Ian Alexander Blue

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

Constitutional appeal concerning whether a provincial liquor-control provision limiting possession of non-provincially sourced alcohol violated s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court held that s. 121 bars laws that in essence and primary purpose restrict interprovincial trade like tariffs, but does not invalidate laws whose trade impacts are incidental to broader regulatory objectives.

It also held that lower courts cannot depart from binding precedent absent genuinely transformative legal developments or new social and legislative facts.

Applying that framework, the impugned provision's main purpose was provincial control of liquor distribution and use, not trade restriction.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was upheld.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the City of Burlington against Burlington Airpark Inc. The parties agreed to fix the costs of the appeal at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

However, they disagreed on the costs of the underlying application.

The respondent Airpark sought partial indemnity costs of $149,917.90, while the application judge had awarded the successful City substantial indemnity costs of $118,327.53.

The Court of Appeal determined that while Airpark was entitled to costs of the application despite adverse findings, an award of partial indemnity costs 25% higher than the substantial indemnity costs incurred by the successful applicant was unreasonable.

The Court fixed Airpark's costs at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

An aerodrome operator appealed an order requiring it to file a permit application under a new municipal by-law for fill and site alteration work performed before the by-law was enacted.

The court considered whether the by-law could be applied retroactively to work completed under a prior regulatory regime.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the by-law had no retroactive effect and could not be applied to work performed before its enactment.

Two competing applications concerned whether a municipal site alteration by-law regulating the dumping of fill applied to an aerodrome.

The municipality sought declarations that its by-law requiring a permit and environmental safeguards for fill operations applied to the airport’s grading activities, while the airport operator argued that such regulation intruded on exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

Applying the constitutional doctrines governing division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity, the court held that the by-law’s pith and substance concerned environmental protection and land use regulation, matters within provincial jurisdiction.

The by-law did not impair the protected core of federal aeronautics power because it regulated only the quality and management of fill, not the design or operation of runways or airport facilities.

The municipal application was granted and the airport operator’s application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a claim alleging negligence in the conduct of a federal tender process relating to hydroelectric facilities.

The plaintiff sought damages, declarations, and injunctive relief, alleging that a profit‑sharing requirement in the Request for Proposals was ultra vires the governing federal legislation.

The court held that Parks Canada was acting as a federal board, commission, or tribunal within the meaning of the Federal Courts Act and that the relief sought fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s. 18.

The court distinguished Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., finding that the action effectively challenged administrative decisions and sought traditional judicial review remedies.

The statement of claim was struck for lack of jurisdiction.