Southey

The plaintiffs, Ontario residents, purchased a package holiday that included a cruise and a shore excursion in Grenada.

During the excursion, the plaintiff suffered carbon monoxide poisoning in a vehicle operated by the Grenadian defendants.

The plaintiffs sued the tour operators and the Grenadian defendants in Ontario.

The Grenadian defendants moved to stay the proceedings, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter and was not the convenient forum.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, finding a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the subject matter of the action, and that Ontario was the most convenient forum.

The plaintiff corporation commenced an action while dissolved.

The defendants moved for security for costs, and the Master dismissed the action as a nullity because the plaintiff was dissolved when the action was commenced, despite the plaintiff obtaining Articles of Revival before the Master rendered his decision.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that under s. 241(5) of the Business Corporations Act, the revival deemed the corporation to have the right to bring the action as though it had not been dissolved.

The appeal was allowed and the dismissal set aside, though costs were awarded against the successful appellant due to its solicitors' delay in obtaining the revival.

The applicant, a First Nations Constable, sought judicial review of the termination of his appointment by the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police.

The Commissioner had terminated the appointment on the basis that the applicant's employment as a Band Constable had been terminated by the Band Council, without providing details of the alleged misconduct or consulting further.

The Divisional Court found that the Commissioner failed to comply with the statutory duties under subsections 54(4) and (7) of the Police Services Act, which require consultation and the provision of reasonable information regarding the reasons for termination.

The court quashed the termination and remitted the matter to the Commissioner to be dealt with according to procedural fairness.

The applicant's request for a declaration of entitlement to wages was deferred to a separate civil action.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring a construction lien expired.

The appellant argued that the owner, having been noted in default under s. 54(4) of the Construction Lien Act, was not entitled to participate in the action or move for a declaration under s. 46.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the general provision in s. 54(4) does not remove an owner's power to move for a declaration of an expired lien under s. 46, as the latter section allows 'any person' to bring such a motion.

The applicants challenged a City of Toronto by-law requiring individual taxi-cab owners to attend mechanical examinations of their vehicles in person, while allowing corporate and partnership owners to send designated custodians.

The applicants argued the by-law lacked enabling authority, was enacted in bad faith, was vague, violated procedural fairness, and infringed section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court rejected the administrative law arguments but found the personal attendance requirement had a discriminatory effect on elderly and disabled owners who could not reasonably attend in person.

The court held the provision was not saved by section 1 of the Charter, as the owner's presence was not necessary for an effective examination, and struck down the impugned section of the by-law.

The applicant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, attempted to file nomination papers for the office of Mayor of Toronto.

The City Clerk rejected the nomination before nomination day on the basis that provincial legislation rendered members of the House of Commons ineligible to hold municipal office.

The applicant sought mandamus and an order quashing the relevant statutory provisions, arguing they violated his democratic rights under section 3 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the clerk had the discretion to reject the nomination early and that the restriction on holding municipal office did not infringe the applicant's Charter right to be qualified for membership in the House of Commons.

The plaintiffs, four Ford dealerships, appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class proceeding against Ford Motor Company of Canada.

The motions judge had found that all certification criteria were met except the preferable procedure requirement, concluding that an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) would be more efficient.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a Rule 14.05(3)(d) application would not resolve the common issues for the entire class, as Ford refused to be bound by the result for non-parties.

The Court concluded that only a class proceeding would bind the class and avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The applicants, a lawyer and his law firm, sought judicial review to prohibit the Ontario Securities Commission from continuing proceedings against the lawyer under s. 127(1) of the Securities Act.

The Commission alleged the lawyer made misleading statements in a letter during a prospectus review.

The applicants and the Law Society of Upper Canada argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction to discipline lawyers acting in a professional capacity, asserting such power belonged exclusively to the Law Society and that the Commission's exercise of it violated the independence of the bar.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that s. 127(1) applies to lawyers and that the Commission's public interest jurisdiction to control its processes does not usurp the Law Society's role or infringe the rule of law.

The appellant bank brought actions to enforce mortgages and declare a transfer of property void as a fraudulent conveyance.

The respondent counterclaimed for abuse of process and intentional infliction of mental suffering, alleging the bank was piling on claims to pressure her into a settlement.

The bank moved to strike the counterclaim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, striking out the claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of mental suffering as they disclosed no reasonable cause of action, despite the bank's delay in bringing the motion.

The plaintiff bank brought actions for judgment on mortgages and to declare a property transfer a fraudulent conveyance.

The defendant counterclaimed for abuse of process, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the bank was piling on claims to pressure her into settling the first mortgage claim despite her serious illness.

The bank's motion to strike the counterclaim was initially dismissed.

On appeal, the Divisional Court struck the claims for abuse of process and intentional infliction of mental suffering, finding the defendant failed to plead a collateral purpose or an act outside the action.

The court held that the bank's delay in bringing the motion did not prevent striking a pleading that was a nullity in law.

The claim for breach of fiduciary duty was allowed to stand.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief pending the determination of its application for a declaration that the Minister of Health acted unlawfully in refusing to recommend its generic drug for inclusion in the Drug Benefit Formulary.

The Minister had reconsidered its recommendation after a Federal Court decision quashed the applicant's Notice of Compliance, despite a subsequent stay of that decision.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Minister's refusal was motivated by a desire to protect the public interest, and therefore the applicant failed to meet the balance of convenience requirement for interim relief.

The defendants in a libel action appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to compel production of documents and examination for discovery of a non-party investigator.

The investigator had been hired by the plaintiff employer to interview employees regarding the same allegations that formed the basis of the libel action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the interview notes were relevant to the defendants' plea of justification and were not protected by privilege under the Wigmore criteria.

The court concluded it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without discovery of the non-party.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Municipal Board order regarding its jurisdiction to extend the boundaries of an adopted official plan amendment and to change the proposed uses.

The Divisional Court held that the Board has jurisdiction to do both as a matter of general principle, though it could exceed its jurisdiction by acting unreasonably.

However, the court quashed the appeal as premature because the Board had not yet made a decision on the specific modifications.

The plaintiffs, the parents and brother of a two-year-old boy who was killed in a motor vehicle accident, brought an action for damages for nervous shock after witnessing his death.

The defendants appealed a ruling that the claim for nervous shock was not barred by s. 266(1) of the Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that 'bodily injury' includes psychological injury and that the exception to immunity 'where the injured person has died' applies only to the person who actually died, not to third parties claiming independent nervous shock injuries.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board regarding a human rights complaint.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Court of Appeal's decision in C.N.A. v. Orillia Soldiers Memorial Hospital conclusively determined the liability issues in favour of the appellant.

The Board's decision was set aside, the complaint was dismissed, and costs of $3,000 were awarded to the appellant.