Andrew Felker

The applicant commenced an application challenging her late father's will and seeking dependent support.

On the eve of trial, the applicant reached a settlement with the estate trustee and brought a motion to discontinue the proceeding.

The non-settling respondent opposed the discontinuance and sought to be substituted as the plaintiff.

The court granted the motion to discontinue, finding the applicant would be prejudiced if forced to proceed to trial, while the non-settling respondent could still commence his own proceeding.

The motion for substitution was dismissed due to the respondent's unexplained delay in advancing his own claim.

This appeal concerns the applicable limitation period for an equitable trust claim against a deceased's estate.

The respondent, a common-law spouse, brought a claim for constructive trust and unjust enrichment against the estate more than four years after the deceased's death.

The motion judge applied a ten-year limitation period under the Real Property Limitations Act (RPLA).

The Court of Appeal, applying a holistic statutory interpretation approach, determined that the two-year limitation period under section 38(3) of the Trustee Act applies to equitable trust claims against estates, as "wrong" in section 38(2) encompasses unjust enrichment.

The Court found that the longer RPLA period does not apply to general estate claims, emphasizing the legislative policy for expeditious estate administration.

Consequently, the respondent's equitable trust claim was statute-barred and dismissed.

The applicant sought an order validating an undated, unwitnessed fill-in-the-blanks document as the deceased's last will and testament under section 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The respondent brother opposed, arguing the document was merely a draft and that his subsequent reconciliation with the deceased vitiated her intention to exclude him.

The court found the document represented the deceased's fixed and final testamentary intentions at the time it was made, and that a subsequent change in circumstances does not revoke a will.

The application was granted and the document was validated.

The Applicant, represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee, objected to the Respondent Estate Trustee being represented by a non-lawyer.

The non-lawyer sought leave to represent the Estate Trustee and the Estate Trustee personally.

The court held that under Rule 15.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party acting in a representative capacity must be represented by a lawyer, and there is no discretion to grant leave for a non-lawyer to appear.

The court ordered the non-lawyer not to represent the respondents and required the Estate Trustee to retain counsel.

The applicant brought an application for the delivery of a dog pursuant to the deceased's will.

The will provided a legacy of $100,000 for the care of the dog to the individual who assumed its care and residence.

The estate trustee had placed the dog with her son after the applicant allegedly declined to take it.

The court reviewed text messages between the parties and concluded that the applicant did not intend to be the guardian of the dog in accordance with the will.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant estate trustee applied to pass his accounts.

The respondent beneficiaries objected, alleging the trustee failed to pay debts, failed to diversify the stock portfolio, purchased shares on margin, improperly paid himself $70,000 as an alleged inter vivos gift, and incurred tax penalties.

The court found the trustee breached his fiduciary duties by failing to diversify and by making high-risk margin investments.

The court also found the $70,000 payment was an unperfected gift.

The trustee was removed and ordered to pay $357,140 to the estate to cover investment losses, tax penalties, excess compensation, and the invalid gift.

The appellant, a bartender on the respondent's boat, appealed the dismissal of her action for damages after she fell while descending a ladder and broke her leg.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was the author of her own misfortune and preferring the respondent's evidence regarding the appellant's footwear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings or his conclusion that the respondent was not negligent under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact were open to him on the evidence and were fatal to the issues raised.

The court also held that the issue of interest was a question of contract and was properly pleaded.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for wrongfully dismissing the respondent employee.

The employer argued that the trial judge interfered in the conduct of the trial to such an extent that the image of judicial impartiality was destroyed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge unduly intervened by redirecting lines of questioning, extensively cross-examining the employer's witnesses, and requiring the production of a policy manual that was not part of the pleadings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded punitive damages and solicitor-and-client costs against him arising from a partnership dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding errors.

The Court noted that the trial judge properly distinguished between the appellant's conduct as a partner, which justified punitive damages, and his fraud and deception on the court, which justified solicitor-and-client costs.

The defendants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligence and occupiers' liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that although the trial judge misstated some evidence, the findings on negligence, contributory negligence, and the status of the individual defendants as occupiers under the Occupiers' Liability Act were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The damages award was also upheld.