Ian Alexander Blue

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

The appellants, Dairy Farmers of Ontario and Dairy Farmers of Canada, appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to intervene as added parties in an application challenging the constitutionality of mandatory milk pasteurization laws.

The Master had dismissed the motion based on the Supreme Court's decision in Northwestern, finding that allowing the appellants to intervene would violate their impartiality as administrative bodies.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Master erred in applying Northwestern, as the underlying application was a constitutional challenge to a statute, not a judicial review of the appellants' own decisions.

The Court found the appellants met the criteria under Rule 13.01 and could make a useful contribution given their specialized expertise.

Constitutional appeal concerning whether a provincial liquor-control provision limiting possession of non-provincially sourced alcohol violated s. 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court held that s. 121 bars laws that in essence and primary purpose restrict interprovincial trade like tariffs, but does not invalidate laws whose trade impacts are incidental to broader regulatory objectives.

It also held that lower courts cannot depart from binding precedent absent genuinely transformative legal developments or new social and legislative facts.

Applying that framework, the impugned provision's main purpose was provincial control of liquor distribution and use, not trade restriction.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was upheld.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the City of Burlington against Burlington Airpark Inc. The parties agreed to fix the costs of the appeal at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

However, they disagreed on the costs of the underlying application.

The respondent Airpark sought partial indemnity costs of $149,917.90, while the application judge had awarded the successful City substantial indemnity costs of $118,327.53.

The Court of Appeal determined that while Airpark was entitled to costs of the application despite adverse findings, an award of partial indemnity costs 25% higher than the substantial indemnity costs incurred by the successful applicant was unreasonable.

The Court fixed Airpark's costs at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

An aerodrome operator appealed an order requiring it to file a permit application under a new municipal by-law for fill and site alteration work performed before the by-law was enacted.

The court considered whether the by-law could be applied retroactively to work completed under a prior regulatory regime.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the by-law had no retroactive effect and could not be applied to work performed before its enactment.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) Reconsideration Order.

The IPC had ordered the LCBO to cease collecting the personal information of wine club members when processing special orders, finding the practice contravened s. 38(2) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The LCBO argued the IPC's order forced it to violate liquor laws and that the IPC applied an unreasonably strict test for 'necessity' under FIPPA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the IPC's decision was reasonable, the LCBO was exempt from the relevant liquor law prohibitions, and the IPC correctly applied the established legal test for necessity.

The appellant, an aerodrome operator, appealed a decision declaring that a municipal fill by-law applied to its landfill activities.

The appellant argued the by-law was inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity because aerodromes fall under federal jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the by-law regulates the quality of fill for environmental protection and does not impermissibly trench on the core of the federal aeronautics power.

Two competing applications concerned whether a municipal site alteration by-law regulating the dumping of fill applied to an aerodrome.

The municipality sought declarations that its by-law requiring a permit and environmental safeguards for fill operations applied to the airport’s grading activities, while the airport operator argued that such regulation intruded on exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

Applying the constitutional doctrines governing division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity, the court held that the by-law’s pith and substance concerned environmental protection and land use regulation, matters within provincial jurisdiction.

The by-law did not impair the protected core of federal aeronautics power because it regulated only the quality and management of fill, not the design or operation of runways or airport facilities.

The municipal application was granted and the airport operator’s application was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a claim alleging negligence in the conduct of a federal tender process relating to hydroelectric facilities.

The plaintiff sought damages, declarations, and injunctive relief, alleging that a profit‑sharing requirement in the Request for Proposals was ultra vires the governing federal legislation.

The court held that Parks Canada was acting as a federal board, commission, or tribunal within the meaning of the Federal Courts Act and that the relief sought fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court under s. 18.

The court distinguished Canada (Attorney General) v. TeleZone Inc., finding that the action effectively challenged administrative decisions and sought traditional judicial review remedies.

The statement of claim was struck for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court issued an addendum to its initial endorsement to correct factual errors in paragraph 4 regarding bypass compensation and stranded transmission connection facilities.

The appellants appealed a procedural decision of the Ontario Energy Board regarding their application to declare bypass compensation provisions of the Transmission System Code ultra vires.

The Board had determined the application was not a standalone application but was linked to an earlier Leave to Construct decision, and gave the appellants three procedural options to proceed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was interlocutory and discretionary, and raised no true question of law or jurisdiction.

The Crown moved to strike portions of two affidavits filed by the Ontario Propane Association in support of its judicial review application challenging O. Reg. 440/08.

The Crown argued the impugned sections contained improper legal argument and irrelevant exhibits.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, applying the general principle that issues of admissibility and relevance of affidavit evidence should be determined by the panel hearing the judicial review application, rather than on an interlocutory basis.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision dismissing its claims for compensation for injurious affection, business loss, and disturbance damages following the expropriation of lands for a highway overpass.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for findings of fact by the OMB is palpable and overriding error, and correctness for questions of law.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the OMB's conclusion that the appellant's loss of profits was not attributable to the expropriation, but rather to other factors including the appellant's own strategic marketing decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant and respondent entered into a consensual arbitration over a commercial dispute arising from a share purchase agreement containing an earn-out provision.

The arbitrator found in the respondent's favour.

The appellant brought a judicial review application to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in principle by failing to determine the standard of review before deciding the application.

However, applying either a reasonableness or patent unreasonableness standard, the Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the arbitrator's award, concluding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a deportation order based on foreign criminal convictions.

The appellant argued that the photocopy of the foreign court judgment did not comply with s. 23(1) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 23(1) was satisfied by the record produced and that the adjudicator had broad discretion to determine the credibility and trustworthiness of the evidence.