John B. Laskin

The appellants, holders of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) notes, appealed a decision sanctioning a restructuring plan under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

The plan included comprehensive releases of third-party financial institutions from liability, including certain claims relating to fraud.

The appellants argued the CCAA does not permit third-party releases and that the releases were unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring.

The Court found the application judge did not err in concluding the plan was fair and reasonable, as the releases were necessary for the restructuring to succeed and benefited the creditors as a whole.

Imperial Oil Limited applied for judicial review of an arbitration board's decision that its random drug testing policy using buccal swabs violated the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration board's interpretation of the collective agreement in light of established arbitral jurisprudence (the 'Canadian model') was not patently unreasonable.

The Court held that the board did not alter the collective agreement, did not rely on unsupported findings of fact, and reasonably interpreted the agreement's requirement to treat employees with respect and dignity without needing to apply the Human Rights Code.

The appellant, SimEx Inc., acquired rights to certain films from IMAX Corporation under a Transfer Agreement.

A dispute arose when a third party, Robots of Mars, Inc., commenced arbitration in California claiming unpaid royalties under a prior Production Agreement with IMAX.

IMAX cross-claimed against SimEx, arguing SimEx assumed all liabilities under the Production Agreement.

SimEx applied for a declaration in Ontario that it was not bound by the Production Agreement's arbitration and royalty clauses.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the assignment conveyed both benefits and burdens.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the unambiguous terms of the Transfer Agreement only transferred ownership rights to the films, not the contractual obligations of the Production Agreement.

The Liquidator of Shoppers Trust Corporation applied for directions regarding the distribution of unanticipated surplus funds of approximately $6 million.

The motion judge ruled that a previous order fixing an earlier interest calculation date precluded creditors from claiming interest up to the winding-up date, thereby allowing the surplus to be paid to a subordinated noteholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in treating the motion for directions as a motion to vary and in failing to apply the fundamental insolvency principle of pari passu distribution.

The Court held that creditors are entitled to prove their claims for principal and interest to the date of the winding-up in priority to subordinated noteholders.

The appellant appealed an application judge's order appointing an arbitrator and defining the scope of the arbitration regarding a dispute over the use of casino revenues to fund litigation.

The appellant argued the application judge exceeded his authority by defining the arbitrator's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Arbitration Act, 1991 does not grant an arbitrator exclusive authority to decide jurisdictional questions in the first instance.

The court held that the application judge properly exercised his jurisdiction to assist the parties and prevent multiple proceedings by deciding between the competing draft orders.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the undischarged bankrupt acquired shares and diverted property in violation of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trial judge found that the bankrupt collaborated to conceal assets from the trustee and ordered an accounting by the corporate appellants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions on share ownership, jurisdiction, and credibility, and upheld the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of preliminary procedural rulings made by a university Faculty Disciplinary Committee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the discipline proceedings had not yet been completed and there was a right of appeal to the University Appeal Committee.

The court found no evidence of corruption or bias that would justify interfering at this stage.

The respondent university brought a motion to quash the applicant's application for judicial review of a Human Rights Commission decision.

The applicant had alleged that the university's use of the LSAT in its law school admissions policy was discriminatory.

The court found that the applicant's case was virtually identical to another recently dismissed application, relying on the same arguments and factum.

Concluding that the application had no reasonable chance of success and constituted an abuse of process, the court granted the motion and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant lawyer sued his former law firm and its managing partner for defamation based on comments published in a legal newspaper following his departure from the firm.

The defendants successfully moved to strike the statement of claim on the basis that the words were not reasonably capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the impugned words, when construed in context and according to their natural meaning, were not capable of meaning that the appellant was forced out, unable to work as a team, selfish, or unprofessional.

The appeal and a motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The respondent resigned as a partner from the appellant law firm and commenced an action asserting financial claims, a claim regarding the transfer of client files, and a dispute over a non-competition clause.

The appellant moved to stay the claims on the basis that they were subject to mandatory arbitration under the partnership agreement.

The motion judge declined to order a stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the arbitration clause, which covered any dispute 'in connection with' the agreement, was broad enough to encompass all of the respondent's claims.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered that the action be stayed.

The applicant, an African-Canadian male, sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his complaint against the University of Toronto Faculty of Law to a board of inquiry.

The applicant alleged that the law school's reliance on LSAT scores for admission constituted systemic discrimination against African-Canadians.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable, as it had considered extensive evidence showing the law school used a holistic admissions policy rather than strict numerical cut-offs.

The court also dismissed claims of procedural unfairness and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant, representing unsecured noteholders, sought leave to appeal orders approving a CCAA reorganization plan for the GT Group of Companies.

The appellant argued the plan was unfair because it excluded the parent company, required the parent to transfer assets to subsidiaries, and deprived noteholders of rights to sue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the asset transfer complaint illusory as the assets would be lost to secured creditors anyway, and the loss of rights to sue unsubstantiated.

The Court also noted the appellant's delay and failure to propose an alternative plan.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an endorsement on costs following an appeal.

The court determined that costs should be awarded against the respondent Sudbury Downs Holding, as it stood in an adversarial relationship to the appellant, unlike the Ontario Racing Commission.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity scale for the application for judicial review, the motion for leave to appeal, and the appeal itself, totaling $42,880 in fees plus disbursements and GST.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the respondent for the redemption of preference shares.

The appellants argued that an oral collateral agreement delayed the payment obligations until the completion of a separate share sale, and that the respondent's interference in that sale justified equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the alleged collateral agreement contradicted the clear terms of the written redemption agreement and guarantee, which included an entire agreement clause.

The court also found that equitable set-off was expressly precluded by the guarantee and that the motions judge did not exceed her jurisdiction in granting summary judgment.

The appellant association appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review.

The respondent race track owner had excluded certain licensed members of the appellant from racing at its track, citing private property rights.

The Ontario Racing Commission declined jurisdiction to hold a hearing on the matter, believing it could not interfere with private property rights.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Commission's broad statutory powers to govern and regulate horse racing in the public interest necessarily included the power to make decisions that incidentally affect private property rights.

The Commission was directed to hold a hearing.

A supplementary endorsement was issued to clarify the disposition of costs in the Divisional Court.

The court amended its previous reasons to provide the appellants with the option to have the costs assessed on a party and party basis within thirty days.

If the option is not exercised, the respondent is entitled to recover the $20,000 in costs fixed by the Divisional Court.

The respondent lost its major customer due to a bribery scheme orchestrated by a consultant hired by the appellant, a rival supplier.

The respondent sued the appellant, arguing it was vicariously liable for the consultant's tortious conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was not vicariously liable because the consultant was an independent contractor, not an employee, based on a holistic assessment of the relationship.

The Court also held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to reopen the trial to admit fresh evidence from the consultant.

Appeal from dismissal of an application for judicial review challenging a university board resolution authorizing closure and sale of two downtown colleges as part of a capital development and financial restructuring strategy.

The majority held that the impugned decision concerned management, property, revenues, expenditures, and facilities within the Board's authority under the Trent University Act, and did not amount to educational policy requiring Senate concurrence.

The majority also held the faculty-member appellants lacked standing to seek judicial review, rejecting both personal and public interest standing arguments.

The appeal on the merits was dismissed, but the costs order below was varied to permit assessment of the party-and-party costs awarded by the Divisional Court if the appellants elected that course.

A dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the closure decision engaged educational policy and required Senate approval.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an initial order made under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act that authorized the debtor to obtain debtor-in-possession financing with superpriority over existing security.

The initial order was made without notice but included a comeback clause allowing interested parties to seek variations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal as premature, holding that the moving party should first utilize the comeback clause to have their concerns heard by the supervising judge on a full record.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a resolution by the Trent University Board of Governors authorizing a capital development project that could involve closing or relocating two colleges.

The applicants argued the Board lacked jurisdiction without a concurring motion from the University Senate, which had passed a resolution opposing any change of location.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that under the Trent University Act, the Board has plenary and exclusive jurisdiction over the university's property, revenues, and expenditures, while the Senate's jurisdiction is limited to educational policy.