Sharon Shore

The respondent brought an urgent motion seeking custody of the parties' 14-year-old son and a comprehensive case review, alleging the applicant failed to follow COVID-19 guidelines and that a prior review was not held.

The respondent also made conspiracy allegations.

The applicant sought dismissal, highlighting the respondent's prior designation as a vexatious litigant and the denial of leave for a similar custody motion in April 2020.

The court denied leave to the respondent's motion and struck it under Family Law Rules 1(8) and 1(8.2), finding it to be an abuse of process.

The court noted the motion was almost identical to a previously denied one, new allegations were unsubstantiated, the respondent failed to meet conditions for parenting time resumption, and conspiracy theories had been previously rejected.

The applicant father sought an urgent motion to change the children's residential schedule to establish equal time-sharing or primary residence with him, citing concerns about the respondent mother's work as a healthcare professional during the COVID-19 pandemic and the children residing with maternal grandparents.

The court, acting as a Triage Judge, found that the motion to change the residential schedule was not urgent, as the father failed to provide substantive evidence that the children were unsafe or that the existing arrangements needed urgent modification.

Furthermore, the court determined that the father's lack of access since March 20, 2020, was not urgent because he had refused offered access that did not meet his demand for equal time-sharing.

The court denied the urgent motion, encouraging parties to resume the regular residential schedule.

The parties brought a consent motion (Form 14B) seeking an order to set a six-day trial date for the week of September 21, 2020.

The court declined to grant the order, finding the issue not urgent under the Chief Justice's Notice regarding COVID-19 suspensions.

The judge emphasized the need to avoid queue-jumping for trial dates given the ongoing suspension of court matters and the court's process for re-scheduling trials, citing the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to deal with cases justly, including appropriate resource allocation.

The Father brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of the parties' four-year-old daughter to Arizona, her habitual residence, after the Mother unilaterally removed her to Ontario.

The Mother sought a declaration that Ontario had jurisdiction and argued that the Hague application was commenced more than one year after the wrongful removal, and that the child was settled in Ontario.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was Arizona, the removal was wrongful, and the Father did not consent or acquiesce.

The court determined that the Hague proceedings were commenced within one year of the removal.

Even if not, the court found the child was not sufficiently settled in Ontario to dismiss the application, emphasizing the Convention's objectives of deterrence and rapid return, especially for a young child whose environment is primarily family-centric.

The court ordered the child's return to Arizona.

The applicant sought costs against the respondent's former lawyer, Murray Maltz, personally, under Rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules.

The motion stemmed from Maltz's actions, including providing a legal opinion on a foreign divorce's validity despite ongoing disputes, removing matrimonial home designations without notice, acting on property sales, misleading opposing counsel about urgency, and disbursing funds to his client while court orders for support and costs were outstanding.

The court found Maltz's conduct to be a series of deliberate actions that assisted his client in avoiding court obligations and unnecessarily increased the applicant's costs.

The court ordered Maltz to personally pay $6,500 in costs.

The appellant, J.H., appealed final child protection orders placing his children in extended society care with no access, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The appellant claimed the trial judge rejected his plan for the children's return before final submissions.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's statements in context, applying the high threshold for apprehension of bias.

It found that the trial judge's comments, including hypothetical scenarios and expressions of preliminary thoughts, did not indicate a closed mind but rather an open one amenable to persuasion by submissions.

The appeal was dismissed, with no costs awarded.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAST) appealed a lower court order that granted the Respondent Mother access to her child, A.G., after the child was placed in extended society care.

CAST argued the lower court erred in its interpretation of a "beneficial and meaningful relationship" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), by considering future rather than existing relationships, and by making findings without sufficient evidentiary basis regarding the child's cultural heritage and medical history.

The Superior Court found that the lower court erred in its interpretation of "beneficial and meaningful" by rejecting pre-CYFSA jurisprudence and in making a finding about the child's medical history without evidence.

The appeal was allowed in part, the lower court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing on the issue of access.

The father brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of his two young children to Massachusetts, their habitual residence, after the mother wrongfully retained them in Ontario following a consented visit.

The court found that Massachusetts was the children's habitual residence, the father had custody rights which he was exercising, and the mother's retention was wrongful due to deceit.

The court dismissed the mother's defence of grave risk of harm, finding the alleged abuse insufficient to meet the high threshold.

The children were ordered to be returned to Massachusetts.

The respondent mother, S.A.P., appealed a final disposition order that placed her children in the custody of the respondent father, M.I., following a child protection application.

The appeal raised six grounds, including alleged errors in law regarding the mother's position on the children's need for protection, the test for future emotional harm, the consideration of services provided to the mother, the consideration of less disruptive alternatives, the weight given to the father's criminal record and behaviour, and the mother's willingness to maintain ties between the children and the father.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's decision based on the children's best interests, emphasizing the importance of continuity of care and deference to the trial judge's factual findings and weighing of evidence.

The applicant sought the release of $2,750,000 from her share of the net proceeds of sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent brought a cross-motion, agreeing to release $500,000 to the applicant and $100,000 to himself, but sought to impose a condition that a further $2,000,000 be released to the applicant only upon her entering into an agreement to purchase a home in Toronto, citing concerns about her financial management and the children's future housing.

The court found no legal basis to impose such conditions on the applicant's share of property proceeds, distinguishing it from child support cases where such interference is rare and only in exceptional circumstances.

The court granted the applicant's motion for the release of funds without preconditions and denied the respondent's cross-motion.

The Applicant and Respondent both brought motions concerning disclosure, amending pleadings, questioning, child support, spousal support, and interim disbursements.

The court granted mutual orders for disclosure and amending pleadings, with the Respondent advancing funds for the Applicant's disclosure costs.

Leave was granted for both parties to question each other, with time limits.

The court ordered the Respondent to pay interim child support of $1,296 per month retroactive to January 1, 2018, and interim spousal support of $2,185 per month retroactive to January 1, 2018.

The Respondent was also ordered to pay $20,000 in interim disbursements to the Applicant.

The applicant wife sought leave to amend her pleadings for a second time to include a constructive trust claim on the matrimonial home.

This motion was brought late in the litigation process, after the respondent husband had already agreed not to rely on separation agreements for trial.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding that allowing the amendment would cause significant, non-compensable prejudice to the respondent due to the late stage of litigation, the need for additional facts and disclosure, and the inevitable delay of the trial.

The court emphasized the importance of fair notice and diligent pursuit of claims under the Family Law Rules.

The Respondent Father brought a motion to enforce existing access orders for the child of the marriage and for a defined holiday access schedule, including police enforcement for access and an order for costs.

The Applicant Mother brought a cross-motion to vary the Father's access to remove overnight visits and to vary child support based on updated income.

The court found the Mother had a pattern of unlawfully withholding the child and had not properly brought her motion to change access.

The Father's motion for enforcement and a defined holiday schedule was granted, including police enforcement.

Child support was varied by consent.

The Father was awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant's new application, which sought relief regarding a beneficial interest in the matrimonial home.

The court found the new application constituted a collateral attack on ongoing litigation between the same parties concerning the identical issue, which was already before the court and subject to an appeal.

Applying Rule 1(8.2) of the Family Law Rules, the court deemed the new application an abuse of process and struck it, emphasizing that all claims arising from a marriage breakdown should be heard together.