Jack A. Walker

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board dated October 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal, subject to the quantum of costs being fixed at the agreed amount of $2,500 all inclusive.

The Appellant appealed the property assessments for its light vehicle assembly plant for the 2009 to 2023 taxation years.

In previous interim decisions, the Board confirmed the current values for 2009-2022.

MPAC sought to amend the 2017 current value to reflect a supplementary assessment for a body shop expansion completed mid-year.

The Board found that under the agreed Production Capacity Cost Approach Method, the expansion did not change the facility's normalized annual production capacity, and therefore did not increase the Replacement Cost New.

The Board concluded no amendment to the 2017 current value was required and directed the parties to finalize apportionments.

The Appellant, General Motors of Canada Company, appealed the property assessments for its light vehicle assembly plant for the 2009 to 2023 taxation years.

The parties agreed that an equitable adjustment was required under s. 44(3)(b) of the Assessment Act but disagreed on the quantum.

The Board found that the best evidence to determine the equitable reduction was the Appellant's approach, which focused on the lower average construction cost rates used by MPAC to calculate the replacement cost new for similar properties.

The Board ordered reductions to the current values for the taxation years under appeal based on the Appellant's proposed percentage reductions, but rejected the Appellant's request for an additional adjustment.

The appellant property owner sought to withdraw its assessment appeals for the 2017-2021 taxation years.

The municipality opposed the withdrawal, having previously served a notice of higher assessment.

The Assessment Review Board found that under its Rules of Practice and Procedure, an appellant cannot withdraw an appeal as of right once a notice of higher assessment has been served.

The Board also declined to grant discretionary permission to withdraw, as the appellant provided no specific grounds to support the request.

The motion to withdraw was dismissed.

The City of Brampton brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's property assessment appeals because the appellant failed to provide a Statement of Issues by the deadline prescribed in the Schedule of Events.

The appeals were designated as 'Legacy Appeals', which are subject to accelerated timelines and an expedited dismissal process for non-compliance.

The Assessment Review Board found that the appellant failed to comply with the deadline and that its explanation of inadvertence and misunderstanding was unsatisfactory.

Weighing the prejudice to both parties and the need to strictly enforce the Rules for Legacy Appeals, the Board granted the motion and dismissed the appeals.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the valuation of a residential property.

The Board had found that MPAC failed to meet its burden of proving the property's current value and, as a result, fixed the assessment at the last uncontested value rather than determining the current value.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's approach was contrary to the Assessment Act, which strictly requires the Board to determine the current value of the property.

The matter was remitted back to the Board.

The applicants appealed the City of Brampton's dismissal of their application for a vacant unit rebate for the 2014 taxation year.

The City dismissed the application because it was received after the statutory deadline of February 28, 2015.

The applicants argued the application was delivered on time but misplaced by the City.

The Assessment Review Board found the applicants' timeline of events implausible and concluded the application was submitted late.

The Board dismissed the appeal, noting it has no statutory jurisdiction under the Municipal Act, 2001 to extend the deadline.

The parties stated a question of law to the Assessment Review Board regarding whether the market value of the rights associated with an Environmental Compliance Approval (ECA) should be reflected in the current value of a landfill site for property assessment purposes.

The Board held that the principle established by the Court of Appeal in Restfulcare applies to landfills, meaning that where lands have an inherent capacity for a certain use and a government approval authorizes that use, the value of the approval is a component part of the value of the land.

Consequently, the Board concluded that the market value of the rights associated with the ECA must be reflected in the current value of the landfill site.

The moving parties brought a motion requesting the Assessment Review Board state a case to the Divisional Court under section 43(1) of the Assessment Act.

The proposed question asked whether the market value of rights associated with an Environmental Compliance Approval should be reflected in the current value of a landfill site.

The Board dismissed the motion, finding that the question was either a mixed question of fact and law or a question of law that would attract deference on a reasonableness standard.

The Board concluded that specialized tribunals should not bypass their statutory role by referring questions to the court that the tribunal is expected to answer itself, even when all parties consent.

The appellants appealed the property assessments of four car dealerships in Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board had ruled that for the purposes of equitable assessment under s. 44(3)(b) of the Assessment Act, similar lands in the 'vicinity' could not exceed the boundaries of the municipality.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the legislature did not intend to limit 'vicinity' to municipal boundaries in the Assessment Act, as evidenced by explicit municipal boundary limitations placed on the term in other statutes like the Municipal Act, 2001 and the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The matter was remitted to the Board for redetermination.

A stated case was brought before the Divisional Court regarding whether a municipality's Property Negotiator/Appraiser had the authority to file assessment complaints without prior specific authorization from the Municipal Council.

The Court held that while the act of filing the complaint was purely administrative and authorized by by-law, the decision to pursue the appeal required authorization or ratification by Council within a reasonable time.

Because the Council's resolution attempted to delegate the decision-making power rather than ratify the administrative action, the Court found the process deficient and concluded there were no valid complaints before the Assessment Review Board.