Sharon Shore

Two organizations, York University Staff Association (YUSA) and Black Legal Action Centre (BLAC), sought leave to intervene in an application for judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision.

The underlying decision dismissed most of the applicant's discrimination claims for being outside the one-year limitation period.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to intervene.

The court found that YUSA did not have a direct interest in the narrow limitation period issue before the court, and that BLAC would not provide a distinct perspective from the applicant and risked introducing irrelevant peripheral issues.

The appellant, a high-profile public figure, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of his request for a sealing order and publication ban in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider alternative protective measures such as anonymization and partial sealing.

The court also found a palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no evidence of harm to the child, noting the child's need for security guards and signs of distress.

A partial sealing order and publication ban were granted to protect the child's privacy.

The appellant mother appealed a temporary order granting the respondent father equal parenting time on a week-about basis with their 15-month-old child.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to conduct a proper analysis of the best interests of the child under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The motion judge failed to consider the child's young age, the status quo, allegations of family violence, and the AFCC-O Guidelines.

The temporary order was set aside and the matter remitted to a different judge, with an interim graduated parenting schedule put in place.

The landlord appellants sought to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering them to pay the tenant $12,330.30.

Despite multiple directions and extensions from the court to file their appeal materials, the appellants failed to do so.

On the scheduled hearing date, the appellants still had not filed materials and sought a further adjournment based on a vague medical note provided that morning.

The court refused to grant any further adjournments, dismissed the appeal for delay and failure to file materials, and lifted the stay of the LTB order.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a WSIB decision approving a worker's third-party settlement retroactively, allowing the worker to claim 'top-up' benefits under s. 30(14) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The employer argued the statute strictly requires WSIB approval before a settlement is made.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the WSIB's interpretation reasonable.

Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and the mandatory/directory distinction, the court held that the pre-approval requirement is directory, and barring the worker from benefits due to timing would undermine the remedial purpose of the Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director under the Discriminatory Business Practices Act.

The Director had concluded that the Act was not engaged by agreements between the University of Windsor and student groups regarding protest encampments, which included a provision limiting institutional academic agreements with Israeli universities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Director's conclusion that the University was not 'engaging in business' under the Act to be reasonable.

The court also upheld the Director's alternative finding that the agreements did not mandate a refusal to employ or promote, as required by section 4(1)3(ii) of the Act.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order requiring $4,000,000 from the proceeds of the sale of their property to be paid into court as security for the respondents' damages claim.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal and set aside the order, finding that the motion judge erred in law by applying the general test for an interlocutory injunction rather than the stringent test for a Mareva injunction.

The court held that there was no evidence of a real risk of asset dissipation, no undertaking as to damages was provided, and the alternative argument under Rule 45.02 failed because the respondents sought damages rather than an interest in a specific fund.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA) Director, which confirmed the Guelph Chief of Police's finding that the applicant's police misconduct allegations were unsubstantiated.

The applicant had alleged unlawful arrest, excessive force, and retaliation during an incident where he was tasered and arrested for assault with a weapon.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Director's decision was internally coherent, justified by the evidence, and consistent with the applicable legal framework.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for unpaid flooring invoices on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant argued the invoices were part of an ongoing construction contract and that the discoverability principle should apply.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's finding that there was no ongoing contract and that the invoices, which did not specify a payment date, were demand obligations.

The appeal was dismissed as the claim was commenced more than two years after the date of the last invoice.

The tenant appealed two decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board which allowed the landlord's eviction application for the purpose of her son's residential occupation.

The tenant argued the eviction was in retaliation for reporting a lead paint issue to Public Health.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board erred in law by confusing whether the good faith intention required under s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act needed to be that of the landlord or the landlord's son.

The Board's failure to distinguish between the landlord and her son also infected its analysis of the mandatory refusal provisions under s. 83(3).

The matter was remitted to the Board for a new hearing.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellants paid out the principal and interest, and the mortgage was discharged.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue that the appeal was moot.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding no live controversy and declining to exercise its discretion under the Borowski test to hear the moot appeal, as there were no collateral consequences or issues of broad public importance.

The appeal was quashed with no costs awarded.

The Divisional Court issued an amended costs addendum after mistakenly ordering no costs on a motion for leave.

The responding party, having been successful on the motion, sought $17,747 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found this amount disproportionate given the small amount in issue ($6,610) and noted the matter arose from the responding party's failure to file in time.

Costs were fixed at $2,500.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision of the Brampton Appeal Tribunal upholding a Property Standards Order under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The appeal was brought before a panel of the Divisional Court.

The court determined it lacked jurisdiction, as section 15.3(4) of the Act requires such appeals to be heard by a single judge of the Superior Court of Justice.

The matter was transferred to the Superior Court of Justice pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant lawyer appealed decisions of the Law Society of Ontario finding him incapacitated due to a delusional disorder and suspending him indefinitely.

The appellant had initiated numerous Federal Court actions alleging acquaintances were government spies, leading to him being declared a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of expert psychiatric evidence, the dismissal of motions to call witnesses and admit fresh evidence, or the tribunal's handling of the appellant's arguments.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review in the Divisional Court to remove a parenting coordinator/arbitrator appointed under a consent order.

The respondent challenged the court's jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Arbitration Act, an application to remove an arbitrator must be brought in the Superior Court of Justice or Family Court, not the Divisional Court.

The court also noted it would decline to exercise its discretion even if it had jurisdiction, as the proper route is under the Family Law Rules and the Arbitration Act.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Chalmers J. dated July 12, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a costs order made by a Deputy Judge.

The responding party requested that the moving party be declared a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and declined to declare the moving party a vexatious litigant due to a lack of supporting submissions.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a December 10, 2024 decision of Faieta J. The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal specifically on the issue of the disclosure of counselling and therapy records.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $5,000 and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $4,882.50.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision approving an Above-Guideline Rent Increase, arguing procedural fairness was denied when the LTB expedited the hearing ex parte and denied an in-person hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the LTB properly exercised its discretion under its rules to shorten time due to harassment of the landlord's staff.

The Court also held the LTB did not err in ordering a written hearing, as the tenants failed to raise any Human Rights Code accommodation requests at the initial hearing.