substance (crack cocaine).

The court considered an application to exclude evidence based on an alleged s.8 Charter violation, which was denied.

In sentencing, the court weighed aggravating factors, including the nature and quantity of the drug and the offender's significant criminal record with prior drug offences and probation breaches, against mitigating factors such as the efficient conduct of his defence.

The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the Defence proposed 13 months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The court imposed a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment, followed by one year of probation, with credit for pre-trial custody and house arrest.

Mandatory weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge were also ordered.

Shanice Waldron was found guilty by a jury of importing 2.753 kg of cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record for identity fraud, and mitigating factors such as her youth, status as a single mother, strong rehabilitation prospects, and a history of sexual abuse leading to vulnerability.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed a range of five and a half to six and a half years.

The court imposed a sentence of six and a half years of incarceration, along with a mandatory 10-year firearms prohibition, a lifetime prohibition under s. 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, and a DNA order.

The court specifically found that the presence of her young son during the offence was not an aggravating factor.

Two separate appeals concerning the entrapment defence in dial-a-dope drug trafficking investigations.

In Williams' case, the trial judge found entrapment and stayed drug trafficking charges, but the Crown appealed.

In Ahmad's case, the trial judge rejected an entrapment application and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that police may provide opportunities to sell drugs to persons associated with phone lines reasonably suspected of being used in dial-a-dope operations, even without reasonable suspicion that those individuals are engaged in criminal activity, provided the police are conducting a bona fide inquiry.

The majority found no entrapment in either case.

The concurrence reached the same result but on the basis that police had reasonable suspicion that both accused were engaged in criminal activity.

The appellants were convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue on appeal concerned the validity of a search warrant obtained using information from a confidential informant.

The warrant was executed at night and resulted in the seizure of approximately 300 grams of cocaine and $46,000 in cash.

The appellants challenged the warrant on multiple grounds, including the use of the Garofoli step six procedure, the adequacy of the judicial summary of redacted information, whether the confidential informant's tip met the Debot criteria for reliability, and whether the night search was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the warrant was valid and the search lawful.

The accused, charged with drug offences, brought a motion for production of information relating to a confidential informant and the Information to Obtain a search warrant, ahead of a planned Garofoli application.

The accused sought source handler notes and other documents, and requested to cross-examine the affiant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the request to cross-examine premature and holding that the accused failed to provide any factual foundation to justify disclosure of materials outside the investigative file.

The defendant was charged with possession of opium and methamphetamine, both Schedule I substances under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police stopped the defendant's vehicle for a sobriety check and discovered a brown tar-like substance in the centre console cup-holder, which they believed to be opium.

The defendant was arrested, and a subsequent search of the vehicle revealed additional drug paraphernalia and a white powdery substance hidden in the light above the driver's side sun visor.

Health Canada testing confirmed the brown substance was opium and the white substance was methamphetamine.

The defendant testified that he had no knowledge of the items and suggested an employee may have left them in his vehicle.

The court found the defendant not guilty due to reasonable doubt regarding possession and knowledge.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The trial was brief, with the Crown calling one police officer who testified that he found a small bag containing cocaine in the defendant's front pants pocket during a search at a GO Train station.

The defendant, self-represented, did not testify, cross-examine the officer, or present evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty, rejecting his unsworn statement that he was unaware of the cocaine in his pocket, finding the inference of knowledge irresistible based on common sense and the circumstances.

A police officer with the Niagara Regional Police was convicted of conspiracy to smuggle cheese into Canada from the United States without paying required duties, related customs offences, and breach of trust by a public official.

The appellant organized a scheme with another constable to smuggle approximately $133,000 worth of cheese across the border, evading approximately $325,000 in duties.

The appellant was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for the smuggling offences and one month consecutive for breach of trust.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his breach of trust conviction and sought leave to appeal both sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences regarding the CPIC query were reasonable and the sentences were fit.

The accused, Shamar Cole, challenged a search warrant for his vehicle, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights and seeking to exclude evidence of cocaine seized.

The court found that while the police had reasonable and probable grounds to search the accused's residence, the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds for the vehicle search due to a technical omission by the affiant, thus violating s. 8.

However, applying the R. v. Grant s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the Charter breach was technical and not egregious, the impact on privacy was limited (vehicle vs. dwelling), and the public interest in adjudicating serious drug trafficking charges on their merits strongly favoured admission.

Consequently, the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and the evidence was deemed admissible.

Shamar Cole, a 22-year-old first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of possession of 275.33g of crack cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

The drugs were found during search warrants at his associated residence and a vehicle registered to him.

The Crown sought a four-year sentence, while the defence sought two to two-and-a-half years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the commercial nature of the dealing, lack of remorse evidenced by a Facebook post, and the presence of drug paraphernalia and cash.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth and lack of prior record.

The court imposed a sentence of two years and eight months imprisonment, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of seized cash and a vehicle.

The applicant, Malcolm Alpha King Cassells, sought to exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a residence and his person, arguing breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Police entered a residence without a warrant based on perceived exigent circumstances and arrested the applicant without reasonable and probable grounds.

A search incident to arrest yielded currency and cocaine.

The court found the arrest unlawful, breaching the applicant's s. 9 rights, and the subsequent searches incident to arrest breached his s. 8 rights.

Applying the *Grant* test, the court determined that admitting the evidence (currency, cocaine, and police observations of the applicant's location) would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of police conduct, the impact on Charter-protected interests, and the diminished reliability of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was granted.

The accused, charged with a 1998 sexual assault identified via a 2014 DNA hit, brought a pre-trial motion under the Mills regime seeking production of the complainant's OHIP billing records, police occurrence reports, and particulars of her testimony in a prior unrelated sexual assault trial.

The court dismissed the requests for the OHIP and police records, finding them overly broad, irrelevant, and an unjustified intrusion into the complainant's privacy.

However, the court ordered the Crown to provide particulars of the time and place of the complainant's prior public testimony, as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information.

A secured lender brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of accounts receivable assigned to it following borrower default.

The moving party relied on security agreements governed by Virginia law and the Uniform Commercial Code, asserting a right to collect accounts receivable directly from an account debtor.

The responding parties argued the lender’s decision to collect receivables rather than realize on other collateral was commercially unreasonable and raised triable issues.

The court accepted expert evidence on Virginia law and held the UCC’s commercial reasonableness requirement applied to the manner of collection, not the decision to pursue accounts receivable over other collateral.

The court further held that cause of action estoppel barred the applicants’ claims due to prior litigation in the United States.

Summary judgment was granted and the related application dismissed.

The plaintiff, an artist, brought an action for copyright infringement against the defendant, another artist, alleging that the defendant's paintings of crumpled paper infringed the copyright in the plaintiff's 'Classical Series' of paintings.

The court found that while copyright subsisted in the plaintiff's individual paintings, it did not subsist in the series as a whole.

The court dismissed the action, concluding that the defendant's works were not substantial copies or colourable imitations of the plaintiff's works, as the similarities were based on commonplace artistic techniques.

Furthermore, the court found that the defendant had independently created his works using his own photographic models.