Michael W. Gunsolus

The applicant sought declarations regarding the interpretation of her late husband's holographic will.

The primary issue was whether a clause stating the applicant 'shall assume ownership' of the family home granted her full ownership or merely a life interest, given a subsequent clause leaving the equity to the respondents upon the applicant's death.

The court applied the armchair rule and considered admissible extrinsic evidence, concluding that the ordinary meaning of 'assume ownership' granted full ownership.

The subsequent clause was interpreted as a gift over that would only apply if the applicant had predeceased the testator.

The court considered whether the applicant, Gerry Tyndall, had a life interest in the property where he resided with the deceased, Gail Hill, pursuant to her will.

The court found that Mr. Tyndall had a life interest in the property, including the right of exclusive possession, subject to his responsibility for day-to-day expenses, while the estate was responsible for taxes, insurance, and capital improvements.

The decision also addressed the right to collect rent and the removal of other occupants.

The applicant sought leave to issue a Writ of Seizure and Sale against the respondent, based on an assigned judgment.

The respondent had previously received a full and final release from the prior assignee after funds were provided by the applicant and her common-law partner.

The court determined that these funds constituted consideration for a 25% ownership interest in the respondent's property, rather than a loan.

Consequently, the original judgment was deemed satisfied, and the applicant's request for a new writ was dismissed to prevent double recovery.

The accused, Stephen Douglas Shier, pleaded guilty to counselling the commission of murder not committed after attempting to hire a police officer, posing as a hit man, to kill his ex-partner.

The offence was motivated by financial distress and anger over monthly support payments following an acrimonious domestic relationship.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the calculated nature of the crime, the domestic context, and the opportunity for sober second thought, alongside mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, lack of criminal record, strong community support, and low risk of future violence.

The court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of five years, five months, and eighteen days, along with ancillary orders.

The Appellants (Hills) appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment obtained by the Respondent (Hiley) on a defendant's claim.

The Appellants had failed to file a defence to the defendant's claim, mistakenly believing their original plaintiff's claim sufficiently addressed the issues.

The court found the motion judge erred by not considering the net effect of the refusal on the interests of justice, as it would foreclose the Appellants' ability to advance their original claim.

The appeal was allowed, the default judgment was set aside, and the Appellants were permitted to file a defence.

No costs were awarded on the appeal due to the Appellants' initial error.

The appellant, a physician, appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for wrongful termination of employment to the respondent, a nurse who had worked in his medical office for 22 years.

The trial judge found that the appellant terminated the respondent's employment at a meeting on June 20, 2012, based on credibility findings that favored the respondent's account of events.

The appellant argued the trial judge's credibility findings were unreasonable and failed to consider the context of the respondent's resistance to converting office records to electronic format.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no overriding and palpable error in the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The court also found no reversible error in the trial judge's determination of reasonable notice period under the Bardal factors.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $15,000, all inclusive, with a correction to the pre-judgment interest rate from 3 percent to 1.3 percent to be recalculated by the parties.