Ryan Stewart Breedon

The applicant brought an application under the Road Access Act to close an access road to the respondents, proposing to erect gates that would allow other property owners access while excluding the respondents.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that closure was reasonably necessary to prevent substantial damage or injury to his property interests.

Furthermore, the court held that public interest considerations, including emergency and utility access, weighed in favour of keeping the road open.

The application was dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the motion judge was correct in concluding that the statement of claim in the fraudulent conveyance action was not before her at the hearing.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties for a transcript.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a trial judge's decision on fraudulent conveyance and oppression claims.

The trial judge had found oppression but did not rule on fraudulent conveyance, basing the oppression finding on a theory not pleaded or argued.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons legally insufficient, internally inconsistent, and procedurally unfair, as the decision was based on an unpleaded "reasonable expectation" of a reserve fund.

The court determined it could not conduct a de novo analysis or substitute findings due to credibility issues and the record not inevitably yielding a particular outcome.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the trial judgment set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The plaintiff sought a contempt order against the defendant corporation and its director for repeated failure to comply with court orders to answer undertakings from a judgment debtor examination.

Despite multiple adjournments and assurances, the undertakings remained incomplete.

The court declared the defendant in breach of the orders but, exercising restraint, deferred an immediate contempt finding.

It granted the defendant one final opportunity to comply by a specified date, failing which the contempt motion would proceed.

The court also ordered the defendant and its director to pay costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff slipped and fell at a Wal-Mart store, suffering a knee dislocation.

She was taken to the hospital where she was treated by an emergency room physician and an orthopaedic surgeon.

Due to a delay in diagnosing and treating compartment syndrome and a vascular injury, the plaintiff's leg had to be amputated.

The court found that both physicians breached the standard of care by failing to conduct adequate examinations and communicate effectively, and that these breaches caused the plaintiff's injury.

The action against Wal-Mart was dismissed as any assumed breach of the standard of care did not cause the injury.

The plaintiffs invested in a land development project in Brampton promoted by the defendants.

The defendants promised to develop the property into a subdivision and deliver serviced lots to the investors.

However, the defendants never developed the property, secretly used project funds to pay for their personal expenses, and ultimately sold the undeveloped land to a third-party developer for over $15.3 million.

The plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, fraud, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the actions, finding that the defendants had engaged in a deliberate pattern of deceptive and self-serving misconduct.

The court imposed a constructive trust and awarded the plaintiffs a pro-rata share of the sale proceeds based on their capital contributions, totaling over $10.6 million, plus $150,000 in punitive damages.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

The appellant, Dr. Colin Ward, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for negligence in performing a laparoscopic colectomy on the respondent, Karen Armstrong, in February 2010.

The trial judge found that Dr. Ward breached the standard of care by bringing a LigaSure device within one to two millimetres of the respondent's left ureter, causing a thermal injury that resulted in stricturing of the ureter and eventual removal of the kidney.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Paciocco and Juriansz JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by defining the standard of care as a goal or result (avoiding injury) rather than as the means a prudent surgeon would employ.

The majority held that since the trial judge found Dr. Ward took the steps a prudent surgeon would take, he should have been exonerated.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, finding the trial judge's findings on standard of care were fully supported by the evidence and that staying at least two millimetres away from the ureter was a necessary step, not merely a goal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant's counsel withdrew one month prior to the appeal hearing, and the appellant requested an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment request, finding no basis to grant it.

The respondent argued the appeal lacked merit, noting that the summary judgment was granted after the appellant failed to comply with court-ordered indulgences regarding payment of costs and filing of material, and that the material would not have raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a costs endorsement following a partial appeal of a trial judgment concerning adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The appellants successfully set aside the trial judge's finding that the respondent was entitled to a prescriptive easement over a cedar trail, but the appellants' appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge's costs award from $42,954.63 to $32,000, finding that although the respondent lost on the cedar trail issue, he still bettered the offer to settle and his claims to adverse possession of the house lands and a prescriptive easement over the laneway were more significant than the cedar trail claim.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant for breach of contract over a real estate transaction.

The parties had agreed the plaintiffs would buy a house with an extended closing, renovate it, and sell it, keeping the profits above the original purchase price.

The house sold for a profit, but the defendant refused to pay the full amount, arguing the plaintiffs had agreed to vary the contract and accept a lesser sum, or alternatively, that various deductions applied.

The court found no valid variation of the contract, as there was no meeting of the minds, no consideration, and any agreement was extracted under economic duress.

The court rejected most of the defendant's claimed deductions, allowing only a deduction for real estate commission fees, and awarded the plaintiffs $212,224.63.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding he engaged in professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a 15-year-old patient.

The appellant argued the Panel misapprehended the evidence by failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, improperly considering post-incident conduct, and applying unequal scrutiny to the evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Panel's credibility assessments and factual findings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The respondents were injured in a motor vehicle accident while in the course of their employment.

They elected to opt out of WSIA benefits to join a class action and subsequently applied for Statutory Accident Benefits (SABS).

After the class action was dismissed, the insurer terminated their SABS, arguing the election was invalid.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the election was made in good faith to pursue the class action, not primarily to claim SABS.

The Divisional Court dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the Tribunal applied the correct legal test and reasonably concluded that the ultimate dismissal of the class action did not retroactively invalidate the good faith of the initial election.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a failed residential subdivision development project in Fort Erie, Ontario.

The central issues were whether the parties had entered into an enforceable written agreement dated December 13, 2005, whether there was a breach or repudiation of that agreement, and the validity of a construction lien filed by Ravenda Homes.

The motion judge had dismissed Ravenda Homes's breach of contract action, vacated its certificate of pending litigation, allowed its lien action, and allowed the respondent's counterclaim in part.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most of the motion judge's findings but set aside the award of damages under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act, referring that issue to trial.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motion judge's decision finding that an unknown driver caused or contributed to a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant challenged the motion judge's credibility findings regarding a witness and argued the judge engaged in speculation rather than rational inference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's approach, noting that the judge carefully considered the evidence and made findings based on the whole of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This costs endorsement pertains to a motion brought by 1372708 Ontario Inc. to compel Ravenda Homes Ltd. and its principal, John Ravenda, to answer undertakings and questions refused during discovery in three complex proceedings.

The moving party achieved substantial success, as most outstanding discovery issues were resolved in their favour, either by court order or consent after the motion was initiated.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the moving party, reducing the amount due to some unsuccessful aspects of the motion, such as the attempt to examine an expert on a Deloitte LLP report.

The court emphasized that costs "in the cause" are only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here, and fixed costs at $19,000.00 inclusive of HST.

This addendum clarifies and amends a previous summary judgment ruling.

The court addressed five requests for amendment, largely granting those related to the scope of claims not pursued on summary judgment, legal costs for vacating a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and utility/maintenance costs for model homes.

The court affirmed its power to amend a ruling before it is finalized and rejected attempts to re-litigate factual findings.

This costs decision followed the dismissal of an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming involuntary patient status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant had primarily pursued a Charter declaration against the respondent physician concerning the alleged wrongful administration of an injection, relief that had not been sought before the Board or identified in the notice of appeal.

The court held that approach was fundamentally unfair and awarded the respondent physician partial indemnity costs despite the appellant's vulnerable circumstances.

Costs were fixed at $3,000 all-inclusive, payable forthwith, and the Attorney General did not seek costs.

In a discovery motion arising from three related civil proceedings concerning an alleged subdivision development agreement, model homes, and a renovation claim, the moving parties sought answers to undertakings and refusals and leave to examine on an expert loss-of-profits report.

The court held that Rule 31.10 barred examination of the expert author, and that there was no express or implied right to discover a party on its delivered expert report absent exceptional circumstances and clearly identified holes in the expert's analysis.

Relying on proportionality and accessibility principles, the court rejected what would amount to an end run around the expert discovery rules.

The court nevertheless ordered re-attendance to answer outstanding discovery matters, a further and better affidavit of documents, an adjournment of the trial, and a judicial pretrial after the contemplated summary judgment motion.