Eric Zablotny

The applicants sought an order to discharge a mortgage registered against their property in 1974 by the applicant's former employer.

The mortgage was paid in full by 1979 but never discharged from title due to inadvertence.

The respondent company did not appear and had not provided a discharge despite requests.

The court granted the application, finding that any claim under the mortgage was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act and that a discharge could not otherwise be obtained, warranting relief under the Mortgages Act.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to purchase the respondent's minority shares in a corporation.

The motion judge made the order to advance the litigation, finding that both parties ultimately wanted a share buyout.

The appellants argued they were denied procedural fairness because the issue of a compelled share purchase was not formally before the motion judge, and that a finding of oppression was required first.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants had notice of the argument, suffered no prejudice, and that the court had broad discretion under the Business Corporations Act to order a share purchase without a finding of oppression.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to stay a civil action.

The appellants argued the respondent breached the common law implied undertaking rule by using documents disclosed in an Ontario Labour Relations Board proceeding to initiate the civil action.

The Divisional Court held that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not supplant the common law implied undertaking for administrative proceedings, and found that the respondent breached the undertaking.

However, because the appellants suffered no prejudice, the court declined to stay the action and instead ordered substantial indemnity costs against the respondent.

The moving parties sought an order determining whether leave was required to appeal a motion judge's order directing the purchase and sale of shares in an oppression application.

The Court of Appeal had previously transferred the appeal to the Divisional Court, finding the order was made under the Business Corporations Act.

The Divisional Court held that pursuant to the plain wording of s. 255 of the Business Corporations Act, an appeal lies directly to the Divisional Court from any order made under the Act, and therefore leave to appeal is not required.

The respondents, Grid Link Corp. et al., moved to stay a prior order requiring them to purchase the applicant Foglia's shares and produce financial documents for valuation, pending their appeal of that order.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay, finding the appeal had low prospects of success, no irreparable harm was proven (as concerns about confidential information misuse were speculative and eventual disclosure was inevitable), and the balance of convenience favored allowing the valuation to proceed without further delay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The court also clarified that the deemed undertaking rule did not apply to the compelled disclosure, imposing a specific protective order for the financial information.

The Court of Appeal quashed an appeal originating from an oppression remedy application, finding that the case management judge's substantive order for share purchase and valuation was appealable only to the Divisional Court under the Business Corporations Act, not the Court of Appeal.

The matter was transferred to the Divisional Court.

This endorsement addresses costs arising from the Plaintiff's motion for particulars and the Defendants' motion to compel cross-examination.

The motion for particulars was resolved on consent, with the Plaintiff ultimately obtaining clarity on the scope of serious allegations made against him in the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.

The court found the Defendants' conduct necessitated the motion for particulars and awarded the Plaintiff $7,500 in costs.

Regarding the cross-examination motion, the court found divided success, noting that while cross-examination occurred, its scope exceeded the court's order and provided limited assistance to the particulars motion.

Consequently, no costs were awarded for the cross-examination motion.

The defendants moved to dismiss or permanently stay the plaintiff's action, alleging a breach of the common law deemed or implied undertaking rule.

They claimed the plaintiff used documents obtained from an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) matter to prepare its statement of claim in the civil action.

The plaintiff argued there was no breach, or alternatively, sought relief from the consequences.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that Ontario's Rule 30.1.01(2) limits the deemed undertaking rule to evidence obtained through discovery processes under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore does not apply to documents obtained from an unrelated proceeding in another forum like the OLRB.

The applicant sought partition and sale of a jointly owned home, which she co-owned with the respondent, her former romantic partner.

The respondent, who continued to reside in the home, opposed the sale, arguing that the applicant had relinquished her interest years prior and that a forced sale would cause him significant hardship.

The court affirmed the applicant's prima facie right to partition and sale under the Partition Act, finding no evidence of malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct on her part.

The court ordered the partition and sale of the property, allowing the respondent a period of time to secure alternate accommodation and seek legal advice regarding potential claims, with the sale proceeds to be held in trust.

The plaintiff brought a motion for particulars regarding allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in the defendants' counterclaim.

In support, the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating he had no knowledge of the allegations.

The defendants sought to cross-examine the plaintiff on his affidavit, which the plaintiff resisted as an abuse of process and premature discovery.

The court held that while there is a prima facie right to cross-examine on an affidavit, the court has discretion to limit it to prevent a fishing expedition.

The court permitted the cross-examination but strictly limited its scope to the plaintiff's knowledge of the particulars sought.

The applicant sought judicial review of a COVID-19 pandemic response bylaw enacted by the Fort William First Nation Chief and Council, arguing it was ultra vires.

The impugned bylaw was repealed before the application was filed.

Applying the Borowski test, the Federal Court dismissed the application for mootness and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it, noting that proceeding would lack practical utility and intrude into the legislative sphere of the band council.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed the motion and awarded costs of $2,500 to the plaintiff.