CITATION: Georgiou v. Ministry of Health et al., 2026 ONSC 2529
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00000501-00JR DATE: 20260513
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
CONSTANTINOS (DINO) GEORGIOU
Constantinos (Dino) Georgiou, Self-represented
Applicant
– and –
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, MAPLE LEAF MEDICAL CLINIC, and CHURCH-WELLESLEY HEALTH CENTRE
Respondents
Matthew Chung, for the Respondent, Ministry of Health Jonathan Mertz, for the Respondent, Maple Leaf Medical Clinic James Lenoury, for the Respondent, Church-Wellesley Health Centre
-and-
University Health Network, Unity Health Toronto, Casey House, Sherbourne Health Centre Corporation and Mount Sinai Hospital
Respondents on motion only
HEARD: In writing
REASONS FOR DECISION
Shore, J.
1The Respondents, Maple Leaf Medical Clinic (“ML”) and Church Wellesley Health Centre (“Wellesley”), seek an order quashing the Application for Judicial Review.
2The Applicant, Constantinos Georgiou, seeks an order adding University Health Network (“UHN”), Unity Health Toronto (“UN”), Casey House, Sherbourne Health Centre Corporation (“Sherbourne”) and Mount Sinai Hospital (“MSH”) as respondents to his application.
3For the reasons set out below, the motion to quash is granted, and the motion to add respondents is dismissed.
Background:
4ML is a not-for-profit private corporation established to host and support the IT infrastructure for a group of physicians practicing out of 14 College Street, Toronto.
5Wellesley is a corporation under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, established to operate and manage 491 Church Street, Toronto. Through a sub-tenant relationship, Wellesley provides offices and practice support to a multidisciplinary group of medical professionals.
6In August 2023, the Applicant visited Dr. Harriot, a family doctor within the group practicing at 491 Church Street. Dr. Harriot referred the Applicant to Dr. Sobhani, an infectious disease specialist, practicing at 14 College Street. The Applicant alleges that Dr. Harriot dismissed him from his office and failed to refer him to a specialist and to another family doctor.
7Dr. Sobhani did not see the Applicant but instead referred him to Toronto General Hospital. The Applicant was advised that the initial referral by his family doctor was declined.
8In March 2024, the Applicant commenced proceedings before the Human Rights Tribunal, against ML and two doctors practicing at 14 College Street, alleging that ML breached the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, by refusing to accept him as a patient. Dr. Sobhani was not a party to those proceedings. The Applicant was seeking compensation in the sum of $50,000 and an order requiring ML to change its policy restricting patients from transferring to a different doctor within the clinic.
9On March 1, 2025, the Applicant commenced proceedings before the Human Rights Tribunal, against Wellesley, alleging that Wellesley contravened the Human Rights Code.
10On June 26, 2025, the Applicant brought this application, seeking judicial review of the actions and conduct of both ML and Wellesley, as well as the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health did not participate in the motion.
11In the amended Notice of Application, the Applicant is seeking the following relief:
a. An order of mandamus, that the Ministry be required to investigate ML and Wellesley for implementing patient transfer policies that are discriminatory and non-compliant with provincial legislation and the College standards;
b. A declaration that the policies of ML and Wellesley violate the Ontario Human Rights Code and other legislation;
c. An order directing the Ministry of Health to issue province wide directives prohibiting publicly funded clinics from instituting policies that restrict or prevent patients from transferring between physicians within the same facility;
d. An order acknowledging the existence of an ongoing investigation by the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario and recognizing the lack of findings or formal communications;
e. An order quashing the Respondents’ decisions to deny the Applicant access to primary care services;
f. An order directing all institutions to reassess the Applicant’s eligibility for care, reinstate access to in-house laboratory and primary care services, implement reforms, and ensure access to medically necessary services;
g. An order prohibiting the Respondents from relying on unsubstantiated or retaliatory allegations to deny care;
h. Damages; and
i. An order of mandamus, requiring the Respondents to implement a policy preventing dismissal of patients, or what the Applicant referred to as eliminating their “gatekeeping” function to access medical services.
12ML and Wellesley (collectively “the Respondents”) brought a motion to quash the Application for Judicial Review.
Position of the parties on the motion:
13Both Respondents submit that the application should be quashed for three reasons:
a. The Respondents were not exercising delegated state-decision making authority and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction to judicially review their policies or decisions;
b. The application is an abuse of process because it duplicates the proceedings before the Human Rights Tribunal; and
c. The application is premature because the decisions of the HRTO had not been released on the date the application was issued.
14The Applicant submits that because the doctors are all paid by OHIP, the clinics are exercising state authority. He submits that he is challenging the discretionary gatekeeping function being imposed by the Respondents, which he claims acts as a barrier for people to be able to access medical treatment.
Analysis:
15A court can quash an application pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction or pursuant to Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for want of jurisdiction or an abuse of process of the court. Under either approach, a motion to quash may be granted where it is "plain and obvious" and "beyond doubt" that the application is certain to fail.
16If the allegations advanced by the Applicant were assumed to be true, is it plain and obvious and beyond doubt that the claim is doomed to fail? This will be the case where an application for judicial review is deficient on its face due to prematurity, lack of jurisdiction and/or standing, collateral attack, abuse of process, or justiciability of the issues raised therein: see Stewart et al. v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director et al., 2014 ONSC 6150 (Div. Ct.), at para. 18.
Lack of Jurisdiction:
17I find the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this application for judicial review.
18The Divisional Court’s jurisdiction to hear an application for judicial review arises from s. 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, in that the decision under review must be an exercise of statutory power. Under s.1(b) of the JRPA, “statutory power” means a power or right conferred by or under a statute to exercise a statutory power of decision and “statutory power of decision” means a power or right conferred by or under a statute to make a decision deciding or prescribing,
(a) the legal rights, powers, privileges, immunities, duties or liabilities of any person or party, or
(b) the eligibility of any person or party to receive, or to the continuation of, a benefit or licence, whether the person or party is legally entitled thereto or not,
and includes the powers of an inferior court.
19Were the decisions of the Respondents an exercise of statutory power and subject to judicial review?
20While the health care field is highly regulated, this does not mean that the Respondents are state actors. Although doctors are funded by OHIP, this does not make the Respondents’ decisions an exercise of statutory power.
21The Applicant has not identified a statutory power that is being relied on in the exercise of its policy making. There is no evidence to conclude that the policies of the Respondents or the decisions subject to this application fall within the definition of statutory power under the JRPA.
22The jurisdiction of this Court to judicially review decisions made by hospitals, was recently discussed in West Grey (Mun.) v. South Bruce Grey Health Centre, 2025 ONSC 3193, 177 O.R. (3d) 444, where the applicant was seeking an order quashing a decision by the respondent hospital to relocate 10 patients to a different site, and an order in the nature of mandamus compelling the respondent to relocate the patients back to their original site.
23The Court found that the decision to transfer beds from one site to another was an operational decision and not made under a statute: see paras. 35-36. In dismissing the application for judicial review, the Court found that the decision was made by a not-for-profit corporation that controls its internal management and allocation of resources to meet the standards expected of a public hospital. The decision was not sufficiently of a public nature to make it subject to judicial review: at para. 51; see also O.N.A. v. Rouge River Valley System, 2018 ONSC 6315, 302 D.L.R. (4th) 751 (Div. Ct.).
24In Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483, the Court held that despite providing a public service, operational decisions of a hospital did not qualify as a government function for the purposes of the Charter. Matters that are routine or regular in nature such as policy decisions are not subject to judicial review: also see West Grey, at para. 37.
25In this case, the Respondents are even further removed from exercising statutory power than hospitals because they are private entities and not hospitals. They are not exercising any delegated decision-making authority. The Respondents offer infrastructure support. Their purpose is to facilitate doctors in providing healthcare services.
26Although some private entities sometimes make decisions that have a broad impact, the appearance of a public character does not transform the decision into an exercise of state power: West Grey, at para. 40. For example, in Sprague, this Court found that a hospital’s visitor policy was not of a sufficiently public character as to engage the application of public law.
27Finally, this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested. This Court does not have jurisdiction to order damages. This Court cannot order the Respondents to accept the Applicant as a patient. This Court cannot order the Ministry to undertake an investigation or issue the directive (or any directive) as requested. In this regard, the Applicant has misunderstood the role of the Court in an application for judicial review.
28Having found that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review because the Respondents were not exercising state authority, and having found this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant most of the relief requested, it is plain and obvious and beyond a reasonable doubt that the application cannot succeed. The motion is granted, and the application is quashed.
29Having quashed the application for lack of jurisdiction, I am only going to address the motion brought by the Applicant to add respondents and on the issue of prematurity as it relates to the proceedings against the Ministry of Health. The application against Wellesley and ML has been dismissed.
Prematurity and Abuse of Process:
30Courts will not judicially review the proceeding of a lower court or an administrative tribunal until that proceeding has concluded and its decision is final. Courts have repeatedly refused to prematurely intervene in an administrative proceeding because:
Applications for judicial review may ultimately be totally unnecessary: a complaining party may be successful in the end result [ ... ] Also, the unnecessary delays and expenses associated with such appeals can bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
Garrick v. Amnesty International Canada, 2011 FC 1099, [2013] 3 F.C.R. 146, at paras. 48-49, citing Zundel v. Canada, [2000] 4 F.C. 255, at para. 10.
31The request to review the decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal is premature. These proceedings were commenced on June 26, 2025, at which time the HRTO had not made any final or interlocutory decisions in the case before them. There is no decision by the HRTO that could be subject to this Court’s review.
32For this reason, the application as against the Ministry is also dismissed.
33Further, I find starting multiple proceedings on the same set of facts and on the same legal issues is an abuse of process.
34On March 1, 2025, the Applicant started proceedings before the HRTO.
35On June 26, 2025, the Applicant started this application for judicial review, seeking similar and almost identical relief.
36On December 23, 2025, following the release of the HRTO decision on December 17, 2025, the Applicant commenced an application to judicially review the decision.
37The Applicant also submits that he has filed similar complaints with the Patient Ombudsman, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.
38The Applicant has multiple claims on the same allegations, requesting the same remedies. I find this to be an abuse of process. Had I not already dismissed the application above, I would have granted the motion and dismissed the application in its entirety as an abuse of process.
Motion to add Respondents
39The Applicant brought his Application for Judicial Review in June 2025.
40On November 20, 2025, the Applicant filed an amended Notice of Motion. The Applicant brought the motion to add University Health Network (“UHN”), Unity Health Toronto (“UN”), Casey House, Sherbourne Health Centre Corporation (“Sherbourne”) and Mount Sinai Hospital (“MSH”) as respondents to his application. The Respondents to this motion, but for Sherbourne, were represented by the same counsel. I will refer to these potential respondents as the “Group”, to include all but Sherbourne.
41The Group are public hospitals operating sites in Toronto, Ontario, pursuant to the Public Hospitals Act, as amended.
42The Applicant’s primary reason for adding the Group and Sherbourne as respondents is “to ensure all organizations potentially affected by the mandamus remedy are properly before the Court and that the issues may be adjudicated fairly and completely in accordance with the Judicial Review Procedure Act.”, or in other words, to ensure that all hospitals that may be subject to the Ministry’s directive (as part of the relief requested in the Application) are parties’ in the proceedings to ensure province wide compliance.
43The Applicant submits there are “coordinated statutory violations, when viewed together, [that] establish a pattern of systemic non-compliance across multiple healthcare institutions. The Respondent hospitals' collective disregard for these legal obligations demonstrates a failure of public accountability, warranting judicial intervention under the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.”.
44The Group and Sherbourne submit that there is no legal basis to add them as parties and the motion should be dismissed.
Unity Health of Toronto:
45In the spring of 2024, a physician at St. Michael’s Hospital Family Health Team agreed to accept the Applicant as a patient. However, the Applicant attended the clinic without an appointment, demanded immediate bloodwork and became verbally aggressive with staff. He also attempted to enter a staff-only area. The physician subsequently discharged the Applicant due to a breakdown in the physician-patient relationship, following an extensive email campaign by the Applicant.
46On February 27, 2025, the Applicant commenced an application before the HRTO against UH. On October 14, 2025, the HRTO dismissed the application. The Applicant has sought judicial review of the HRTO decision.
Casey House:
47In January and February 2021, the Applicant briefly accessed outpatient services at Casey House, which he discontinued. The Applicant otherwise did not meet the eligibility criteria for receiving primary care services there. He was referred to alternate community resources.
48On May 26, 2025, the Applicant commenced an application before the HRTO against Casey House. A decision from the HRTO is still pending.
University Health Network
49In May 2025, the Applicant was referred to the Toronto Western Family Health Team, a clinic service of UHN. His intake appointment was cancelled due to the physician sustaining an injury. The Applicant engaged in an aggressive and hostile manner with staff during the rescheduling efforts. As a result, UHN discontinued the intake process.
50On January 25, 2025, the Applicant commenced an application before the HRTO against UHN. A decision from the HRTO remains outstanding.
Sinai Health System:
51The applicant requested care from a family doctor practicing at MSH. As per their usual practice, MSH undertook an assessment of its capacity to take new patients and determined it did not have capacity at this time. They provided the Applicant with alternative primary care providers.
The Law and Analysis:
52Any motion to amend pleadings in an originating process to add parties must be assessed against a series of criteria derived from Rule 26.01 and Rule 5.04(2): Beaudoin v. City of Ottawa, 2025 ONSC 3870, at para. 10.
53Rule 26.01 states:
26.01 On motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
54While the language of Rule 26.01 is mandatory, the Court has residual discretion to deny amendments where appropriate. As stated by the Court of Appeal in Marks v. Ottawa, 2011 ONCA 248, 280 O.A.C. 251, at para. 19, factors to be considered are summarized as follows:
a. An amendment should be allowed unless it would cause an injustice not compensable in costs.
b. The proposed amendment must be shown to be an issue worthy of trial and prima facie meritorious.
c. No amendment should be allowed which, if originally pleaded, would have been struck.
d. The proposed amendment must contain sufficient particulars.
55Rule 5.04(2)of the Rules of Civil Procedure states:
5.04(2) At any stage of a proceeding the court may by order add, delete or substitute a party or correct the name of a party incorrectly named, on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
56Similar to the operation of Rule 26.01, the Court also retains residual discretion under Rule 5.04(2) to refuse a joinder. Additional considerations noted by courts include fairness and judicial efficiency (if adding a party would unduly complicate or delay the proceeding), or if the addition of a party appears to be an abuse of process.
57As set out above, the Court does not have jurisdiction to grant most of the relief being requested by the Applicant.
58Further, this Court cannot order the hospitals or doctors to take the Applicant as a patient. The decision to take on patients is not a decision subject to judicial review.
59As set out above, although the hospitals may operate pursuant to the Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.40, the decision whether to take on a patient is not an exercise of power subject to their statutory mandate. Instead, they are making operational decisions (see the discussion of Stoffman and West Grey above).
60Further, whether a patient is accepted or discharged from a hospital’s clinical services is also informed by medical decision-making and judgment. Section 11 of the Hospital Management Regulations, R.R.O. 1990, Reg 965, under the Public Hospitals Act provides that:
(2) No physician, registered nurse in the extended class, dentist or midwife shall order the admission of a person to a hospital unless, in the opinion of the physician, registered nurse in the extended class, dentist or midwife, it is clinically necessary that the person be admitted.
(3) No person shall be registered in a hospital as an out-patient except,
(a) on the order or under the authority of a member of the medical staff, midwifery staff or extended class nursing staff;
(b) on the order or under the authority of a member of the dental staff who is an oral and maxillofacial surgeon;
(b.1) in the case of a person who is an out-patient solely for the purpose of attending a dental clinic in a hospital, on the order or under the authority of a member of the dental staff […]
61I therefore find that the Court does not have jurisdiction to judicially review the decisions of the proposed Respondents and therefore it is plain and obvious that the Applicant’s claims against the proposed Respondents cannot succeed.
62Further, as set out above, I find the motion to be an abuse of process, because with respect to four of the proposed Respondents, the complaints have already been or are still the subject of applications before the HRTO.
Costs on Motion to Quash:
63On the motion to quash, the Respondents were successful and there is a presumption that they are entitled to their costs. The Respondents are each seeking costs of $2,500. They each filed a bill of costs that was significantly higher than the amount they are seeking. Having regard to the number of documents filed by the Applicant that had to be reviewed by counsel and the time spent on the motion, I find the costs requested to be very reasonable.
64The Applicant shall pay Maple Leaf Medical Clinic and the Wellesley Health Center costs of $2,500 each inclusive (for total costs of $5,000) within 30 days.
Costs on Motion to Add Respondents
65The Respondents were successful in defending the motion to add them as respondents to the application. There is a presumption that they are entitled to their costs.
66Sherbourne is seeking costs of $9,000. Each of the other Respondents to this motion are seeking costs of $2,500 each.
67I find it reasonable in the circumstances for the Applicant to pay Sherbourne costs of $7,500 and each of the Respondents $2,500.
Order:
68This Court orders that:
a. The Application for Judicial Review, as against Maple Leaf Medical Clinic and Wellesley Health Centre is quashed.
b. The motion to add respondents to the Application for Judicial Review is dismissed.
c. But for Sherbourne, the Applicant shall pay each of the Respondents costs of $2,500 within 30 days. The Respondents to be paid are as follows: Maple Leaf Medical Clinic, Wellesley Health Centre, University Health Network, Unity Health Toronto, Casey House, and Mount Sinai Hospital, for total costs payable by the Applicant in the sum of $15,000 inclusive.
d. The Applicant shall pay the Sherbourne Health Centre Corporation costs of $7,500 inclusive within 30 days.
___________________________ Shore J.
Released: May 13, 2026
CITATION: Georgiou v. Ministry of Health et al., 2026 ONSC 2529
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-00000501-00JR DATE: 20260513
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
CONSTANTINOS (DINO) GEORGIOU Applicant
– and –
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, MAPLE LEAF MEDICAL CLINIC, and CHURCH-WELLESLEY HEALTH CENTRE Respondents
REASONS FOR DECISION
Shore J.
Released: May 13, 2026