Ryan Stewart Breedon

The cross-appellant lawyer appealed a 12-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Appeal Panel for professional misconduct involving sexual harassment.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the impact of the proceedings on his life.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it of limited value.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on penalty, finding the 12-month suspension unreasonable given the historical context of the misconduct (1988-1993), comparable cases, and mitigating factors.

The penalty was reduced to a three-month suspension.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which ordered costs as a condition of an interim decision to adjourn a hearing.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the decision, holding that the Discipline Committee lacks the express statutory authority required to order costs on an adjournment.

The Law Society appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's finding that the respondent lawyer committed professional misconduct through sexual harassment.

The Appeal Panel had ordered a new hearing, finding the Hearing Panel erred by failing to strictly apply the credibility assessment test from R. v. W. (D.).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that strict application of W. (D.) is not required in administrative disciplinary proceedings provided the correct civil standard of proof is applied.

The court restored the finding of professional misconduct but upheld the Appeal Panel's conclusion that the penalty of disbarment was unreasonable, substituting a 12-month suspension.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim that the steam rate under a 1994 Steam Sale Agreement should be based solely on nuclear-generated steam, rather than including oil-fired steam.

The trial judge interpreted the phrase 'full reasonable cost recovery principle' to allow the respondent to recover its actual costs, including those from an oil-fuelled back-up boiler.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the factual matrix or her application of contract interpretation principles.

The respondent owner built four rental buildings that were approved and inspected by the appellant municipality.

It was later discovered the buildings lacked required firewalls, leading to the tenants vacating and a mortgage shortfall.

The municipality admitted liability for negligence at trial.

On appeal, the municipality argued the owner was contributorily negligent for the defective plans submitted by its contractor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding no evidence the contractor breached the standard of care and upholding the trial judge's finding that the owner and contractor were not joint venturers.

The judgment amount and set-off were corrected on consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing proposed evidence of the complainant's propensity to inflict injuries on herself as collateral, as it was relevant to a central fact in issue.

The convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm were quashed and a new trial ordered.

However, the appeal from the breach of recognizance convictions was dismissed, as there was ample evidence that the appellant knowingly breached the conditions.