Oren Weinberg

The applicant mother sought the return of her two children to Costa Rica under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, arguing they were habitually resident there and wrongfully retained in Canada by the respondent father.

The father contended the move to Costa Rica was temporary and the children's habitual residence remained Ontario.

The court applied the hybrid approach to determining habitual residence, considering parental intention and the children's acclimatization, and found that the children's focal point of life was Costa Rica as of August 11, 2023.

The application was granted, and the children were ordered to be returned to Costa Rica, as no exceptions to return applied.

The applicant mother sought interim child and spousal support, while the respondent father sought an order for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court imputed the father's income at $300,000 and the mother's income at $100,000 for the purposes of interim support.

The father was ordered to pay the Table amount of child support for five children, continue paying educational expenses, and contribute a lump sum of $3,000 per month for other section 7 expenses.

The father's motion for the sale of the matrimonial home was adjourned sine die as the property was already the subject of parallel power of sale proceedings in civil court.

Following a motion for temporary child and spousal support where success was divided, both parties sought costs.

The applicant husband had successfully established a prima facie entitlement to spousal support and obtained a temporary support order, despite the respondent wife's position that no support should be ordered.

The court found the husband was the successful party on the most important issues.

After considering the parties' behaviour, offers to settle, and the proportionality of the fees, the court ordered the respondent to pay costs of $33,000 to the applicant.

The applicant husband brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support following the parties' separation.

The respondent wife, a law firm partner, brought a cross-motion seeking a regime where she paid no support but covered all housing and child expenses.

The court imputed the wife's income at $1,076,652 based on her firm's projections, despite Covid-19 uncertainties.

Applying section 9 of the Child Support Guidelines, the court modified the strict set-off amount to account for the wife's significantly higher housing costs.

The court also found the husband established a prima facie needs-based entitlement to temporary spousal support to maintain the family's accustomed lifestyle.

The wife was ordered to pay $6,714.50 monthly in child support and $5,567 monthly in spousal support.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a family law arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator erred in law by finding that child support for his son was 'suspended' rather than 'terminated' during a gap year before university.

The applicant claimed that a termination of child support would have triggered a de novo review of spousal support under the parties' divorce order.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator made no error of law and correctly determined that the gap year did not terminate the child support obligation, thereby not triggering the spousal support review.

The applicant father sought to prevent the temporary relocation of the 22-month-old child to Italy with the respondent mother, and for temporary sole custody and an equal parenting schedule.

The respondent mother sought temporary sole custody and permission to relocate with the child to Italy for a new job opportunity.

The court denied the mother's request to relocate, finding it not in the child's best interests on an interim basis due to the potential disruption to the child's relationship with the father and the lack of compelling financial benefit.

The court ordered a progressive parenting schedule for the father, including overnights, and joint decision-making pending trial.

The applicant husband sought to stay the child and spousal support provisions of an arbitration award pending leave to appeal.

The respondent wife opposed the stay.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test, finding that while a serious issue for appeal existed, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favored a stay.

The court emphasized the arbitrator's findings of the applicant's financial non-disclosure and the "no automatic stay" policy for support orders.

The motion to stay was dismissed.

The applicant wife sought extensive financial disclosure and interim security for spousal support, while the respondent husband also sought disclosure and resisted some of the wife's requests, particularly concerning disputed separation dates and solicitor-client privilege.

The court made conditional orders for disclosure, requiring third-party real estate appraisals over MPAC assessments, and addressed the timing of tracing reports.

On privilege, the court found the wife had waived privilege over a former lawyer's file and an email chain by placing her state of mind and the communication in issue, but denied her request for the husband's legal consultation dates as irrelevant.

For interim security, the court ordered the husband to designate the wife as a revocable beneficiary of $500,000 in life insurance, with an option for the wife to increase it to $1 million by paying additional premiums.

The husband was deemed more successful, and the wife was ordered to pay him $12,500 in costs.

In a divorce proceeding, the applicant amended her application to claim an unequal division of net family property under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act, alleging the respondent recklessly depleted his assets by spending money on a mistress, escorts, and adult websites.

The respondent brought a motion to strike these amendments.

The court found that the amendments failed to disclose a reasonable claim because the applicant did not plead material facts showing a significant reduction in the respondent's net family property or that equalization would be unconscionable.

The motion to strike was granted without leave to amend, as it was clear the applicant could not specify the financial impact of the alleged spending.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order to increase spousal support and continue child support for the parties' 23-year-old daughter.

The respondent father had taken early retirement, receiving a large pension payout, and subsequently returned to work as a consultant.

The court found that the daughter was no longer a 'child of the marriage' as her online continuing education courses did not constitute a reasonable educational plan, terminating child support.

The court found the father's early retirement constituted a material change in circumstances.

Applying the rule against double-dipping, the court determined the unequalized portion of the father's pension to be considered for support.

The court declined to strictly apply the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines due to the mother's unreasonable post-separation financial decisions, and ordered the father to pay increased spousal support of $5,000 per month.

The applicant brought a motion to vary existing child and spousal support orders following the respondent’s earlier-than-expected retirement and pension payout.

The court found a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify reconsideration of spousal support but dismissed the claim for continued child support.

The judge identified unresolved issues regarding the proper actuarial treatment of the pension payout and the appropriate calculation of spousal support, including whether the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines should apply.

The court sought further submissions from counsel and potentially the actuaries to determine the correct approach before finalizing the variation.

A procedural endorsement in a family law motion to change where the originally scheduled hearing dates conflicted with the judge’s schedule.

Following a conference call with counsel and consultation with the trial office, the court vacated the previously scheduled dates and set new hearing dates.

The motion was directed to be heard in Brampton.

The judge noted that although not formally seized of the matter, it was anticipated that he would hear the motion.

The appellant father appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice dismissing his motion to vary a separation agreement governing child support obligations and quantifying arrears for special expenses.

The father argued that a material change in circumstances existed due to a decline in his income and an increase in the mother’s means, and that the trial judge erred by failing to adjust his support obligations accordingly.

Applying the principles from Willick v. Willick and the deferential appellate standard described in Housen v. Nikolaisen and Hickey v. Hickey, the court held that the alleged financial deterioration was foreseeable and largely the result of the father’s own choices regarding employment and business ventures.

Because the circumstances relied upon were apparent at the time the agreement was executed and did not constitute a qualifying material change, the refusal to vary the agreement was upheld.

The respondent mother’s cross‑appeal seeking trial costs was also dismissed, as the costs determination fell within the trial judge’s discretion.