DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 322/24
(Hamilton) DATE: 20260513
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
D.L. Corbett, Faieta and Shore JJ.
BETWEEN:
B.T.V.
Appellant, self-represented
Appellant
– and –
L.M.D.
Monique Rae Bennett, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD at Hamilton: October 27, 2025
AMENDED REASONS FOR DECISION[^1]
The Court
1Following a 14-day trial, in compendious reasons running to 360 paragraphs over 58 pages, the trial judge, N. Gregson J., ordered that the parties’ child (who had recently turned 10 years old at the time this appeal was argued) live primarily with the respondent mother, that the mother have sole decision-making authority for the child, that the appellant father have prescribed parenting time with the child, that the father pay child support and net s. 7 expenses, and detailed ancillary and other orders in respect to a broad range of family law issues (2024 ONSC 4856), and a subsequent costs order made November 22, 2024.
2After reviewing the evidence in detail, and explaining her general credibility findings, the trial judge made the following findings of fact:
(i) “… it is more likely than not [that] the mother was subjected to some form of domestic violence during her relationship with the father” (para. 223)
(ii) “[t]here was no evidence that the [child] was subjected to or exposed to any violence during the parties’ relationship or since separation” (para. 224)
(iii) “… there were many [decisions respecting the child] which were conflictual and there continues to be a lack of trust between [the parties]” (para. 228)
(iv) “Considering the abuse during the relationship and its impact on the mother as well as the different personality traits of the parties, these inequalities impede the objective of achieving a balance of roles and influence in the decision-making process” (para. 229)
(v) “… there is no evidence which would compel me to change the current status quo [respecting parenting time] …. [P]arenting arrangements which have been established over the last few years continue to meet the child’s best interests. The child has primary residence with the mother and about 40 percent parenting time with the father.” (para. 238)
(vi) “This is a child who has struggled with the father’s new relationship. The child recently had academic challenges and has made recent concerning statements at school. I do not believe this is the time to disturb his primary residence which has been with the mother. The current residential arrangement provide[s] the child with stability and some continuity.” (para. 239)
(vii) “I disagree with the mother’s most recent request of reducing the father’s parenting time by one evening each week in light of her concern that she believes the son is overscheduled. The child is entitled to maximized time with the father and I see no reason for a reduction in parenting time.” (para. 242)
3The father appealed the parenting terms ordered by the trial judge, and in particular sought orders on appeal:
(a) for joint decision-making;
(b) for equal parenting time
(c) for adjusted ancillary orders and support orders reflecting equal parenting time.
4We saw no merit in the appellant’s issues on appeal, with one exception: the order that the Appellant maintain $250,000 security in the form of insurance in respect to his child support obligations. In respect to other aspects of the judgment impugned on appeal, the trial judge applied correct principles on the basis of factual findings available on the record. The comprehensive, detailed parenting terms provide the appellant with considerable involvement in, and parenting time with, the child, but reflect the trial judge’s findings, fully justified on the record, that conflict between the parties remains high and stressful, in part (not exclusively) because of the appellant’s high-conflict, litigious approach to issues large and small. We dismissed the appeal without calling on the Respondent, except in respect to the issue of insurance to secure support obligations.
Error of Fact
5The trial judge ordered that the Appellant maintain insurance of $250,000 to secure his child support obligations. The trial judge made this order after finding that the Appellant had such a policy in place already. He did not. He had an existing policy of $30,000.
6The finding that there was a policy of $250,000 was an error of fact. Following argument directed to this point, we directed as follows orally:
We likewise see no error in the trial judge’s order that the appellant provide security for his support obligations or that the support be in the amount of $250,000. We do conclude that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that the appellant’s current insurance policy is in the face amount of $250,000. It is not contested that [it] is in the face amount of $30,000. We are going to afford the parties time to discuss and [try] to agree on the form of security to be posted. Failing agreement, we will provide further directions on this issue. We ask you to get back to us within two weeks. If you need an extension because inquiries are being made and you’re waiting for responses or you’re going back and forth, that’s fine, you can ask for the extension, but we would like to hear back from you in some form within two weeks of today.
7By letter dated November 18, 2025, counsel for the Appellant advised as follows:
Pursuant to the oral Endorsement of the Honourable Justices Corbett, [Faieta], and Shore, dated October 27, 2025, the parties were afforded time to discuss and agree upon a form of security.
The Appellant has diligently worked to acquire life insurance in the amount of $250,000.00. As of November 10, 2025, the Appellant has secured:
Industrial Alliance Life Insurance policy (Contract no. 6000258405) in the amount of $250,000.00. Reference number: E3FCYCR.
Please let us know if there is anything else required from the Appellant.
Unfortunately, through administrative oversight, this communication did not come to the attention of the panel when it was sent to the court.
8By letter dated March 9, 2026, counsel for the Respondent wrote to the court, advising that the Appellant had failed or refused to provide evidence that he had, in fact, obtained the required insurance, and requesting this court to deal with the problem.
9On March 18, 2026, this court directed as follows:
The President of the Divisional Court panel, D.L. Corbett J., directs me to advise you as follows:
At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel directed (among other things) that the parties report back to the court within two weeks respecting their efforts to address the issue of the security ordered in the trial judgment. It appears that the parties did not do this. The parties are now directed as follows:
The appellant shall advise, by email, by March 23, 2026 (a) whether the court-directed report was made to the court, and if it was, to provide a copy of it and to explain why it was not provided within the two weeks stipulated by the court;
The respondent may respond to the appellant’s submissions by March 25, 2026.
The parties are to keep their responses brief and are not to engage in lengthy explanations about why they did (or did not) do what they did in respect to the court’s direction. If the court requires further information after receiving the parties’ responses, the court will ask for it.
10The deadlines were extended slightly at the Appellant’s request in light of the Spring Break holidays.
11On March 26, 2026, the Appellant advised this court as follows, by email:
It was my understanding that my lawyers sent correspondence dated November 18, 2025, to the Panel advising of the efforts made in order to address the issue of security. A copy of the correspondence is attached for reference which indicates that a life insurance policy was acquired and particulars of same.
The correspondence also stated, “Please let us know if there is anything else required from the Appellant” and my understanding is that no further correspondence was received from the Panel. I understood that the November 18, 2025, was effectively the ‘court-directed report’ and am not aware of any obligation beyond same nor was I advised by my lawyers that anything else was and/or would be required. The information about the life insurance policy represented in the correspondence is accurate and the attached ‘Contract Summary’ was not available at the time and not received by me until earlier this year.
As the trustee of the irrevocable beneficiary, it is my understanding that the Respondent would be entitled to obtain payment for expenses such as child support in the event that the policy was realized (and funds made available as result of a triggering event) prior to the child obtaining the age of majority. There was no spousal support obligation at the time the policy was obtained so the policy was purchased to protect the future child support entitlement. This was done in order to ensure proper oversight and to avoid any unanticipated windfall being paid to any but the designated beneficiary.
As mentioned in prior correspondence, the Respondent had a returnable contempt motion when this matter was before the panel and has now amended the same contempt motion (dated and served on March 13, 2026) to include (among other things) the issue of compliance with the life insurance requirement. The amended motion specifically references that life insurance issue was before the Divisional Court so, as previously stated in my correspondence of March 9, 2026, the Respondent has put this issue before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice subsequent to the Divisional Court matter. Although there are additional particulars as to the constraints encountered which limited policy selection and/or availability, I am mindful of the potential prejudice of correspondence on this issue becoming evidence in the Respondent’s contempt motion and so am not inclined to provide any further particulars subject to any specific requests from the Panel.
The Appellant attached a Contract Summary of his $250,000 insurance policy, referencing that the policy had an effective date of November 10, 2025, and a copy of the letter that had been sent to the court back in November 2025.
12By letter dated March 27, 2026, counsel for the Respondent asked this court to take steps to enforce the insurance terms of the trial judgment, in light of this court’s direction on this topic at the conclusion of the appeal hearing.
13On March 30, 2026, this court directed as follows:
Justice Corbett directs me to advise you as follows:
The appellant is directed to provide a copy of the insurance policy referenced in the letter of November 18, 2025, including the beneficiary designation, to the court, by email, by April 8, 2026.
14By email dated March 27, 2026, the Appellant advised the court as follows:
I am responding to the March 30, 2026, email in which Justice Corbett directs that the appellant provide a copy of insurance policy referenced in the letter of November 18, 2025 (re: letter from appellant’s counsel). I apologize for referring to myself as the third person (i.e. appellant) in the information provided below but I thought doing so would be simpler in the circumstances.
It is not possible to comply with this direction because neither the appellant nor his counsel had an actual copy of the insurance policy/certificate referenced in the letter from appellant’s counsel. The reason for this is that the appellant had no direct communication or interaction with the insurer that underwrites the policy as all consultations, applications, transactions, etc., were undertaken through a third-party broker retained by the appellant. The broker transacted the application with the underwriter on behalf of the appellant and thereafter provided the general information (i.e. policy number, amount, etc,) to the appellant that was set out in the November 18, 2025 letter from the appellant’s counsel. The appellant’s understanding was that this information was to confirm that the existence of a policy for a given period and amount in connection with the financial transaction (i.e. payment) providing consideration for the contract notwithstanding the fact that the appellant had yet to be provided with either the certificate of insurance or policy particulars. The appellant’s understanding (which comes from the broker) is that this common practice when a policy is required within a short time frame and is akin to when one purchases automobile insurance and/or home insurance that might be required on a timely basis where the broker confirms the existence of the policy by providing the policy number, extent of coverage, etc., but the actual documents are received at some point thereafter.
There were some changes to the certificate of insurance subsequent to when the first payment transaction took place as a result of information that was not available and/or known to the appellant when the broker initially confirmed coverage. The information pertained to satisfying the appellant’s obligation to secure a future payment obligation while ensuring that, should events occur that result in the policy being realized, there would not be any unintended outcomes and/or windfall gains received by a party that would not be entitled to same. The changes also arose in attempting to find a satisfactory solution to the fact that there was no available policy which satisfied both the specific wording of the requirement placed on the appellant while at the same time preventing any unintended consequences.
The above is not in any way a complete summary of what was a very complicated process in which the appellant worked diligently with a broker in order obtain a satisfactory policy of insurance. The appellant is confident that the active policy satisfies the requirement to protect a future payment obligation and acted in good faith throughout the process; however, the appellant was not asked to provide such particulars and will await further direction prior to doing so.
15By email dated April 13, 2026, the Appellant wrote to the court as follows (attachments omitted):
The appellant is sending this email in response to the email of April 10, 2026, and request from Justice Corbett. The appellant is going to first address his concerns about evolving nature of this correspondence exchange and thereafter will provide the information requested by Justice Corbett with supporting particulars.
CONCERNS REGARDING ONGOING CORRESPONDENCE
The appellant has attempted to address the issue of his actions in obtaining a life insurance policy to protect a future child support payment by following the instructions of the panel to keep his communication as brief as possible. The appellant takes issue with the fact that these communications are being used as evidence in the respondent’s now amended contempt motion, the affidavit for which was sworn on March 13, 2026. The appellant also takes issue with the significant volume of correspondence the respondent’s counsel has submitted to the panel, almost all of which is extremely inflammatory, without foundation and references issues not germane to the issue at hand.
The appellant, as an officer of the court, did reach out to the respondent’s counsel in an attempt to provide the information that is described below along with attachments in order to address his compliance with the requirement to obtain life insurance while also making sure the policy would not have unforeseen consequences as detailed below. The correspondent from the appellant was sent in November of 2025 but counsel for the respondent did not respond to that correspondence (on this specific issue) until February of 2026 claiming that she had ‘only recently’ been informed that the respondent was no longer represented by a lawyer. The lawyer, Pheadra Klodner, that was acting as an agent for the respondent and sent correspondence to Ms. Bennett on November 27, 2026, advising that she was no longer acting as agent for the respondent and that all communications should be sent to the respondent directly.
The appellant is aware of the fact that the Law Society of Ontario is investigating the conduct of the respondent’s counsel as a result of certain events that occurred in 2025 during the court of these proceedings. The investigation was not initiated by the appellant nor at the behest of the appellant. While the appellant is aware of the seriousness of the some of the accusations being made against him by counsel for the respondent, he is concerned with the appropriateness of the content and tone of the correspondence being submitted to the panel. Some of the correspondence and content therein did not appear familiar to the appellant and/or make reference to content in other correspondence which had allegedly been sent to the appellant. Unfortunately, the appellant’s concerns were [well] founded in that counsel for the respondent appears to be unaware of the fact that she is sending correspondence to herself and then submitting that same correspondence as one that was sent the appellant, a copy of which is attached but was including in those provided to this panel as an attachment (TAB &) to the five (5) page letter dated March 27, 2026, signed by Ms. Bennett.
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY -
The appellant did not receive a copy of the policy (the original policy purchased in November of 2025) until February 13, 2026, when the appellant mentioned to the broker that he had yet to receive same. The broker advised that that hard copy of the policy had been received by the broker’s office (instead of being sent to the appellant) and so the broker sent the appellant the screen shots as per the attached on that date. The discrepancy had been discovered prior to that date during discussions which were ongoing as noted below. The broker advised the appellant that the error in the beneficiary designation was likely due to a data entry error during the policy entry process which is handled by the broker. The appellant did not think that this error was an issue as the broker advised the appellant that making the change was just a formality and the appellant had already provided the broker with a direction to do so.
The change was made and this resulted in the copy of the policy already provided to the panel as requested. The dates (i.e. different then when the policy was purchased) as reflected on policy certificate provided simply confirm circumstantial events, the nature of which were innocuous.
The incorrect beneficiary designation was discovered during part of what had been follow up discussions in order to address the appellant’s concern that there be provisions to ensure oversight with respect to making sure that, should an event trigger the policy, that the funds would be received by the intended beneficiary at the appropriate time while allowing the trustee to receive support payments as contemplated by the Court Order and/or otherwise be reimbursed for expenses incurred on behalf of the beneficiary. The appellant sought assistance [of] an estate counsel on this issue after obtaining an actuarial report in order to determine the proper present future value the appellant might be required to protect at various future dates, of copy of the actuarial report is attached.
The decision to obtain this report was based on the fact that at no point at trial nor in the 1670 pages of transcripts and/or exhibits from trial was there any evidence whatsoever led or otherwise submitted as to the appropriate amount of life insurance to protect a future child support amount, the calculation of same, the duration of such a requirement, the availability of such a policy and/or any direct and/or indirect evidence as to the date on when such a future value would have been calculated. The appellant is communicating this not to contest the requirement to obtain a policy to protect a future value but rather to reinforce the efforts made by the appellant and actions taken in this process in the absence of the requisite parameters that would otherwise provide some guidance in order to obtain a policy that satisfied the requirement to protect the future value of a financial obligation while avoiding any unintended consequences such a significant windfall gain being received by the respondent.
The quantum of child support used the determine the net present value of future payments was $1,400.00 as opposed the $1,185.00 as per the Order in order to ensure the calculated amounts would be well in excess of what might be the required amount. The appellant notes that the based on a monthly child support payment of $1,400.00 the net present value of future support obligation (should the policy have come into effect on December 1, 2025) is $117,746.85, which would create a windfall of $132,253.15 or the insurance policy is in excess by that amount depending what perspective one might take. It is important to note that the net present value required also decreases with each child support payment the appellant makes.
The appellant was advised by his estate counsel that without there being a trust agreement (to which the respondent would have to be a signatory) there could be a significant windfall going to the trustee should the trustee be made the irrevocable beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds as opposed to the child to whom the entitlement belongs as per the relevant legislation. The appellant also considered the prevailing legislation, specifically Subsection 51 (1.1) and Ontario Regulation 120/21 of the Children’s Law Reform Act R.S.O. 1990, c C.12, as amended, whereby any amount over $35,000.00 to which a child beneficiary might be entitled is to be paid into Court and management by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice. As well, the appellant was advised that designating the respondent as the irrevocable beneficiary as opposed to just the trustee for the child could expose the policy proceeds to potential claims by creditors and/or other claims.
The appellant’s estate counsel advised that the appellant that, absent a trust agreement to which the respondent trustee is a signatory, the appellant’s estate lawyer provide the broker/insurer with correspondence inclosing a direction making reference to the actuarial report and setting out the purposes of the life insurance policy, the appellant’s irrevocable direction that the respondent trustee would be entitled to obtain monthly child support payments from proceeds so long as the respondent trustee is entitled to do so in accordance with the Order and be reimbursed for any expenses determined to qualify as special expense in accordance with Order.
The appellant’s extensive efforts in obtaining advise and direction in order to have an appropriate life insurance policy in place have been ongoing since the end of November. From incurring the expense and taking the initiative in requestioning the actuarial report to consulting with senior estate counsel and insurance broker, the appellant believes that he has acted in good faith in attempting to satisfy the requirement that he a obtain life insurance in order to proactive a future payment obligation. The appellant’s current policy provides substantially more coverage than might ever be required in order to provide financial support for the child in the event of the appellant’s unexpected passing.
The exercise of obtaining a life insurance policy, the purpose of which is to protect a future payment interest for a minor, is not a straightforward exercise and it requires that one consults with the appropriate legal and insurance experts in order to take into consideration all potential future events and/or the issues that might arise in the event the policy is realized prior to when the child reaches the age of majority. An example of this is that the appellant’s estate counsel has advised that a provision should be in place in the event the respondent trustee is not able to act as the trustee as contemplated by the policy, something that the appellant understands could potentially compromise the distribution of the policy proceeds if the trustee and the irrevocable beneficiary are the same person.
16By email dated April 23, 2026, counsel for the Respondent wrote to the court as follows:
I request further direction from the Court in this matter, given that B.T.V. has not complied with the endorsement to produce his life insurance policy (only attached the front page in his April 13, 2026, email), and the signed beneficial designation forms still have not been produced.
L.M.D. submits that B.T.V.’s answers to the court are wholly inadequate as he has not produced the required information directed by Justice Corbett, clearly set out in the email sent to both counsel on April 10, 2026, which states:
“The appellant has provided an explanation as to why he did not provide a copy of the insurance policy immediately after the policy was purchased. It does not explain why he has not provided a copy of the policy since that time. He shall provide a copy of the policy immediately, including information showing that the beneficiary designation is irrevocable, or he shall contact the court to schedule a case management conference to explain himself further.”
The Applicant has not complied with the Divisional Court's order to provide a copy of the policy and the designation. The two summaries produced may prove that the life insurance was revocable until the Respondent’s letter to the Divisional Court on March 9, 2026, and then B.T.V. made the life insurance irrevocable on March 11, 2026, but these summary forms are not the signed beneficial designation forms he had to have signed for the insurance company.
B.T.V. left the child listed with L.M.D. underneath, and he has not provided a copy of the policy, only a front page, and not the beneficial designation forms that he would have had to sign for the policy and beneficial designation to be effective.
Sections 171 (1), 190, and 191 of the Insurance Act R.S.O. 1990, Chapter I. 8, as amended, require that the insured or policy owner sign and date a beneficiary designation form for it to be valid. A beneficiary designation is a legally significant document that must be in writing and properly signed to be effective. Under the Insurance Act, a designation must be made in writing, which includes electronic signatures that comply with legal standards such as the Electronic Commerce Act. The electronic computer forms provided to the Divisional Court do not comply with Section 171 (1) of the Insurance Act, which states that a beneficiary designation must be an instrument signed by the insured. Section 190 of the Insurance Act authorizes the insured to designate a beneficiary to receive insurance proceeds by contract or by written declaration.
The final order requires that L.M.D. be listed as the irrevocable beneficiary in trust for the child, M. The order does not require listing the child. A minor child named as an irrevocable beneficiary cannot be changed until the child reaches the age of majority, as a minor cannot legally provide consent. Naming the child and not L.M.D. or the child, with L.M.D. below, is a breach of the clear terms of the Final Order dated September 11, 2024, paragraph 50, and the endorsement of the Divisional Court on the appeal dated October 27, 2025. Naming the child is not a security for child support and s. 7 obligations, if the funds cannot be accessed until the minor is 18 years of age, and wholly disregards that the purpose of the life insurance is for L.M.D. to receive support out of the life insurance in the event of the death of B.T.V.
Section 191 of the Insurance Act governs irrevocable beneficiary designations, which require the written consent (signature) of the irrevocable beneficiary to be altered or revoked. Given that B.T.V. has not produced the policy or the beneficial designations forms in compliance with the Final Order of Gregson J. or the endorsement of Justice Corbett of the Divisional Court, we seek a path forward to obtain this information.
L.M.D. also requested this information pursuant to paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Gregson J. order, which was requested in 2025 and 2026, to be complied with within 45 days. These requests were also not satisfied by B.T.V. Her requests are noted in the attachment to the email sent to the Divisional Court on April 13, 2026.
L.M.D. opposes B.T.V.'s attempt to reduce the $250,000.00 order of Gregson J., confirmed by the Divisional Court, to $250,000.00. The materials B.T.V. provided do not address what Justice Corbett required B.T.V. to produce in the email dated April 10, 2026. B.T.V.’s email did not satisfy Justice Corbett’s endorsement. The amount has been decided twice to be $250,000.00 and is at an end, so I do not understand the lengthy submissions by B.T.V. on this issue. His resistance to compliance is laid bare by his lengthy submissions on issues (such as the amount and evidence from Phelps that go only to age 18, and the amounts sought at the appeal and denied) that are not before the court.
For the reasons set out above, the signed beneficial designation form must state that L.M.D. is the irrevocable beneficiary of the life insurance in trust for the child, M, and to be signed by B.T.V. We seek the beneficial designations he had to have signed. We also seek the full policy, not just a photo of page 1.
We therefore seek a path forward, given that no options were provided to L.M.D. in the event of B.T.V.'s continued non-compliance.
One option would be an Order directing the life insurer, Industrial Alliance Life Insurance Policy (contract # 66000258405), Reference Number E3FCYCR, to produce the complete life insurance policy and all signed beneficiary designations to B.T.V. (to an address or email designated by him) and L.M.D. by providing the requested information to Monique Rae Bennett Law Office by email to mrb@monique.ca forthwith or as we are further directed on the matter by Justice Corbett. L.M.D. continues to seek her costs, as the orders were clear and the endorsements of Justice Corbett make it clear what B.T.V. is to produce, and he has not. Another option is to attend before the court to address the matter further.
17By email dated April 24, 2026, the Appellant wrote to the court as follows (attachments omitted):
The appellant wishes to advise the panel that this matter (the ongoing legal proceeding subsequent to when it was before the panel) was before the Kitchener Superior Court of Justice on April 24, 2026, the details of which are attached and described below as it relates to the ongoing with these communications.
The appellant is in receipt of the April 23, 2026 email correspondence from the counsel for the respondent. The appellant reiterates the concerns he raised in his email to the panel of April 13, 2026.
The appellant attaches the respondent’s Amended Confirmation (signed April 21, 2026) and Amended Amended Confirmation (signed April 23, 2026) for a ‘speak to’ date in this proceeding that was before the court on April 24, 2026 at the direction of the Honourable Justice Mountford. The appellant also attaches the Confirmation dated April 23, 2026, which was submitted on appellant’s behalf.
The appellant would like to bring to the panels’ attention the Orders requested in the respondent’s Amended Amended Confirmation which start on page 7, the respondent’s basis for which are set out in the first 6 pages of the document.
The appellant attaches a copy of Justice Mountford’s Endorsement from the ‘speak to’ on April 24, 2026. The appellant believes that the Endorsement speaks for itself.
The appellant has repeatedly raised concerns about the respondent using correspondence exchanged with this panel in an active ‘contempt’ proceeding that’s before in court as per the attached documents.
The respondent’s email correspondence of April 23 to this panel is especially concerning given that the respondent is seeking new forms of relief based on correspondence from her counsel which provides editorialized interpretations and conclusionary statements on various aspects of the appellant’s correspondence with this panel. The respondent appears to change what is being sought and reasons for same with every correspondence and in every forum.
The respondent is also creating a multiplicity of proceedings by seeking nearly identical relief from both this panel and from the Superior Court of Justice by way of the respondent’s contempt motion. The respondent is seeking relief in one forum by improperly and disingenuously misrepresenting the information obtained in a different forum and vice versa.
The appellant has provided information in good faith as to life insurance matter and disclosed that certain decisions were made after obtaining information from the appropriate actuarial and insurance experts as well as on advice from his estate legal counsel.
18This court makes the following observations:
(a) The issue before this court is the appeal from the judgment of Gregson J. On the day of the hearing, this court dismissed the appeal in all respects other than regarding the order for insurance to secure child support. In respect to that one issue, the court gave the direction quoted above.
(b) Once the Appellant advised the court that he had obtained the requisite insurance, all concerns arising from the trial judge’s factual error about an existing insurance policy for $250,000 disappeared: the trial judge’s factual error was thus not “overriding”.
(c) Enforcement of the judgment is the task of the trial court, not this court.
(d) The Appellant, who is self-represented before this court, is a lawyer. When the Respondent indicated to this court that adequate proof of the policy had not been provided, this court had continuing jurisdiction over the question of whether the Appellant’s advice to this court – that he had obtained $250,000 to secure his support obligations – was true.
(e) On the basis of the information provided, we are satisfied that the statement to the court was true. Whether the insurance policy terms and beneficiary designation comply with the trial court’s judgment is a matter of enforcement of that judgment and should be decided by a judge of the trial court, not this court.
19We would note that the history of the insurance policy issue before this court reflects one important theme of the trial judgment. Insurance to secure child support obligations is a common term in family law trial judgments and settlements. If insurance can be purchased, it should be a simple, straightforward matter to provide documentation demonstrating compliance. The Appellant’s obfuscatory approach to this issue before this court has been fodder for conflict and reinforces one of the concerns that led to the trial judge’s disposition of parenting and ancillary issues.
Disposition
20Although the trial judge erred in finding that there was an existing insurance policy of $250,000, we would not remit the issue of security back to the trial judge. By advising this court that he had obtained the requisite insurance, the appellant’s primary basis for this ground of appeal (he could not obtain the insurance) proved not to be correct, and the trial judge’s error would not warrant revisiting the quantum or form of security in the result.
21As a result, we would dismiss the appeal entirely. As ordered on the day of the hearing, the Appellant shall pay the Respondent costs of $15,000.00, inclusive, payable within thirty days, and collectible as in respect to support.
“D.L. Corbett J.”
“Faieta J.”
“Shore J.”
Date of Release: May 13, 2026
CITATION: B.T.V. v. L.M.D., 2026 ONSC 2749
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 322/24
(Hamilton) DATE: 20260513
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
D.L. Corbett, Faieta and Shore JJ.
BETWEEN:
B.T.V.
Appellant
– and –
L.M.D.
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
D.L. Corbett J.
Date of Release: May 13, 2026