Peter L. Biro

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent was constructively dismissed when his employment contract was unilaterally changed from an indefinite hiring to a fixed-term contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on constructive dismissal, the requirement to assign a keyman insurance policy, the calculation of damages based on the previous contract, and the award of a Wallace extension.

The court also declined to order reimbursement for lieu time payments or an accounting for pension payments.

This was a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal in a municipal election Charter challenge.

The successful respondent did not seek costs either in the Court of Appeal or on the motion for leave to appeal.

Applying the ordinary rule that costs follow the event, the court nevertheless made no order as to costs because the successful respondent did not ask for them.

The costs order in the Divisional Court was left undisturbed.

The appellant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, challenged provincial legislation that rendered him ineligible to be nominated for or hold municipal office while remaining in Parliament.

He argued that the prohibition burdened his democratic rights under s. 3 of the Charter by preventing him from running for mayor without first resigning his federal seat.

The court held that s. 3 protects only voting and candidacy rights in federal and provincial legislatures, not municipal elections.

Because the impugned provisions regulated only eligibility for municipal office and did not impair the appellant's right to remain qualified for membership in the House of Commons, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, attempted to file nomination papers for the office of Mayor of Toronto.

The City Clerk rejected the nomination before nomination day on the basis that provincial legislation rendered members of the House of Commons ineligible to hold municipal office.

The applicant sought mandamus and an order quashing the relevant statutory provisions, arguing they violated his democratic rights under section 3 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the clerk had the discretion to reject the nomination early and that the restriction on holding municipal office did not infringe the applicant's Charter right to be qualified for membership in the House of Commons.