By the Court

The appellant, a single-purpose company incorporated for an acquisition, appealed a decision finding that solicitor-client privilege was lost due to a prima facie case of fraud.

The motion judge found that the appellant used corporate funds to benefit itself to the detriment of creditors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the finding of fraud embraced the entirety of the transaction, the usual two-stage process and document-by-document review were unnecessary.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were exemplary and that there was no error in the appreciation of the facts or the law.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant appealed an order granting an injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision and noting that the impact of the decision is a matter for the arbitrator, not the court.

The appellants appealed an order made by Cumming J. The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the order was interlocutory and that any appeal from it must be directed to the Divisional Court with leave.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision by Swinton J. dismissing their claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's principles or application, as the appellants produced no evidence of publication by the respondents beyond a communication that was absolutely privileged.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, confining the appeal to the issue of good faith disclosure regarding ongoing negotiations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation or basis for reliance on the information.

Costs were fixed at $30,000, with the court reducing the requested amount based on policy and accessibility concerns rather than questioning counsel's hours or quality.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's finding that they failed to meet the standard of care regarding the design of a carbonated beverage in a glass container.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were well supported by evidence that the product was dangerous and the manufacturer failed to take steps to reduce the risk of explosion.

A cross-appeal seeking to vary the apportionment of negligence was also dismissed, as it did not meet the threshold of a very strong and exceptional case.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a serious assault.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting it was appropriate given the serious nature of the assault and the injuries inflicted on the complainant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's findings on liability and the quantum of damages.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's findings on liability to be reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the quantum of damages.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claim for real estate commission on the sale of an apartment building.

The trial judge found that the respondents did not deliberately delay the transaction to avoid paying commission and that the final offer was a separate and discrete transaction.

The Court of Appeal held that these findings of fact were well supported by the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that its action under s. 132 of the Insurance Act was barred by the limitation period in paragraph 4 of the insurance contract.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court, noting there was no contractual language or conduct by the parties that would warrant departing from this result on public policy grounds.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,500.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement with an abatement equivalent to damages caused by the respondents' alleged breach of a promise of confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's conclusion that the promise was collateral to the agreement and that specific performance with an abatement is not available in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

Dr. Krop, a practitioner of environmental medicine, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario finding him guilty of professional misconduct for failing to maintain the standard of practice.

The appellant argued that the investigation was improper, the Committee lacked jurisdiction, the prosecution was for an improper purpose, the wrong standard of practice test was applied, there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, and the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the Committee correctly applied the test for standard of practice and that the appellant's diagnostic and treatment techniques lacked scientific validity and fell below the standard of practice.

The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order requiring the disclosure of the top ten medical procedures billed to OHIP by the highest-billing general practitioner in Toronto.

The Ministry argued the records constituted personal information and were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's finding that the physician was not identifiable from the requested records.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of Swinton J. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the appeal raised a serious issue, it had already been fully settled by the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General).

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for unlawfully in a dwelling house, fraud, and attempted fraud.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions for unlawfully in a dwelling house and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to consider the counts separately, address legal issues regarding the appellant's status upon entry, and assess the reliability of the complainants' evidence.

The fraud convictions were upheld, but the sentences were varied because the original sentences exceeded the two-year maximum.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months for the fraud and attempted fraud counts, noting the appellant's terrible record of preying on elderly citizens.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that it was involuntary due to pressure from his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to strike the plea, as the appellant's affidavit lacked credibility and did not demonstrate undue pressure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code regarding credit for pretrial custody.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were full and comprehensive and that the conclusions were fully supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a settlement she made with the defendants.

The motion judge found that the appellant fully understood the legal effect of her actions and that the $20,000 settlement was not unconscionable given a previous $72,000 payment.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding municipal liability for a parking lot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the municipality's act of clearing snow from a sidewalk was not a corporate act sufficient to demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention to assume the entire parking lot for public use.