By the Court

The appellant appealed a decision finding that a debt survived bankruptcy under section 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and that a specific mortgage was invalid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower court's findings on both the survival of the debt and the invalidity of the mortgage, and awarded costs of $2,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action for lost profits and expenses against the respondent, who supplied a wood finishing product.

The trial judge had dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to prove the product was defective, caused the delamination, or that damages were proven.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellants appealed a fact-driven trial decision.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent cross-appealed the disposition of costs, seeking full solicitor and client costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that special circumstances, including the small proportion of the mortgage collection claim relative to the overall litigation, justified the refusal to award full costs.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision finding a breach of section 11(b) of the Charter.

The breach was based on the finding that the Crown unreasonably pursued an application to remove defence counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that this finding was open to the summary conviction appeal judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motions judge's decision dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal found that the issues raised in the statement of claim had already been fully canvassed and decided against the appellants in prior arbitration proceedings.

Applying the doctrine of issue estoppel, the court held that the appellants could not pursue litigation simply because they were unsatisfied with the arbitration results.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligence and occupiers' liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that although the trial judge misstated some evidence, the findings on negligence, contributory negligence, and the status of the individual defendants as occupiers under the Occupiers' Liability Act were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The damages award was also upheld.

The appellants appealed a trial judge's refusal to accede to a joint request to remove a party defendant from the action.

Based on an Agreed Statement of Facts filed as fresh evidence and the consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

The court set aside the finding of negligence against the appellant and amended the judgment to remove her as a party defendant.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to set aside a judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to bring its motion forthwith after the judgment came to its attention, noting the obligation was triggered almost a year before the motion was made.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Ministry of Correctional Services applied for judicial review to prevent a Board of Inquiry from considering whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the implementation of its previous human rights order.

The Board had found the workplace to be poisoned and retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the Board should first be permitted to determine the extent of its retained jurisdiction and the relevance of the new allegations to the implementation of its remedy.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the interpretation of a lease, which arose as a special case under Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court judge's interpretation of the parties' intentions based solely on the lease provisions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant (defendant at trial) appealed the trial judge's finding of liability and assessment of damages.

The trial judge found that the appellant breached his obligation to the respondent by secretly informing clients that their partnership was ending, soliciting them, and misappropriating files.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of a civil claim alleging malicious prosecution and other causes of action.

The court held that the motions judge could properly conclude there was no genuine issue for trial on reasonable and probable grounds, malice, or the remaining claims.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant sought to overturn an order of Juriantz J. The Court of Appeal found no grounds to interfere with the order below and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The endorsement contains no further factual or legal analysis.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her civil action against the respondent police board for assault, unlawful arrest, and imprisonment.

The appellant had accompanied her son to the police station, where he was arrested.

After becoming upset and refusing to leave the lobby when ordered by police, she was arrested for trespassing.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the arrest was lawful under the Trespass to Property Act, that reasonable force was used to effect the arrest, and that her Charter rights against arbitrary detention were not violated.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a determination concerning whether a bank account constituted a debt payable to an individual partner or to the partnership for the purposes of Rule 60.08(1.1).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons below and held that the account was a debt payable to the partnership, not to the individual partner among others as a partner.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed from a trial judgment in a civil dispute involving a bank.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's very full reasons and dismissed the appeal.

The court ordered that the $15,000 paid into court as security for costs of the appeal be paid out with accumulated interest to the respondent's solicitor and applied to costs of the appeal and on the trial.

The appellant creditor appealed a finding that the company was insolvent under s. 20(1)(d) of the Business Corporations Legislation Act.

The Court of Appeal was not persuaded that the master erred in making that finding.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award regarding the scheduling of lunch breaks for teachers and pupils.

The arbitrator had found that the collective agreement, which incorporated Regulation 298 under the Education Act, required teachers and students to have a 40-minute lunch break at the same time.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for the arbitrator's interpretation of outside legislation was correctness.

The Court found the arbitrator erred in reading 'at the same time' into the regulation, allowed the application, set aside the awards, and dismissed the grievance.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that the 15-year starting point used by the trial judge may have been at the upper end of the range, but it was not outside the range and no error in principle was established.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The sentence was nonetheless varied to reduce a lifetime firearms prohibition to a 10-year prohibition because no notice had been given.

The Crown appealed from a stay of proceedings granted on the basis of trial delay.

The court accepted that a delay of approximately 4 years and 5 months was prima facie unreasonable, and that for slightly over three years there could not have been a trial regardless of the accused's readiness.

The court held that the Crown should have been ready for trial earlier, and that Crown-attributable delay combined with actual prejudice made a stay appropriate for both the respondent and the corporate accused.

The appeal was dismissed.